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This dissertation examines journalists’ early encounters with computers as tools 
for news reporting, focusing on election-night forecasting in 1952.  Although election 
night 1952 is frequently mentioned in histories of computing and journalism as a quirky 
but seminal episode, it has received little scholarly attention. This dissertation asks how 
and why election night and the nascent field of television news became points of entry for 
computers in news reporting. 
The dissertation argues that although computers were employed as pathbreaking 
“electronic brains” on election night 1952, they were used in ways consistent with a long 
tradition of election-night reporting.  As central events in American culture, election 
nights had long served to showcase both news reporting and new technology, whether 
with 19th-century devices for displaying returns to waiting crowds or with 20th-century 
experiments in delivering news by radio. 
 
 
In 1952, key players – television news broadcasters, computer manufacturers, and 
critics – showed varied reactions to employing computers for election coverage.  But this 
computer use in 1952 did not represent wholesale change.  While live use of the new 
technology was a risk taken by broadcasters and computer makers in a quest for attention, 
the underlying methodology of forecasting from early returns did not represent a sharp 
break with pre-computer approaches.  And while computers were touted in advance as 
key features of election-night broadcasts, the “electronic brains” did not replace “human 
brains” as primary sources of analysis on election night in 1952. 
This case study chronicles the circumstances under which a new technology was 
employed by a relatively new form of the news media.  On election night 1952, the 
computer was deployed not so much to revolutionize news reporting as to capture public 
attention.  It functioned in line with existing values and practices of election-night 
journalism.  In this important instance, therefore, the new technology’s technical features 
were less a driving force for adoption than its usefulness as a wonder and as a symbol to 
enhance the prestige of its adopters.  This suggests that a new technology’s capacity to 
provide both technical and symbolic social utility can be key to its chances for adoption 
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“… I might start off of course by answering the question which everybody always 
asks anyway, and which gets asked more often by people who are not in the computer 
business – but it gets asked often and everywhere.  That is something to the effect: did 
you ever think it was going to turn out like this? I’ll admit my mother never told me, but 
my colleague Mr. Eckert and I, independently I think, have developed about the same 
answer:  that, yes, we felt it was going to turn out to be a big thing.  It was just to our 
disappointment that it took so long.  But then, it always takes a long time to change 
people’s minds, and it takes even longer for us to change an institution. 
 “So that’s what the invention is all about, you might say:  to try to convert people 
from one way of managing their affairs and doing what they think needs to be done, over 
into something which is at least on the surface different, but the thing is, many times all 
you were ever proposing was that they approach this new tool with an open mind and try 
to put it to work in every way they could.” 
 
John W. Mauchly, computer pioneer and co-inventor of the UNIVAC, 








After graduating from college in 1977, I was a newspaper reporter for 24 years 
before returning to academia in 2001.  In the fall of that year, I launched a new career as 
a journalism educator.  I also began what came to feel like an endless career as a doctoral 
student.  As I pondered possible topics for my dissertation, I thought about a phenomenon 
that had perplexed me as a journalist:  a widespread lack of enthusiasm in journalism for 
adopting the computer as a tool to unearth stories and trends, especially in the years 
before the Internet became ubiquitous in newsrooms.  In my second year as a doctoral 
student, when a journalism history course required me to write a research paper from 
primary sources, I decided to go back and revisit that issue.  As I explored what turned 
out to be the sparse literature on the history of the computer as a tool for news reporting, I 
wondered how it all started – how journalists and computers first crossed paths.  I 
wondered, too, whether those early experiences might tell us anything useful about the 
subsequent reception and deployment of computers as information tools in journalism.    
That inquiry led to this dissertation, which explores the early intersection of 
computing and journalism through election-night reporting more than a half century ago.  
It was, like our own time, an unsettled era of new technologies, new venues for news, and 
important questions about whether and how journalism and new technologies might have 
anything to do with each other. My quest has taken me across the country in search of 
documents, recordings, artifacts, and participants.  But the longer I worked on finding the 
buried stories of election-night computer use in1952, the more I realized it would be a 




the focus, at least at the start, was largely on a period of a just a few hours on one night.  I 
come to the end of this phase of my research – the writing of this dissertation – with more 
questions than when I started, certain there is much more to know about election night 
1952, its context, its aftermath, and the parties involved. 
With that caveat stated, I do hope readers will find this dissertation useful.  At the 
heart of the issue that drew me into this study are, I believe, important questions about 
what journalism is and what it might be.  By all accounts, journalism is not only wrestling 
with profound questions about its economic viability, but is facing either a real or 
perceived crisis of public confidence in the quality and relevance of the work.  My own 
sense is that this crisis is real, though I am not convinced that the crisis is entirely new.  I 
doubt that the current state of affairs signals the death knell for the enterprise of 
journalism – independent of whatever fate awaits the particular organizations for which 
journalists work or the types of media by which journalism makes its way to readers, 
viewers, and listeners.  I do suspect that the trained journalist, to survive, will have to 
make the best use of available and practical tools.  If journalists are not using those tools, 
or not using them well, or only using them in limited ways, then one has to wonder why.  
I have done that.  I hope what I have found will be helpful to anyone who is inclined to 















I have brainstormed this project so incessantly with so many people and received 
so much support that it is hard to know where to begin the process of acknowledging that 
help.  Parts of the first chapter describe the meandering and serendipitous path I followed 
to track down source material. But I would also make a note here of the individuals and 
institutions whose help was vital in opening doors, offering ideas, and, in one way or 
another, easing the burden of completing a dissertation while carrying on with the rest of 
my life.  
I am grateful to Chris Callahan for launching me on this adventure when he 
recruited me from the Washington Post to the University of Maryland’s Philip Merrill 
College of Journalism in 2001. He was then associate dean of the College of Journalism 
and is now dean of the Walter Cronkite School of Journalism at Arizona State University.  
I am also grateful to Tom Kunkel, who was dean of the College of Journalism during my 
first years here and has remained a friend and adviser since becoming president of St. 
Norbert College in De Pere, Wisconsin. 
Professor Emeritus Maurine Beasley, who has been a member of my committee 
from the start and is now its chair, pointed out to me – because I could not see for myself 
– that a paper I wrote on the early use of computers in election-night broadcasting had the 
seeds of a workable dissertation.  Her encouragement and her insight have been vital to 
the completion of this project.  
Professor Robert Friedel, also a member of my committee from the start, let me 




I struggled to make sense of what I was finding and to place it in a meaningful context 
inside the history of technology, his area of expertise. Without his help and 
encouragement I would not have made it this far.  Thanks also to Associate Professor 
David Sicilia, who provided counsel well before he officially joined my dissertation 
committee and who wisely convinced me to present part of my research along the way to 
the Maryland Colloquium on the History of Technology, Science, and Environment. Two 
other scholars who preceded me in making the career switch from journalism to academia 
kindly agreed to serve on this committee: Professor W. Joseph Campbell of American 
University and Associate Professor Mark Feldstein of George Washington University. 
One of the original members of my committee, Professor Michael Gurevitch, 
passed away before this dissertation was completed.  His influence on this project was 
profound.  He was always gracious when I stopped by to try out an idea on him, inviting 
me to sit down and chat awhile.  He never failed to come up with probing questions and 
ideas for further inquiry, and he pushed me to think beyond the stories I was finding to 
bigger conceptual and theoretical questions. 
At one point or another, almost all of my current and former colleagues in the 
College of Journalism allowed me to pick their brains and try ideas out on them. The 
opportunity to talk with them about my research helped me, over time, to see the parts of 
it that were most interesting and most relevant.  Several of them also read draft material 
and provided useful feedback, including Douglas Gomery, Jon Franklin, and Chris 
Hanson. I have also appreciated the support and encouragement of our new dean, Kevin 
Klose. James Gilbert in the Department of History at the University of Maryland also 




My students also helped me.  One former student in particular, A.R. Hogan, has 
been researching the history of television coverage of the U.S. space program. Along the 
way he has come across interesting and highly useful material on election coverage, 
which he has been more than willing to share with me.  Other students let me talk with 
them about my research, either in class or in my office, and their responses allowed me to 
see my material through their eyes. Knowing of my research, they also passed along 
valuable items of interest from time to time. These students included Jim Baxter and 
Jamie McIntyre, both of whom, like me, returned to graduate school after careers in 
journalism. 
Many dozens of archivists, curators, library directors, scholars, authors, and 
private collectors across the country steered me to useful materials and sources, giving 
generously of their time and knowledge, and providing assistance at pivotal points in this 
project. For helping me in my quest to track down complete footage of the NBC and CBS 
television election night broadcasts and relevant radio recordings, I would like to thank 
the following: Nancy Cole at the NBC News Archives; David Bushman and Maria 
Pagano at the Paley Center for Media in New York;  Daniel DiPierro and Ann Fotiades at 
CBS News Information Resources; J.T. “Tom” Johnson of the Institute for Analytic 
Journalism; Ruta Abolins, director of the Walter J. Brown Media Archives and Peabody 
Awards Collection at the University of Georgia; J. Daniel Goldin at RadioGOLDINdex; 
Phil Gries at Archival Television Audio; and Michael R. Williams and Paula Jabloner at 
the Computer History Museum in Mountain View, Calif. 
For steering me to records that I would not have otherwise located, I would like to 




University of Maryland’s College Park campus; Peggy Kidwell at the National Museum 
of American History; Paul Ceruzzi at the National Air and Space Museum; Philip Meyer, 
professor emeritus at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; Alexander Magoun, 
executive director of the David Sarnoff Library, Princeton, N.J.; Raymond Failoa and 
John Behrens at CBS Audience Services; Brecque Keith at the Wayne State University 
Archives; Carrie Seib and Stephanie Crowe at the Charles Babbage Institute at the 
University of Minnesota; Valerie Komor and Sam Markham at the Associated Press 
Corporate Archives; Assistant Professor Mike Conway at the Indiana University School 
of Journalism; Assistant Professor Dale Cressman at Brigham Young University; Paul C. 
Lasewicz and Dawn Stanford at IBM Corporate Archives; Emerson W. Pugh, a historian 
of IBM technology; Tim Bergin, recently retired from American University and a 
collector of artifacts in the history of computing; and Dan Rooney at the National 
Archives in College Park, Md. 
Richard Roberts, CEO of Monroe Systems for Business, gave me a huge boost 
early in this research by opening the historical records of the Monroe Calculating 
Machine Company to me.  Dorothy Burkhart also provided immeasurable help by sharing 
with me the papers of her late husband, William Burkhart, an inventor and unsung 
pioneer of small-scale computing about whom you will read more in this dissertation.  A 
number of individuals who took part in the events I describe or knew some of the players 
were generous with their time, records, leads, and recollections. They include Richard 
LaManna, Vincent Pogorzelski, Stephen E. Wright, Max Woodbury, Monroe and 




Gardoff, a colleague of Burkhart, and former NBC News President Reuven Frank, have 
since passed away. I was honored to have had the chance to speak with them.   
Very special thanks go to Peter Vaslow, whose wisdom helped me be open to the 
possibilities for a life outside the newsroom and then whose friendship helped keep me 
sane, focused, and enthusiastic over the many years during which this project took shape. 
I also owe a debt to Doris Mattingly, an exemplary piano teacher, who provided me with 
encouragement for this endeavor and reminded me, through her own actions, that mastery 
of anything – whether playing piano or wrestling a dissertation to the ground – is hard 
work and takes time to do well. 
Finally, there are the two people who have had to put up with this project, day in 
and day out, and without whose love and support it most certainly would not have seen 
the light of day. They are my wife, Gail, and my daughter, Molly.  
One of the surprising finds in the subject of my research was the importance of 
collaboration in its many forms for the rollout and spread of computing in journalism. In 
retrospect, it should not be a surprise that this theme presented itself to me.  Just one 




Table of Contents 
Preface................................................................................................................................ iii 
Acknowledgements............................................................................................................ vi 
Table of Contents............................................................................................................... xi 
Chapter 1:  Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1 
The Paradox ............................................................................................................ 1 
Plan of this Dissertation ........................................................................................ 20 
The Literature........................................................................................................ 25 
Theory – Technology and Change........................................................................ 38 
Sources and Methods ............................................................................................ 55 
Narrative Choices.................................................................................................. 70 
Chapter 2:  Election Night in the Age of Print.................................................................. 74 
Conditions for Election Night as a Journalistic Event .......................................... 75 
A New Problem for Newspapers – Aggregating the Vote on Deadline ............... 83 
Newspapers and Election Night in the Latter 19th Century ................................. 86 
Methods of Forecasting......................................................................................... 87 
Collaboration with Experts for Calculation .......................................................... 94 
Getting the Word Out on Election Night .............................................................. 97 
Broadcasting Returns Before Radio.................................................................... 104 
Potent Election-Night Mix:  News, Entertainment, and Showmanship.............. 110 
The Story of the Story......................................................................................... 114 
The Election-Night Audience:  Part of the Story................................................ 120 
Chapter 3:  Election Night in the Era of Broadcasting ................................................... 124 
Election Night as a Venue for Launching Commercial Radio ........................... 133 
Election-Night Continuity in the Broadcasting Era ............................................ 141 
Engaging the Audience ....................................................................................... 150 
Parties, Prestige, and the Center Stage................................................................ 158 
Election Night on Television: News and Showmanship..................................... 161 
Times Square as Election Night Icon and Battleground..................................... 164 
Election-Night “Sublime”................................................................................... 173 
Chapter 4:  Setting the Stage for Election Night 1952.................................................... 177 
A High-Stakes Election....................................................................................... 178 
TV News in the Early 1950s:  Seeking Respect … and Attention ..................... 184 
Computers for Sale:  The Uncertain Future of a Nascent Industry..................... 199 
UNIVAC and the Appeal of a Public Stage........................................................ 204 
IBM and Competitors Large and Small .............................................................. 215 
Monroe and the Monrobot .................................................................................. 226 
Chapter 5:  Joining Forces for Election Night 1952 ....................................................... 243 
CBS and UNIVAC Team Up.............................................................................. 244 
NBC and the Monrobot....................................................................................... 260 
IBM’s Ambiguous Role...................................................................................... 274 
Mixed Response: The Case of Bill Henry .......................................................... 285 
On the Television Beat: Reporters Respond....................................................... 289 
Behind the Scenes: UNIVAC and CBS.............................................................. 292 




The Final Polls and the Memories of 1948: Prognostication and Risk............... 302 
The Culture of Demonstration and the Element of Risk..................................... 308 
Chapter 6:  Cultural Competition for Attention on Election Night ................................ 316 
Election Returns in Public Venues ..................................................................... 316 
Engaging the Audience: The Story of the Story, Technology, and Celebrity .... 323 
For the Active Audience: Scorecards and Vote-Watching Guides..................... 328 
Technology and the Times Square Tradition...................................................... 334 
Chapter 7:  Election Night 1952: After Promotions, the Live Event.............................. 341 
Promoting the “Brains” on Election Day............................................................ 345 
Behind the Scenes: Final Preparations................................................................ 348 
CBS Television Coverage Begins....................................................................... 352 
UNIVAC’s “Rough Ride” .................................................................................. 372 
UNIVAC Behind the Scenes .............................................................................. 389 
The Monrobot’s Election-Night Debut on NBC Radio and Television ............. 402 
Wrapping it up at CBS: Mysteries and Messages of the Voters......................... 423 
The Demise of Times Square as a Venue for Election-Night News................... 427 
Computers on Election Night: An Uncertain Future .......................................... 430 
Chapter 8:  Aftermath of the 1952 Broadcasts................................................................ 433 
Responses among the Collaborators ................................................................... 434 
Observers Respond: Journalists, Talk-Show Hosts, and Comedians ................. 441 
What the Broadcasts Meant to Viewers at Home ............................................... 451 
The Notion of “UNIVAC” as Household Word ................................................. 455 
1954: The Detroit Times and Wayne University Collaborate ............................ 461 
The Lure of Election Night at IBM: A Calculated Risk for 1956 ...................... 467 
Mixed Message at ABC - But Continuity in Election-Night Culture................. 479 
The Critics: Coming to Terms, Slowly, with Election-Night Computing .......... 483 
Chapter 9:  Conclusions .................................................................................................. 493 
The More Things Change… ............................................................................... 498 
Logistical Challenges and the Locus of Innovation............................................ 509 
Epilogue .............................................................................................................. 521 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 525 
Abbreviations...................................................................................................... 525 
Primary Sources .................................................................................................. 526 
Television, Radio, and Newsreel Recordings ......................................... 526 
Archival Document Collections.............................................................. 528 
Personal Collections and Company Records .......................................... 530 
Oral Histories and Speeches ................................................................... 531 
Personal Communications and Interviews.............................................. 532 
Reports .................................................................................................... 532 
Newspaper and Periodical Databases ..................................................... 533 
Contemporary Publications and Other Primary Sources ........................ 533 
Congressional Hearings .......................................................................... 554 
Secondary Sources .............................................................................................. 554 
Dissertations and Theses......................................................................... 554 





Chapter 1:  Introduction 
The Paradox 
In the fall of 2002, I came across an article that caught my attention for its 
relevance to my recent change of career.  A year earlier, after nearly a quarter century in 
various newsrooms, I had taken up a new vocation as a journalism educator. I was 
teaching a course in what had come to be known in journalism circles as “computer-
assisted reporting.” The term generally referred to the use of the computer as an 
analytical tool for news reporting, especially when applied to the analysis of government 
records stored in database files: city crime reports, county restaurant inspections, federal 
contracts, and the like.  The article that caught my eye was written by a journalist 
specializing in commentary on the news media. It was largely contemptuous of 
journalism schools.  And it included this dig:  “I'd rather hire somebody who wrote a 
brilliant senior thesis on Chaucer than a J-school M.A. who's mastered the art of 
computer-assisted reporting.” Why? “If you can crack Chaucer,” he explained, “you've 
got a chance at decoding city hall. If you're a computer-assisted reporting wizard, maybe 
you can reformat my hard drive.” 1 
This passage was striking in several ways.  First, there was no small irony in the 
fact that the piece appeared in Slate, founded six years earlier as a creature of the 
computerized world of cyberspace, a pioneering online magazine of news and 
commentary. Second, the argument seemed to suggest as unthinkable the idea that 
                                                 





someone who had facility with computer analysis could also parse complexity in the 
worlds of culture and politics.  Third, for several years, leading news organizations had 
been actively recruiting reporters with skills the Slate piece dismissed. Three years 
earlier, the Columbia Journalism Review, in a story about the 1999 Pulitzer Prizes, 
observed that “Computer-assisted reporting, no longer a toy but an invaluable tool, 
played a key role in many entries.”2    
And yet the sentiment expressed in the Slate piece did not seem at all uncommon.  
A tour through the rather thin literature on computer use in the newsroom confirmed what 
I had seen myself: that the practice of computer-assisted reporting had spread wide but 
not deep.3  That is, while many newsrooms had at least one staff member engaged in the 
practice, it was also true at that time that in any given newsroom, only a small minority of 
journalists possessed the skills and inclination to include computer-assisted reporting in 
their approach to finding and researching news stories.  By then, computers in the 
newsroom had come to be used increasingly for all sorts of other activities – writing, 
                                                 
2 “Inside the Pulitzers,” Columbia Journalism Review, May-June 1999, 26-27. 
3 Bruce Garrison of the University of Miami, one of the few scholars to do research in this area, reported in 
2001 that “little is known about computer use for newsgathering.” Conducting annual surveys of 
newspapers for several years in the 1990s, he reported that by 1998, nine out of 10 newsrooms “reported 
using computers to find and analyze information.” As for the numbers doing this at each of those 
newspapers, the mean was 7.5 persons, with many newsrooms reporting that two to 10 persons engaged in 
these practices; Bruce Garrison, “Computer-Assisted Reporting Near Complete Adoption,” Newspaper 
Research Journal 22, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 65-79. The published findings did not quantify the degree to 
which various tools were used – that is, how much of this was actually using the computer for analysis. One 
of the few studies to get at this, published in 2000, surveyed 28 computer-assisted reporting trainers at 27 
newsrooms; the trainers estimated that only 10 percent of reporters at their newspapers had done any sort of 
analysis with a spreadsheet, only four percent had worked with a computer database (i.e. using database 
management and analysis software such as Microsoft Access), and fewer than one percent had used 
computer mapping or statistical programs. Half of the reporters in these newsrooms were not routinely 
using the Internet for research; Scott R. Maier, “Digital Diffusion in Newsrooms:  The Uneven Advance of 
Computer-Assisted Reporting,” Newspaper Research Journal 21, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 95-110. In my own 
experience providing computer-assisted reporting training to colleagues in two newsrooms to 2001 – and in 
attending conferences and conferring with computer-assisted reporting practitioners and trainers elsewhere 
– the percentage of reporters using spreadsheet and database analysis programs, let alone more specialized 




layout, communication, the retrieval of archived news stories, and, eventually, Internet 
searches – but not so much for analysis of government records stored in database form or 
databases created by journalists from paper records.  And while some advocates of 
computer use in the newsroom were embarrassed that the practice needed a term calling 
attention to the computer as a special tool – especially as late as at the end of the 20th 
century – it was also clear that resistance, barriers, and other challenges abounded when it 
came to using the computer as a tool for analysis.4 
So here was a paradox in the relationship over time between news reporting and 
computers.  News reporting is an information-centered enterprise. In this enterprise, there 
is a premium on the ability to find information, to find patterns in that information, and to 
find a narrative thread that makes sense of those patterns.  The computer is an 
information-centered tool.  It can be used to interrogate large reservoirs of information 
and spot trends, leads, patterns, and even questions that might not reveal themselves in a 
timely fashion using other means. In other words, the computer would seem to be a tool 
with a great deal of promise in an information-centered endeavor such as journalism.  
The paradox, as it appeared to me, was that while the computer was being adopted as a 
tool in the production and business side of journalism – from justifying lines of type to 
processing paychecks, and later from word processing to the layout of newspaper pages – 
as an information machine the computer was far slower to be adopted a tool for reporters 
to use in unearthing stories. In 1995, an advocate of more computer use for analytical 
reporting spoke of “the challenge of moving from the nerd in the corner to the middle of 
                                                 
4 Philip Meyer wrote of computer-assisted reporting, known to practitioners as “CAR,” that “CAR is an 
embarrassing reminder that we are entering the 21st century as the only profession in which computer users 
feel the need to call attention to themselves,” in “The Future of CAR: Declare Victory and Get Out!” in 
When Words and Nerds Collide:  Reflections on the Development of Computer-Assisted Reporting  (St. 




the newsroom.”5 Even as the 21st century began, journalists’ primary uses of computers 
in the course of reporting tended to be associated with Internet searches, news library 
searches, and e-mail.6  While the business world had come to employ data mining as a 
valuable tool, the notion that desktop computers and off-the-shelf software might be used 
to analyze government records was not widely embraced by journalists. This left me 
wondering why. My approach here, rather than asking why this application of technology 
was not used more, was to explore the uses that were made and try to understand what, if 
anything, was distinctive about them. I decided to look at what happened when 
journalists first encountered computers as a potential tool.  How and why did computers 
make their way into the work of news reporters? Were computers embraced, resisted, or 
perhaps both at the same time? Did the early experiences play a role in the way 
computers were viewed as potential tools for news reporting or the kinds of stories for 
which computer analysis might be used? 
The scholarly literature addressing the intertwined histories of news reporting and 
computing is not voluminous. What references I could find to the very earliest unions of 
computers and journalism pointed to television news broadcasting on election night in 
1952.7 The first-ever coast-to-coast television network broadcasting of election returns 
                                                 
5 Rose Ciotta, then a practitioner of computer-assisted reporting at the Buffalo News; comments made in 
1995 and cited by Bruce Garrison, Successful Strategies for Computer-Assisted Reporting (Mahwah, N.J.: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1996), 9-10. 
6 Garrison, “Computer-Assisted Reporting Near Complete Adoption”; Maier, “Digital Diffusion in 
Newsrooms.” 
7 See, for example, Margaret H. DeFleur, Computer-Assisted Investigative Reporting:  Development and 
Methodology (Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997), 36-39; Matthew M. Reavy, 
Introduction to Computer-Assisted Reporting: A Journalist's Guide (Mountain View, Calif.: Mayfield 
Publishing Company, 2001), 3-4; Patricia L. Dooley, foreword by Neil Chase, The Technology of 





featured efforts to produce computer-generated forecasts of the outcome based on the 
early vote count and comparisons to historical election data.  
Sitting at the intersection of so many threads in American culture – journalism, 
television, computing, politics, information management, and the evolution of popular 
culture itself – the episode yields at least a mention in histories from a variety of fields. In 
telling the story of the development of computing during the 20th century, for example, a 
number of historians have singled out election night 1952 for special mention. It has been 
described it as a “pivotal moment in computer history,” coming at a time when few 
people had seen a computer.8  It is said to have been “one of the most dramatic events in 
the early days of computer usage,” one that “inaugurated the intrusion … of computers 
into the public consciousness.” 9  Yet another historian of the early years of computing 
writes, “No event on television proved more revealing and dramatic in publicizing 
computers to the American public than the presidential elections of 1952.”10  Decades 
later, newspapers would describe this as the point at which computers and elections 
became “wired together” and as “perhaps the most significant live TV performance ever 
by a computer.”11  As 2000 approached, USA Today declared the 1952 introduction of 
                                                 
8 Martin Campbell-Kelly and William Aspray, Computer: A History of the Information Machine ( New 
York: BasicBooks, 1996), 123. 
9 The first of these quotations is from Michael R. Williams, A History of Computing Technology, 2nd ed. 
(Los Alamitos, Calif.: IEEE Computer Society Press, 1997), 363. The second quotation is from Paul E. 
Ceruzzi, A History Of Modern Computing, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003), 31-32. 
10 James W. Cortada, The Digital Hand:  How Computers Changed the Work of American Manufacturing, 
Transportation, and Retail Industries (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2004), 43. 
11 Peter H. Lewis, “Armchair View of Election,” New York Times, Nov. 3, 1992, C12; Kevin Maney, “In 





computing into election night coverage to be one of the top media events of the 20th 
century.12 
To be sure, the 1952 episode is not always described in such monumental terms. 
A cultural historian characterized it as “an amusing anecdote.”13 And, in fact, it is often 
portrayed that way elsewhere:  as a curiosity, thinly described and even more thinly 
sourced, in treatments of subjects ranging from the role of information in American 
culture to quadrennial retrospectives of election nights past. It has been mentioned in 
hundreds of accounts in newspapers, magazines, journals, scholarly books, popular 
books, textbooks, broadcasts, documentaries, museum exhibits, and Web pages.14 As I 
worked on this project, the story was brought out again on the occasion of the 2008 
elections and the 2009 death of Walter Cronkite, who anchored his first election night 
broadcast for CBS in 1952. 
And yet this election-night computer use in 1952 has received little scrutiny from 
scholars working from primary sources. Where the episode is mentioned, the secondary 
sources cited often trace back to limited accounts in memoirs or celebratory accounts of 
the early computer years, and these typically lack citations to primary sources.15 Studies 
dealing with the early development of computing and the framing of early computers in 
popular media include descriptions and discussions of the 1952 episode based largely on 
                                                 
12 Joe Saltzman, “The Top 10 for the 20th Century: Mass Media,” USA Today Magazine, Nov. 1, 1999, 66. 
13 Theodore Roszak, The Cult of Information: A Neo-Luddite Treatise on High-Tech, Artificial Intelligence, 
and the True Art of Thinking (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994 [1986]), 7.  
14 Based on searches of databases including: Lexis-Nexis, Google, Google Books, Google Scholar, Amazon 
(“search inside” feature), NewspaperArchive.com, EBSCO databases, and JSTOR. 
15 These include: Harry Wulforst, Breakthrough to the Computer Age (New York: Harry Scribner's Sons, 
1982), 161-171; and Herman Lukoff, From Dits to Bits: A Personal History of the Electronic Computer 




contemporary news accounts or on secondary sources.16 I have found no published study 
taking advantage of a broad range of primary source materials beyond contemporary 
newspaper and magazine accounts.17  One reason for this is completely understandable. 
In the present study, it has taken years, contact with dozens of archives around the 
country, and efforts leading to many frustrating dead ends in order to track down the 
complete 1952 election-night broadcasts of two television networks, to find several hours 
of broadcasting by one radio network, to identify and locate surviving participants, and to 
examine thousands of pages of relevant documents and publications. And even with that, 
it is clear now that so much more has yet to be unearthed – or has simply vanished – 
leaving the story to be cobbled together, at best, from a decidedly incomplete historical 
record.  
I have come to believe more strongly than when I started that this sort of 
historical study has value today, when questions about the place of computer technology 
in journalism remain unsettled. What is striking about election-night computer use in 
1952 is that it came so early in the history of commercial computing, at a time when the 
machines were commonly referred to as wondrous “electronic brains.”18 It would be easy 
to assume that once computers came along, they would be patently obvious choices as 
election-night tools. I confess to routinely making that assumption before starting this 
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project. But this choice was not obvious to the journalists involved, and, what’s more, at 
least some were openly skeptical and even dismissive.  Several hours into the 1952 
election-night telecast on CBS, for example, the footage reveals the distinguished-
looking, somber-toned correspondent Eric Sevareid, with a lit cigarette in a holder in one 
hand, venturing a telling comment about computer use during the broadcasting of returns. 
His remarks followed a series of gaffes associated with the use of a giant, room-sized 
UNIVAC computer to forecast the outcome of the presidential contest in real time on 
election night.  “I’m delighted,” he told the equally serious Cronkite, the two of them 
then cracking smiles, “that UNIVAC, our machine competitor, was wrong for awhile and 
we were consistently right with a human voice – or we’d all be victims of technological 
unemployment pretty soon.”19 It is unlikely that Sevareid actually feared losing his job to 
a computer, especially in light of the penetrating analyses that he and his colleagues, 
including Edward R. Murrow, offered for the direction and meaning of the election 
results.20 But Sevareid was not alone in poking fun at what he and at least some others 
treated not as a potential tool but as an incursion into the turf of election-night reporters 
and commentators. The computer would make its way into journalism early and with a 
great deal of fanfare, but, as this broadcast and other commentaries before and after 
would reveal, not with a uniform degree of acceptance or a fixed trajectory. 
That the 1952 episode has not been studied much does not mean that it has been 
invisible. Quite the contrary, as noted earlier.  There is a story about computer use on 
election night in 1952 that quickly took hold and has been repeated innumerable times, 
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decade after decade. The story varies in the telling but typically includes these details: In 
that year, when computers were rarities, CBS arranged with manufacturer Remington 
Rand to have a UNIVAC computer in Philadelphia predict the outcome of the 
presidential contest. This would be done during the Nov. 4 election-night broadcast, 
based on a comparison of early returns to historical election data.  When, with just a 
fraction of the vote counted, the UNIVAC predicted a landslide for the Republican 
candidate, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, over his Democratic opponent, Illinois Gov. 
Adlai Stevenson, the numbers were met with disbelief. This result was at odds with 
expectations of a much closer race, and it was not aired. Instead, the UNIVAC’s keepers 
in Philadelphia revised their program and, when the computer came out with a new 
forecast for a narrower Eisenhower victory – one more in keeping with those 
expectations – that’s what CBS viewers saw. Only hours into the broadcast, when it was 
clear that Eisenhower had indeed pulled off a sweeping victory, was it revealed on air by 
a member of the UNIVAC camp that there had been an early prediction of a landslide – a 
prediction the audience did not see or hear at the time because the computer’s keepers 
feared the machine had erred. 
These details are correct, as far as they go. But the story rarely stops there. In the 
telling and retelling, like a child’s game of “telephone,” it has undergone many 
variations, picking up details that are flatly wrong or, at the very least, are of uncertain 
provenance and not clearly supported by the historical record.21 Some of these details 
have to do with whether or not CBS news personnel were in on the decision to withhold 
the first prediction of a landslide – and whether they even knew of it at that point in the 
                                                 




evening. There are problems with various other enhancements to this account, especially 
in details about the chronology of events both behind the scenes and in front of the 
cameras. Assertions that the UNIVAC reaped a public relations bonanza are an 
oversimplification, too: the UNIVAC’s performance itself met with decidedly mixed 
reviews for the machine, its keepers, the network, or all of the above together.  What is 
clear is that positive spin came from a narrative which quickly came to prevail through 
accounts of the UNIVAC’s unseen exploits, starting with the Remington Rand official’s 
appearance on television late on election night and then taking hold with numerous 
retellings in the print media and on air.    
But there are also more serious questions about the message that this sketch of a 
story is typically meant to convey:  the message that in this election-night debut for the 
computer, the “electronic brain” not only outsmarted its own programmers but was 
capable of seeing what reporters and commentators could not see as the early returns 
came in. Framing the episode in this way is especially problematic when it is done 
without access to primary sources that could enable a comparison of human and machine 
performance. Without that, it is too easy to make or repeat assumptions about how well 
the new technology worked, and an important question is missed: just how revolutionary 
was the introduction of computers into the election-night mix, and what was its value? 
There are other issues here, too. One deals with the tendency to use the expectations of a 
close race as a complete explanation for the lack of faith in the early prediction of a 
landslide. This focus neglects the question of whether there would have been other means 
– besides comparison to expectations – to assess the validity of such a prediction early on 




in this trial run as a journalistic tool, was integrated into the rest of the election-night 
newsgathering and analysis operation at CBS.   
Problems with this account don’t stop there. As it turns out, even without any 
embellishments, this story – told as a tale of CBS and UNIVAC – leaves out critical 
aspects of that election night, including what was happening on the other television 
networks and at other news organizations.  I was first alerted to the possibilities of a more 
complicated story when, in 2002, I came across an online newsletter dealing with the 
history of Unisys, the eventual corporate successor to UNIVAC’s earlier manufacturer, 
Remington Rand. 22  There was a paragraph about the computer’s use on that election 
night in 1952, and it included this: “Jack Gould, the television writer for the New York 
Times, was not impressed with either the UNIVAC or the much smaller Monrobot 
computer used by the NBC network.”  
Another computer? Indeed, I would learn that the Monrobot, no larger than a 
typical office desk, was manufactured by one of the leading calculating machine 
companies of the day – the Monroe Calculating Machine Company – in an early foray 
into the world of electronic computing. The Monrobot’s creators did not see its 
diminutive size as a drawback, but as a virtue – together with its purported ease of 
operation and its relatively modest cost. Although I have since found references to the 
Monrobot here and there, these are rare.23 And in the election-night story, when the 
                                                 
22 George Gray, “UNIVAC I: The First Mass-Produced Computer,” Unisys History Newsletter 5, no 1 
(January 2001), http://wiki.cc.gatech.edu/folklore/index.php/UNIVAC_1:_The_First_Mass-
Produced_Computer.  
23 For example, a search of Google that includes these words –1952, election, Eisenhower, Stevenson, 
Univac, Monrobot – yielded eight links when searched on August 15, 2009, and only three of those 
displayed content written after the 1950s and mentioning the use of both machines on election night. By 
comparison, when “Monrobot” was removed from the same set of search terms, Google generated 416 




Monrobot makes an appearance at all, it has been treated as a sideshow to the UNIVAC 
main event.  One reason may be that commonly cited sources for the election night story 
are memoirs and celebratory accounts written by players associated with – and limited in 
focus to – the CBS and UNIVAC camps, and published decades later.24 
Yet here, it seemed, were the makings of an epic battle, or battles – between 
networks in the young medium of television, between fledgling television news 
operations, between players in the new and uncertain world of commercial computing, 
between different visions of what computing might be, between narratives about election-
night computer use, and even between humans and machines, or at least between 
differing opinions about whether computers were appropriate tools for election-night 
journalism.  I would learn that CBS and NBC issued dueling press releases and 
newspaper ads – and promoted their “electronic brains” on air in the run-up to the 
election.25  Available records include scripts of two CBS radio news broadcasts devoted 
to the UNIVAC before the election, with correspondent Charles Collingwood referring to 
the computer as a “prodigious monster of electronic thought” and asserting that it would 
help the network report election results “faster and more accurately than is humanly 
possible.”26 NBC touted the Monrobot – in very exaggerated terms – as “America’s 
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fastest electronic brain” and featured it on the Today show and even on The Kate Smith 
Hour, a variety show, in promoting the network’s election-night plans to use “miraculous 
machines that seem like something out of Buck Rogers.”27  On election night, while a 
UNIVAC was generating forecasts in Philadelphia, Collingwood was stationed in the 
cavernous CBS set at Grand Central Terminal in New York in front of a mock-up of a 
UNIVAC operator’s console. The device featured flashing lights which were later said to 
have been hooked up to the kind of timers used for the blinking bulbs on Christmas 
trees.28 A few blocks away in Rockefeller Center’s famed Studio 8-H – once home to 
Arturo Toscanini and the NBC Symphony Orchestra – the Monrobot was in operation 
before the television cameras. Tended to on air by a young woman who worked for an 
insurance company, the Monrobot’s results were reported and discussed by the 
distinguished-looking Morgan Beatty, one of the best-known NBC radio news 
broadcasters of the day.29 A few months earlier, the Monrobot had been described in 
detail at a Navy symposium on small computers, but it would be making its debut for the 
general public – and generating an unprecedented amount of attention for Monroe – on 
election night. 30 Electronics magazine, in its December 1952 issue, published side-by-
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side photos with a caption that read: “Univac (left) and Monrobot (right) also ran on 
November 4 in race to predict outcome of election on basis of preliminary returns and 
past elections.”31 The available evidence indicates that the Monrobot’s assessment of the 
odds of an Eisenhower victory was presented to the NBC television and radio audiences 
ahead of the first airing of the UNIVAC predictions.  
As I looked into the dueling machines and the dueling networks that made use of 
them, it turned out there was still more.  In a Time magazine piece about the way the 
UNIVAC and Monrobot were to be used on election night on CBS and NBC, an ABC 
news director was said to have “professed disdain for such electronic gimmicks.” 32 He 
touted instead, by name, some of the “human brains” who would be used on his network: 
Elmer Davis, John Daly, Walter Winchell, and Drew Pearson. But I discovered well into 
my research that another titan of information processing, IBM, was in the mix on election 
night, too, in conjunction with coverage at ABC – and elsewhere. This included use of 
IBM equipment that a company publication would later boast had played “a vital role the 
computation of vote returns” and comparisons with data from past elections.33  There was 
one such installation at the ABC network’s massive studio in New York and a separate 
installation at the New York World-Telegram and Sun, where the local ABC station had 
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set up shop for its election-night coverage.34 Still another arrangement involved the use of 
IBM equipment based at the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation in Burbank, Calif., for NBC 
coverage in the West.35  And IBM equipment for tabulating returns served a variety of 
other news operations in cities around the country, too, including Washington, D.C., 
where it was brought in for use at the Associated Press, and in Hartford, where it was 
credited with helping the Hartford Courant call the state of Connecticut for Eisenhower 
just 40 minutes after the polls closed.36   
IBM was then still weeks away from the shipment of what is typically described 
as its first commercial electronic computer – a model dubbed the “Defense Calculator,” 
or the “701” – from the manufacturing plant to IBM headquarters, and several months 
away from the machine’s public unveiling and official debut as a commercial product.37  
But there were existing IBM commercial machines that, while not typically seen as 
“computers” in the sense that word has acquired, represented a transitional technology. 
Over time, the definition of a computer has come to include the ability to store and run a 
program from internal “memory,” with the capacity to automatically alter the program as 
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it runs based on intermediate results. This “stored program” concept was not a feature of 
the IBM equipment used on election night. Still, IBM had been the first to 
commercialize, shortly after World War II, electronic calculating machines – the “603” 
and then the “604.” These could carry out programs – eventually numbering dozens of 
steps – based on instructions wired by hand into a control panel. Then in 1949, IBM came 
out with an arrangement of existing equipment that cobbled together the “604” – and later 
a successor, the “605” – with several other IBM devices, providing the ability to run 
longer programs from a combination of hand-wired “plugboards” and punched cards.38 
This cluster of equipment was marketed as the “Card-Programmed Electronic 
Calculator,” or CPC, and it occupies an important place in computing history. This is not 
because of the CPC’s technical specifications. In fact, by 1952 IBM engineers already 
recognized the CPC as a technological dead end – though the machines would be 
produced and used for several more years. Rather, these were among the first commercial 
devices capable of carrying out computer-like operations at electronic speeds, and they 
were manufactured by the dozens and then the hundreds, helping to spread knowledge of 
programming, attract customers, and lay a foundation for the marketing of commercial 
computers – and IBM’s rapidly-achieved supremacy in that field – in the 1950s.39  
The few available accounts of IBM’s various roles on election night are not 
always clear on just which IBM devices were used where. Lockheed’s contribution to the 
election-night mix was definitely a CPC. One account refers to the devices seen by ABC 
viewers on election night – at the network studio and from the World-Telegram and Sun 
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newsroom – as CPCs, while two other accounts leave open the possibility that the 
featured devices were electronic calculators used together with other punched-card 
machines, but without the full complement of additional equipment that the CPCs 
included.  In any event, IBM machines were in the mix on election night. They came 
complete with delegations of IBM service staff to run them, and they provided – at least 
for the New York World-Telegram and Sun – an opportunity for promotion.  “Lightning-
Fast IBM Devices to Help Speed W-T&S Televised Vote Count” was the headline on the 
newspaper’s story about its upcoming election-night collaboration with IBM and ABC, 
promising that a “battery of IBM equipment of the very latest design” would be installed 
in the paper’s city room, “nerve center of the combined newspaper and television 
coverage.”40 The Hartford Courant, in a Sunday magazine article about its own 
preparations for “Operation Election,” also cited its plan to use “large mechanical-brains” 
– courtesy of IBM – to “keep abreast of the election returns” that newspaper subscribers 
could expect to find tabulated and analyzed in the editions on their doorsteps on the 
morning after the election. 
Here, then, was an increasingly rich landscape coming into view for election night 
in 1952, one in which computers and transitional, computer-like devices appeared not 
only to be tools for calculation, but tools for publicity and prestige as well.  In setting out 
to answer the question of what happened on that night – and why computers made such a 
splashy entrance into journalism in that way and in that time – this dissertation seeks to 
avoid the assumption – one easily made with an eye to the historical rear-view mirror – 
that computers were simply bound to find their way into journalism and into election-
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night reporting.  Certainly, the slow and limited adoption of computer analysis for other 
uses in journalism after 1952 – and the clear resistance or at least lack of enthusiasm for 
computers among at least some serious journalists – calls into question the idea that the 
computer was just an obvious and natural choice for deployment on election night in 
1952 and moved into journalism as a force unto itself. In fact, the nascent computer 
industry was not yet established as an essential player in American life, and broadcasters 
were still trying to establish television as a respected medium for news. For both, the live 
experiments with election-night computing posed risks.   Yet as my interest turned to the 
way elections had been reported before the computer era, I could also see a very rich set 
of circumstances in the century leading up to 1952 that might help me better understand 
the context for that episode. These circumstances included a well-established set of 
journalistic practices and tropes.  Journalists long had used credible methodologies for 
making sense of early election returns, and they made a habit of placing themselves at the 
center of election-night events long before the era of broadcasting. In setting the stage for 
election night in 1952, this dissertation explores election nights as central events in 
American culture that have served as showcases both for new technology and news 
reporting, events that have engendered both competition and collaboration where the 
various interests of journalists and technologists intersected. 
It would be easy to dismiss the race to report election returns as part of a class of 
what some scholars have term “media events” – in this case, a lot of hype and churn over 
something that will be known soon enough anyway.41  But to make a case here at the 
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outset for the importance of election nights as worthy subjects of study – and of interest 
to more than journalists, politicians, government job holders, policy advocates, and voters 
at large – I would offer an observation about the importance of these infrequent events to 
researchers from several academic disciplines and allied areas of practice.  For decades 
now, the counting of votes has offered scholars and market researchers a rare opportunity 
to test their theories and methods.  Elections are occasions when political scientists, 
sociologists, and practitioners of statistical and quantitative methodologies can evaluate 
their means of measuring public opinion.  Statistical sampling, after all, is often involved 
in measuring that which cannot be precisely or effectively known in any other way, 
including the opinions of very large groups of people and the factors best able to predict 
group behavior. But elections do provide a chance to test the adequacy of sampling 
algorithms and other assumptions of survey methodologies.  On election night, students 
of human nature can find out – often quickly – whether their algorithms and assumptions 
hold up.  In the wake of the 1936 presidential election, when the Literary Digest was 
famously wounded by fatal flaws in its massive nationwide straw poll of self-selected 
respondents, the more scientific selection of smaller samples vindicated some of the 
rising stars in survey research. The New York Times took note, explaining that the 
outcome of the election was important in demonstrating the value of scientific polling to 
business leaders for market research. The story, which used the term “straw poll” for 
polling generally, began this way:  
Having focused the attention of the public and business men on the 
importance of pre-determining consumer reactions, straw polls in the last 
election will prove the biggest boon to market research the profession has 
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received in years, specialists asserted here yesterday.  Disregarding The 
Literary Digest poll, which they insist was not scientifically conducted, 
research men praised the Gallup and Crossley surveys and predicted that 
more intensive inquiries of that character will feature future elections. 42 
Even as the 1952 election approached, the importance of election results in testing 
scholarly theories was recognized in a study published by Mississippi State College with 
assistance from heavyweights in the still-evolving field of public-opinion measurement. 
These included Hadley Cantril, director of the Office of Public Opinion Research at 
Princeton University, and George Gallup, director of the American Institute of Public 
Opinion.43   The study focused on the election-forecasting abilities of county party 
chairmen.  Here was an opportunity to examine how the subjective judgments of 
partisans, based on personal experience, would match up against the objective, 
quantitative judgments of impartial outsiders – a question deemed to have important 
repercussions for the application of social science to the formulation of government 
policy.44  Indeed, while election-night reporting might be dismissed in some quarters as a 
trivial sideshow in the political process, it is likely that scholars who study public opinion 
are among those watching the reporting of returns most closely, election after election, 
for the verdict that might be rendered on some of their own work.  
Plan of this Dissertation 
This dissertation is divided into two general parts.  After this introductory chapter, 
the first of these two parts takes a step back from 1952 and looks at journalism’s election-
                                                 
42 Charles E. Egan, “Straw Polls Help Market Research,” New York Times, Nov. 8, 1936, F9.  
43 William Buchanan and Virginia V.S. Zerenga, County Chairmen as Election Forecasters (State College, 
Miss.:  Social Science Research Center, Mississippi State College, 1952), iii. 




night practices before computers. The second part of the dissertation focuses largely on 
the events of 1952 and their aftermath: the conditions under which players from the world 
of computing and journalism joined forces for election reporting; their preparations; the 
events of election night; responses and reactions; and some subsequent developments in 
election-night history. 
In the balance of Chapter 1, I will review the extant accounts of election-night 
computer use in 1952 and the literature dealing with the history of election-night 
journalism before 1952. I will also consider two theoretical perspectives that have been 
relevant in approaching this study. One is from the field of communication studies and 
deals with the diffusion of innovations. The other is from the study of the history of 
technology and focuses on the role of users and social practices in the trajectory taken by 
new technologies. I will also revisit these theoretical perspectives at the end of the 
dissertation and make a case that the point at which these two frameworks intersect is a 
valuable one for examining the reception and deployment of computers and their 
applications in journalism.  Chapter 1 will conclude with a discussion of methods and 
sources for this project, which became a treasure hunt, more or less, for buried pieces of 
the story of election night 1952.  
Chapters 2 and 3 look at ways in which what seemed revolutionary about election 
night 1952 as plans developed  – the use of computers as tools for broadcast journalism 
before a nationwide audience – had a great deal of continuity with past practice in the 
culture of election-night news reporting.  Reaching back into the 19th century, we can 
find salient features in that culture which carried on into 1952, and these will help us 




innovative computing technologies in journalism. Well before 1952, methodologies had 
been worked out by print journalists for early forecasting on election nights. In addition, 
election nights also served as venues for showcasing new technology – and for deploying 
dazzling new technologies in the service of showmanship orchestrated by news 
organizations to attract attention and enhance prestige. Chapter 2 deals with the period 
from the mid-19th century up to the early 20th century, before early experiments in radio 
broadcasting.  Chapter 3 deals with the election-night journalism in the broadcasting era 
and the continuation of themes seen in the earlier period.  These chapters are not intended 
as thorough histories of election-night journalism, but rather as explorations of particular 
themes running through that history which are recognizable in the run-up to election 
night 1952 – including the special place of election night in the culture of journalism for 
telling the “story of the story” and putting journalists at center stage in the night’s events. 
Chapter 4 sets the stage for understanding the early use of computers in 
journalism as a set of events that brought together two worlds – the nascent commercial 
computer industry and the nascent enterprise of television news.  Neither was yet central 
to American culture. Within each of these worlds there was a desire to be noticed and 
taken seriously, and within each of these worlds there was intense competition. There 
were also divergent visions of computing. These conditions help us see the willingness to 
conduct live experiments in the use of a new technology on election night as a balancing 
of risk with the opportunity for exposure and relevance. 
Chapter 5 continues setting the stage for election night 1952, starting with the 
origins of plans for using computers to identify trends and forecast the outcome. This 




advance intersecting agendas. It also explores the way computers were represented to the 
public in the course of promoting or reporting on election-night plans. This chapter 
reveals nuances in the dual themes of “man vs. machine” and “man plus machine” that 
permeated the discussion around the deployment of this technology.  We can also see the 
way computers were deployed to serve both practical and symbolic purposes, as tools 
both to analyze the vote and to compete for attention and prestige. In addition to 
discussing one alliance between NBC and the Monroe Calculating Machine Company 
and another alliance between CBS and Remington Rand, this chapter reports on the more 
ambiguous case of the association of ABC and IBM, as well as the IBM role at several 
newspapers and wire service offices. Also important in the pre-election landscape and 
discussed in this chapter was the unhappy memory of 1948 for pollsters and journalists 
alike, when pre-election expectations based on polling colored the reporting of election 
returns. The resulting caution in the reporting of polling data in the run-up to the 1952 
election would feed into decisions made in the high-pressure atmosphere of election night 
about the quality of the computer analysis. 
Chapter 6 reveals the myriad ways in which Americans in 1952 would have been 
able to get news of the election before the morning papers hit the streets.  This chapter 
helps us understand how the debut of computers fit into a culture-wide competition for 
attention on election night. 
Chapter 7 details the deployment of both computer and human analysis on 
election night 1952. The focus of this chapter is primarily on two networks: CBS, for 
which complete television footage and transcripts of some brief radio segments have been 




recordings have been obtained. The availability of these resources provides, for the first 
time, a chance to explore the relative importance placed on people and machines for 
divining the direction of the vote count at a time when computers were new entrants in 
the election-night scene. Salient features in the use of computing in these broadcasts 
include themes of competition and collaboration, risk-taking and caution, and the ever-
present theme of electronic brains vs. human brains as a way of coming to terms with the 
meaning and place of computers in journalism. While computers had been touted in 
advance as a means to draw in viewers and listeners, they were not given primacy over 
other traditional election-night methods as the broadcasts played out. The use of 
computers also provided an opportunity for on-air, ad hoc explorations of what it meant 
to have machines doing election-night work on turf traditionally reserved for journalists, 
commentators, and public opinion analysts.  
Chapter 8 explores responses to the use of computers on election night in 1952.  
Although this episode is often portrayed as a publicity coup for UNIVAC, the reality is 
more complex. Wonder, disappointment, resistance, humor, and the widely deployed 
motif of man-vs.-machine were among the variety of responses to election-night 
computer use – for those involved, for other journalists, for the audience, for talk-show 
hosts, and for celebrities who worked the debut of election-night computing into their 
radio and television programs. This chapter also explores more extended responses. 
These included a range of approaches by the three major networks in 1954, one being an 
overt pullback from computer use at NBC at the same time that a Detroit newspaper was 
forging new ground for print media in an election-night alliance with the computing 




scenes maneuvering of IBM, starting in late 1954, to craft an alliance with a news 
organization in order to get some of its first-generation electronic commercial computers 
in on the election-night action in 1956.  
Chapter 9 concludes the dissertation by revisiting the questions that prompted it. 
Given what appears to have been the limited interest in computer analysis as a newsroom 
tool for so many decades, how do we make sense of the entry of computers into 
journalism for election-night analysis starting as early as 1952? This dissertation finds 
that the use of computers on election night was consistent with values and practices 
dating back to the 19th century. It stresses the importance of cultural factors that underlay 
both resistance to and embrace of this new technology in journalism. It also highlights the 
multiplicity of meanings attached to the computer and its deployment at the intersection 
of the agendas of a variety of players engaged in multi-dimensional competition.  Given 
the early adoption of computers for election-night forecasting, this chapter asks what we 
can learn by considering whether technological and logistical challenges are sufficient to 
explain the otherwise slow diffusion of computers as tools for news reporting.  It 
concludes by suggesting the value of this study – and its emphasis on the role of cultural 
continuity in the face of new technology – for those interested in examining the current 
era of new technology in journalism. 
The Literature 
Despite the periodic celebration of computer use on election night 1952 as a 
sentinel and seminal event, it has not been the subject of much scholarly inquiry.  This 




events of that night, and it explores questions not asked before about those events and 
their historical context. At a time now when important questions have been raised about 
the relationship between journalism and digital technology, a search of the literature 
reveals the early history of that relationship to be fertile ground for exploration.  
Descriptions of the 1952 episode have appeared in published memoirs by two 
participants – Herman Lukoff, who was a leading engineer in UNIVAC’s development 
for Remington Rand, and Sig Mickelson, who was director of news and public affairs for 
CBS television.45 A description also appears in Breakthrough to the Computer Age, a 
book on early computer history for a general audience.46  Authored by Harry Wulforst, a 
former publicist for UNIVAC’s manufacturer, this book is commonly cited in other 
works that mention computer use on election night 1952. 47  The accounts by Wulforst, 
Mickelson, and Lukoff deal only with the CBS broadcast of the UNIVAC forecasts. They 
were written decades later – published between 1972 and 1989 – and do not specify the 
source materials for the election-night stories. The authors would have had access, by 
virtue of their positions, to at least some relevant documents in personal and company 
files, and they would have had access to various participants in those events. These 
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accounts do not appear to have made use of broadcast recordings, though Wulforst’s 
account includes brief excerpts that may have come from a transcription service such as 
the one employed by Remington Rand to follow mentions of UNIVAC on air.48  The 
accounts in these books differ from each other in some details of the chronology of 
election-night events, and they vary in some details from the sequence of events that can 
be seen in recordings of the CBS broadcast.49 But they have been helpful in providing an 
overview of the episode and in suggesting leads for this research project. 
The events of election night 1952, focusing mostly on CBS and UNIVAC, were 
also the subject of the opening chapter of a master’s thesis completed in 1970 by Elmer 
Lower after many years as a television news executive.50  Of interest to Lower was the 
debate over whether election-night broadcasting in the computer age – and the projection 
of winners before the closing of polls in the West – was having an effect on voter turnout 
and the outcome of elections.  Lower himself had testified during Congressional hearings 
on this subject in 1967 while he was vice president of ABC and president ABC News. 
Lower did not appear to have had access to the 1952 broadcast recordings or a large 
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number of documents. But his master’s thesis has been useful in providing leads for 
pursuing primary source materials, though some of these have not been possible to locate 
with the passage of several decades.  Lower’s thesis also includes useful material from 
interviews he did in the mid 1960s with two participants in the events of election night 
1952.  
Facets of the 1952 election-night episode have appeared occasionally in other 
scholarly works.  Drawing on a post-election account in a contemporary trade 
publication, Thomas W. Bohn included the 1952 computer projections in a 1980 journal 
article about the evolution of election-night broadcasting in the television age.51  In a 
2008 Ph.D. dissertation, David P. Julyk explored the role of the computer as an icon 
reflecting anxieties over automation and technological unemployment in American 
culture after World War II.52  Julyk’s opening chapter analyzed the language used to 
describe early computers in newspapers and magazines, including news stories about 
election night 1952. He also included excerpts from a 2003 telephone interview with 
Walter Cronkite, who recalled perceiving the computer analysis both as a gimmick and as 
an invader of journalistic turf – and had a memory of taking some pleasure in UNIVAC’s 
election-night troubles.53  Election night 1952 has also made cameo appearances in other 
academic works dealing with the history of computing.54 These typically depend on 
accounts limited to the outlines of the UNIVAC role on CBS. 
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A thorough history of the early years of the use of computers as tools for news 
reporting has yet to be written.  An overview is provided by Margaret H. DeFleur as 
background for her study of contemporary practices employed in computer analysis for 
investigative reporting.55 Philip Meyer, an early advocate of the use of computer analysis 
in journalism, included examples of his and other’s efforts in the late 1960s and early 
1970s in a 1973 volume, Precision Journalism: A Reporter's Introduction to Social 
Science Methods, and three subsequent editions.56  Meyer was instrumental in producing 
a 1967 analysis of survey data following the Detroit riots that year, a key element in 
coverage that won the Detroit Free Press a Pulitzer Prize. Scott Maier has written a 
detailed account of an another landmark event in the history of computer analysis as a 
reporting tool – the 1968 Miami Herald series on crime in Dade County, Florida. 57  The 
newspaper’s Herculean reporting effort involved transferring information about court 
cases onto 13,000 computer punch cards, and according to Maier it is the first example of 
journalists using a computer to analyze government records.  While the newspaper touted 
its pioneering achievement at the time, Maier also concluded the Herald staff had to 
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overcome substantial technical and logistical barriers. Understanding this, he argues, 
provides “perspective to the slow and faltering advance of computer-assisted 
reporting.”58  
As for the larger history of journalism and technology, while each field has its 
own body of scholarship, their intersection has received only limited attention from 
scholars, according to a recent book exploring the literature and themes in the technology 
of journalism.59 The author, Patricia L. Dooley, also concludes that the field of 
journalism history has long had what she describes as a “bias that favors technology as a 
driving force behind changes in news.”60 In another recent overview of journalism 
historiography, Chris Daly identifies an approach in many works that he terms the 
“Technological Imperative.”61 This approach to the past, he writes, “holds that history is 
propelled by inventors.”62 Works that see technology as a force shaping journalism – an 
approach generally referred to as technological determinism – are not hard to find.63 But 
this way of framing the relationship between technology and journalism is also not 
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universal.  Three examples of an alternate approach will serve to provide context for the 
argument in this dissertation about the importance of paying attention to those parts of the 
past that have staying power in the face of new technology.  Donald Lewis Shaw’s 
analysis of more than 3,000 American newspaper stories from 1820 to 1860 explored the 
conventional wisdom that, among other things, the telegraph brought about changes in 
styles of reporting and writing news stories and in their content.64  While that period did 
see change – including the increasing use of reporters to gather news, more timely reports 
of news, and more attention to locally-generated news – Shaw found continuity in other 
important features of newspapers as a group. These included continuity in the general 
types of stories covered and the style in which those stories were written.  Kevin G. 
Barnhurst and John Nerone’s history of the “form” of news explores conventional 
wisdom about other changes.65 These include the eventual disappearance of illustrated 
news in the era of photography and talk of a “design revolution” for newspapers in the 
1970s and 1980s. Barnhurst and Nerone conclude that neither set of changes was dictated 
by the arrival of new technologies, reflecting instead other factors and trends that had 
been developing in some cases for decades. Lastly, a study by Pablo J. Boczkowski of 
innovation in online newspapers stresses the importance of “existing social and material 
infrastructures” as well as “broader contextual trends.” 66 Too much emphasis, he writes, 
has been placed on “analyses that underscore the revolutionary character of online 
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technologies and the web and overlook the more evolutionary ways in which people often 
incorporate new artifacts into their lives.”67  
Aside from differences of opinion in academia about framing the relationship 
between technology and journalism, the tendency to ascribe a mostly one-way impact to 
technology – as a force that changes what it encounters – is not a foreign concept in day-
to-day speech, popular culture, or even works of scholarship on a range of subjects.68  An 
alternative approach to this relationship between technology and journalism – the one 
taken here – is to avoid the assumption that once computers came along, they would 
inevitably find their way into journalism and act on journalism as an inevitable agent of 
change.  Questions that arise from resisting this assumption include asking what factors 
set the stage for computers’ entry into journalism and why election night in 1952 became 
a venue for this entry. These questions have not been the subject of much scholarly 
speculation – and none based on a close examination of relevant primary source 
materials.  This study looks for context in the historical role of election night within 
journalism and American culture at large before 1952.  
The history of election night over time – especially in the period up to and 
including the 1950s – has been little plumbed in scholarly research as a special cultural 
and journalistic phenomenon. But there are some exceptions worth noting that support 
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the idea of election night as a rich area of study for journalism historians and cultural 
scholars.    
In 1967, John M. Matheson, a doctoral student at Southern Illinois University, 
went in search of the extant literature on the history of news coverage of election returns.  
He did not find any, and his own dissertation has since become a seminal contribution to 
this area of journalism history. 69  The seemingly narrow focus captured in his title – 
Steam Packet to Magic Lantern:  A History of Election-Returns Coverage in Newspapers 
of Four Illinois Cities, 1836-1928 – belies the value of his research.  Matheson 
demonstrated that the study of election coverage over time can provide a window into 
evolving journalistic values and practices as well as evolving national infrastructures in 
transportation, communication, and settlement.   
The following year, 1968, a journal article that resulted from work done at 
Bowling Green State University by another doctoral student, Thomas W. Bohn, surveyed 
the history of radio and television broadcasting of returns in presidential elections from 
1916 to 1948. 70  Working primarily from accounts in the New York Times and a trade 
magazine, Broadcasting, Bohn argued that election-night reporting provided what he 
calls a “testing ground” for radio broadcasting, and that election-night practices took 
decades to evolve into full-time, hard-news coverage featuring interpretation and 
analysis.   This evolution coincided with a slow realization that the listening public would 
be receptive to such broadcasts, and it coincided, as well, with an increasing ability over 
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that time to gather and aggregate voting results.  Bohn would follow up on this study in 
1980, as noted earlier, by extending his focus to the election-night broadcasting of 
presidential election returns from 1952 to 1976.71  Bohn observed that along with 
constant innovation and adaptation to changing conditions, there remained a durable, 
ritualistic structure to that coverage.   
In 1983, Michael A. Russo completed a Ph.D. dissertation at New York 
University that used several decades of election coverage to help trace the development 
in broadcast journalism of special-events coverage as an important feature of broadcast 
news operations as well as American political culture.72 Himself a former television 
journalist, Russo focused on the creation and evolution of the special events and election 
units at CBS between 1952 – with attention to the network’s coverage of the political 
conventions in that year – and 1968.  Russo succeeded in obtaining access to closely held 
CBS records in this period.  
In 1991, Kate Kelly, a freelance writer, produced Election Day: An American 
Holiday, and American History. This is an anecdotal account for a popular audience of 
the history of voting, election reporting, and election-day celebrations and traditions from 
the colonial era to the late 1980s.73  Not intended to make a historical argument, the 
volume illustrates the richness of election day in American culture over time. 
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In a volume published in 1998, Calling Elections: The History of Horse-Race 
Journalism, Thomas B. Littlewood showed how the history of reporting on campaigns 
and voting exposes an underlying tension in political journalism between the coverage of 
issues and the coverage of contests.74 Working from contemporary news accounts, 
memoirs, and secondary sources, Littlewood explored the evolution since the early 19th 
century of a reporting style that treats elections as sporting events. 
In yet another dissertation, The History of Election Day in Philadelphia: A Study 
in American Political Ritual, completed at the University of Pennsylvania in 2002, a 
study by Mark W. Brewin ranges from the early 18th century to the elections of 2000. 
Brewin was interested in changes that took place over time in American political culture 
and in the rituals of public life. He traced the development election day as a public 
celebration. And with the arrival of mass media – and in particular television – he 
documented a decline in that tradition, a development he argues is a “significant loss for 
democratic life.”75  The dissertation has since been expanded into a book, Celebrating 
Democracy, published in 2008.76  
Of the group of scholarly works, those by Matheson and Brewin stand out as 
providing rare and valuable studies from primary source materials of the culture of 
election day and the reporting of election returns during an extended period of American 
history preceding 1952 – that is, during the period on which I have focused in exploring 
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the theme of cultural continuity.   Each of these has a local focus – four Illinois cities in 
the case of Matheson, and Philadelphia in the case of Brewin.  For understanding the 
period leading up to 1952, the studies by Littlewood and Bohn also stand out as useful 
works of synthesis – focusing on radio and television broadcasting, primarily via New 
York-based networks, in the case of Bohn, and casting a wider net in space, time, and 
medium in the case of Littlewood.  Discovery of the works of these scholars as I 
continued to expand the focus of my own literature search was especially useful in 
helping me get a sense of the wider historical terrain on which election night played out.  
Lower’s thesis, Russo’s dissertation, and Bohn’s second study were also helpful in 
getting a longitudinal look at events that came after 1952 in network broadcasting of 
election returns.     
In addition to these works focused on election day, election night, and the 
reporting of election returns over time, there are two other sets of works that are worth 
mentioning here.  Among the most useful of these are Carolyn Marvin’s explorations of 
the way Americans saw the possibilities for electric communication and electric light as a 
communication medium during the 19th century. 77 Before radio, election results were 
communicated to news consumers at a distance, in public and private settings, by 
searchlight and telephone. Published in 1986 and 1988, Marvin’s studies argue that past 
experiments with new technology and past conceptions of the future of those 
technologies are useful for understanding the social process of navigating change.  The 
latter of these works, When Old Technologies Were New, is regarded as a seminal study 
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in the intersecting histories of technology and culture. Just as Bohn argued that election-
night reporting was important to the development of radio news in the first half of the 
20th century, Marvin argued that elections provided the impetus for a high degree of 
organization in the use of new electric technologies – especially the telephone and the 
electric light: “The distribution of presidential election returns in the late 19th century,” 
she wrote, “was the most ambitiously organized American effort to use new electric 
technologies to deliver the news.”78 
Other studies have approached the phenomenon of election night from a variety of 
directions, typically focusing on a discrete aspect or time frame.  Nineteenth century 
election-night bonfires have been a subject of study.79 So has the history of organized 
markets for betting on the outcome of presidential elections between 1868 and 1940 – 
and their usual accuracy in forecasting the winners.80 Scholarly studies of election-night 
reporting after the 1950s have tended to focus on one or a small number of elections, 
addressing questions dealing with bias, accuracy, methodologies of forecasting, and the 
ritualistic aspects of election-night reporting. One study published in 1988, for example, 
examined election-night journalism as political ritual, focusing on the period from 1982 
to 1984 and arguing that television commentators tended to offer “broad symbolic 
reassurance” after the divisiveness of a campaign by stressing the importance of common 
                                                 
78 Marvin, When Old Technologies Were New, 217. 
79 Mark Brewin, “The History and Meaning of the Election Night Bonfire,” Atlantic Journal of 
Communication 15, no. 2 (2007): 153-169. 
80 Paul W. Rhode and Koleman S. Strumpf, “Historical Presidential Betting Markets,” Journal of Economic 




participation in the process.81  Election night is discussed in works on statistical methods 
for the study of politics and public policy.82 One other area of great interest in connection 
with election-night journalism has been the question Elmer Lower addressed in his 1970 
master’s thesis – whether the reporting of election returns before the polls have closed in 
some areas, especially the West Coast, affects voter turnout and election outcomes.83 This 
question is not just of importance to historians.  It has been a point of periodic 
controversy, and it has been investigated on a number of occasions by Congress.84 
Theory – Technology and Change 
How do we account for change in the technologies people use and the way people 
use them, whether as individuals or as members of a large social system, a profession, an 
organization, or some other configuration? To be sure, people have a fascination with 
what is new and what is strange. Novelty attracts attention. It provokes amazement and 
fear. It is often an essential element to what we find entertaining. It is also fundamental to 
our survival.85 Through recorded history, the powerful have sought to enhance their 
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prestige and authority by patronizing inventors and scientists exploring what is novel by 
working at the boundary between utility and wonder. And chief among the creations that 
astound over time have been automata and their successors – devices that imitate life, 
from the mechanical creatures of ancient times to the latest 21st century robots. Certainly, 
the “electronic brains,” as computers were known early on, were in a category of 
novelties that astounded for their purported ability to do what was once thought of as the 
work of a purely human domain.86 
It is equally true that we do not automatically embrace novelty, especially when 
faced with a choice or possibility of a new technology being employed in our personal, 
social, or work lives.  That which holds the potential to bring improvement in some way 
and for some parties may also threaten existing interests, diminish the value of expertise 
in older arrangements, and disrupt hierarchies of formal or informal authority.87 And as 
noted earlier, the deterministic view that technology exists as an agent with a primarily 
one-way impact on people and social systems can become problematic when the nature 
and trajectory of change are examined closely. 
This dissertation focuses on an era of new technology more than a half century 
ago and on what happened then in the face of choices for bringing together computers 
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and journalism.  I do not propose to offer new theory that derives from this episode, with 
explanatory and predictive power for past, present, or future events.  But I do see this 
study as making a contribution in two ways to the conversation about the relationship 
between technological innovation and change, both in journalism and more generally.  
After taking note here of approaches from two distinct fields that are concerned with this 
relationship – one being the study of the diffusion of innovations and the other being the 
study of the history of technology – I will outline the ways in which themes that are 
salient in my study of the early use of computers as tools for news reporting may also 
serve as useful aids to observation in studying other episodes of the introduction of new 
technologies in journalism and other endeavors.  
During my initial exploration of the historical events that are the subject of this 
study, I began to question the notion that the overriding nature of these events was 
revolutionary.  They were revolutionary, to be sure.  A powerful new technology, the 
electronic computer, was introduced into the mix for analyzing election returns, and 
another powerful new technology, television, was making its mark as an important means 
for distributing breaking news of the election and linking the nation in a new, visual way. 
But I also came to see that to focus primarily on the revolutionary aspects would be to 
run the risk of missing another set of elements critical to understanding what was taking 
place. 
Among the many analytical frameworks that could be applied to thinking about 
the early use of computers in election-night journalism, there are two approaches 
recognizing the nature and importance of the continuity that might be found in the midst 




deals with the diffusion of innovations.88 In diffusion studies – chronicled and 
synthesized over several decades by Everett Rogers – an “innovation” is seen as “an idea, 
practice or object that is perceived as new by an individual or other unit of adoption.”89  
The innovation need not be new in a chronological sense, starting from the point of 
invention. What makes the diffusion of an innovation worthy of study is the perception of 
newness – that it is new to the person or group to which it is introduced. The general 
model for the diffusion of innovations suggests five key dimensions for assessing the 
characteristics of an innovation in understanding its capacity for adoption. These go by 
the terms “relative advantage,” “compatibility,” “complexity,” “trialability,” and 
“observability.”90  In other words: What sort of improvement does an innovation offer? 
How is it consistent with current practices and values? How difficult is it to deploy and 
use? Can it be tried without with a large commitment of resources and risk? And can it be 
seen in action before being adopted?  The notion here of “compatibility,” in particular, 
recognizes that novelty in one aspect of an innovation does not imply novelty in all 
aspects – and that, in fact, continuity with what already exists is actually vital to the 
process of change.   
A second general theoretical framework relevant to this dissertation stems from a 
critique of technological determinism and attends to the ways in which technologies and 
their trajectories are shaped as a social process. This framework encompasses several 
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approaches that have both theoretical and methodological dimensions, including the 
social construction of technology, or social constructivism. 91  Works in this vein tend to 
argue that new technologies do not stand apart as forces with inevitable trajectories and 
one-way impacts on society and culture, or with fixed meanings and uses. Instead, 
technologies are said to exist in a state referred to by some historians as involving 
“interpretative flexibility.” 92  The needs, desires, and actions of users – along with the 
practices and values already prevalent in their various cultures – have effects on the 
design, deployment, modification, and perceived meanings and significance of 
technological innovations. Like the process it posits for technology, this theoretical 
framework does not itself represent a single and immutable model. It has been adopted 
and adapted to a variety of studies and proposed configurations, and it has a number of 
variants and related approaches. Still, the authors of an edited volume on the social 
shaping of technology, Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman, noted that while the 
general idea of the “social shaping of technology” had become accepted in academia, it 
had achieved “little resonance in our wider culture.” 93 Arguing for the relevance of 
continuing to publish works offering an alternative to the one-way view of technology’s 
impact on society, they observed that “discussion of technology in the mass media … is 
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still framed in largely technologically deterministic terms.”94 The editors of another 
volume on the history of technological visions argue that beyond merely limiting public 
understanding of the forces affecting the shape and trajectory of new technologies, 
viewing technology in a deterministic way – and robbed of historical context – can have 
deleterious effects on decision-making and public policy.95 
Studies in the diffusion-of-innovations tradition have also taken cognizance of the 
processes posited for the social shaping of technology. Rogers, the chronicler of diffusion 
studies, argued that since the diffusion of innovations is a social process, the “meaning of 
an innovation is thus gradually worked out through a process of social construction.”96  In 
Rogers’s summary of diffusion studies, he noted the social-construction-like phenomenon 
of “re-invention,” which he defined as “the degree to which an innovation is changed or 
modified by a user in the process of its adoption and implementation.”97 Rogers reported 
that until about 1970s, this phenomenon was not seen by scholars as significant, with 
adopters treated as “rather passive acceptors of an innovation, rather than active 
modifiers of a new idea.”98  Still, the more nuanced view of adopters does not appear to 
have taken hold universally. Diffusion scholars James W. Dearing and Gary Meyer, in a 
recent assessment of the work in their field, called for greater attention to the idea of 
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adopters as “creators of innovations.” 99  They found in their review of the literature that 
“activity of this sort has usually been considered deviant or minor in relation to the 
original source-defined purpose of an innovation and how it was designed by that 
source.”100 Dearing and Meyer argue that “adopter activity in relation to innovations is 
far more important, common, and consequential than reflected in the diffusion 
literature.”101 Whereas traditional diffusion theory tends to “decouple” the process of 
innovation from the process of diffusion, Dearing and Meyer propose a theoretical 
perspective that “closely weds the two.”102 This suggests that in addition to the 
shortcomings of viewing technology in a purely deterministic way, there remain 
promising opportunities for examining potential users’ relationship with new technology 
as more than a pair of distinct choices – to adopt or not.  
The work of Claude Fischer in exploring the early decades of the telephone as a 
commercial technology has been especially useful in thinking about the subject of this 
dissertation.103  Fischer emphasizes the importance of examining technology from the 
perspective of the user – terming his approach the “user heuristic,” with “heuristic” 
meaning an “instructive tool for thinking about technology.”104  He writes: “We need to 
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study how specific devices were introduced and adopted, what people used them for, how 
that use changed as the technology evolved, how those uses altered other actions, how 
patterns of use changed the context for other actors, and so on.”105 His study of the 
telephone, for example, reveals that its use for social interaction was not a role envisioned 
in the original marketing of the telephone as a tool to serve practical ends. Unexpected 
uses came from customers who adopted the telephone for extending and enhancing their 
own social connections, practices, and needs, including women at home and residents of 
rural areas.106 Summarizing his findings, he writes:  
… while a material change as fundamental as the telephone alters the 
conditions of daily life, it does not determine the basic character of that 
life… As much as people adapt their lives to the changed circumstances 
created by a new technology, they also adapt that technology to their lives. 
The telephone did not radically alter American ways of life; rather, 
Americans used it to more vigorously pursue their characteristic ways of 
life.107   
This dissertation confirms the value of taking a user-eye-view of new technology 
and understanding the dynamics in which users may adopt and adapt new technologies 
for their own ends.  A close look at the practices and values at work in election-night 
journalism before 1952 will reveal a great deal of continuity from that pre-history to the 
ways computers were first employed for election-night coverage. These include, among 
other things, a multidimensional treatment of computing equipment where it was used –
its deployment for calculation and analysis, but also as a prop in the long tradition of 
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election-night showmanship, with some commentators even making use of the 
computers’ limitations as a foil.  
Several notions – that what a technology means is important, that a single 
technology can have multiple meanings, and that these multiple meanings can play a role 
in the way that technology is received and deployed – are among the points of 
intersection in the diffusion and social constructivist approaches.108  As a result, 
understanding the responses to new technology involves far more than seeing that 
technology and its associated practices solely or primarily as a cluster of features with 
technical utility. As we will see in the circumstances surrounding the early deployment of 
computing in journalism, what might be called the “nontechnological” aspects of a 
technological innovation are also vital to understanding the choices about whether and 
how to make use of it. 
One particular kind of connection between technology and meaning is what 
historian David Nye has termed the “American technological sublime.”109 The sublime 
involves, in general, “experiences of awe and wonder, often tinged with an element of 
terror.”110 It is a concept with roots in antiquity, taken up and explored in the 18th century 
by Edmund Burke and Immanuel Kant, and traditionally associated with ineffable, 
religious-like feelings about awesome structures and events in the natural world – an 
immense canyon or waterfall, a volcanic eruption, a storm at sea.  Nye has established the 
sublime as a useful concept in understanding Americans’ responses to new technology.  
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From the early 19th century forward, he has argued, the technological sublime has been 
“one of America’s central ‘ideas about itself.’ ”111 Independence Day, the diverse 
nation’s celebration of its unity, has served repeatedly as a venue for the technological 
sublime.  Nye has found that celebrations of the national holiday were intertwined with 
the celebration and inauguration of canals, railroads, and bridges.112  Bold and 
spectacular new technologies have also had value in American culture as magnets to 
draw crowds – on Independence Day and other occasions – and have even become tourist 
attractions on their own, from the 19th-century establishment of rail and telegraph 
systems to late 20th-century launches of manned space flights.  
This dissertation argues that election night can also be recognized as a type of 
cultural event which, over time, has been associated with celebrations of the wonders of 
new technology. Inherent in this mix is the capacity of the new technology – in the case 
of this study, the computer – to have a variety of meanings and uses, technical and 
nontechnical, to players who come from different fields of endeavor – in this case, 
journalists and technologists – but who have intersecting agendas associated with a desire 
to attract and command attention – in this case, driven by an awareness of the natural 
public interest in the outcome of elections. 
In my study of election night 1952, I have taken note of a series of themes that are 
important to understanding the dynamics associated with decisions about the deployment 
a new technology, the computer.  These themes include the collaboration of groups from 
different fields but with intersecting agendas for public respect and competitive 
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advantage – enhanced by the capacity of a single artifact to carry multiple meanings – all 
playing out in connection with the election of a president, an event of special significance 
in journalism and widespread interest in the culture at large. In addition to the continuity 
with past election-night practices both for analyzing returns and attracting attention in the 
journalistic world, there was also some measure of continuity for the nascent computer 
industry with its penchant for showy demonstrations of wondrous new wares. It would 
appear, then, that although the new “electronic brains” were not uniformly seen among 
journalists as natural, desirable, or practical additions to the newsroom’s human brains, 
the momentum provided by many factors taken together was sufficient to open the door 
to experimentation. And yet, as an exploration of the aftermath of election night will 
make clear, the future of computers as an election-night fixture was not a done deal after 
1952. The experiments alone did not bring about immediate and revolutionary change. 
They did increase awareness, both of possibilities and risks. 
I do not mean to suggest that the themes explored here are the only factors needed 
to understand the early deployment of computers in election-night journalism.  In his 
study of meaning in technology, Arnold Pacey warns against the kind of “reductionism” 
that would associate a cause-and-effect understanding of the history of technology with a 
simple set of factors. “There is no ‘only’ about it,” he writes. “The dynamic of 
technological change seems to reflect a synergy among psychological, institutional, and 
socioeconomic movements. It is a mistake to assume that any one part of the complex 
interaction is the key to it all.”113 I do not mean to suggest, either, that a singe case study 
                                                 




provides adequate evidence to support a new direction in theory for understanding the 
dynamics of change in the relationship between technology and journalism.  
Rather, I would propose that what I have detected here raises the possibilities for 
a set of factors at work in 1952 that could serve as an aid to observation – supplementing 
the factors posed by existing theory – in the exploration of other modern encounters with 
technology in journalism. There are seven factors or themes that I would like to articulate 
here, and I will return to them at various points in this study: 
(1). Cultural continuity: The question of the compatibility of computer analysis 
with the existing patterns of election-night reporting is one that yields not a single answer 
but a range of possibilities, from those intrigued enough to experiment with it to those 
who had a hard time seeing election-night analysis as anything other than a human 
domain, peopled by journalists, public opinion pollsters, and political scientists.  In 1952, 
as we will see, what was significant in the deployment of computers on election night 
was continuity with patterns of election-night journalism in many dimensions. This 
included the need to aggregate and make sense of the numbers, the imperative of 
balancing accuracy and speed in projecting a winner, and the methodology of making 
specific comparisons to past results – by discrete geographic areas – to detect variation 
from past trends. But it also included the showcasing of wonders and novelty – including 
technological innovation – as part of the journalistic enterprise of commanding and 
holding attention, which in turn offered bragging rights serving much more than bottom-
line profit interests. The new had a variety of connections to the old in a number of 




Many of these lines of continuity have extended into election-night journalism in the 21st 
century. 
(2). An event of significance: That election night in 1952 became a venue for 
several linkages of computing and journalism suggests the importance attending to the 
social and cultural context of such combinations – and to the specific kinds of 
newsworthy events around which they might take place. The 1952 election presented an 
occasion in which public interest was guaranteed, but it was an occasion in which no 
particular news organization was guaranteed a share of that interest. The role of election 
night as an event of great cultural and social significance is certainly underappreciated in 
the scholarly literature, but it may also be part of a class of situations for the debut of 
technological innovation that is worthy of further exploration in both diffusion and social 
constructivist studies. 
(3). Collaboration with outsiders: In both diffusion and social construction, the 
focus would typically be on an innovation that originates in one sphere and then is  
adopted and adapted in others, as with the movement of a technology from inventors to 
marketers to users. The events of election night 1952 suggest the possibilities for a more 
nuanced exploration of the movement of innovations across group or disciplinary 
boundaries. The technology was deployed jointly in a new way for each party, each 
coming from quite different domains – that is, technology and journalism – but each 
perceiving the benefit of working together toward a common end. This was not simply 
diffusion of a tool from the realm of engineers to the realm of journalists. For each, the 
use and its outcome became learning experiences, and that fed back into their sense of 




 (4). Managing complexity: It would be easy to assume that the rise in computer 
use for analysis in reporting which came decades after 1952 was a result of the 
technology becoming more ubiquitous, with greater availability and lower cost driving 
innovation in applications of database analysis to news reporting. Aside from the inherent 
determinism in this view, it may mask a more interesting possibility: that the greater 
availability of possibilities for computer analysis allowed for a change in the locus of 
innovation and the management of this practice. Later, small newsroom units and 
individual reporters could take the initiative to experiment with this sort of analysis for 
various kinds of stories without the imperative of organizational buy-in and outside 
collaboration.114  But in 1952, the exploration of computing as a tool for journalism was 
facilitated by action at the organizational level and collaboration with outside 
organizations. The complexity of computing was certainly a challenge, but it was not a 
barrier, and such collaboration – fueled by the perception of mutual gain in connection 
with an event of great public interest – was a way to manage that complexity. 
(5). Journalism as a special case: In the 1952 application of computing on election 
night, not only did the tool have the capacity to serve journalism, but journalism (and the 
exposure it entailed) had the capacity to serve the tool – and not only on election night, 
but afterwards.  Remington Rand, in particular, wasted no time in creating detailed 
descriptions and wondrous narratives of its election-night exploits. Monroe used 
references to election night 1952 in booklets it prepared to seek government and military 
contracts. And IBM, though not as active as Remington Rand in touting its election-night 
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contributions, nevertheless called attention to its role with accounts in an in-house 
publication and in a newsletter that circulated in the data-processing world. This suggests, 
at the very least, an opportunity for further exploration: the application of technological 
innovation in journalism as a form of diffusion with special features. 
(6). Critical mass vs. resistance: It is not a new idea that innovation brings the 
opportunity both for improvement and disruption. Computing technology, in particular, 
gets to the heart of what is thought to be most human – the capacity to analyze and 
predict – and thus what is most essential to the way at least some journalists might see 
themselves. How, then, does the decision to use the technology overcome resistance? In 
1952, an important factor was the capacity of the technology to encompass multiple 
meanings and multiple roles – to have both technological and nontechnological 
applications, both utility and symbolic currency, to be promoted in ways both serious and 
circus-like, to have its mechanism of action both revealed and couched in mystery. One 
aspect of the “relative advantage” of this tool over what had been done before – analysis 
done solely by humans – was also that it could be trumpeted one way in promotions, as 
an improvement on the merely human, without actually forcing confrontations over the 
replacement of humans on election night itself. In short, this suggests looking for a 
critical mass of factors, rather than a single defining one, in understanding conditions 
surrounding new applications of technology in journalism. 
(7). Enhancement vs. replacement: It is not a new idea that new technology can be 
accompanied by the binary notion that it is a replacement, rather than adjunct, to human 
action. The concept of “technological unemployment” that CBS’s Eric Sevareid broached 




Whether the computers would, indeed, outdo human journalists on election night for the 
speed and accuracy of detecting electoral trends was something that could not be known 
in advance. In this particular case, it seems significant that the “trialability” and 
“observability” of the new technology were conjoined and built into the structure of the 
event itself. In fact, election night traditions already encompassed multiple approaches to 
detecting trends – newsroom experts, pundits and public intellectuals from the world of 
polling and academia, political officials, and wire reports carrying the judgments of 
newspaper editors from around the country about the electoral outcomes in their states – 
all of which were reported in 1952 along with the computer-based assessments. The 
enhancement vs. replacement question did not need to be settled in advance of trying out 
the new technology. 
The salient features described above worked together in a matrix of sorts.  They 
suggest the importance of studying the application of new technology to journalism in a 
multidimensional way, understanding the importance of the specific cultural 
circumstances, and noting ways in which diffusion may take place as collaboration across 
groups in addition to the spreading of innovation from one group to another. The 
dynamics here were certainly far more nuanced than the idea that the computer is 
presented as an option and journalists decide simply between using it or not.  
To borrow a notion from the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss about the value 
of certain things “to think with,” the collection of salient features from election night 
1952 might serve as an observational device.  The final chapter of this study provides an 
opportunity to at least take note of events over the most recent decade of election-night 




a single episode from one long-ago night. In the end, however, I should also reiterate that 
this dissertation does not seek to explain why and how computing entered journalism in 
the way that it did. That would be, at best, premature. I do seek to better understand how 
and why election night 1952 made sense and worked as a venue for this coming together. 
A word about terminology: I initially settled on the term “cultural continuity” in 
this dissertation as a way to refer to the staying power of values and practices and to talk 
about the way in which new technology is used to extend and enhance them.  When I 
looked around to see if the term already had currency, I found that it did.  In fact, it 
appears in a variety of disciplines, including anthropology, sociology, political theory, 
and media studies.  I have opted to use this term nonetheless, rather than invent one never 
used before. And I would call attention briefly at this point to a difference between my 
intended application of this term and the way the term has been used by mass 
communications scholar Clifford Christians.115  In critiquing the notion that technology is 
value-free and that only the uses of technology are “value-laden,” Christians has 
proposed a theory of “normative” technology. His idea is that designers and 
disseminators of technology should take “cultural continuity” as a paramount value. He 
argues that expert technologists should not design or deploy technologies that will 
interrupt and colonize the cultures of those who have relatively less power – smaller 
nations, developing nations, “natives,” and so forth.  My own conception of cultural 
continuity does not take issue with this argument, but it does turn this view of the 
relationship between technology and cultural continuity on is head. Rather than viewing 
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technology in an asymmetrical way as something that may place cultural continuity in 
jeopardy, this study observes ways in which potential users make decisions about 
deployment of new technology in a variety of dimensions that have – or seek to maintain 
– consistency with existing values and practices of cultures defined as narrowly as 
broadcast journalism or as widely as the larger shared culture of a nation.  As noted 
above, by peering closely at the events of election night 1952, we see a lot of continuity 
with past practices and values in the journalism of election nights back to the 19th 
century. We come to appreciate, in the end, the somewhat counterintuitive notion that 
strong continuity with the past is an important key to change – that tools which break 
with the past technologically may well incorporate the past in terms of continuation of 
core practices and incorporation of core values. 
Sources and Methods 
While working on this project, I came upon The Historian’s Craft, written by the 
scholar Marc Bloch and published after he was tortured and executed by the Gestapo in 
1944 for his role in the French resistance. 116  Bloch had found it curious that historians 
did not do more to expose what he called “the honest groping of our methods,” and he 
suggested that this failure was a disservice to readers.   I certainly felt that I had done my 
fair share of groping on this project.  I also felt some identification with the uneven 
process described by Clifford Geertz in the introduction to a new edition of his classic 
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1973 work on cultural anthropology, The Interpretation of Cultures. Geertz suggested 
that there is more of a “backward order of things” to the scholarly work in his field than 
at least some are willing to acknowledge.117  The process tends not to start with clear 
hypotheses that are then taken into the field to be checked by “carefully codified 
procedures systematically applied.”118  Rather, material is collected – perhaps on subjects 
more interesting to the researcher than those that prompted the search – followed by post-
hoc attempts to make sense of it all and fit the material into some sort of scholarly 
framework.  The final stage of assembly, into “chaptered books and thematic 
monographs,” is what Geertz describes as both “crucial and a bit of sleight of hand”:   
Crucial, because without it we are left with an assortment of vignettes and 
apercus, fragments in search of a whole.  Sleight-of-hand because it 
presents what is in fact a trailing construction as though it were a 
deliberated thesis happily confirmed.  Anthropological arguments … are 
like excuses, made up after the stumblings that make them necessary have 
already happened.119  
This, too, had a familiar ring to me. 
As I toyed with a way to describe my research process – a discovery process, 
really, and one that easily passed the Bloch and Geertz tests for groping and stumbling – I 
realized that an account of my methods could best be described without any pretense to 
having had a clever plan from the outset.  At the beginning, I was hooked when I came 
across that first clue about the Monrobot and the notion that there might be some missing 
history in the oft-told, UNIVAC-only anecdote from election night 1952.  From there, the 
process might be described as a treasure hunt. It would come to involve materials 
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gathered in person or by correspondence from more than 40 archives and individuals 
spread across the country, plus extensive use of online databases of historical 
newspapers, magazines, and journals, and, of course, the Web. I was even able on 
occasion to locate hard-to-find publications on eBay – along with a small part from a 
long-deceased Monrobot. At various points along the way, snippets of video on YouTube 
provided evidence that certain kinds of footage might still exist and that I should keep 
looking. Videos uploaded to YouTube also proved useful on occasion for confirming the 
accuracy of certain broadcast transcripts and even accounts of events depicted on old 
television programs and films.  
I had little to go on at the very beginning when I proposed this dissertation, 
especially in the way of primary source materials. At that point, I had seen materials 
available at the Library of American Broadcasting on my own campus at the University 
of Maryland. These included NBC press releases from 1952 and trade publications 
covering radio and television in that era. I had perused accounts in contemporary news 
and magazine articles. I had seen some archival materials at the Library of Congress, 
including microfilm of NBC’s “master books.” These contained details of 1952 election-
day television broadcasts, though not those of election night. I had visited the Hagley 
Museum and Library in Wilmington, Delaware, to look at records of the Sperry-
UNIVAC division of the Sperry Corporation and its historical predecessors, which 
included Remington Rand and the Eckert-Mauchly Corporation. A conversation over 
lunch at a journalism history conference led me to a few minutes of footage dealing with 
the 1952 election-night use of UNIVAC on CBS television.120 And I had visited 
                                                 




computer historian Paul Ceruzzi at the National Air and Space Museum to pick his brain 
about the Monrobot. Checking his own files on the history of computing, he came up 
with a key lead for me. It was a note about a 1953 account in an edition of The Digital 
Computer Newsletter reporting that the Monrobot had had its public debut on election 
night 1952 in connection with the NBC television broadcast. He also told me how I could 
find the newsletter, which had been published at that time by the Office of Naval 
Research as a supplement to another periodical, Mathematical Tables and Other Aids to 
Computation. 
Together, these items gave me at least the hope of finding more.   
One of the most challenging aspects of writing about broadcast television in the 
early 1950s is that it tended to be ephemeral.  Videotape would not come along for 
several more years. The means for recording television in 1952 was kinescope – using a 
motion picture camera to capture on film what appeared on a television monitor during a 
live broadcast. After a long search, I was eventually able to locate all six hours of the 
election-night broadcast on NBC television, which started at 9 p.m., plus the first few 
hours of election-night broadcasting on NBC radio, which started at 8 p.m., and several 
relevant radio broadcasts in the run-up to the election. I was also able to locate, after an 
even longer search, all of the CBS television network broadcast, which began at 8 p.m. In 
indicating that I located these broadcasts, I would not want to give the impression that 
this was done with any efficiency. It was not – more on this shortly. But in the end, I 
believe this to be the first study to have access to and make use of these broadcasts – or at 




I learned several things in this quest for materials – beyond the standard protocols 
for this sort of historical research involving databases, reference works, catalogues, and 
the mining of many thousands of footnotes for leads to sources.121 The first was not to be 
shy about letting it be known to as many people as possible what I was seeking. In their 
guide to historical inquiry, Jacques Barzun and Henry Graff write this: “The researcher 
must again and again imagine the kind of source he would like to have before he can find 
it.”122  I did that, and then shamelessly spread the word about what I hoped to find, 
talking  about it with mentors, colleagues, students, acquaintances, other researchers, 
archivists, collectors, and just about anyone else I thought might be interested. I made 
hundreds of these contacts along the way. This part of the process yielded a steady stream 
of ideas and leads – many of them dead ends, but many not – and following up on them 
yielded new finds right up to the completion of the final draft of this dissertation.  
A second thing I learned – not unrelated to the first – was that, just as in my 
former life as a journalist, cold-calling does not work as well as having someone in 
particular to call when contacting an organization or archive that might hold relevant 
materials. To this end, I pored through the acknowledgments in countless books and 
journal articles, looking both for relevant archives and the individuals there who had been 
helpful to other researchers. I asked the people with whom I spoke for names of those 
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whom I should contact at other institutions. And I scanned the Web pages of archives and 
other entities looking for the names and numbers of archivists and specialists, and, where 
possible, I tried to learn a bit about their expertise and background. This almost always 
made for more interesting, productive, and enjoyable conversations – even if there were 
no fresh finds. 
The third thing I learned was to cycle back around for a second or third look at 
repositories that did not seem at first to be very promising. One of the most important 
reasons for doing this is that archives may have new acquisitions, freshly digitized 
holdings, or enhanced finding aids, catalogs, and databases for exploring their 
collections.  This turned out to be the key to getting access to the NBC broadcasts 
following the passage of time after an unsuccessful initial attempt.   My renewed efforts 
focused on an online database of holdings that had been made accessible on the Web.  
My experiences in obtaining the complete CBS television broadcast from election 
night 1952 succeeded, in stages, when I eventually realized that I needed to push past the 
initial appearance that much of the broadcast had disappeared.  The CBS News Archives 
was able to locate only the first 30 minutes of the broadcast in its own holdings, and the 
archives made this available to me. A few additional minutes turned up at the Computer 
History Museum in Mountain View, California.  One terrific find was a 30-minute 
compendium, including a number of key UNIVAC segments, which was located at the 
archives of the Peabody Awards in Georgia. CBS had apparently prepared the edited reel 
in an unsuccessful attempt to win the broadcast news award that year. And transcripts of 
those and other segments involving the UNIVAC turned up in the papers of CBS News 




of Wisconsin in Madison.  It seemed that would be all for the CBS television broadcast.  
But then well along in my research, I requested from the Computer History Museum a 
copy of a 1951 episode of CBS’s See it Now program in which host Edward R. Murrow 
did a segment about a computer operating at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  
When I screened that episode, much to my surprise I found several extra, undocumented 
minutes tacked on at the end. These turned out to be from the 1952 CBS election night 
broadcast, and they included footage I had not seen in any of the other segments I had 
encountered.  Realizing that there must be more, I redoubled my efforts and ended up on 
the Web site of the Paley Center for Media, a place I had visited earlier on a trip to New 
York.  The database there had listings for lots of episodes of election-night programs for 
many years, but none for 1952. This time I searched for any election-night segment that 
had no listing of the year and no specific detail that would rule it out as possibly from 
1952. The search returned 15 segments. A curator at the center determined from another 
list that eight of these were definitely not 1952. The other seven were a mystery. The 
Paley Center staff agreed to have a look at them. As it turned out, all seven were from 
election night 1952 – covering the period from 9 p.m. on election night to about 3 a.m.,  
plus an edited compendium of segments at the end of the final reel that had clearly been 
the source for the video I had found earlier in the Peabody Awards collection. Between 
the Paley Center footage and the half hour I had obtained from the CBS News Archives, I 
was still missing a segment of almost 30 minutes between 8:30 p.m. to 9 p.m.  Just weeks 
before completing this dissertation, I went back into to the Paley Center database and 
located one item that had a catalogue number one digit lower than the catalogue number 




screen it – and it turned out to be the full first hour of the broadcast, including the 
previously missing material between 8:30 and 9 p.m. 
Other network documents and radio recordings came from a number of sources, 
the most complete of which, for the period of interest to me, was the NBC collection at 
the Wisconsin Historical Society. These included, among other things, radio recordings 
and NBC’s planning documents for its 1952 election-night television broadcast, as well 
as documents from the coverage of earlier elections that are referenced in Chapter 3. 
Not all quests were successful. ABC radio and television broadcasts, transcripts, 
press releases, and summaries have eluded me so far in searching for them with the 
network and other archives. 
As with broadcast materials, the search for records from the computer world was 
also a treasure hunt, more or less.  Pivotal experiences involved locating Max A. 
Woodbury, the mathematician who figured out the formulas behind the UNIVAC’s 
election night forecasting, and Stephen E. Wright, the lead programmer in converting the 
formulas into instructions for the computer. Chasing leads in documents from the Hagley 
archives and on the Internet was the key to finding Woodbury. And finding Wright, 
whose name I also first encountered in a document at the Hagley archives, was made 
easier by the fact that he maintains a Web site with autobiographical material. 
One of the biggest breakthroughs came after determining that the Monroe 
Calculating Machine Company, formerly based in New Jersey, survived as Monroe 
Systems for Business in an office and adjacent warehouse in Levittown, Pennsylvania – a 
fraction of Monroe’s former size but still satisfying, in the computer age, a market for 




whether he might still have any records from the 1950s, he told me that he had been 
waiting for years for someone to ask that question. Over time, as the company changed 
hands and moved and consolidated in size, Roberts had gathered up what records he 
could. They were sitting in a few dozen filing cabinet drawers in a room off the main 
warehouse floor. He made them available to me. I went through them drawer by drawer. 
The materials in them proved invaluable. Perhaps the best of these was a drawer full of 
glossy in-house magazines, including one titled Keynote. There in the stack was the issue 
from November 1952.  And right in the middle of that issue was a two-page spread titled 
“Monrobot Flashes Election Trends.” It had photos, details, and, most importantly, 20 
names of participants from the Monroe camp – in the article, and in a list in small type at 
the end. 
Following those leads took me eventually across the country to Dorothy Burkhart, 
widow of William Burkhart, an inventor and Monrobot developer. And, like so many 
others I encountered along the way, Dorothy Burkhart was generous with her time and let 
me spend several days going through her husband’s files.  She also helped me track down 
others who had worked with her husband and had been present at NBC’s famed Studio 8-
H on election night in 1952.   
Fifty-plus years are a long time to ask someone to remember the details from one 
long-ago set of events.  But almost everyone I contacted was willing to speak with me 
and provide recollections, whatever documents and photos they had, and, especially, 
leads. It is an article of faith among historians that remembered accounts should be 
supplemented where possible with other records. I have done that wherever possible, 




In addition, various archives hold the papers of some key participants in the 
events of 1952 who have since passed away. These included John Mauchly, co-inventor 
of the UNIVAC, and Herman Lukoff, the engineer who was responsible for keeping the 
computer equipment in good working order on election night. The papers of Mauchly’s 
partner, J. Presper Eckert, ended up with a collector, Jeremy Norman, who listed and 
described them as part of a published catalog of his holdings. These were auctioned off at 
Christie’s in New York while I worked on this project, and I had a chance to look at the 
items of interest to me before the auction. 
One of the ironies of new digital technologies is that they can enable us in some 
ways to peer more deeply and closely into the pre-digital past. I benefited from several 
databases that were well established or became better known as I worked on this project. 
One of the most useful of these was NewspaperArchive.com.  Covering thousands of 
mostly smaller newspapers, it allowed me, in conjunction with the handful of major 
papers that are full-text searchable through the ProQuest Historical Newspapers database, 
to do a chapter I had not originally envisioned when planning this dissertation. That is 
Chapter 6, which explores the culture-wide competition for attention on election night in 
1952, encompassing not only television and radio, but events sponsored by newspapers, 
civic groups, schools, movie theaters, restaurants, and even a religious event featuring the 
evangelist Billy Graham.   
There is, unfortunately, no equivalent to these databases of historic newspapers 
for transcripts of broadcast programs in the 1950s. But transcripts were made – including 
those made by third-party vendors in the business of selling them to corporations whose 




them. In the papers of Charles Collingwood, as noted earlier, there was a file identified as 
a UNIVAC “scrapbook” for 1952. In addition to the aforementioned transcripts by Radio 
Reports, Inc., similar transcripts had been prepared for occasions when the UNIVAC was 
mentioned on air after the election – not just by the CBS news staff, but by entertainers, 
talk-show hosts, and commentators from a variety of television and radio networks. 
These helped in understanding the way that the story of election night developed and took 
on a variety of meanings in subsequent days.  
Serendipity also played a role in spurring my inquiry into the historical patterns of 
election-night journalism and the special place for the touting of technology on election 
night. At a used-book fair organized as a fundraiser by a local high school, I bought a 
reference book written for a general audience, The History of the American Presidency. 
Thumbing through it, I noticed in the entry for Woodrow Wilson a photo of a 1916 
campaign poster plastered on a brick wall in St. Louis. 123 Next to that poster was another 
one for a vaudeville theater. In large letters it announced “PARISIAN FLIRTS,” and this: 
“ELECTION RETURNS – BY SPECIAL WIRE.” I was struck by several things, 
including the nexus between show business, election news, and technology, and this 
sparked my interest in learning more both about the culture of election night before 1952 
and the competition for attention on election night that resulted in a mix of news and 
entertainment values.   
One of the most challenging aspects of this process was pushing past versions of 
events in journalism history that are seemingly so well-known and well-established that 
they are simply taken as fact. One of these has already been discussed – UNIVAC and 
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CBS, the one-network, one-computer account of election night 1952. Yet even after I 
came to terms with the idea that a second computer, the Monrobot, was used on NBC, I 
was stuck on the idea that nothing of the sort was used on ABC and that IBM played no 
role.  After all, in addition to assertions by an ABC executive that the network would not 
use electronic brains, I could find no mention of an IBM role on election night in 
histories of the company and biographies or autobiographies of its legendary founder, 
Thomas Watson Sr., or his son, Thomas Watson Jr., who was president of IBM at the 
time of the election.124 Rather, where election night was mentioned at all among these 
works, it was in reference to the publicity – unwelcome and even alarming from IBM’s 
perspective – accorded to UNIVAC and IBM’s arch rival, Remington Rand. As it would 
turn out, and as mentioned earlier, a variety of types of IBM equipment – including 
machines deemed at the time to be included among the imprecise category of “electronic 
brains” – had been used in a variety of venues, including the national and local New York 
City broadcasts on ABC.  It did not help that ABC does not have an archive of news-
related records or footage from this period, and no recordings of ABC from election night 
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1952 have turned up to date in searches elsewhere.125 But the absence of an expectation 
of finding ABC using a computer or computer-like equipment also affected how I read 
some documents at first.  For example, in one of the same transcripts found in Charles 
Collingwood’s papers, there was a post-election discussion by a pair of radio talk-show 
hosts, “Dorothy and Dick,” of what they had seen on air on election night in 1952. 
“Dorothy” mentioned that she had seen a discussion about “electronic brains” in which 
news broadcaster John Daly was being briefed on air about what this device would be 
doing at his network.126 Initially, knowing that Daly was part of the ABC election-night 
broadcast, I thought that perhaps “Dorothy” had simply confused him with someone else. 
But later, I realized that “Dorothy” was Dorothy Kilgallen, who, in addition to being a 
radio talk-show host and newspaper columnist was a regular panelist on the CBS 
television entertainment program, What’s My Line. In an unusual arrangement, that show 
on CBS was hosted by Daly, the ABC newscaster. That made it unlikely that Kilgallen 
was wrong, prompting me to redouble my efforts to find out about the “electronic brains” 
used at ABC. Enough bits and pieces then turned up in various places to at least put IBM 
equipment in the election-night picture at ABC and elsewhere: from the IBM Corporate 
Archives, including a story in an IBM company publication after the election and a 
mention in the records of an IBM executive; from the archives of the Charles Babbage 
Institute in Minnesota, where there was another story from late 1952 in a publication of 
the National Machine Accountants Association; from the Library of Congress, where 
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there was an article in an Associated Press magazine; from articles in microfilmed copies 
of the New York World-Telegram and Sun and the Hartford Courant; and even from the 
Web site of a retired computer pioneer who had been involved in the project to use 
Lockheed’s IBM equipment for election-night broadcasting to NBC viewers in the 
West.127 
Another very challenging aspect of understanding the events of election night 
1952 was trying to determine precisely what went on behind the scenes at the UNIVAC 
home base in Philadelphia and out of view of the CBS cameras.  The most common 
element of the standard election night story, as noted earlier, is that the UNIVAC spit out 
a prediction of a landslide – often said to have happened at 8:30 p.m. – but that this 
prediction was not deemed credible and was not aired, and only hours later was the 
behind-the-scenes drama revealed to viewers. But there are questions about the timing of 
this initial prediction, whether anyone at CBS was in on the decision to hold it back, and 
whether, at the point when the prediction was made, the computer program had detected a 
trend that could not have been detected by journalists and commentators who were 
following the returns in traditional ways. These are not trivial questions. The story that 
has prevailed over time goes like this: machine outsmarts humans and scores a publicity 
coup when the truth comes out. It carries messages about technological change. One is 
the idea that the new application of a new technology could do in those circumstances 
what humans absolutely could not. Another is the idea that a single ephemeral event – a 
television broadcast – could generate a uniform response to that technology.  To assess 
these ideas, one needs to know, among other things, just when that first prediction was 
                                                 




made – and what journalists and commentators were making of the night’s events without 
the benefit of a computer.  Typical of the difficulties in asking and answering these 
questions is ambiguity in the documentary record.  For example, after the election, 
Remington Rand put out a report, “How UNIVAC Predicted the Election for CBS-TV.”  
During the research for this dissertation, two versions of this report were found in three 
separate archives. One version was found in two locations: among records given by 
Remington Rand’s successor, the Sperry Univac division of the Sperry Corp., to the 
Hagley Museum and Library in Wilmington, Delaware, and the among the papers of 
UNIVAC’s co-inventor, John Mauchly, at the University of Pennsylvania.128   The other 
version was found among computing history documents archived at the National 
Museum of American History in Washington, D.C.129 These two versions carry the same 
date – December 15, 1952 – and the content is nearly identical, though typed separately. 
But they differ on one detail, the time of that first behind-the-scenes prediction – 8:30 vs. 
9:15 p.m.  Additional elements of ambiguity come from comparing the early vote totals 
listed in the famously dismissed and withheld UNIVAC prediction – which are uniform 
among the several versions of the prediction printout that were found in a variety of 
locations – to the smaller vote totals that can be seen and heard on CBS television, NBC 
television, and NBC radio at around 8:30 pm.  And as early as the first 24 hours after the 
UNIVAC started digesting returns, various versions were already appearing about what 
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happened when and who knew what. I will deal with this particular set of issues in 
Chapters 7 and 8. Suffice it to say here that encounters with this sort of ambiguity were 
not at all uncommon. In the end, the narrative presented here depended not on finding a 
large trove of complete and perfectly reliable records in a discrete number of repositories, 
but on making connections between many small pieces from multiple archives, private 
collections, databases, memoirs, and interviews – and dealing directly with conflicts that 
cannot be rectified with the extant records and recollections.  
Narrative Choices 
I have concluded, after trying a variety of approaches, that there is no single, ideal 
way to tell this story.  I have picked one path through the material, but I am certain there 
are many other possible paths.  Beyond that, I have been reminded, constantly, that 
among the chief frustrations of those who seek to say something about the past are the 
limitations of the historical record. Even after gathering, over several years, shelves full 
of documents, recordings, and interview notes, and after crisscrossing the country to visit 
archives and meet participants in these events, it is so easy to be stalled by the awareness 
of what is missing, all that dark matter.  In an effort, instead, to make the most of what I 
do have, I have chosen anecdotes here and there to give a sense of the events and 
developments under study. I have chosen in some places to devote attention to a small 
number of people, especially those whose stories have not been told before. And I have 
chosen to present at some length a single document or news article or slice of television 




a larger picture where so much is missing. Or as is my hope, perhaps this dark matter is 
not so much missing as it is yet to be revealed. 
As for choices of terminology, a variety of words – prediction, forecasting, 
projection, and prognostication – might be used to describe the act of making a claim 
about the probability of something happening or becoming known in the future.  
Attempts have been made on occasion to make distinctions between these terms for the 
purposes of categorizing and studying how we talk about the future.  In examining the 
history of “technological prognostication,” for example, David Nye makes what he calls a 
“crude division” of that activity into three parts: “We predict the unknown, forecast 
possibilities, and project probabilities.”130  As The Oxford Companion to Philosophy 
points out in the entry on “prediction,” without making Nye’s sort of distinctions, “the 
key role of prediction in human affairs inheres in our stake in the future.”131 Humans 
constantly make judgments about what might follow a particular course of action.  
Evaluation of a scientific theory is connected to beliefs about its predictive capabilities. 
At the heart of this dissertation are events that take place on election night, when early 
returns are used to say something about the likelihood of a particular outcome.  Various 
terms were used in 1952, and are still used, to refer to that activity. I do not explicate or 
make specific distinctions between them, except to note, where relevant, the use of 
particular words in particular ways – earnestly or in jest – to refer to the efforts of 
humans and machines to say something about what was to come. 
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One other point is worth mentioning. During the course of my research, I could 
find no references to the use of modern, stored-program digital computers on an election 
night prior to 1952. The UNIVAC and Monrobot appear to be the first, though one 
cannot absolutely rule out the possibility that some other instance will turn up that did not 
leave an indelible mark on the available historical record.  The use of computers on 
election night in 1952 was certainly treated then as a first. We do not know a great deal 
yet about ways in which advanced pre-computing machines for calculating and 
organizing information were used in connection with election nights or other news 
reporting before 1952. Pre-computer technologies for counting and sorting IBM punched 
cards, for example, had been around for years in newspaper business offices and 
continued to be used after the commercialization of early computers.132 There was even 
an intriguing line in an Associated Press in-house publication following the 1952 
election. Describing the use of more than a ton of IBM punched-card equipment at the 
AP headquarters in Washington on election night, the article cryptically reported that 
such devices – IBM “mechanical brains” – had been “old stuff to some bureaus – been 
using them for years.”133 The machines used by the AP in Washington that night were not 
computers – the article mentions a 195-pound card-punching machine and a 1,900-pound 
tabulator, also referred to in a photo caption as an accounting machine.  But learning 
more about such uses would contribute to our understanding of the kinds of calculating 
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and tabulating equipment that may have been used in connection with news reporting 
before – and even after – the advent of the computer. 
In the end, I am not so much interested here in the notion of “firsts” for their own 
sake. Rather, I am interested in the conditions that help us better understand this early 
intersection of computing and journalism. As we will see in the next two chapters, while 
computers provided something new on election night when they arrived, the role of 





Chapter 2:  Election Night in the Age of Print 
It is a natural impulse, when contemplating “innovation,” to focus on what is new 
– that is, to talk about change.  The very word, “innovation,” draws us to the notion of 
“newness.” But when as members of the first generation of commercial, stored-program 
computers, UNIVAC and Monrobot sat poised for their debut as election-night tools in 
1952, they were, in many respects, continuing an old election-night story.  It was a story 
that encompassed well-established forecasting methods stretching back into the 19th 
century.  It was a story that provided a prominent place, election after election, for 
technological novelty.  And it was a story that played up technological wonders not only 
in disseminating election news, but in attracting a crowd and promoting the intersecting 
interests of journalists and their technological collaborators.  The drama of reporting the 
election-night story had long been part of that story, as had the seemingly wondrous 
means by which journalists and collaborating “experts” gathered, analyzed, and 
disseminated the news.  Even in the decades before radio and television, newspapers did 
not wait until the next day to publicize election results and forecasts. Publishers 
employed novel means to transmit the news by sight, sound, and wire to audiences in the 
street, at indoor events of all sorts, and even miles away at home.  Commentary on the 
size and extent of these audiences – drawn in, reached and informed by newspapers with 
the help of technological innovations – became part of the story, too, and provided 
bragging rights for bolstering the news organizations’ stature in the communities they 
served.  In a competitive environment, election night was a chance for journalists to 
shine, and touting their extraordinary, technologically enhanced efforts had been a 




There were well-known risks, too.  One was the very real risk of embarrassment 
from a wayward forecast in the rush to get the news out.  Another was the risk of making 
a tardy call and being beaten by a competitor.  So there was a special place for any tool, 
any practice, or any sort of collaboration with non-journalists that could help – anything 
that could reliably improve the extent of the available vote count, the speed at which it 
was assembled, the conclusions that could be drawn from it, and the size of the audience 
that could see or hear it.  These enhancements were desirable for the news that could be 
reported on deadline.  They were also desirable for staking a claim to methodological 
supremacy, and they continued to have a place in election-night reporting during the era 
of radio and then television.  
Conditions for Election Night as a Journalistic Event 
Long before the advent of broadcasting and computers, journalists had been at 
center stage on election night.  How did they become key players in a set of intensely-
engaging events compressed into a few hectic hours on one night, election after election? 
This role has been commonplace for so long now that the thought of an election night 
without news organizations as centers of attention seems odd.  But election night as a 
journalistic phenomenon has a history, most visible in the case of presidential elections.    
In fact, decades would go by after the first presidential election before there was any 
common, discrete event across the country that could be called a national “election night” 
and until the right constellation of conditions found journalists as the focus of public 




One of these conditions was expansion of popular participation in elections 
through voting, along with the corollary rise of public interest in the outcome. Though the 
United States was founded as a democracy, voting rights were far from universal at the 
outset.1  With widespread exclusions based on gender, race, and property ownership, 
voting tended to be an elite affair in the early years of the republic. And in a number of 
the original states, even elite members of society with voting rights did not participate in 
choosing the president.  Instead, legislatures in those states picked electors who, in turn, 
would meet with the electors from other states to choose a president. 
As voting rights expanded, most white males possessed those rights by the early 
19th century.  Along the way, there were signs of increasing public interest in elections 
and outcomes while election night took shape as a complex social phenomenon. In a 
nation where powerful and privileged interests held sway in the economic, social, and 
political spheres, popular elections, by their very nature, turned the de facto hierarchy of 
American society on its head.  For one day, at least, a large number of ordinary 
Americans – those to whom suffrage had been extended – seemed to have a say in the 
affairs of public life.  In the mid-19th century, the poet John Greenleaf Whittier captured 
this notion in lines from a poem entitled, “The Poor Voter on Election Day.” 
The proudest now is but my peer, 
     The highest not more high; 
To-day, of all the weary year, 
     A king of men am I. 
To-day alike are great and small, 
     The nameless and the known; 
My palace is the people’s hall, 
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     The ballot-box my throne!2 
This social inversion carried through to election night.3  Celebrations could be lively and 
even rowdy affairs, with bonfires, crowds of unruly boys roaming the streets, the spirited 
collection of wagers, and disputes verging over into violence and even death.4   
Along with expanded participation in balloting, there came evidence of expanded 
public interest in the expected and actual outcome.  Long before newspapers and election 
nights became joined in the public mind – and long before news organizations 
commissioned and published scientific public opinion polls – citizens devised their own 
means of trying to divine which candidate was most likely to win.  Watching the ebb and 
flow of odds in a vibrant betting market that surrounded presidential elections was one 
way. 5  And there were a variety of other efforts to quantify voter preference in advance 
of elections.  Scholars have settled on the election of 1824 as a particular watershed in the 
evolution of public-opinion polling.6  That year’s presidential contest would involve both 
a handful of notable political personalities and a significant milestone in public 
involvement, with 18 of 24 states choosing their electors by popular vote.7  During the 
run-up to the election, straw votes were taken at militia assemblies, grand jury meetings 
                                                 
2 John Greenleaf Whittier, “The Poor Voter on Election Day,” The Chapel of the Hermits and Other Poems 
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3 One of the landmark studies of another form of social inversion in the 18th and 19th century America is 
Stephen Nissenbaum’s The Battle for Christmas (New York:  Vintage Books, 1996).  
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and tax gatherings. 8   At musters of local militias on the Fourth of July, participants 
would also offer toasts to their favorite candidates.  The number of toasts was taken as an 
indicator of political strength, and these counts were reported in newspapers.  The 
newspapers did not invent these early or “proto” straw polls.  The counting of toasts was 
an outgrowth of natural public interest.9  But local newspapers did report on them, and 
those reports reappeared elsewhere, reflecting a common practice in that era for editors to 
freely recycle items from periodicals that arrived by postal service or were carried by 
travelers.10   In what is surely an early example of journalistic data analysis, editors in 
some places culled reports from a variety of newspapers and published them in the 
aggregate. The Raleigh Star and North Carolina State Gazette compiled results from 49 
gatherings and published them in August 1824, then aggregated the results of some 155 
gatherings by October.11  Such tallies were reported with a combination of curiosity and 
skepticism.12  In August 1824, the editors of the Republican Compiler of Gettysburg, 
Pennsylvania, reprinted this item from another Pennsylvania paper:13  
                                                 
8 Ibid., 26. 
9 Littlewood, in his study of “horse-race journalism,” writes: “The impetus for the development of straw 
polls and their progeny – the modern ‘scientific’ polls – comes not from journalists but from The People”; 
in Littlewood, Calling Elections, 176; he also discusses this phenomenon in detail in Chapter 2, 15-27. 
10 Matheson reports an example of an Illinois paper, The Alton Telegraph, reprinting an account in 1836 of 
voting in Pennsylvania; the account came from a Louisville paper, which, in turn, got the news from a 
Pittsburgh paper that had been provided by a steamboat passenger;  Matheson, Steam Packet to Magic 
Lantern,. 41. 
11 Tankard, “Public Opinion Polling by Newspapers in the Presidential Election Campaign of 1824,” 363; 
Smith, “The First Straw?”  27. 
12 Smith, “The First Straw?” 27-29. 
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Fourth of July Toasts – Some have supposed that much of public 
sentiment may be gathered from this source.  No doubt this is in some 
degree fact; but we do not believe it is an exact criterion of the whole 
public feeling.  With a view to get all the light we could from this quarter, 
we carefully perused all the papers received at this office, containing 
anniversary toasts, and have devoted more than a whole day, in examining 
them.  The result is, that in this state, the 4th of July was celebrated by 111 
distinct parties, of all descriptions – that they collectively drank 2807 
toasts:  of these, the four Presidential candidates received as follows:  
JACKSON, - - 268 
CLAY, - - -   29      
CRAWFORD,  -   20 
ADAMS, -  - -   11 
The article went on to elaborate on its method, the sort of disclosure that even today may 
get short shrift in news reports on polls and surveys:  Jackson, it was noted, was credited 
with toasts that may not have named him directly but were offered in honor of the “Hero 
of Orleans.”  The piece concluded with this caveat:  “These are the facts we have 
gathered, as regards Pennsylvania.  Let each draw his own conclusion from them.”14 
In addition to evidence of increasing public interest in presidential elections and 
journalistic interest in voter sentiment, other important elements were in place by 1848 
that would help solidify the position of journalists at the center of election-night activity.  
Until that year, there could be no single, nationwide “election night” because states held 
their elections, even for president, on different days.  In fact, there was a window of 34 
days in the fall during which voting for president could be held. That changed when 
Congress enacted, in 1845, a uniform voting day for president, to take effect in 1848. 15    
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Still, having a uniform voting day alone did not guarantee the evolution of 
election night as a phenomenon that would find newspapers at the center of attention.  A 
change in the pace at which news could move from place to place was also critical.  Of 
course, to people living at that time, delays were not perceived the way they are today.  
Americans marveled as early as the 1830s and 1840s at the “annihilation of space and 
time.”  But when that phrase turned up in periodicals of the day, it referenced accounts of 
steamships crossing the Atlantic, a voyage that could be measured in weeks; locomotives 
traveling at a wondrous 30 miles per hour; and telegraph messages traversing hundreds of 
miles – from Buffalo to Pittsburgh and back, by way of New York and Philadelphia – in 
under two hours.16  Even so, weeks and even months might elapse as election returns 
dribbled in from distant states during an era when newspapers relied on trains, horse 
relays, steamboats, rowboats, messenger pigeons and even signal flags to transmit 
information.17  On Nov. 10, 1840, the editor of the Southport Telegraph, a newspaper in 
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Control, ed. Miriam R. Levin (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 2000), 235. 
17 In a history of the Associated Press written in 1940, Oliver Gramling tells of the use of signal flags to 
transmit breaking news from the 1848 Whig National Convention across the Hudson River in its journey 





the Wisconsin Territory, was underwhelmed by the adequacy of election news.18  
Although returns were trickling in from various parts of the country, they were “not 
sufficient to tell how any one state has gone.”19  And the stakes in making a judgment 
from insufficient data were deemed serious:  “We should not like to risk our reputation 
for prophecy by venturing an opinion.”20   
Those limitations in the movement of information would start to fade away with 
the arrival of the telegraph. The first presidential election involving telegraphic 
transmissions took place in 1848.21  And the wonders of technology quickly became part 
of the story that newspapers told about their own efforts to deliver the news.  Following 
the 1848 election, a newspaper in southwest Illinois reported the astounding fact that due 
to the “facilities afforded by the magnetic telegraph,” returns from as far away as New 
York, Richmond, and “nearly the whole of Vermont” had arrived several hours before the 
newspaper got returns in from a nearby village.22  But arrival of the telegraph did not 
bring about immediate or universal changes in the speed at which returns could be 
aggregated.  Telegraph installations did not spread at once to each community where 
votes were cast.  The process took time, and the nation itself was expanding. After 
winning statehood, Californians first participated in the national vote in 1852. That was 
still nine years before a telegraphic network crossed the continent. Existing technologies 
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and overlapping systems were needed in the interim.  Even as the telegraph was taking 
root, reporting on election returns might call attention, breathlessly, to the other 
technologies in place to speed the vote count on its way.   A brief item that appeared in 
the New York Daily Times on Nov. 12, 1852, noted, “Some extraordinary engine running 
was performed on the railroads in Massachusetts … in collecting the election returns.”23   
The story went on to quote an article appearing in another newspaper about a train that 
had run from the Vermont line to Springfield, Massachusetts – “50 miles – making six 
stops on the way, in fifty-three minutes!”24  After the 1860 election, the pony express 
continued to be an important means for transmitting vote counts to telegraph stations – 
and worthy of mention in news stories about the election.25  Even when 1861 marked the 
first coast-to-coast link, it would take years for the telegraph to spread to enough places 
for a critical mass of votes to be reported nationwide on election night. In 1882, a desire 
to speed up reporting from two mountainous Congressional districts prompted the editor 
of the Atlanta Constitution to run telegraph and telephone wires, charter trains, and set up 
relays of couriers on horseback.26  As late as 1904, a lengthy magazine article on the 
workings of the Associated Press noted that the telegraph and telephone had become the 
most common means of gathering returns and that bicycles were employed, too, but “in 
some of the more remotely and thinly settled counties, couriers on horseback are used.”27 
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New technological twists could bring old systems into focus as novelties in the 
transmission of election information. In 1896, the New York Times carried a front-page 
item on the expanding utility of homing pigeons.  As a result of experimentation at the 
United States Naval Academy – including the invention of a lightweight, water-tight 
message holder made of aluminum – “messenger pigeon stations” had been set up at navy 
yards on both coasts.  Among the various other uses of the birds of late, the Times 
reported – and Scientific American reprised a few months later –newspapers had used 
pigeons during recent elections to transmit returns.28   
   A New Problem for Newspapers – Aggregating the Vote on Deadline 
Methodologies for aggregating returns in meaningful ways and projecting winners 
from incomplete data predated the telegraph. Writing his classic history of American 
journalism in 1873, Frederic Hudson was already referring to the handling of election 
returns as a “science.” 29 He attributed expertise at this task to some of the journalists 
whose fame as editors was associated with the “penny press” and its attendant expansion 
of popular newspaper readership before the advent of the telegraph.    
These [election] figures, so interesting to politicians and to office-
seekers when they result in majorities on the right side, are very difficult 
to arrange clearly and intelligently.  Sometimes they are a Chinese puzzle.  
One must understand the science not to make stupid blunders…. Bennett, 
of the Herald, thoroughly comprehended them.  So did Greeley, of the 
                                                 
28 “Their Sphere Enlarging; Homing Pigeons Demonstrate Their Usefulness in Many Ways,” New York 
Times, Nov. 28, 1896, 1; “Increased Use of Homing Pigeons,” Scientific American 76, no. 2 (Jan. 9, 1897), 
20. 





Tribune.  Others, in attempting to give election returns, would get them 
terribly confused.30 
Another master of this “science” was Richard Haughton.31  When Haughton was 
recruited to edit the Boston Atlas in the 1830s, according to Hudson, the move 
precipitated a problem in election coverage at his old paper, the Journal of Commerce in 
New York. Who was to handle this “peculiar department,” as Hudson called it? The 
paper’s proprietors, David Hale and Gerard Hallock, discussed the issue: 
Hale told Hallock he must perform this task.  “I don’t understand 
such things; I never did, and I never could,” said Hallock.  “Well,” replied 
Hale, “we must have them, and you must try your hand at them.”  Hallock, 
patient and obliging man, did try, and succeeded.  Some of the Union 
merchants, in giving silver plate to him one day for his services to the 
country as a journalist, included in their compliments one for the accuracy 
of his election returns.32 
Understanding the “science” of handling election returns took on greater urgency 
after the arrival of the telegraph, which precipitated a new sort of election-night crisis for 
newspaper editors.33  This crisis runs counter to the more common way of viewing the 
ramifications of the telegraph.  In works such as The Control Revolution, James 
Beniger’s classic study of the 19th-century roots of the “information society,” the 
telegraph is revealed as a solution to a serious safety problem for the railroads at a critical 
period in the nation’s development.34  The harnessing of steam power and its application 
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in the nascent rail system had allowed for the movement of unprecedented quantities of 
goods – especially the output of the industrial revolution – at unprecedented speeds and 
greater distances.  But in the early rail lines, trains typically ran in both directions on a 
single track.  Inadequate information about the location of trains and inadequate systems 
of control led to numerous and notorious head-on collisions.  For that problem, the 
telegraph – and the ability to instantly transmit information about the location of trains – 
served as a critical part of the solution. But for newspapers, the seeming godsend of the 
rapid flow of election returns meant a deluge of information.  The Associated Press – 
itself nascent in the late 1840s with the formation of its progenitor, the New York 
Associated Press – would come to play a pivotal role in organizing and aggregating the 
flow of election-night returns from around the country.  But this system would take years 
to evolve.  The combination of regional press associations into a truly national entity 
would be key, as would be the development of procedures and systems for handling the 
new flood of telegraph-transmitted returns in an efficient and effective manner.  A 
plaintive appeal from the New York Associated Press shortly before the 1852 election 
gives a hint of the challenges that had to be met.  Reprinted on the front page of the New 
York Daily Times under the headline “Telegraphic Election Returns,” the circular 
bespoke an ambitious goal, nothing less than “to enable the Press of the entire country to 
announce the result of the national election on the morning after the closing of the 
polls.”35   “Confusion” – a word that appears three times in the circular – was the enemy, 
and the news service was asking telegraph operators, correspondents, and newspaper 
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agents to follow a few rules. Only “reliable individuals” were to be trusted to supply 
returns.  Except for large cities, vote counts should be reported at the county level, not for 
each small town. The “actual majority” for each presidential candidate was to be 
reported.  When complete returns were not available, it would be okay to send the 
“probably majority” – a forecast, in effect – but only by making clear the percentage and 
number of towns in a county on which the estimate was based.  To be avoided were 
rumors – in fact, “rumors of all sorts.”   As it was, the Times would note in the week after 
the voting that “The Election returns dribble in slowly.”36   Eight years later, the 
expansion of the telegraph notwithstanding, complete news of election of Abraham 
Lincoln in 1860 would still require a combination of means – the telegraph where it 
existed, the pony express where it did not.37  In December, the vote was still coming in.38  
Telegraph wires would not stretch from coast to coast until the next year. 
Newspapers and Election Night in the Latter 19th Century  
As a constellation of requisite parts came together – expanded suffrage, common 
voting dates, technology for rapid transmission of returns, and systems for collating those 
returns in a meaningful way – the significance of election night for newspapers increased.   
The latter half of the 19th century saw the continued development of election-night 
practices that would serve as a base of cultural continuity heading into the 20th century 
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and right up to 1952.   These included the use of well-orchestrated systems for gathering 
local and distant returns.  Journalists collaborated with non-journalists – outside experts – 
for the calculation of results.  Empirical methods were employed for predicting the 
winners.  Technological innovation figured prominently in attention-getting means of 
displaying returns to an audience in advance of publishing returns in the newspaper.  The 
people who ran newspapers also demonstrated an awareness of the audience as 
participants rather than merely passive observers. In this mix, showmanship became a 
paramount value.  Reporters and publishers inserted themselves into the story of election 
night, touting their accomplishments not only under intense deadline pressure but in 
preparations lasting weeks or even months.  Technologies of information and 
communication played multiple roles – as technical means to journalistic ends, as 
wonders to attract attention, as promotional tools both for the journalists and for the 
technologists, and as symbols of the excellence of their purveyors.  In this era, even the 
audiences for these events – rising in numbers to astounding levels – became, themselves, 
objects of wonder.   
Methods of Forecasting 
The increased ability of newspaper editors to have vastly more information – and 
better-organized information – in the hours after the polls closed posed a new challenge 
beyond the mere imperative to present the vote count in a comprehensible way.  Editors 
might be able to make a convincing forecast in their first regular editions, in extras, or 
even sooner in announcements to waiting crowds.  But that opportunity to show off their 




forecast – or worse, the issuance of a forecast projecting an outcome that would turn out 
to be grossly incorrect – could bring embarrassment instead of prestige. 
Part of the “science” of election returns is the notion that predicting a winner from 
early returns presents a special sort of mathematical problem.  This problem cannot be 
solved without knowledge of the fine-grained geographical dimensions of politics and 
access to detailed, comparative data about past elections.  In short, the early vote count is 
useless as an indicator of victory if divorced from details about the locations providing 
that vote and the electoral history of those locations.  Nineteenth-century newspaper 
editors came to understand this just as well as 21st-century television news producers do.  
As early as 1848, a newspaper in Wisconsin evidenced this sensibility in praising the 
telegraph for “relieving” the populace “of that long suspense which formerly followed 
elections.” Though results were not available from all locations – in fact, the paper noted, 
telegraphed results had been “meager” – they had come “from such points as would serve 
as a basis of calculations for other places.”39  After the same election, readers of the 
Massachusetts Ploughman and Journal of Agriculture were being advised in 1848 to hold 
onto newspapers listing election returns in order to consult them again at the next 
election.40 And in an 1892 article about election-night methods and practices, Willis John 
Abbot, managing editor of the Chicago Times, wrote, “Comparison is the prime factor in 
the solution of the election problem.”41  While assessing the outcome of a presidential 
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election meant focusing primarily on the “doubtful states,” determining on election night 
which party would control Congress and by how much could be even more daunting:  
[It] is a task requiring exceptional facilities in the way of getting and 
handling the news, and unusual knowledge of political statistics. Yet it has 
been done with practical accuracy by several newspapers during the 
present decade.  It will be readily understood that estimation, comparison 
– scientific guesswork, in short – contributes as much to the result in this 
case as the actual returns.42 
Newspapers even found ways to generate income from the sale of data that might be used 
to make sense of election returns as they were reported.  Before the 1860 election, for 
example, the New York Tribune assembled returns from elections back to 1824 – together 
with a “vast amount of historical matter” – and packaged it all up in a 254-page volume, 
The Political Text Book, which sold for one dollar. 43  An advertisement for the Tribune’s 
election data book – an ad that ran in the New York Times – suggested that “As the 
Election returns come in, politicians will want to compare the result with the votes of 
former years.”44 
Data points for future use could also be generated from fine-grained analyses in 
the days following elections – albeit tinged with the biases of the day – linking locale, 
ethnicity, and vote counts. One such example appeared in the New York Times following 
Lincoln’s 1864 reelection victory over the Democratic challenger, Gen. George B. 
McClellan.45  The Times concluded that “from Maine to Kansas,” though with “marked 
exceptions,” the “vicious and ignorant population of the cities and manufacturing villages 
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has been for McClellan, while the strength of Lincoln lay in the farming class, and the 
intelligent class of the towns.”46  A ward-by-ward dissection of the New York City 
returns followed. Heavy support was reported for McClellan in “all the most crowded and 
wretched of the ‘tenement house’ districts,” as in the First Ward, “where there are nearly 
as many rum-holes as houses,” or in the Eleventh Ward, home to “immense multitudes of 
ignorant Germans, … and where domicile, the rag-pickers and bone-gatherers of New 
York.”47 Lincoln support could be pegged to specific city blocks with “separate houses 
and a well-off or intelligent class.”48 
Employing data from past elections and an understanding of variations in the 
electorate, some editors developed legendary methods of election-night analysis and a 
special reputation for accuracy.  Charles H. Taylor, the Boston Globe’s iconic publisher 
and editor, had worked out a system for election-night forecasting by 1883, one that he 
supervised until his final election night at the newspaper in 1920.  This system was 
chronicled in 1923 by a Globe editor of Taylor’s era, James Morgan, and was later 
described in a history of the Globe published by another Globe newsroom veteran, Louis 
M. Lyons. 49  The heart of Taylor’s system for state elections involved following the 
source of returns as they came in on election night, right down to the precinct level.  The 
Globe was able to tame the mass of information flowing through the newsroom with 
specially designed organizational tools.  The figures were captured on duplicate sheets of 
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paper, color-coded so that that one set would go to the political editor and others to 
various arms of the newsroom operation.  These incomplete and scattered returns would 
be assessed using another set of tools, historical data for the same precincts that had been 
assembled into books during the weeks and months before election day.  Comparisons 
were made to detect whether current voting patterns were following or diverging from 
what had happened in prior elections.  The Globe staff also came to understand ways of 
examining the returns by general geographical area – Boston, the other Massachusetts 
cities, and the towns – with awareness from past elections of the plurality a candidate 
would need in one of these areas to overcome a deficit elsewhere.  Without knowledge of 
the specific sources of the vote as it came in, the cumulative totals would have had little 
value as the night went on.  But with that specific knowledge – combined with input from 
the political writers who might be asked to make sense of anomalies (“some riddle in the 
returns,” as Lyons put it) – a forecast could be made by a methodology that the Globe had 
developed and come to trust over time.50 
Morgan acknowledged that while Taylor’s system “bars all guessing … by 
reducing the question of who is elected to a problem of mathematics,” the decision to 
employ it was made with an awareness of the stakes in prestige to be won or lost.51  
“When, as often happens, a candidate runs second in the returns all evening,” Morgan 
wrote, “it does take nerve to keep putting out the statement that he will come in first on 
the full returns in the morning.”52  Perhaps for that reason, Taylor’s method was not 
automatically adopted elsewhere – despite its apparent power as a forecasting tool.  
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Morgan gave an account of Taylor’s attempt at one point to organize a nationwide 
network of newspapers that would follow his system and band together for better 
collective forecasting power.  But, wrote Morgan, “Having no experience to sustain their 
faith in the scheme, his pupils lost their courage and patience when the test came, and 
they reverted to their old unscientific method of computing.”53  Even as Morgan penned 
his description of the Taylor system in 1923, the principles on which it was based were 
still not the obvious choice everywhere, which left Morgan perplexed at the result. He 
saw a continuing pattern of post-election confusion that could take days to resolve in 
some states.  “Now that the telephone is everywhere, one voting precinct is no more 
remote than another from a newspaper office that goes after it and keeps after it, as the 
Globe does, until it has waked the sleepiest hamlet in the hills,” Morgan wrote. “Once a 
fair sample is obtained of how the people voted, General Taylor’s system of analysis 
discloses, almost with the exactness of a chemical test, the total vote of a State.”54 
Morgan recited a number of occasions over Taylor’s tenure in which the 
publisher’s system had given the Globe a jump on its competitors or saved the paper from 
inaccurate forecasts that many other papers were making based on a less rigorous 
approach.  These included the state election of 1892, when the incumbent Massachusetts 
governor waited through the night at the Globe to see the paper correctly forecast his 
narrow reelection.  And there was the presidential race of 1916, when Taylor’s 
understanding of the evolving national vote led him to resist joining the tide of papers 






announcing mistakenly, before enough of the California vote was known, that Charles 
Evans Hughes had defeated Woodrow Wilson.55 
The Globe system of using what would later be known as “key precincts” to make 
judgments about the outcome of an election from early returns has been described by 
Thomas Littlewood, a historian of the “horse-race” style of political reporting, as “the 
single most important methodological advance in the history of electoral journalism… 
The concept which underlies key-precinct analysis – leaping from partial information to a 
broader conclusion – is central to the practice of horse-race journalism, past and 
present.”56  This general methodology – using the votes coming in from specially selected 
areas and comparing the results to historical data for the same areas – provided the 
foundation of election-night forecasting practices that survived to 1952 and beyond.57  
And even when the practice of exit-polling – scientific surveys of voters on election day 
– came to dominate election-night forecasting in the latter 20th century, the principle of 
using vote counts from selected areas and comparing them to expectations based on 
historical data would constitute a powerful line of continuity in election coverage.58 
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Collaboration with Experts for Calculation 
Accounts of election-night reporting and forecasting in the century before 1952 
provide abundant references suggesting that the use of outside experts for calculation – 
together with various mathematical tools – were recurrent features of the culture of 
election-night journalism.  Sometimes the newsroom would borrow these experts from 
other offices of the newspaper.  At the Boston Globe, Taylor and Morgan borrowed the 
services of bookkeepers and accountants from the newspaper’s business office – known 
at the Globe as the “slide-rule men,” or, less formally, the “slide-rule boys.”59  A Chicago 
newspaper editor wrote in 1892 that “Election night finds a newspaper office equipped 
with skilled accountants like a bank.”60  
The source of the mathematical corps employed at the New York Herald on 
election night in 1890 was not specified, but they were described as “expert accountants – 
no better can be found in the city of New York.”61  Ten were employed, along with 60 
“tally clerks,” arranged at long tables in a cavernous, block-long room at the Herald 
building.  A detailed drawing of them – formally attired, their heads down in 
concentration as they worked with pencil and paper – was featured prominently in the 
Herald’s extensive report on its election-night exploits.  The accountants are the 
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specialists here. They are described as “lightning calculators.”62 The presence of the 
experts served multiple purposes, just as computing equipment would later – doing the 
job at hand while adding both to the mystique of the election-night process and the 
prestige of the journalists who organized it.63  
A succession of devices and machines that served as increasingly sophisticated 
aids to calculation appeared throughout the 19th century and 20th century before the 
advent of computers.64  Accounts make clear that along with experts, these machines 
might be borrowed on election night for newsroom calculations.   In 1905, Melville E. 
Stone, manager of the Associated Press, provided an example in an article on the 
workings of the wire service for Century Illustrated Magazine. 65   The work of election 
day, he wrote, was “mapped out in advance with scrupulous care,” and an army of 
Associated Press correspondents and headquarters staff were “augmented by the 
employment of expert accountants and adding-machines from the local banks.”66 
A photograph from the early 20th century in the computing-history archives at the 
Charles Babbage Institute – and an apparently related magazine advertisement for adding 
machines – suggest that newspaper work on election night could advance more than just 
the agendas of the journalists.  The agendas of experts and technologists in the realm of 
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calculation could be advanced at the same time. The photograph depicts a long row of 
tables on which there are visible at least 18 adding machines with narrow rolls of paper 
attached at the back. 67  Behind these tables there are dozens of men, a row of them seated 
and the rest standing, dressed in coats, ties and an assortment of hats, plus a mustachioed 
man in a uniform standing at the back by a door.  All are staring at the camera.  Across 
the top, in large type, is a caption:  “Burroughs Breaks Election Records in Buffalo.”  
This may well be the same or a similar event referenced in a magazine advertisement for 
Burroughs that appeared in January 1911.68  The ad asserted the infallibility of Burroughs 
adding machines as an answer to the impossibility of absolute reliability in calculation by 
humans. It touted one event in particular, the performance of the company’s machines on 
election night: 
The Burroughs is beginning to serve the Public just as it does the 
Individual.  Here is an item from the Buffalo “Express”: 
“Owing to the voting-machines and the excellent system devised by the 
newspapers for prompt collection of returns, Buffalo now leads the 
country on election night.  It is the only real big city that gives its votes 
complete on the main offices of a ticket before 6 P.M., and few of the 
other cities that use the machines can rival Buffalo in the speed with 
which the returns are assembled.  Much of the credit in this work is due to 
the compilers who handle the adding-machines.  The long battery of 
machines ranged in the City-Hall basement on election night, and the 
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machines used by the “Express” in compiling its own city tables and in 
collecting the vote of the towns, were Burroughs Adding Machines.”69 
 
In a similar display of the linked agendas of newspapers and technologists, the 
Illinois State Journal gave a nod in 1912 to the Remington Typewriter Company for 
providing a typewriter with “the marvelous Wahl adding machine attachment,” a device 
allowing the newspaper for the “first time in the history of Springfield” to provide “table 
totals” on the morning after the election.70  And in 1913, the Duluth News-Tribune in 
Minnesota reported on the aftermath of a hotly-contested municipal ballot question 
dealing with liquor control.  As hundreds of people called the paper after the polls closed, 
results were “furnished as fast as R.G. Roberts, city salesman for the Remington 
Typewriter company made rapid fire totals with a Remington-Wahl adding and 
subtracting typewriter from the bulletins flashed into the office from each precinct.”71 
Getting the Word Out on Election Night 
Well before the era of radio and television broadcasting, the public did not need to 
wait until newspapers’ morning editions to learn of election results.   Editors and 
publishers developed increasingly ingenious means for getting the word out, satisfying 
public interest and allowing newspapers to remain at the center of attention on election 
night, even if they did not gain financially in delivering the news by these means.  This 
was a special night, and it was a chance for newspaper owners and staff to assert their 
importance.  Prestige was attached to relaying news as it came in and trends as they 
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developed, and the practices of posting returns quickly evolved along with the ability to 
gather returns and project winners.  Technological novelty would come to have an 
increasingly important role in these arrangements for both the display of returns and 
judgments about the outcome.  These technologies were promoted and celebrated in print.  
They helped attract crowds.  And the size of the crowds they attracted was also celebrated 
in print, serving to demonstrate a newspaper’s importance in the community. 
Although the telegraph made it possible by the middle of the 19th century to get 
news from far-flung places on election night, the practice of newspapers posting vote 
counts on bulletin boards as returns dribbled in began even before the era of the 
telegraph.72   The arrival of the telegraph helped establish the street outside local 
newspaper offices as the place to get news on election night, and in communities with 
more than one newspaper, there was fierce competition to get the word out first.73  With 
telegraph wires reaching coast-to-coast by 1861, there was greater likelihood of having 
enough data available on election night to declare a victor before the morning papers hit 
the streets.  This possibility set the stage for an era of remarkable inventiveness and 
showmanship, forging and strengthening a link between election-night news, technology, 
and entertainment. 
As the likelihood of getting definitive news on election night grew, so did the size 
of crowds waiting to receive it.  New technologies – or novel applications of existing 
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technologies – were touted for their ability to display returns to people who could not get 
close enough to read the words posted on bulletin boards or to hear returns as they were 
called out.  Before the electric light, newspapers began employing projection systems that 
went by the names “magic lantern” and “stereopticon.”  These were means of projecting 
images or photographs made on plates of glass, or “transparencies.”  A powerful light 
beam, typically produced by heating a block of calcium, was passed through these plates.  
Aided by lenses, the projection system cast a magnified image on a large surface.74   
There were reports in the 1860s of projected images 24 feet in diameter being displayed 
on a massive stretch of canvas.  Improved versions of these devices surfaced from time to 
time, credited to various inventors, and in 1863, the New York Times referred to one as a 
leading amusement of the day.  Dubbed a “philosophical and scientific novelty” and “one 
of the most curious and instructive inventions of the age,” it attracted audiences who 
came to see the lifelike scenes that it generated.75  The use of such systems to project 
election returns for the crowds waiting outside newspaper offices – and to dazzle them in 
the process – dates back to at least 1860, when references appear to a display outside the 
offices of the New York Herald.76 
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In early October 1872, the Times recounted in a front-page article how crowds 
intensely interested in the elections in Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Ohio gathered on a 
street corner where the newspaper’s returns were to be projected courtesy of the 
Stereopticon Advertising Company.  This “novel method of advertisement,” wrote the 
Times, “found general favor with the throngs of merchants, brokers and professional 
gentlemen packed on the sidewalks and crossings that evening.”77  The story recounted 
the merging of human and technological systems. A telegraph wire was laid from the 
Times building at Printing House Square up Broadway to the stereopticon company’s 
office on 23rd Street. From there, an “attaché of the paper” worked hand in hand with the 
stereopticon operators to generate accurate and timely displays.  Images and sayings were 
projected, too, including these to end the night:  “Washington, Lincoln, patriotic mottoes 
and the Goddess of Liberty.” 78  The crowd that gathered reflected well on the Times.  
These people were of “the best classes,” an “assemblage of the wealthy, well-to-do and 
commercial citizens of New York,” and “there was no need of Police, except to look after 
pick-pockets, of whom it is only natural to suppose there would be a great many where 
well-filled wallets and costly watches were so numerous.” 79  On election night in 
November, the Times’s collaboration with the stereopticon company was repeated, once 
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again merging news and entertainment values.  The Times arranged for the display of a 
“special artist’s” cartoons of notable people and incidents from the campaign, which kept 
the crowd “in excellent humor.” 80 The Times reported that “the Stereopticon worked like 
a charm, and held its beholders till its work was well done.”81 
At Park Row in lower Manhattan, the center of city’s newspaper publishing 
industry in the latter 19th century, New Yorkers would find papers vying with each other 
through competing election-night displays and next-day accounts.82  The newspapers also 
established outposts around the city for displaying returns on election night, as the Herald 
did in 1890, sending returns by special telegraph wire from the newsroom to stereopticon 
operators at its offices on 23rd Street and in Brooklyn.83 After state and local elections in 
1895, the New York Times boasted that it had provided returns accurately and more 
promptly on election night than the other New York publishers, and that it’s display – 
using five stereopticons casting images on “an immense cloth … stretched across the face 
of The Times Building” – was of such a size and clarity that it was visible at a much 
greater distance, prompting defections from a crowd that had been watching the “futile” 
efforts of another unnamed paper.84  Just three years earlier, the Times had scoffed at 
competing newspapers for over-attention to such election-night diversions as displays 
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with “caricatures and pictures of ostrich farming.”85  Now, in 1895, the Times noted that 
“In order to keep the crowd in good temper all the while, The New York Times had 
prepared a pictorial entertainment to go with the news.”86  This included portraits of 
leading political figures and “a series of handsome colored pictures of familiar works of 
art, humorous pictures, and timely cartoons suitable for the occasion, which were 
received with great delight.”87    
The next year, 1896, when the New York Times was acquired by Adolph S. Ochs, 
the symbolic power of election coverage was clear to the 38-year-old publisher.  The 
newspaper had been failing financially when he bought it, and its anemic circulation was 
dwarfed by a host of more popular and sensation-minded competitors.88  Ochs made what 
was, considering his limited resources, the “daring splurge” of spending $2,000 on the 
first election to be covered by the Times under his stewardship, according to Meyer 
Berger’s 1951 history of the newspaper.89  Berger, a Times reporter, described what Ochs 
witnessed on the eve of the 1896 election as he stepped out to see what his Park Row 
competitors were doing and what was going on three miles to the north, where the Herald 
had taken up new quarters. 
The night before the balloting he walked from lower 
Manhattan to Herald Square, a little man in the throng of bustled 
women in gigantic hats escorted by brown-derbied and 
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mustachioed gallants in fawn-colored top coats.  He saw that 
Hearst’s Journal had built a bandstand in front of its main office 
for musicians to blow brassy serenade for returns watchers in front 
of The Journal bulletin board and had hired chalk artists to 
entertain the throng during intermissions.  The World, he noticed, 
had put up an eighty-foot screen on the Franklin Street side of the 
gold-domed tower.90 
 
While Ochs did not have the means to match his competitors, he did have plans to display 
the returns both outside his building and in Madison Square, where the Times had erected 
a 20-foot screen under the now-famous slogan it had earlier installed there in electric 
lights, “All the News That’s Fit to Print.”  Ochs was so attuned to the importance of the 
election-night displays that he took a hand in working out the technical details.  He 
proposed the idea of writing the returns on a “gelatine” sheet that would avoid blurring, 
and he would later complain that one of his stereopticon operators had “spread the idea 
all over town,” where “all the newspapers copied it.”91  Although he was outdone on 
election night at Park Row, where competing papers were trying to win the attention of 
tens of thousands of people who had gathered, he was reportedly pleased to find an even 
larger crowd when he made is way up to Madison Square to have a look at his 
newspaper’s display there.92  The next year, 1897, the Times reported that in addition to 
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competing displays at Park Row, “nearly all the newspapers” chose Madison Square – the 
“great meeting ground of the people” – for displays of election returns:  “the fronts of the 
tall buildings on every side had been pre-empted for stereopticon screens.”93 
Broadcasting Returns Before Radio 
Starting in the late 19th century, a succession of technological innovations was 
deployed on election nights to disseminate returns at an even greater distance than the 
stereopticon displays could be seen.  In fact, well before the advent of radio, news seekers 
in a number of American cities no longer found it necessary to turn out on a cold and 
dreary November night to find out who had won.    Newspapers, press associations, 
telegraph companies, and newer entrants in long-distance communication – the telephone 
companies and the manufacturers of powerful electric lights – engaged in something of 
an election-night free-for-all, sometimes collaborating, sometimes competing, in 
innovative combinations of technology and human endeavor to get out the election-night 
news.  And as would happen repeatedly during the course of American history, election 
night would serve in this period as a crucible for the merging of new technology and 
news.  In her study of experiments with and responses to electric communication during 
the late 19th century, historian Carolyn Marvin wrote, “The distribution of presidential 
election returns in the late nineteenth century was the most ambitiously organized 
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American effort to use new electric technologies to deliver the news.”94  In 1888, the 
president of American Bell Telephone Company and his guests heard election news via 
special line at his home in Boston.95  Four years later, telephone companies were 
transmitting returns gathered from a variety of sources between Chicago and New York, 
with bulletins then being phoned to clubs in both cities and to the headquarters of both 
parties in New York.96 Arrangements were even more elaborate in 1896 as long-distance 
telephone lines spread to more parts of the country.  In advance of the elections, the New 
York Times described in great detail what it was calling a “contest of the wires.”97 The 
telegraph and telephone companies, reported the Times, were “going to greater expense” 
than before “to keep pace with popular demand for news.” 98   In addition to special wires 
that would be run to clubs, hotels, cafés, theaters, and bars, the well-heeled were planning 
private election parties and arranging to run special wires to their homes for the occasion.  
While the telegraph companies were not newcomers to the gathering and transmission of 
election news, the Times noted that the establishment of a nationwide organization to do 
the same thing by long-distance telephone was a novelty – and as such, “the experiment 
will be watched with interest.”99 Not to be outdone, newspapers were also experimenting 
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with visual means of transmitting returns for miles around.  Powerful new electric lights 
were adapted for use on election night both as means of communication and as symbols 
of status.  Newspapers were using searchlights mounted atop their own buildings or other 
tall structures in this way as early as 1891, and the practice continued into the 20th 
century and even right up to the 1952 election.100   
The audiences for these returns were not merely passive recipients.  Systems for 
dissemination of election returns at a distance merged the showcasing of technology with 
the active participation of the news consumer through the use of codes necessary to 
decipher the bulletins.   These codes might involve the direction in which a light was cast, 
its duration, its frequency, or its color.  In advance of the elections in cities where 
searchlights were installed for this purpose – including New York, Chicago, Boston, and 
San Francisco – newspapers would publish the codes in advance.  Typical were the codes 
published in the run-up to the 1904 election by the New York Times.  From the summit of 
its new tower in Times Square – some “357 feet, 10¾ inches above the curb” – the Times 
claimed that its pronouncement of the outcome would be visible from 30 miles away.101  
Steady lights to the east or west would signal the victor in the Presidential contest – west 
for the Republican incumbent, Theodore Roosevelt, or east for his Democratic 
challenger, Judge Alton Parker.  Steady lights to the north or south would flash the 
outcome of the governor’s race.  A light to the west moving up and down would 
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announce a Republican Congress, and a similar movement of the light in the east would 
mean the Democrats had achieved a majority.  “With this code before him,” wrote the 
Times, “the voter who wants to find out how things are going and who doesn’t want to 
stay out all night at a telegraph office, either in the city or out of town, can don his 
negligée and from an advantageous window in his flat or his house ascertain the 
important results.” 102  The post-election paper does not contain a report on the use of the 
searchlight.103  But the practice of using coded searchlight messages continued for 
decades at Times Square – as did the associated self-promotion and detailed explanations 
of the lighting mechanisms involved.  Before the 1906 election, for example, The Times 
claimed to have installed atop its tower “the largest searchlight in the city,” one of the 
same “type supplied to the battleships of the United States Navy for service in war.” 104  
There was a plug for the light’s manufacturer in Nuremburg and plenty of technical 
detail, from the “parabolic ground glass silver-plated mirror” to the “positive and 
negative carbons [that] are fed automatically at the same time.”105   
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One of the most ambitious displays – accompanied by a complicated set of codes 
– was that of the New York Tribune in 1896.106  Readers were advised to “keep this code” 
when it was printed ahead of time, and they certainly would have needed it.107  A string 
of colored lights was to be hoisted aloft – to a “point 500 feet above The Tribune 
Building” – by a set of specially-built kites, with the Tribune giving the manufacturer a 
nod in print for his “skill and experience.”108  There were dozens of specific codes to 
indicate which of three candidates was ahead in each one of the 45 states and New York 
City.  Those with red lights were for Republican William McKinley. Green lights were 
for Democrat William Jennings Bryan, and orange lights designated one of the third-
party candidates, John M. Palmer, the former governor of Illinois.  Each state would be 
indicated by combinations of varying numbers of white lights – from one to nine of them 
– divided in the string at various spots by the colored lights to indicate which candidate 
had the majority in that state.  If a state had been a “doubtful and important” one, the 
signal would be given a second time as “confirmation.”109  There were codes for 
nationwide and regional trends, and indicators for both partial and final results.  
The Tribune left no doubt that both technological showmanship and timely 
transmission of news were paramount values at work in its elaborate plan.  On the 
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Sunday before the election, in a prominent, front-page announcement under the bold 
headline “SIGNALS IN THE SKY,” the newspaper introduced its code scheme this way:  
“Election night in this city will be notable for many proofs of unusual and profound 
interest; but no other outgrowth of modern devices to please the eye, while conveying 
valuable and accurate information to a multitude of people, will probably attract more 
attention than the signals in the sky which The Tribune will display above The Tribune 
Building that night, to carry thirty miles away the news of the election returns.”   On the 
afternoon of election day, the Tribune reported launching nine kites flown on a single line 
and hauling up an American flag measuring 15 by 21 feet.  But then the weather ceased 
to cooperate. The kites came down and the coded strings of lights were raised above the 
building on halyards. 110 
Elsewhere, the transmission of coded returns on election nights was not limited to 
visual displays.  Although thousands of people gathered around the buildings of 
competing newspaper and other locations in downtown St. Paul, Minnesota, on election 
night 1896, far greater numbers may have learned of the results by hearing them from 
miles away.111  The St. Paul Dispatch arranged with the Northern Steamship Company to 
borrow a whistle system from the forward stack of a Great Lakes passenger liner, the 
North West.  When launched two years earlier to carry passengers in luxury between 
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Duluth and Buffalo, the North West was the largest vessel on the lakes – measuring some 
384 feet long and 44 feet wide.  The fog whistle on the forward stack was said to be 
almost as big as a man.  Powered by the ship’s impressive boilers, it could be heard 15 
miles away.  While the ship was berthed in Duluth for the winter, the whistle was 
transported to St. Paul for election night.  A notice in the pro-McKinley Dispatch 
provided the codes: “Succession of Sharp, Short Toots If Returns Favor McKinley.  A 
Long, Dismal Wail If Returns Favor Bryan.”112  Readers were assured that the sound 
would carry so far that no effort would be required to hear it:  “The tremendous blast will 
cleave the air like a salvo of artillery and carry the message of the election.”113   
Potent Election-Night Mix:  News, Entertainment, and Showmanship 
In the tumultuous combination of technological enthusiasm, national 
development, commercial boosterism, and showmanship that marked the latter 19th and 
early 20th centuries, newspapers were not alone in seeing the possibilities presented by 
election night. 114 A range of establishments that provided public amusements also 
hitched themselves to election night’s main news event. In 1876, an ad for “The Great 
New-York Aquarium” boasted that in addition to a long list of attractions, from “six rare 
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sea-horses” to “the living white whale,” returns would be provided by “transparency,” 
and a “special wire” would “afford … patrons the most authentic intelligence concerning 
the results of the great election.”115   On the same day in 1876, an ad in New York for the 
“New and Greatest Show on Earth” assured prospective patrons that “P.T. Barnum has 
effected arrangements” to provide election returns.116 In 1896, at Oscar Hammerstein’s 
complex on Broadway and 44th Street, the showman was featuring comic opera, 
vaudeville, acrobats, and dancing girls from Paris – and election returns to be read every 
half hour on all stages and shown on a “gigantic” screen.117  Theaters, in fact, were 
common venues for returns. Their ads typically did not specify the source of the election 
news beyond the mention of a “special wire.”118  But with newspapers, press associations, 
telegraph companies, and later telephone companies all involved in gathering returns on 
election night, there were certainly plenty of sources.  And in addition to newspaper ads, 
theaters also touted their election night plans on large sheets pasted side by side with 
campaign posters.  In 1916, a sheet for the Standard, an establishment in St. Louis, 
promised “Parisian Flirts” – “2 Big Shows” – and “Election Returns by Special Wire.”119 
Against this backdrop of culture-wide competition for attention on election night, 
newspapers showcased technological innovations of all sorts – not just for a role in 
transmitting the news, but as means of entertainment and as objects of wonder in 
themselves.  In 1896, for example, a new device for projecting moving images – the 
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“vitascope” – was used to delight and amaze crowds in New York and Chicago in 
between the presentation of election returns.120  In 1906, the New York Times announced 
that among its election-night offerings – which included an improved means for 
projecting bulletins, a prodigious new searchlight for coded returns, moving pictures, and 
a live band – there would be something called the “Auxetophone,” said to be the “last 
word in improvement of the phonograph.”121  Two years later, the Times was promoting 
its use of a device called the “telautograph” that would allow crowds in the street to 
watch cartoonist Hy Mayer at work, projecting his drawings as he made them. 122  The 
day after the election, the paper reported that crowds had, indeed, been held in fascination 
by the telautograph’s “electrical writing.”123  And in 1920, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch 
orchestrated a rich confection of news and entertainment, wedded by technology, to 
assert its social, cultural, and political role as an essential player on election night.124  
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While many of the movie theaters and burlesque houses in St. Louis were advertising that 
they would provide their audiences with election returns, the Post-Dispatch used its front 
page to announce the technological novelties to be used as part of its customary offering 
of election-night news and amusements.125  Promised was the first public showing of “a 
motion picture made by X-ray process, showing movement of kneecap when knee is 
moved up and down, also the movement of wrist, jaw bone, elbow, etc.”126   Another 
innovation, the “Magnavox telemegaphone,” proved so effective on election night, 
according to the Post-Dispatch, that the massive crowd, including those who were too far 
from the stereopticon screens to see the returns, had been “startled” to hear the returns 
“clearly and distinctly … above all street noises.”127  The paper transmitted returns by 
telephone to gatherings at schools and other indoor locations, aided by new “sound-
multiplying devices.”128  And the Post-Dispatch teamed up with a local technologist to 
broadcast returns by way of a “wireless telephone” transmitting station. 129  Installed in a 
local residence just the day before the election, at a time when wireless transmission of 
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20 Schools By Post-Dispatch Service,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 3, 1920, 3. 
129 “Wireless Telephone to Carry Vote Returns,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 2, 1920, 1; see also, 




voice and music was still a wonder, the transmitter was said to be one of the most 
powerful in the nation, capable of reaching of 5,000 receivers within 1,000 miles of St. 
Louis. 
The Story of the Story 
On the day after that 1920 election, the Post-Dispatch devoted at least three news 
stories to itself – including one on the front page – illustrated by a full page of 
photographs:  how it had attracted the largest outdoor election-night crowd in St. Louis 
history despite temperatures that fell to 40 degrees; how an estimated 30,000 people had 
attended those 23-indoor venues for election-night news and amusements; how various 
educational and civic leaders praised the Post-Dispatch – mentioned by name seven times 
in one story – for an election-night role that provided a “forward step in community 
service.”130  In one of these stories, the Post-Dispatch also claimed a place for itself in 
communications history:  “the first use of a wireless telephone in St. Louis” had been to 
transmit Post-Dispatch election returns to a region stretching from North Dakota down to 
Arkansas, states where returns were then relayed by wireless telegraph to recipients from 
Canada to the Gulf of Mexico.131  This sort of proud report placing newspapers in heroic 
roles was not a new or isolated phenomenon in the coverage of elections.  As far back as 
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the early decades of the telegraph era, journalists had been telling what might be called 
“the story of the story” about their election-night exploits.132  
Key features of the “story of the story” over time included dramatic accounts of 
newspapers’ efforts to assemble, analyze, and disseminate the news – vote counts and 
forecasts – in a timely and competitive fashion, all of it aided by organizational systems, 
technology, and political expertise.   One of the more elaborate of these accounts 
appeared in the New York Herald on the Sunday after the 1890 election.133 The Herald 
even promoted the story in advance, promising to reveal “the Inside Mysteries and 
Mechanism of a Great Newspaper in Action.”134  The article occupied two thirds of a 
page.135  It was accompanied by six illustrations:  a police station house where reporters 
went to record the vote counts on special color-coded forms; uniformed messengers 
delivering those forms to the newspaper; the expansive newsroom where vote totals were 
computed by dozens of “tally clerks,” “readers,” and “expert accountants”;  the 
stereopticon room for display of fresh returns to crowds in the street; the massive 
composing room where the paper was set in type, including dozens of columns of results 
arranged in tables; and a host of delivery men as they hastened away from the Herald 
with their bundles of newspapers.  If lavishing so much space to a story about itself didn’t 
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send a clear enough message, the Herald’s six-deck headline left no doubt about the point 
– that a newspaper could and should be judged by the quality and content of its election-
night performance: 
HOW THE HERALD GETS 
        ELECTION RETURNS. 
                  ————— 
Workings of a System that Insures 
      the Most Complete and Ac- 
          curate Printed in Any 
                 Newspaper. 
                  ————— 
ANOTHER TRIUMPH LAST WEEK. 
                  ————— 
In the Herald Alone Was To Be Found 
  Correct Pluralities and the Vote Tab- 
         ulated by Election Districts. 
                  ————— 
NO EXPENSE SPARED AND 
                      AN ARMY OF EXPERTS. 
                  ————— 
Such a Scene at the Compiling of the Vast 
     Mass of Figures and Such Intricate 
        but Smooth Working System as 
              Were Never Duplicated  
                     or Attempted. 
                  —————        136 
Themes that would come to define the shape of election-night broadcasting in the middle 
of the 20th century could be seen at work here. The headline and story boasted of 
innovation.  Both called forth a sense of wonder at the integration of people, systems, and 
technology in a fine-tuned process – one that required the coordination of a host of 
players across a vast area in a compressed time frame.  Collaboration with outside experts 
was involved.  So was “a vast amount of careful preparation.”137 And the writer 






addressed the reader directly, offering “to let you into the secret of the system” and then 
asking at the end, “What do you think of it now that you have seen it from the inside?”138 
The story left no doubt that immediate profit was not the supreme motive in all of 
this.  For one thing, the preparation and election-night operation could only be had with 
“a heavy extra expenditure.”139  What the writer described as “the first and fundamental 
secret” of the paper’s system was this:  “that the HERALD is willing to make that 
expenditure.”140  For its troubles, the paper could measure its reward in “reputation.”  
Though the paper’s election coverage could be counted on to generate orders for 
“thousands of extra copies, both by advance orders and for weeks afterward,” the writer 
does not identify these orders as the prize, but rather as “the best proof” that “HERALD 
election returns are synonymous with perfection in this field of journalistic endeavor.”141  
And this reputation was said to be not just “nation-wide,” but “international”:  two years 
earlier, the “Presidential Election HERALD of 1888,” loaded with tables of voting data, 
had created a “news sensation” in London.142   
Newspaper reporters also wrote articles for magazines about the drama in the 
newsroom on election night.  One of the most extensive and detailed of these was penned 
in November 1894 for Scribner’s Magazine by Julian Ralph, a notable journalist and 
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author of his day.143  His 14-page account clearly drew on his many years at the New 
York Sun, though the paper is not mentioned by name.  He noted that while there was a 
great deal of “popular curiosity” about the work of journalists, accompanied by much 
mystery,  
… there is but one night in every year, in every great newspaper office, 
when work is done that is the least understood of all that goes on in the 
making of a daily paper; one night when the highest state of fever attends 
the excitement and strain of the most intense work that falls to the lot of 
any men, except soldiers at war.  That is election night.  That is the night 
when a few men sit down at six o’clock before virgin sheets of paper, with 
the knowledge that they must cover those sheets with the election figures 
of a nation, digesting mountains of figures and apprising the public of the 
results in the most condensed forms…. And these results must stand the 
test of comparison with the rival newspapers…144 
Providing “windows into our methods,” Ralph described in detail the systems by which 
the flood of returns was assembled, computed into totals, summarized for the stereopticon 
bulletins by a “bright reporter” selected especially for the task, expertly analyzed by 
knowledgeable reporters, and sent off to the composing room under strict deadlines 
imposed by the managing editor.  There is a sense of wonder about some of those taking 
part. These range from the managing editor, who remains calm and focused amidst the 
chaos, to the well-paid, elegantly attired Washington correspondent in town for the 
occasion, who is known for having a smoke with the president on the back porch of the 
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White House.  While the first edition is being printed, there are a few minutes to take a 
break:  “Hot coffee is brought up from a near-by restaurant, bottles of beer are being 
opened with a pop and a splash, grapes and sandwiches are being devoured by men who 
are all on their legs, relieving the strain of long sitting.”145  And then the heroic work 
resumes as the “chief men of the office” carefully scrutinize the competing papers – “wet 
and fresh” – and get on with the business of turning out a second edition. 146  The stakes 
on this night are of the highest: “journals which are managed with pride in their 
correctness” avoid being swayed by political bias in gathering and presenting the news, 
“take no chances” in assuring quality, and “throw economy to the dogs.” 147    
In a magazine article in 1892 – “How the Returns Come In; Election Night in a 
Great Newspaper Office” – Willis John Abbot of the Chicago Times voiced another 
theme that would later be a hallmark of the election-night broadcasts of 1952.148  With all 
the preparation, all the work to be done, all the forces to be marshaled, all the deadlines to 
be met, and all the pressure to turn out a timely and accurate report, the stress on a 
managing editor was extraordinary, with no guarantee of satisfaction when all was done.  
Abbot began his account on this very theme: 
When, on election morning, the managing editor lets himself into 
the cubby-hole of an office in which gentlemen of his profession are 
usually ensconced, he feels that the error of his career was made when he 
failed to resign the day before.  He has to confront the problem incapable 
of exact solution, recurring every four years, yet to which the partial 
solutions of four years ago are applicable only in part to-day.  Few people 
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outside the profession of journalism have any comprehension of the 
amount of intelligent planning and painstaking study of detail involved in 
gathering and editing the election returns which are given to the public by 
every well-conducted paper the morning after each Presidential 
election.149 
Abbot returned to the same theme at the end, after capturing the drama and wonder of 
highly-orchestrated election-night methodologies at work: 
And after it is all done, when the wheat has been sifted from the chaff of 
tens of thousands of words of telegraph, when hundreds of columns of 
figures have been digested and put into a head-line, when at 6 a.m. the 
general result of an election in which twelve million votes were cast has 
been correctly announced, the managing editor will still feel that he has 
fallen short of fulfillment of his programme, and will believe more than 
half correct the scoff of the oldest printer in the “chapel,” who invariably 
remarks at this season, “I’ve worked under every managing editor of this 
paper since old Nestor’s time, and I never saw an election report so balled 
up like this ’ere one.”150 
This variation on the behind-the-scenes story presages some of the angst that those 
involved in the election-night broadcasts in 1952 would feel at the end of that night. 
The Election-Night Audience:  Part of the Story 
In addition to the “story of the story” of how returns were gathered and analyzed, 
election coverage sometimes included florid accounts of the street scene.   The crowds 
around the newspaper displays grew increasingly massive and so became, themselves, an 
object of wonder.  In 1860, the New York Herald’s account of the scene in the vicinity of 
the newspaper on election night noted that the “living mass … presented such a spectacle 
that it must be witnessed to be fairly understood; and the sounds that arose therefrom 
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more resembled the ‘rumbling of distant thunder’ than aught else we can think of at 
present.”151  In 1872, the New York Times account of the scene around its election-night 
display included this about the response to a mayoral contest: “Words cannot convey any 
idea of the frantic demonstration of approval.”152   A writer for the New-York Daily 
Tribune was carried away by emotion when describing, in no fewer than 82 lines of copy, 
the street scene on election night in 1896: 
Merely as a sublime spectacle New-York wore the aspect of a 
great force of nature last night.  Poets have written of the sea in its might, 
and Milton has painted the gigantic splendors of hell.... New-York took on 
in its hour of triumph a grandeur that sent the mind to the two poles which 
mean the extremes of dramatic significance… 
How idle it must ever seem to any one who saw this spectacle to 
revert any longer to the Hanging Gardens of Babylon, to the Pyramids, to 
the highest Alps, to Rome, to any of the wonders of the world, for 
standards of grandeur… Perhaps we are, as individuals, a little amazed at 
what we all felt and did under the stress of excitement, aroused by the 
figures flashed upon screens all over the city… It was the work of a 
nation… To have seen the spectacle of the Election Night of 1896 is to 
have had the veil of mortality swept aside for the nonce, and to have had a 
glimpse of the glorious attributes of immortality.  The vision can never 
die.153 
Newspapers were not the only cultural players to remark on the awesome nature 
of collective activity in the service of democracy as a feature of elections.  Consider these 
lines from Walt Whitman’s poem, “Election Day, November 1884”:  
If I should need to name, O Western World,                               
your powerfullest scene and show, 
‘Twould not be you, Niagara – nor you, ye                           
limitless prairies – nor your huge rifts of canyons, Colorado, 
Nor you, Yosemite – nor Yellowstone, with all its spasmic    
geyser-loops ascending to the skies, appearing and 
disappearing, 
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Nor Oregon’s white cones – nor Huron’s belt of mighty           
lakes – nor Mississippi’s stream: 
– This seething hemisphere’s humanity, as now, I’d name –          
the still small voice vibrating – America’s choosing day, 
(The heart of it not the chosen – the act itself the main….)154 
 
Nineteenth century journalists can be seen positioning themselves in the center of this 
activity, key players on election night in drawing the democratic mass together.  During 
the Civil War, the New York Herald’s post-election story in 1864 left no doubt about the 
paper’s place in the saga of election night:  “A similar scene cannot perhaps be witnessed 
in any other country than democratic America, nor in any other city of the Union than 
New York, and nowhere else in the metropolis than around the Herald office.”155  Four 
years later, an even more theatrical account reported that “The sun had scarcely set – 
long, indeed, ere the dusk had spread its gloomy wings – the multitude, as if by instinct, 
moved en masse towards the Herald building…. The Herald was the magnet of the 
moving population of the city last night.”156  And once there, the “multitude” could 
behold a technological wonder akin in likeness to a “new moon,” bulletins projected by 
“brilliant calcium light” that “shed its rays upon the transparency.”  Three days after the 
voting in the disputed 1876 presidential contest between Rutherford B. Hayes and 
Samuel Tilden, the New York Times reported “few signs of decrease,” despite rain, in the 
“surging mobs of eager citizens clustered in front of the bulletin-boards” on which 
newspapers were posting fresh dispatches from the states with uncertain results.157  In 
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1897, the New York Times reported that while the city’s newspaper district, Park Row, in 
its “long, varied, and exciting history has seen many crowded and crazy nights,” there 
was “never one crazier or more crowded than last night.”158 Newspapers eventually used 
photography to provide evidence of the magnitude of the crowds drawn to newspaper 
displays on election night. One such photograph accompanied the St. Louis Post-
Dispatch coverage in 1920.  It is the width of a newspaper page and shows a virtual sea 
of formally attired men and women, their upturned faces captured in a “flashlight” 
photograph as they watch the newspaper’s display from the street.  Even from the 
distance of more than 80 years, the scene is striking, and the Post-Dispatch did not miss 
the opportunity to share it with its readers under a headline that read: “Immense Throngs 
in Twelfth Street and Auditoriums Get Post-Dispatch Election Bulletins.” 159 
Over the course of several generations, through changes in newspapers’ reporting 
styles, readership, and the technologies and systems used to gather and disseminate the 
news, there had developed several powerful line of continuity in the culture of election-
night journalism.  These would continue into the era of broadcast news.   
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Chapter 3:  Election Night in the Era of Broadcasting 
From the earliest days of radio – starting with the experimental period before it 
was a popular medium – election night continued to provide a venue for showcasing new 
technology. A sense of wonder at contemplating the audience for real-time election 
bulletins – now spread over previously unimaginable distances – also continued to be a 
salient feature of the “story of the story.”  So did new technology’s capacity to play a 
critical role in both collaboration and fierce competition within the world of journalism 
on election night.   
The precursor to radio arrived in the United States as part of a promotion 
advancing the intersecting interests of an inventor known for his promotional savvy and a 
newspaper publisher known for his competitive zeal.  Guglielmo Marconi’s 
experimentation in Italy and Great Britain with the wireless transmission of telegraphic 
code led to a British patent in 1897. A sensational demonstration in the United States 
followed in the fall of 1899.  At the invitation of James Gordon Bennett and with a great 
deal of fanfare, Marconi used his invention to cover the America’s Cup races for 
Bennett’s New York Herald.  Dispatches with accounts of the action were conveyed to 
waiting crowds in New York, forwarded by wire around the country, and transmitted by 
cable across the Atlantic.  It was a coup for both the inventor and his journalistic patron.1  
Earlier the same year, Lee de Forest had completed his doctoral dissertation at Yale, 
where he experimented with the electromagnetic waves that made wireless telegraphy 
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possible – and then wrote to Marconi in a bid to become Marconi’s assistant.2  De Forest 
did not land the position, but he was soon among the pioneers competing with Marconi 
and experimenting with devices for the wireless transmission of sound – known by terms 
such as “wireless telephone,” “radiotelephone,” or “radiophone” before it was more 
commonly known, simply, as “radio.”3  De Forest would also see the promotional 
benefits of yoking wireless telephone together with a news event of great public interest – 
the reporting of election returns.  
Though not a great businessman, de Forest demonstrated repeatedly that he 
appreciated the linkage between new technology, showmanship, and publicity.4  Early 
experiments that helped win him notoriety included broadcasting music hundreds of 
miles by wireless telephone from atop the Eiffel Tower in 1908.5  Two years later, he 
arranged one of the more notable early broadcasts of the human voice:  the legendary 
tenor Enrico Caruso performing at New York’s Metropolitan Opera House.  Caruso could 
be heard by listeners who had been invited to gather at points in New York City and 
Newark, New Jersey, including a group of “newspaper men” whose response was quite 
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laudatory.6  In the fall of 1916, de Forest was engaged in yet another round of activities to 
call attention to his ideas about the future of wireless telephone – and to generate 
business, including sales of listening equipment and of the Audion tubes he had invented 
for amplifying weak radio signals.7  In late October, he generated news by arranging the 
broadcast of phonograph music from the Columbia Graphophone Company’s laboratory 
in Manhattan to an audience assembled a few blocks away at the Hotel Astor in Times 
Square.8  Several weeks later, in the middle of November, he would be the subject of 
wide-eyed newspaper stories about his novel plan to make the wireless telephone a 
medium for news.9 One such story referred to the concept in a four-deck headline as “An 
Air Paper,” a “Scheme to use Atmosphere as Medium for Sending News,” and “A 
Wireless Journal,” adding: “De Forest Company To Start First Publication in America.”10  
Just ahead of these stories about the advent of a new medium for news, election night 
turned out to be a prime opportunity to launch this innovative application of radio 
technology.   
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As with earlier uses of election night to showcase technology, de Forest’s exploits 
on Nov. 7, 1916, represented a close collaboration between journalists and technologists 
and took place at the intersection of news and entertainment.  In his autobiography, de 
Forest recalled that on this occasion – with which he staked a claim as “the first use of 
radiotelephone for broadcasting news of general interest” – his laboratory station 
transmitted election news provided by William Randolph Hearst’s New York American.11 
The broadcast lasted six hours.  The vote counts arrived by telephone from the newspaper 
building to the de Forest facility in the Highbridge neighborhood of the Bronx, across the 
Harlem River from Manhattan.12  From there, accounts variously identify the inventor 
and “an unassuming chap” named Walter Schare as providing bulletins over the air.13  In 
between bits of election news, listeners were regaled with “music sent through the 
clouds,” in the words of the American.  The tunes included “The Star Spangled Banner,” 
“Dixie,”  “Columbia, the Gem of the Ocean,” “America,” “Maryland,”  “Yankee 
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Doodle,” and, reported the American, “all the other anthems, songs and hymns that 
Americans love.”  Contemporary accounts carried estimates that thousands of amateur 
wireless receivers within 200 miles of Highbridge could hear the de Forest broadcast.14  
Years later, de Forest would recall that at 11 p.m., just before he shut down the station for 
the night, he announced the election not of the incumbent, Woodrow Wilson, but of the 
Republican challenger, Supreme Court Justice Charles Evans Hughes.  De Forest was in 
good company with his errant call.  Shortly before 9 p.m. on election night, the New York 
Times signaled by prearranged code – rings of red light atop the Times Tower and a 
swinging red searchlight – that Hughes was the apparent victor.15  The New York Herald 
was even earlier to give the nod to Hughes.  Under a flash photo of an immense crowd 
packed shoulder to shoulder in Herald Square, the newspaper boasted that at precisely 
7:31 p.m. it had simultaneously pronounced Hughes the winner from its own searchlight 
atop the Metropolitan Tower – said to be visible for 25 miles – and in bulletins projected 
on 11 outdoor screens in Manhattan, Brooklyn, the Bronx, Yonkers, and Newark.16 The 
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American, too, was among the papers putting out morning editions assigning victory to 
Hughes, giving him electoral votes from a number of Western states that would 
eventually go to Wilson once the tally was completed during the two days after the 
election.17   
The quality of the reporting notwithstanding, the larger historical importance of 
the de Forest broadcast was not lost on either the inventor or the journalists with whom 
he collaborated, and each framed it in a way that highlighted the fact of their separate but 
intersecting interests.  For example, two days after the election, the American ran a news 
story featuring a letter from de Forest to the paper’s editor.18  From de Forest’s 
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perspective, the journalists were cooperating parties in his own grand and futuristic 
vision, a whole new concept in transmitting news: 
“I wish to thank you most heartily for the active co-operation of 
the Hearst newspapers in our efforts to publish the first ‘Wireless 
Telephone Newspaper.’ 
“In sending out New York American election returns from my 
laboratory station here last night, combined with a music concert, we 
demonstrated what I believe, in time, will mark a very significant epoch in 
the distribution of news. 
“We have been literally overwhelmed by telephonic and mail 
replies from various wireless listeners, who have been intensely interested 
in the news we sent out, with many requests that we make this news and 
music service a regular feature.  This we propose to do. 
“I believe you will recognize the fact that the time will come when 
from large wireless telephone stations scattered throughout the country 
literally hundreds of thousands of listeners, provided with a simple 
receiver, will be able to get the latest news, combined with music and 
entertainment, in their homes. 
“This will mean much to those in rural districts, who are out of 
touch with the late evening editions of the newspapers. 
“I trust you will express my thanks to all of your staff, who have so 
ably co-operated in making this effort a success.”19 
 
 
As for the American, in stories on each of the two days following the election, the 
newspaper positioned itself at center stage in the saga of the election-night broadcast.20  
For starters, this was just one in an elaborate set of arrangements whereby, the paper 
claimed, “more than a million persons received their first news of the returns through The 
American service.”21  The American reported that its returns were made available in 180 
or more locations around greater New York – flashed on screens at nearly 100 
“cinematograph,” or motion picture, theaters; read from the stage at dozens of shows, 
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including Ziegfeld’s Follies; displayed in famed hotels, including the Waldorf-Astoria, 
the Plaza, and the Ritz-Carlton; announced to diners at “fashionable” restaurants; and 
projected on outdoor screens at several locations in Manhattan, Brooklyn and the Bronx, 
along with movies to keep the crowds entertained.22  The American also employed 
another innovation at the intersection of journalism and technology, one it had reported 
inaugurating a few days before the election and was calling “The Newspaper in the 
Sky.”23 An electric sign some 64 feet long and 20 feet high that could flash news 
bulletins in letters four feet tall – “the very newest thing in electric signs” – had been 
erected atop a 25-story building at 49th St. and Seventh Ave.24  A similar “frame of fire” 
was erected in Newark, N.J., and carried the American’s election bulletins.25 
Attention to this array of means for transmitting election-night news was not to 
diminish the significance of what de Forest had done.  In its first story on all these 
arrangements on the day after the election, the newspaper carried a bold headline calling 
attention to the wireless broadcast as historic – and framing it as a New York American 
operation:  “American’s Returns Sent 200 Miles by Wireless Telephone; This Newspaper 
First to Use New De Forest Method for This Purpose.”26 Written with dramatic flourish, 
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the story described the way the newspaper staff had “worked like dynamos” to generate 
election bulletins, and gave this description of the broadcast: 
     Thus, through the clouds, was hurled the news of the night.  To tossing 
ships beyond the bay, beyond the end of Long Island, across the northern 
tier of New Jersey, far up the rolling Hudson, leaping far above the rugged 
palisades, topping the crests of the Catskill foothills and charging above 
the glowing towns and villages, farms and valleys swept the news. 
     It was the first time in the history of this wonderful world of ours that 
such a thing could be done.  For the first time the wireless telephone had 
been demonstrated as a practical, serviceable carrier of election news and 
comment.27 
The article concluded by reminding readers one more time of the paper’s heroic election-
night labors: “It was a stupendous effort, but the thousands of messages of thanks 
received amply paid for the weary strain and the night-long grind.”28 
At least two other New York papers weighed in on the historic nature of the de 
Forest broadcast, though each in a self-serving way.  In a two-sentence account, the New 
York Times deemed it “an election-night innovation” – without mentioning that de Forest 
got his election-night information from a Times competitor.29  In a brief mention of de 
Forest, the New York Herald reported – against the backdrop of its own efforts to spread 
the news a great distance by “wireless” (perhaps in telegraphic code, though the type of 
wireless is not specified) – that election night was “the first time the wireless telephone 
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had been put to a practical use.”30  The Herald also took credit as the source of the 
bulletins that de Forest transmitted, with no mention of the American.31    
The technologist, de Forest, had seized on election night as a prime opportunity to 
advance his interests.  What is equally clear is that an association with this innovative 
technology was perceived as having the capacity to bestow status on any journalists 
involved.  Hence the American’s lavish attention to its role, the Times’s omission of the 
fact that de Forest had carried out his feat in alliance with at least one rival paper, and the 
Herald’s focus on itself and silence about the American.   
Election Night as a Venue for Launching Commercial Radio 
After the United States entered World War I in 1917, President Wilson exercised 
his legal authority to commandeer wireless stations or shut them down.  Some 53 
commercial wireless stations were placed under the control of the Navy, and the other 28 
were taken off the air.32  But with the end of the war, promoters – including newspaper 
publishers and entrepreneurs with an interest in selling radio equipment – began to see 
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opportunities in the commercial broadcasting of voice and music. The question of who 
was “first” to do one thing or another in the early history of radio has been a contentious 
one.33 But what is clear is that for nascent broadcasting concerns looking to launch with a 
splash, the public appetite for election news represented an ideal target – and one worth 
scrambling to meet. In time for the 1920 campaign season, primaries and election night 
would be seen as ideal opportunities to roll out innovative applications of the new 
technology. 
One of these took place in Detroit, where William E. Scripps, publisher of the 
Detroit News, had become intrigued by radio at a time when the notion that radio might 
have a future as a news medium was still an exotic concept. After assembling a radio 
receiver at home from parts and being able to hear voice transmissions over the airwaves, 
he bought a piece of de Forest equipment, a “radiophone” transmitter, and arranged to 
have it installed and tested at the newspaper.34  The amateur station was licensed as 
“8MK,” and there is some evidence that it represented a collaboration between the 
newspaper publisher and a group of de Forest associates looking to sell radio 
                                                 
33 See, for example, the discussion by Christopher H. Sterling and John M. Kittross, Stay Tuned:  A History 
of American Broadcasting, 3rd ed. (Mahwah, N.J.:  Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002), 63-67; Aitken, 
The Continuous Wave, 469ff; Gordon B. Greb and Mike Adams, Charles Herrold, Inventor of Radio 
Broadcasting (Jefferson, N.C.:  McFarland & Company, 2003), 150ff; and Gleason L. Archer, History of 
Radio to 1926 (New York:  The American Historical Society, 1938), 207ff. 
34 This account is drawn from Barnouw, A Tower in Babel, 62-64; Sterling and Kittross, Stay Tuned, 66; 
Emery et al., The Press and America, 272; The Radio Staff of The Detroit News, WWJ-The Detroit News:  
The History of Radiophone Broadcasting by the Earliest and Foremost of Newspaper Stations; Together 
With Information on Radio for Amateur and Expert (Detroit:  The Evening News Association, 1922), 7-9; 
Gleason L. Archer, History of Radio to 1926 (New York:  The American Historical Society, 1938), 208; 
and the following articles in The Detroit News: “The News Radiophone To Give Vote Results,” Aug. 31, 
1920, 1; “Radio Operators! Attention!” Aug. 31, 1; “Land and Water Hear Returns by Wireless,” Sept. 1, 
1920, 1; “Operators of Telephone and Wireless Sets!” Sept. 1, 1920, 1; “Wireless Stations Praise News 





equipment.35  A period of testing ended with a front-page announcement on August 31, 
the day of the Michigan primary.  While all other stories across the top of the front page 
rated only one-column headlines – from news of early voting in Detroit to the declaration 
of martial law in Belfast – the newspaper reserved for itself a larger, two-column 
headline: “The News Radiophone to Give Vote Results.”36  Amateurs were urged to give 
wireless parties so they could hear “voices in the night.”  The event would be “epochal,” 
the News declared, and there was speculation that “a hundred years from now, perhaps, 
all news will be transmitted by wireless telephone: who knows?”  
On the day after the election, the biggest display across the top of the Detroit 
News front page was not the outcome of the primary but the newspaper’s successful 
broadcast of election returns.37  The story, which also announced the launch of a regular 
nightly service offering news and music, was nothing less than euphoric.  The newspaper 
claimed for itself a place in the intersecting histories of journalism and technology – and 
framed the event as the culmination of human imagination.  It began this way: 
                                                 
35 The most commonly cited accounts of 8MK’s election broadcasts, along with de Forest’s autobiography 
and Detroit News accounts of those broadcasts, do not provide a consistent or clear picture on this point.  
Sterling and Kittross write of 8MK that “The Radio News and Music Company, formed by associates of de 
Forest to sell his radio equipment, held the license” and that “the News, a Scripps paper, apparently 
financed the broadcasts…” (Stay Tuned, 3rd ed., 66).  In his autobiography, de Forest writes “In the spring 
of 1929, my old Army buddy and stanch friend, C.S. Thompson, together with John Hubbard, organized 
the Radio News and Music Company and began making systematic efforts to sell our radiophone 
transmitters to various newspapers…. Thompson finally succeeded in interesting William E. Scripps, 
owner of the Detroit Daily News.  He quickly became convinced that the Detroit News must be the first 
newspaper in the country to have a radio broadcasting transmitter, a De Forest Type OT-10” (Father of 
Radio, 356). Gleason L. Archer, in his landmark 1936 history of the early years of radio, mentions the 
Detroit News and 8MK in only one place, according to the index. That is a discussion on pp. 207-208 in 
History of Radio to 1926 (New York:  The American Historical Society) of competing claims between the 
pioneering Detroit and Pittsburgh stations for “priority” status. Archer reports a third-hand account that in a 
1921 Department of Commerce publication listing amateur radio stations, the Radio News and Music 
Company, Inc., of Detroit is “listed as the operator of Station 8MK” and that a connection to the Detroit 
News in that official record “is not evident.” 
36 “The News Radiophone To Give Vote Results,” Detroit News, Aug. 31, 1920, 1. 




One by one the novelists and poets of the ages have watched their 
dreams come true.  Cold, hard, practical science seems always to follow 
the dream trail through the primeval forests of man’s desires, broken first 
by the dwellers in fiction-land, bringing up in the rear with the paving 
stone with which to lay the broad highway to the ultimate conquest of all 
nature.38 
The “sending of the election returns by The Detroit News’ radiophone,” the newspaper 
boasted, “was fraught with romance and must go down in the history of man’s conquest 
of the elements as a gigantic step in his progress.”39  Following such prescient purveyors 
of futuristic visions as Jules Verne and H.G. Wells, here was the Detroit News with the 
embodiment of “a dream and a prediction,” whereby “the news of the world was being 
given forth through this invisible trumpet to the unseen crowds in the unseen market 
place.”40  In reality, the crowds were not so large – by the newspaper’s estimates, 
measured in the hundreds. But in an event that helps mark the beginning of radio 
journalism, election night provided an opportunity to make the case, and more than two 
dozen individual testimonials about reception of the news and music service were 
published in the days following the election. 41 
The fall elections in 1920 featured a battle for the presidency between two Ohio 
newspaper publishers – Republican Sen. Warren G. Harding, publisher of the Marion 
Daily Star, and Democratic Gov. James M. Cox, publisher of the Dayton Daily News.  
The Detroit station, 8MK, broadcast returns again on election night. And in one of the 




41 “Land and Water Hear Returns by Wireless,” Detroit News, Sept. 1, 1920, 1; “Wireless Stations Praise 
News Radiophone Service,” Detroit News, Sept. 2, 1920, 1, 21; “Voice by Radio Clearly Heard by Night 




most iconic events in the early history of broadcasting, so did station KDKA in East 
Pittsburgh, helping to launch the era of commercial radio.42 
The outlines of the KDKA story are frequently recounted in histories of 
broadcasting.43  It is typically seen as a pioneering and revolutionary event in the context 
of radio’s transition from a curiosity to something commonplace and essential.  But with 
the choice of election night as a debut, the KDKA episode is also part of a story of 
cultural continuity:  the reporting of election-night news as an important showcase for 
new technology. 
After the end of World War I, a Pittsburgh-area engineer named Frank Conrad, 
who had spent several years working on military wireless projects at the Westinghouse 
Electric and Manufacturing Company, received permission to return to the air as a 
hobbyist, operating amateur radio station 8XK from his garage. At the time, the wireless 
                                                 
42 In fact, Aitken argues that what was novel in 1920 about KDKA and its amateur predecessor, 8XK, was 
not the technology involved but the way it was employed, including a combination of regularly scheduled 
broadcasts and commercial backing; see Aitken, Continuous Wave, 471ff. 
43 While the KDKA story is often recounted, the details tend to vary slightly both in the secondary source 
material and in the published recollections of the participants, including differences in the chronology of 
events and the relative importance of the parties involved.  The account here includes common elements of 
these accounts, with specific footnotes for some items not found in the majority of accounts. The secondary 
sources consulted here, including some with extensive quotations of primary-source material, include:  
Archer, History of Radio to 1926; Barnouw, A Tower in Babel; Aitken, Continuous Wave; Emery et al., 
The Press and America; Douglas, Inventing American Broadcasting, 1899-1922; Alfred Balk, The Rise of 
Radio, from Marconi through the Golden Age (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Company, 2006); Greb and 
Adams, Charles Herrold, Inventor of Radio Broadcasting; Marwan A. Simaan, “An Introduction to D.G. 
Little’s 1924 Classic Paper ‘KDKA,’ ” in Proceedings of the IEEE 86, no. 6 (June 1998), 1273-1278;  
Sterling and Kittross, Stay Tuned, 65-66; and KDKA NewsRadio, “It All Started in Pittsburgh…” 
http://www.kdkaradio.com/pages/15486.php.  The first-person accounts consulted include: H. [Harry] P. 
Davis, “The Early History of Broadcasting in the United States,” an address to the Graduate School of 
Business Administration, Harvard University, published in The Radio Industry: The Story of its 
Development  (Chicago:  A. W. Shaw Company, 1928), 189-225; S. M. Kintner, “Pittsburgh’s Contribution 
to Radio,” Proceedings of the Institute of Radio Engineers 20, no. 12 (December 1932), 1849-1862; and 
Donald G. Little, “The Reminiscences of Donald G. Little,” Columbia University Oral History Collection 
on Microfiche, Part V (New York:  Columbia University Oral History Research Office, Radio Unit, 1984). 
Excerpts from Little’s oral history also appear in Donald G. Little, “Dr. Conrad founds KDKA,” pp. 71-73, 
in “The Early Days of Radio; An unpublished story from the files of the Oral History Project,” American 




telegraph was still much more common than the wireless telephone, and Conrad’s 
transmissions of music from phonograph records began to attract attention.  Other 
amateurs contacted Conrad to request particular songs.  Journalists took notice, too, and 
not just in Pittsburgh.  A brief item in the New York Times at the end of 1919 reported 
that listening to Conrad’s broadcasts had become the “Saturday evening amusement of 
400 owners of wireless receiving sets living in Pittsburgh and its environs.”44  After a 
local department store ran at least one newspaper ad calling attention to Conrad’s 
“wireless concerts” – and to the fact that those concerts could be heard with receiving 
sets for sale at the store – Conrad’s boss at Westinghouse, Vice President Harry P. Davis, 
became intrigued. 45  In a speech a few years later to the students of the Graduate School 
of Business Administration at Harvard University, Davis recalled having something of a 
conversion when he thought about Conrad’s amateur broadcasts, the potential audience, 
and the local merchant’s efforts to cash in.46  Davis was coming to understand that radio 
telephony, which tended at the time to be seen primarily as a means of point-to-point 
communication, could become a mass medium, with one station broadcasting to many 
listeners. Davis set in motion plans for Westinghouse to create a station at its facility in 
East Pittsburgh and to sponsor nightly broadcasts.  These, he believed, could help 
generate a consumer market for Westinghouse wireless products and generate publicity, 
too, for the Westinghouse name.  
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In setting out the principles that would guide this endeavor, Davis noted the 
importance of working “hand in hand with the press” to publicize programs.  In fact, he 
said, “One of the earliest decisions was the necessity of building up and obtaining the 
necessary public interest in our efforts through the cooperation of the daily press.”47 He 
also noted that “we were most fortunately situated to accomplish this” since a leading 
figure in the local newspaper world was also an officer of a wireless company associated 
with Westinghouse.48 But simply having newspaper connections and publicity was not 
enough.  A proper occasion for the debut was also needed. “In our discussions, the 
subject of the first program was a matter of very careful deliberation,” said Davis. “We 
wanted to do something unusual – we wanted to make it spectacular; we wanted it to 
attract attention.”49 The solution:  launch on election night. “It happened that 1920 was 
the presidential election year,” Davis said, “and the happy thought occurred to us to open 
our station on the night of the election returns and to broadcast this news.”50  
On election night, KDKA broadcast returns telephoned to the station from a local 
newspaper office, interspersing them with music. 51  One Westinghouse engineer later 
                                                 
47 Ibid., 196. 
48 From Davis, “The Early History of Broadcasting in the United States,” 196: “Mr. A. E. Braun, the 
directing head of the Pittsburgh Post, a morning paper, and the Pittsburgh Sun, an evening paper, was an 
officer in the International Radio Telegraph Company, and the cooperation of these papers and his hearty 
support were immediately forthcoming.” A. E. Braun is listed as president of both the Post and the Sun on 
the masthead of both papers as of election day, Nov. 2, 1920. 
49 Davis, “The Early History of Broadcasting in the United States,” 197. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Most accounts, including the recollections of Davis and Conrad, identify the Pittsburgh Post as the 
source of KDKA’s election returns.  Balk (The Rise of Radio, 36) writes that both the Pittsburgh Post and 
the Pittsburgh Sun served as sources of KDKA’s election-night information, with the arrangements having 
been made by Davis. Davis’s own account (“The Early History of Broadcasting in the United States”) 
reports that the returns were provided by the Pittsburgh Post and does not mention any returns coming 
from the Pittsburgh Sun. In a 1941 KDKA recreation of the 1920 broadcast, the announcer reports that “We 




recalled that the company’s new manager of radio engineering called in from the hall 
during the broadcast to report that “the audience preferred less music and more election 
returns.”52  Later that week, reports on the Westinghouse station’s broadcast in the 
Pittsburgh Post and its sister paper, the Pittsburgh Sun, predicted that within four years, 
radio would become a universal medium for election-night reporting.53   However, in a 
departure from other instances of newspapers touting their association with new 
technology for disseminating election returns, the reaction of the Post and the Sun was 
relatively subdued, and the papers were mute on their own role. Stories did not appear for 
several days.  When brief and almost identical stories did appear, they ran on inside pages 
rather than the front. 54   The lead in each story described the event merely as “one of the 
interesting sidelights of the election.”55 And in perhaps the most curious feature of these 
accounts, the Post and Sun stories cited “press association wires” as the source of the 
bulletins, leaving out any newspaper role in telephoning bulletins to the radio station.56   
                                                                                                                                                 
and Sun”; from KDKA, “KDKA’s Twenty-First Birthday Party,” radio broadcast, Pittsburgh, Nov. 1, 
1941, from the collection of J. David Goldin. In any event, the Post and the Sun were sister papers.  The 
masthead of both on Nov. 2, 1920, lists different managing editors but the same officers and the same 
general office location, Wood and Liberty Streets (also identified in the Post as the Post Building).  In a 
1936 history of the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, J. Cutler Andrews writes that in 1906, the Post, which was a 
morning paper, started the Sun as an afternoon paper (J. Cutler Andrews, Pittsburgh’s Post-Gazette 
(Boston:  Chapman & Grimes, 1936), 294). Andrews also writes that around 1927, shortly before a major 
realignment of ownership of newspapers in Pittsburgh, the same estate owned both the Post and the Sun (p. 
291).  
52 Little, “The Reminiscences of Donald G. Little,” 26; also in Little, “Dr. Conrad Founds KDKA,” 73. 
53 “Wireless Phone Proves Success on Election Night; Westinghouse Concerns Distribute Returns From 
East Pittsburgh Plant; Predict Great Future,” Pittsburgh Sun, Nov. 4, 1920, 4, and “Returns One of Election 
Features,” Pittsburgh Post, Nov. 5, 1920, 16.   
54 “Wireless Phone Proves Success on Election Night,” Pittsburgh Sun, Nov. 4, 1920, 4; and  “Returns One 
of Election Features,” Pittsburgh Post, Nov. 5, 1920, 16. 
55 “Wireless Phone Proves Success on Election Night,” Pittsburgh Sun, Nov. 4, 1920, 4; and  “Returns One 
of Election Features,” Pittsburgh Post, Nov. 5, 1920, 16.   
56 “Wireless Phone Proves Success on Election Night,” Pittsburgh Sun, Nov. 4, 1920, 4; and  “Returns One 




Though there has been a historical pattern of news organizations touting their connection 
with new technological wizardry on election night, the KDKA episode suggests that this 
is not necessarily a uniform response.  What is relevant here, however, is that 
Westinghouse officials saw election night as an opportunity to advance their own 
commercial and technological agenda by latching onto election night as an important 
venue for rolling out new technology.  Westinghouse would go on to become a major 
broadcaster in markets around the country and was not shy over the years about making 
claims for the historic status of what it had done on election night in 1920, even if the 
iconic status of that broadcast was not established right away.57   
Election-Night Continuity in the Broadcasting Era 
By the next presidential election in 1924, however, the KDKA broadcast had 
come to assume the legendary proportions that would remain standard fare in histories of 
                                                 
57 In an account of KDKA that Westinghouse put together in the 1940s as part of a larger history of its 
pioneering status in broadcasting, Westinghouse claimed that the election-night broadcast was a “huge 
success” and “a national sensation, acclaimed by newspapers all over the country”:  Westinghouse 
Electrical Corporation, “Appendix B:  History of Radio Broadcasting and KDKA,” circa the 1940s, 60, 
included in Donald G. Little, “The Reminiscences of Donald G. Little,” Columbia University Oral History 
Collection on Microfiche, Part V (New York:  Columbia University Oral History Research Office, Radio 
Unit, 1984). However, in addition to the limited nature of the accounts in the Post and the Sun, the event 
was not the immediate subject of reporting in several publications for radio enthusiasts, according to Balk, 
The Rise of Radio, 37.   A search of the ProQuest New York Times Historical and Washington Post 
Historical databases also turns up no articles in 1920 (and not until 1922 in the Post and 1924 in the Times) 
about the KDKA election-night broadcast.  The same silence in late 1920 was evident in a check of the 
ProQuest American Periodical Series database.  A check of the NewspaperArchive.com database, searching 
the 192 newspapers with archived editions (as of May 19, 2008) between election day, 1920, and the end of 
that year, turned up no stories that mentioned either a combination of (a). “Westinghouse”, “election”, and 
“Pittsburgh”, or (b) “KDKA” and “election.”  Even accounting for both the fact that these tend to be 
primarily small newspapers and that there is less than perfect accuracy in such searches because of the 
inherent limitations in scanning newspaper pages from that era, the failure to retrieve any articles suggests 
that the broadcast was not an immediate “sensation” and that the fame of this event developed over time 
with later celebratory accounts.  A similar check of the Readex America’s Historical  Newspapers database 
yields similar results.  As for Westinghouse spreading word of its pioneering role in radio through KDKA, 
see for example, Davis, “The Early History of Broadcasting in the United States,” in 1928. By the 1924 
political season, David himself was already known as the “father of broadcasting” – see, for example, 




broadcasting and journalism.58 In a celebratory account, the New York Times reported that 
the four-year anniversary of that election-night broadcast was witnessing something 
“unique” in the “long history of invention.”59   In those four years,  radio was seen as 
accomplishing what it had taken the steam engine, the steamboat, the telephone and the 
airplane “a generation or more” to do, becoming “so much a part of our national life.”60  
Indeed, radio was all the rage by 1924.  Dozens of newspapers owned radio 
stations.  So did churches, schools, theaters, hardware stores, radio clubs, factories, civic 
organizations, police departments, and utility companies.61  Political candidates 
advertized on radio.  Millions of Americans tuned in.  And on Nov. 4, 1924, the same sort 
of free-for-all that had characterized earlier injections of new technology into the 
election-night scene reappeared with the new medium.  Many interests vied through 
advance publicity to grab a share of the expected audience.  Radio stations would provide 
both election news and entertainment.  News venues would seek to entertain.  
Entertainment venues would seek to inform.  All sorts of other entities were hitching 
themselves both to widespread interest in election returns and widespread excitement 
over radio by inviting the public in to hear the news over the airwaves – from a purveyor 
of radio equipment in Fitchburg, Massachusetts, to a high school in Marysville, Ohio, to 
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both the YMCA and YWCA in Titusville, Pennsylvania.62  At the New Amsterdam 
Theater in New York, where the new fall edition of the Ziegfeld Follies was “Glorifying 
the American Girl,” patrons were assured they would get to hear returns by radio.63  From 
the site of the third annual National Radio Exposition, then in its second day and drawing 
thousands of visitors to see a reported 175 exhibitors at the Grand Central Palace in New 
York, celebrity entertainer Eddie Cantor was slated to host an election-night “frolic” 
mixing returns and an on-air variety show.64  The New York Times reported with 
excitement that several hundred stations nationwide would get in on the election-night 
action, sending out news “in the ether” to an “unprecedented audience” numbering as 
many as 20 million.65  The strongest of the American stations had a reach of hundreds of 
miles.  The signal of at least one – Pittsburgh’s KDKA, in fact – was said to be received 
as far away as England.66  The Times ran a schedule for some 33 stations from Boston to 
San Francisco, with starting times and the wave lengths necessary to tune in.67  Election 
night would also provide an opportunity for coast-to-coast broadcasting by radio stations 
                                                 
62 “Election Returns By Radio,” Fitchburg (Mass.) Sentinel, Nov. 4, 1924, 11; “Radio Party at the High 
School,” Marysville (Ohio) Evening Tribune, Nov. 4, 1924, 1; “Will Receive Election Returns at City 
Hall,” Titusville (Pa.) Herald, Nov. 4, 1924, 10. 
63 “New Fall Edition Ziegfeld Follies,” New York Times, Nov. 2, 1924, sect. 7, 4. 
64 “Latest Improvements in Radio to be Displayed This Week,” New York Times, Nov. 2, 1924, sect. 8, 12; 
“Marconi, By Flash, Opens Radio Show,” New York Times, Nov. 4, 1924, 12. 
65 Although this figure appears in a New York Times article in advance of the election (“National Audience 
to Hear Election Returns by Radio,” Oct. 26, 1924, sect. 9, 14), a Times commentary following the election 
pointed out that “Just how large the audience was nobody knows, for there are no trustworthy statistics of 
the number of receiving sets made by amateur radiologists, and the figures of the regular manufacturers do 
not include the achievements of this non small army” (“Topics of The Times,” Nov. 6, 1924, 18). 
66 “Trains Get Radio Returns,” New York Times, Nov. 6, 1924, 21. 
67 “National Audience to Hear Election Returns by Radio,” New York Times, Oct. 26, 1924, sect. 9, 14; 
“Election Returns by Radio,” New York Times, Nov. 2, 1924, sect. 8, 12.  Similar stories ran elsewhere. An 
Illinois newspaper, for example, listed 19 stations between the East and West Coasts that would be 




linked together – a precursor to national network broadcasting.  Humorist Will Rogers 
was among the celebrities who would take part in keeping that unseen audience 
entertained in between returns.68  
But as with the arrival of the telegraph, which created new election-night 
opportunities at the same time it generated chaos with a flood of more rapidly available 
returns, the arrival of radio also prompted a new crisis:  how to organize and present the 
numbers-driven election-night information in a comprehensible and digestible way to 
listeners.  In 1924, a New York Times critique noted that “the gathering and distribution 
of election returns was a wholly unfamiliar task for most of the radio managers and their 
announcers.” 69 The exception was a station that “had the wisdom, or perhaps it was the 
good fortune, to secure the services as announcer of an experienced journalist who had 
lived through election nights before and knew both that early returns are valueless as they 
stand and that when skillfully interpreted they may be a fairly safe basis for prophecy as 
to final results of the voting.”70  These early attempts, one NBC executive later wrote in 
an internal memo, resulted in “a mere hodgepodge of unintelligible returns.” 71  The 
message was clear.  Broadcasters attempting to supply election-night news risked 
embarrassment if they operated their wondrous new technology without adopting an 
established set of journalistic practices – newspaper practices – that had been worked out 
over time to derive meaning from a stream of early returns.  “The election night 
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broadcaster of the future,” declared the Times, “will be a man who can perform the 
computation of averages ‘in his head’ and very rapidly, and his ‘conceding’ and 
‘claiming’ will be as close to the truth as are those made in newspaper officers hours and 
hours before all the ballots are counted.”72  Two other things would be required of this 
future radio journalist.  One was the reading of returns in round figures rather than giving 
all the digits of large numbers.  The other test of competence was the ability to provide 
“explanations and interpretations rather than exact figures.”73  At stake was the gratitude 
of listeners. 
By 1928, the New York Times coverage of the radio industry’s election-night 
plans provides evidence of evolving standards for the broadcasting of returns – changed 
by doing something new in radio, but not at all new in election-night journalism.  This 
was a recognition of the importance of professionalism in the gathering and reporting of 
returns, along with the attendant prestige for a job well done.  The intertwining of news 
and entertainment was still very much in the picture.  But the greatly enhanced efforts to 
report the news merited yet another iteration of the “story of the story.”  Blessed with 
sometimes elaborate broadcasting facilities but lacking their own stables of reporters and 
analysts, radio stations and networks would recruit help and collaborate with news 
organizations for the election. And certain sounds captured for the radio audience would 
lend gravity to the broadcast, too: 
The clatter of adding machines and typewriters, alien sounds in a 
broadcasting studio, will replace symphonies and solos in large studios of 
the National Broadcasting Company Tuesday night.  Instead of 
announcers in dinner jackets and prima donnas in red velvet gowns there 
                                                 





will be newspaper men and tabulators.  The studio will be a newsroom for 
the night.74  
The “tabulators” here were people, and the Times reported that a “staff of writers, 
analysts and tabulators in the studio would act as a human sieve.”75  Their job would be 
to make sense of returns arriving from a newsgathering force of 100,000 people – an 
estimate of the corps who would be gathering complete nationwide returns for three 
national wire services cooperating with NBC.  It was said to be “the greatest 
newsgathering combination ever effected, an organization with representatives in every 
hamlet, town and city in the United States.”76  Only comprehensible figures would be 
read into the microphones. Their significance would be explained by “political experts.”  
CBS would be employing “expert statisticians,” too, and the vote counts would be 
analyzed by “political authorities and writers.”77    
Drawing up plans for coverage in 1932, one NBC executive, Avery Marks, 
circulated an internal memo suggesting that 1928 met with only mixed success in 
providing listener-friendly reports.78  “Experience of 8 years in election night 
broadcasting has convinced me,” he wrote, “that the average broadcast is a mere 
hodgepodge of unintelligible returns.”79 He reported achieving limited success on an 
alternative way of reporting vote counts – as comparative percentages or ratios, both for 
the running totals and the margin of difference between candidates.  The condensation of 
                                                 









information that he suggested would eventually become the prevailing philosophy for 
election night broadcasting.80  But it would take time in the new medium to meet 
expectations that had been carried over from the public’s experience of election nights 
ruled by newspapers. 
In a 1968 journal article – one of the rare explorations of the early history of 
election-night broadcasting – Thomas W. Bohn concluded that the reporting of returns 
had provided an important “testing ground” for radio broadcasting. 81  Working primarily 
from accounts in the New York Times and a trade publication, Broadcasting, he found 
that election-night practices on radio took decades to evolve into full-time, hard-news 
coverage featuring expert interpretation and analysis.  This development coincided with 
an increasing ability over that time to gather and aggregate voting results. It also 
coincided with a slow realization that the listening public would be receptive to such 
broadcasts and a rising awareness that sponsors would be willing to support an election-
night format in which news predominated.   
From the 1920s to the 1940s, as radio established an ever more durable hold in 
American culture, election night was serving as a laboratory for working out important 
aspects of the live broadcasting of complex news events.  But the idea of radio as a venue 
for news – that radio could, should, or would be a venue for news – was not at all obvious 
at the beginning of this period.  And as early as 1924, efforts by broadcasters to 
disseminate election returns were among the precipitating events in what came to be 
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known as the Press-Radio War.82 A central issue in this battle between purveyors of old 
and new technology was whether wire service bulletins should be made available to radio 
stations.  Newspaper publishers were certainly not uniform at first in their resistance to 
radio news, especially those who saw radio as yet one more technology to help position 
them at center stage in the political theater of election night.  A historian of the Press-
Radio War has argued that the stakes for newspapers in seeking to retard the growth of 
radio news were not just economic in nature. 83  To be sure, it was not lost on publishers 
that radio was fairing better than newspapers in the early years of the Depression.  But 
publishers were also driven to maintain their position as powerful and important figures 
in the flow of information in American society.  The history of dissemination of election 
returns by newspapers before radio makes clear  that publishers would go to great 
expense to get the word out well in advance of their printed editions – not to make an 
immediate profit, but to stake a claim to social and cultural importance. 
Election night in 1932 was a pivotal point in the darkening relationship between 
radio and print.  The provision of news wire bulletins to the radio networks – following a 
great deal of intrigue driven by intense rivalry between competing wire services – was 
too much for the publishers to bear.  As a result, networks were cut off from their sources 
of wire bulletins and an association of newspaper publishers resolved to stop carrying 
radio schedules.  As the battle lines hardened, broadcasters began investing in their own 
                                                 
82 A comprehensive study is provided by Gwenyth L. Jackaway, Media at War: Radio's Challenge to the 
Newspapers, 1924-1939 (Westport, Conn.:  Praeger, 1995).  See also Chapter 3, “Growing Pains; The Story 
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news operations.  A truce was in place in advance of the 1936 election, which featured 
radio news reports by a short-lived collaborative enterprise known as the Press Radio 
Bureau.  And while the landscape of election-night journalism had shifted yet again, a 
transcript of NBC’s offering shows that some of the most salient features included the 
continuation of practices that predated radio.84  The “story of the story,” for example, 
would continue to be an important aspect of election-night broadcasting in 1936. Shortly 
after the broadcast began, commentator John B. Kennedy set the scene for his audience: 
“you probably hear the sounds of machines, Morse Code operators, typewriters, 
newspaper men, rewrite men getting together the greatest story of the year…”  After a 
“campaign of turbulence,” he continued, “now the big story is going to be told, and told 
to you first by radio.”85  The head of the Press Radio Bureau, James W. Barrett, then 
went on to describe in detail the technology of election-night reporting and to estimate 
the human component:  that across the country, the worlds of newspaper and radio had, 
between them, engaged 200,000 people in efforts to bring election returns to the public.86 
The forecasting of election results on radio, as it reached for respectability, was also 
being done much as newspaper journalists had been doing for decades, comparing the 
incoming returns to historical data and looking for consistency or divergence from past 
patterns.87  In 1936, as on other election nights in the first generation of radio, 
deployment of a new technology had come to rest on a solid foundation of continuity 
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with the familiar – extending values, practices, and tropes that were already well 
established. 
Engaging the Audience 
Radio broadcasters were discovering, as Bohn noted, that their audience had a 
hearty appetite for an all-news format on election night, and that companies which were 
used to sponsoring night-time entertainment shows on radio could see the value in 
sponsoring all-news shows on election night. Eventually, the all-news format would 
prevail as the rule in election-night broadcasting.88   
Still, the values associated with entertainment – showmanship, storytelling, 
drama, and wonders – remained part of the news-laden broadcasts on election nights, 
both on radio and later on television. Avery Marks’s internal NBC memo in advance of 
the 1932 election shows a network executive worrying about how to keep the audience 
listening in the event of a landslide. The possible solutions included “interpretations,” 
“late returns,” and “showing by figures that all is not over yet.”89 Even the gathering and 
tabulating of numbers could be turned into a potentially audience-engaging activity, 
election after election, as radio matured.  That’s what happened in 1932 when 
broadcasters positioned their microphones to pick up the sounds of telegraph devices, 
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typewriters, and calculators.90 And it’s what happened in 1932 when WABC radio – the 
flagship station of the Columbia Broadcasting System – turned the proverbial man-vs.-
machine trope on its head in the choice of an unusual outside expert for the tabulation of 
returns.  Producers of the election-night broadcast retained and promoted the services of 
one Salo Finkelstein to tabulate returns – not by machine, but in his head.91 
Finkelstein, then in his mid 30s, was one of those rare and wondrous 
mathematical prodigies, or “mental calculators,” who have been celebrated over time for 
their abilities to remember long sequences of numbers and carry out complex calculations 
– not only without the aid of an adding machine, but faster.92  He had discovered and 
nurtured this talent as a young adult in his native Poland, and he turned to making a living 
with it.  He also sought to make a name for himself.  He went on tour.  He presented 
himself for study before scientists in Europe, and then landed in the United States in the 
winter of 1932.  By that September, he managed to capture the attention of the New 
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Yorker, where he was profiled in a “Talk of the Town” piece titled, simply, “Magician.”93  
The New Yorker reported, among other things, that Finkelstein had been brought to the 
United States by the Psychological Corporation – a high-brow group promoting the 
advancement and practical applications of psychology – and had wowed scholars at 
Harvard, Yale, and elsewhere.94  A month later, the New York Times recounted 
Finkelstein’s appearance at the National Business Show in New York, where he chewed 
on a cigar stub and performed privately for reporters and later for the public.95 And by 
election day, amidst heated competition between the growing nationwide radio chains, 
the Times took note of the fact that Finkelstein would be featured on WABC, adding up 
returns on election night.96  Time magazine later reported on his performance in a piece 
titled “Calculator.” “As returns came in,” Time wrote, “he computed them more quickly 
and quietly than adding machine operators,” and then “whispered totals to the 
announcer.”97 
After the 1932 election, Finkelstein continued to be a curiosity and itinerant 
showman.  He was often referred to as “Dr. Salo Finkelstein,” though at least one study 
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later mentioned that he did not have an advanced education.98  An ad in Science News 
Letter announced that “the prodigy Dr. Salo Finkelstein” would be interviewed on the 
Columbia Broadcasting System and would demonstrate “lightening calculation.”99 He 
was the subject of a syndicated article in the late fall of 1932 that appeared in such places 
as Waterloo, Iowa, and Sheboygan, Wisconsin, complete with a photograph of the 
“bespectacled, round-shouldered, rather wistful figure.” 100  Stories reported that no less a 
personage than Albert Einstein had commented on his abilities.101   Finkelstein continued 
to be the subject of study at American universities, and accounts of his talents were 
reported in scholarly journals.102 Things he said showed up as one-liners in lists of 
quotations on newspaper editorial pages, where he was identified in some cases as a 
“Polish-Jewish mathematical wizard.”103 He also passed through communities such as 
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Elyria, Ohio, where a front-page story announcing his appearance before a high school 
assembly in 1936 noted that he had been “described as ‘the world’s greatest calculating 
genius.’”104  The story also reported that that his “speed and his accuracy won him great 
fame on November 8, 1932, when he tabulated presidential election returns.”105  That 
same “mathematical wizardry” was recalled in June 1936 when the Washington Post 
reported that “the most interesting sidelight” of the Republican convention that month 
was that CBS had again retained Finkelstein’s services.106  In fact, he reportedly turned 
up at CBS radio on election nights as late as 1944, and he became part of the “story of the 
story” of election coverage in a 1952 retrospective by veteran broadcasters Robert Trout 
and Paul W. White: 
Dr. Finkelstein was a lightning calculator of the highest voltage.  It 
was his gift to be able, after a glance at a blackboard crammed with 
figures, to write a summary such as: “Roosevelt:  3,656,789, now leading 
in 19 states having 277 electoral votes; Dewey, 2,991,654, leading in 
seven states with 95 electoral votes.” 107 
 
The descriptions of his election-night demeanor make him sound a bit like one of Herman 
Melville’s inscrutable characters.  He would show up in the newsroom, juggle prodigious 
figures, and then, wrote Trout and White, “when the last word had been spoken and the 
microphones turned off, he would collect his fee in cash and promptly vanish.”108  A 
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generation later, his mathematical exploits were invoked in “Ripley’s Believe It Or Not!” 
The syndicated newspaper feature repeated what had been reported about him in the 
1930s:  that before his arrival in the United States, he had replaced 40 humans with 
adding machines in an agency of the Polish government.109 Finkelstein and CBS each had 
something to gain by his role on election nights.  Calculation in a tense atmosphere in 
which accuracy had come to be prized was certainly part of the picture.  Trout and White 
recounted this example: 
One year, with the figures flowing fast, there came a desperate 
moment, a crisis when Dr. Finkelstein’s totals and the tabulations supplied 
by a battery of add-machines didn’t jibe.  In a flash, the doctor 
recalculated.  It took the workers at mechanical computers a couple of 
flashes longer to repeat their work.  Editors, writers, telephone operators 
crowded around. For a few seconds, people forgot to breathe.  Then:  the 
announcement.  It was simple really; the adding machine had been 
wrong.110 
But Finkelstein’s calculations were more than just a mathematical aid to the network’s 
reporting.  From his first election-night broadcast, he lent an air of wonder and celebrity 
to the mix, and he gained exposure in return.  By the 1952 election, Finkelstein’s days as 
an election-night wonder had come to an end.  What television viewers would see 
instead, noted Trout and White, was an “ultramodern ‘mechanical brain.’ ”111 
While radio was ascendant as an election-night medium, newspapers did not 
concede their own demise as important players, even in the dissemination and analysis of 
returns before their first pint editions hit the streets.  Crowds continued to gather around 
newspaper buildings looking for bulletins.  Newspaper reporters and editors appeared on 
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air as experts in the analysis of returns. Newspapers also made themselves valuable to 
active radio audiences by publishing prediction guides and blank score sheets on or 
before election day.  The practice of following returns with printed score sheets dated 
back to at least the late 19th century, when bulletins were available in some places by 
telephone.  There are accounts from 1892 of a telephone company in New York 
providing customers with printed cards for use on election night, complete with historical 
data and room to jot down returns.112  In the radio era, newspapers adopted this practice.  
Ahead of the 1924 election and again in 1926, the New York Sun ran ads in the New York 
Times offering tabulation forms to help radio listeners keep track of returns. 113  The 1924 
ad billed the “tally sheets” as “something entirely new,” certain to “add zest” to the 
evening, and urged listeners to follow returns that the Sun would be providing on radio 
station WEAF.114 The 1926 ad for the Sun’s “election sheets” promised three pages 
“devoted to a comprehensive system for tabulating election returns as they come over the 
radio,” including 1924 voting data to be used in spotting trends.115   
Newspapers’ publication of blank score sheets, historic data, and the expert 
knowledge needed to assess the returns as they rolled in became regular features of pre-
election editions.  In 1936, the Morning News in Florence, South Carolina, invited 
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readers to “Test Your Skill In Election Forecasting.”116  The same year, the Fayetteville 
Daily Democrat in Arkansas ran its tally sheet prominently on the front page of its 
election-day editions.117  Wire service editors also prepared score sheets to be published 
by their newspaper clients.  In 1940, a guide titled “The ABC of Interpreting Election 
Bulletins” was circulated widely by the Associated Press Feature Service. 118  It included 
an electoral map with state-by-state data from the 1936 election and stars by the states 
that had voted with the majority for the past 40 years.  The story suggested “keys to 
important trends” on election night. These included economic and demographic 
considerations (“industrial precincts,” “farm vote,” and “city, rural and suburban 
contrasts”) as well as groupings of states by size (“The Big Ten”) and region.119   
In the radio era, newspapers and their wire services were not alone in seeking to 
be indispensible to broadcast audiences through materials printed in advance.  Even in 
this aspect of election-night culture, there was competition from other interests – 
including radio stations themselves – which generated their own score sheets.  An archive 
of NBC records includes an elaborate full-page “TABULATON SHEET for keeping 
posted on election night” in 1936.120  Prominently displayed are the call letters of two 
NBC stations on Los Angeles – KECA and KFI. Directions for using the chart promised 
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“we will broadcast standing of states every hour.”121  In fact, for every hour from 10 p.m. 
to 3 p.m. there were spaces beside each state to “jot down the party side which is leading” 
in each state, plus room to note the final outcome.122  The tally sheet duly noted the 
sponsor for the election-night broadcast – A & P Food Stores – and at the bottom urged 
voters to vote no on a ballot proposition dealing with retail store licensing. 123 
Parties, Prestige, and the Center Stage 
Score sheets were just one of the ways in which news organizations sought to take 
center stage by addressing a robust public appetite for timely news and excitement on 
election night. In the era of broadcasting, the newsroom itself continued to be a place for 
the proprietors of news organizations to show off, further evidence of the unique place of 
election night journalism in American culture.  Special guests – cultural celebrities, 
political figures, business leaders, and advertisers – were invited to see the inner 
workings of the broadcast operations on these nights. In 1928, officials of NBC and 
affiliated entities brought their wives and special guests to watch an election broadcast in 
action.  They crowded around a news announcer in the control room as he ad libbed his 
coverage from “meagre information provided by cold hard fact,” as an internal network 
                                                 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Exactly which entity produced this page – NBC, the stations, or the sponsor – is not clear, but there is 
one piece of evidence that suggests it might have come from a template for use by other NBC stations in 
the West.  A handwritten note on the top of this document says “Complete file in KFSD” – the call letters 
of a San Diego station – and text on the tally sheet also suggests a focus on the West: “The A&P 
sponsorship of these broadcasts on both the Red and Blue N.B.C. networks is one of the most extensive 




memo described the scene.124   Four years later, an NBC executive would call for changes 
in this arrangement to make it easier for the news staff to work – and get fed.  In 1928, it 
was recalled, the guests scarfed up the food and drink intended to sustain those producing 
the election-night broadcast.125  By 1940, NBC’s election-night party was a huge 
production, worthy of being detailed in a post-election story in the New York Times: 
Columbia and Mutual had room for only a few spectators at their 
election broadcasts, but at NBC the famous Studio 8-H, from which 
Arturo Toscanini directs the NBC symphony orchestra, was converted into 
a huge receiving room for wire and telephone reports of the returns.  An 
audience of about 4,000 gathered in the studio as the guests of [Niles] 
Trammell, president of NBC, to hear the broadcasts and see the 
tabulations of the returns posted on a large scoreboard on the stage…. 
The studio has seats for 1,400, but the seats were removed for the 
special election broadcast and guests stood on the floor, wandering in and 
out and to other NBC studios.  A buffet supper was served from the 
stage.126 
Four years later, in 1944, a photograph taken at the cavernous CBS election-night 
headquarters in New York shows that the network had rallied, at least in terms of having 
high-profile guests. Frank Sinatra, then just 28 and already a singing and acting sensation, 
occupied a front-row seat beside actresses decked out in fur coats.  All were just a few 
feet from the action – reporters and assistants working at their desks, announcers 
broadcasting returns from a raised platform.  Dozens of other guests milled about, taking 
in the busy newsgathering and reporting scene.127  This practice of using election night to 
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show off for celebrities – and using the celebrities to confer status on the news operation 
– continued into the era of television.  Ahead of the 1949 state and local elections, WCBS 
in New York issued a press release describing in detail how it would cover the returns on 
radio and television.  Special guests, it was noted, had been “invited to watch the returns 
in the CBS television studios,” and they would be interviewed for both radio and 
television broadcasts.128  Arthur Godfrey, a popular CBS radio and television entertainer, 
was among them.  So were the wives of two presidents, Eleanor Roosevelt and Margaret 
Truman.   
Before the days of radio, newspaper publishers and editors could be found 
admitting select and privileged guests to watch the newsroom excitement, and this 
phenomenon continued at newspapers into the era of broadcasting.129  At the New York 
Times, a copy boy named Arthur Gelb watched in 1944 as publisher Arthur Hays 
Sulzberger and his wife, Iphigene, brought their after-dinner guests to watch the action.  
They provided a “city-room audience” for the “election-night display.”130 Gelb, who 
would go on to become managing editor of the Times, wrote in his memoir: 
The Sulzbergers enjoyed showing off the city room when it was operating 
at full tilt, and their guests seemed delighted to witness the making of the 
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newspaper they would read at breakfast a few hours later.  We in the city 
room, aware we were onstage, enjoyed it too, shouting a bit louder than 
usual, dashing about a bit more purposefully.131 
The level of activity must have been a sight to behold, judging from the food consumed, 
which the newsroom aides documented in their own publication, Timesweek:  “1,800 
sandwiches, made of liverwurst, bologna, salami, Spam, roast beef, chicken, and egg 
salad.”132   Generations after journalists first came to see their newsrooms as a wonder to 
behold on election night, the habit had not abated.   
Election Night on Television: News and Showmanship 
In fact, running through decades that witnessed changes in technology, society, 
and journalism, one of the abiding features of election night was its importance as a 
venue for news organizations to position themselves at center stage in the national 
political drama.  Hosting parties was one means.  The ever-present trope of the “story of 
the story” was another.  Technological wizardry, too, remained an important element in 
the calculus.  That there would be tremendous public interest was not in doubt as radio 
reached maturity and television became the newest player.  But holding an audience was 
as much an issue for broadcasters as it had been for competitive newspaper publishers 
and their election-night contests in the century before.  The era of an all-news format had 
arrived, but the values of entertainment and showmanship had certainly not disappeared. 
In 1948, broadcasters began making detailed election-night plans at least as early 
as September, and these plans called for packaging the news with glitz.  A planning 
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memo for a collaborative effort between NBC and Life magazine envisioned kicking off 
the election-night broadcast at 9 p.m. by “televising all the hubbub and clatter of the huge 
room in which NBC gathers its election returns and originates most of its broadcasting of 
election results.”133  Radio had long been doing the same thing, conveying the excitement 
of reporting an election by positioning microphones to capture the sounds of 
newsgathering and calculating equipment in a busy newsroom.134   Now, in plans for 
election night in the early years of the television era, the newsroom itself would still be 
part of the story.135  And, as before, even calculation could be deployed not only for its 
value in generating content, but as a visible indicator of the evening’s heroic acts of 
gathering and aggregating the returns under the intense pressures for timeliness and 
accuracy. The visual appeal of the scene would include not only “milling guests,” 
“clattering news tickers,” and “huge wall charts upon which clerks are changing tallies as 
the latest returns come in,” but the human and mechanical machinery of election-night 
number-crunching: “rows of operators of calculating machines.”136  There was a proposal 
for “black magic presentation” of returns.137 And later in the planning process, the 
concepts for visual gimmickry became more developed, with cost estimates for each 
element, including $53 for a “Tug o’ War device,” $65 for a “Tel-a tale Device,” and $32 
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for “Moving objects including elephants in train.”138 As the election drew closer, the list 
of “gadgets” grew longer, including a “Tele-tale” that would be “similar to the Times 
Bldg.” 139  There was to be an elephant and donkey in a tug-of-war and cash registers 
described as “raze-ma-taze” for the “wind-up of the show,” bearing the names of 11 
major and minor-party presidential candidates.140  These devices were not merely to be 
seen at random, but were explicitly referenced in minute-by-minute plans for the 
election-night program. 141 While the news itself could not be scripted, there were six 
pages of details about who would be on camera, when, and where.  Instructions for the 
first few minutes called for the use of “gadgets for visualization,” and there was a call to 
“pan floor showing gimmicks” at a point early on when there would be “few returns” to 
report.142  With the passage of time, these devices and arrangements may now seem 
primitive. But they reveal a marked attention to the importance of visual appeal in the use 
of this new technology for transmitting election returns, a practice that had already 
evolved a great deal since 1932.  In that year, an early television station operated by CBS 
in New York broadcast returns in a way that simply mimicked the long tradition of 
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outdoor bulletins – training the camera’s “electrical eye” on placards with lettered 
returns.143  A newspaper account referred to the arrangement, in fact, as an “ethereal 
bulletin board.”144 Entertainers and pictures of candidates filled in the gaps between fresh 
news of the election.145  
Times Square as Election Night Icon and Battleground 
The inclusion in NBC’s 1948 plans of a gadget bearing some similarity to the 
display of election-night news outside the Times Tower was probably not a random or 
lightly-considered idea.  In the battle for attention on election night – in which 
broadcasting would eventually win an absolute victory over outdoor displays – that 
outcome was in no way guaranteed.  But even beyond that, Times Square on election 
night occupied an enviable place not only in the physical landscape, but in the nation’s 
mental landscape. While radio quickly commanded a larger audience, election night at 
Times Square continued to produce some of the very largest gatherings of people 
anywhere in the United States.  This was a storied location that held a special place in the 
nation’s psyche and figured prominently in broadcasters’ conceptions of their own 
election-night performance.  Even the notion of performance was not remote from the 
calculus that produced these crowds.   Times Square’s environs at Broadway and 42nd 
Street – the heart of the nation’s most famous entertainment district – meant a ready 
supply of people.  Just as the vaudeville of an earlier generation had made people in the 
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seats feel like they were part of the show, crowds in Times Square could count on being 
part of the show on election night.146 
The New York Times did not take these crowds for granted.  Although the 
newspaper operation had outgrown the Times Tower and moved a half block away to a 
new building in 1913, publisher Adolph S. Ochs held onto the original building for its 
public relations value.147  Located at the southern end of Times Square, it had become an 
iconic structure in the heart of the brightly-lit entertainment capital of the nation, a 
location with impressive sightlines where Seventh Avenue and the “Great White Way” of 
Broadway converged. When the advent of radio and its virtual audience promised to 
dwarf the size of election-night gatherings in Times Square, the Times used election night 
in 1928 as a venue to roll out an attention-getting technological innovation in the delivery 
of news.  Dubbed the “Motograph News Bulletin” and later known simply as the 
“zipper,” the five-foot tall panel encircled the Times Tower at the fourth floor and 
featured moving messages with hundreds of letters and numbers spelled out in electric 
lights. 148  Stories following the election described its technical features in great detail, 
including 1,386,000 feet of wire, 88,000 soldered connections, and 14,800 light bulbs 
made of amber glass that was specially developed for this use, combining “warm, 
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pleasing color” and “unusual readability in early twilight.”149  There was a plug for the 
inventor who installed the device.150  And the Times celebrated the motograph’s 
“publication” of election returns as the debut of a nightly news service.151  The moving 
display of news would go on to be one of the most distinctive features of Times Square, 
“printing” headlines for the “teeming midtown throng,” as one writer put it a decade later, 
“in the medium the crowd knows best – electric light.”152  But the motograph itself was 
just one element in the Times’s varied presentation of the news on election night in 1928, 
generations before the term “multimedia” would come to embody both the challenges and 
opportunities facing traditional print journalism in the next century.  Even as the Times 
was enthusiastically reporting on nationwide efforts to broadcast the election’s outcome 
by radio, the paper continued to use searchlight signals, coded colored lights mounted on 
a flag pole, stereopticon projections, and the “Pacent-Phonovox System” for announcing 
the news to the crowd in Times Square.153  For those listening to radio at home – such as 
“Mr. Citizen,” envisioned as having “drawn up before him a table with paper and figures” 
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– the Times had also published a half-page packed with election data back to 1916 and a 
place to record the state-by-state vote.154 
To be sure, radio might have more listeners and was being celebrated in Times 
headlines as “The New Instrument of Democracy.” 155 But Times Square, with its special 
mix of glitzy non-print news media on election night, continued to draw crowds of 
astonishing proportions – in the tens and hundreds of thousands – well into the era of 
broadcasting.156  It’s not hard to understand why broadcasters would want in on that 
Times Square action in the battle for election-night legitimacy. At first, getting in on the 
action meant bringing Times Square to the rest of the nation.   In 1932, the “hubbub” of 
Times Square was captured by radio microphones positioned in hotel windows above the 
crowd.157  In 1936, NBC sent radio announcer and news reporter Ben Grauer to Times 
Square with the NBC Mobile Unit to describe the scene.158   Here was the new medium, 
radio, achieving some sort of paradoxical authenticity as an election-night news source 
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by capturing the excitement of the crowd getting its bulletins the old-fashioned way – 
packed shoulder-to-shoulder in the street.  A few minutes after NBC radio began 
reporting that President Roosevelt was widely viewed as the victor with just a fraction of 
the vote counted – as evidenced by concessions from newspapers in the Republican camp 
– Grauer stood atop what he described as a “steel island … in a sea of humanity” and 
created a picture in words and sound for his listeners: 
[A]s you can probably gather from the background of noise and 
excitement, it seems as if bedlam has broken loose here...  
     The street is absolutely choked with people, 10,000, 20,000, 50,000, 
100,000, I don't think that is too extravagant an estimate, as I look up 
Broadway from my position at 43rd Street to 48th and 49th Streets, and I 
see that the streets are black with people… [The] horns you hear are going 
by the dozens all around us… There are constantly cheering, applauding 
people waving hats… and those who aren’t tall are jumping on the 
shoulders of those who are taller…  
     … The reason for all this noise is that a picture of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt has just been flashed on the screen… 
     … Looking up, I see a searchlight swinging in a long and low semi-
circle in the heavens, indicating election results.  Then beyond this, I can 
look into the skies and see floating down myriad pieces of paper that have 
been thrown from the windows in the nearby offices…  
     There you have a picture, as hectic as it may be, yet an accurate one of 
the excitement in a humanity jammed Times Square in the heart of New 
York City on election night, brought to you by short wave from the N.B.C. 
Mobile Unit.159 
 
Even as it would convey the scene in Times Square, NBC was trying to draw a 
street crowd to its own enormous outdoor display. Thirty feet wide by 30 feet tall, the 
display featured a map of the United States, each state represented with colored glass 
capable of flashing amber light for Landon or green for Roosevelt.  About an hour and a 
half after the report from Times Square, there was a report from NBC’s mobile unit on 
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the scene around the NBC display, where nearly all states were now flashing Roosevelt’s 
green from coast to coast.  As interesting as it was reported it to be, the 8,000 to 10,000 
who stood watching were admitted to be “not as vast a crowd as we brought to you from 
Times Square.”160 
Whether officials at NBC were explicitly trying in 1936 to outdo Times Square is 
not made clear in the transcript.  But internal NBC documents leave no doubt that’s just 
what the network and its parent company, RCA, hoped to do in 1948.161  It was not 
enough that NBC’s combined radio and television audience would have dwarfed any 
crowd which could turn up in Times Square.  The broadcasters wanted to be at center 
stage in the street, too.  This, perhaps, promised visible proof of the network’s election-
night importance.   
The idea of drawing street crowds to watch NBC television monitors surfaced by 
the early fall of 1948 in a memo between two officials at Life magazine, which had 
collaborated with NBC in coverage of the 1948 political conventions and would do so 
again on election night.162  In an effort to gin up a discussion of election-night 
programming, Sidney L. James, a senior editor, wrote to Life publisher Andrew Heiskell 
with ideas for the broadcast.163  Among those ideas was a change of scene to come 15 
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minutes after launching the broadcast in Rockefeller Center’s Studio 8-H: “We continue 
to establish election night atmosphere with our mobile unit which is planted on the street 
below in Radio City.  Here before two large television screens, crowds are gathered to 
watch the LIFE-NBC telecast.”164 
Three weeks later, without referencing the Life memo, the idea of a drawing a 
street crowd for NBC turned up in a memo from Charles R. Denny, NBC’s executive 
vice president and general manager.165 This idea was attributed to Robert Sarnoff, who 
worked at NBC and was the son of David Sarnoff, board chairman of NBC’s parent 
corporation, RCA. The idea was also said to have the blessing of NBC President Niles 
Trammell. And it was nothing less than a declaration of war on Times Square’s 
preeminent position as the nation’s symbolic gathering place on election night.  Using 
technological novelty as a draw – not just television, but big-screen outdoor television – 
was part of the plan: 
Bob Sarnoff has come up with an idea which Mr. Trammell and I 
think is excellent.  He suggests that we arrange to have a big screen 
projection television set up in Rockefeller Plaza on Election Night so that 
the crowds can gather outside in and around the skating rink and in the 
Plaza to see the televising of election returns.  The whole idea is to take 
the play away from Times Square.  During the course of the big screen 
demonstration in Rockefeller Plaza, we would of course turn the camera 
out the window and make a pickup of the crowd and the big screen 
demonstration and put it on the television network.166 
Less than two weeks later, with the election rapidly approaching, precise plans had been 
drawn up and arrangements were underway to carry them out.  These included 
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specifications for construction of a screen and frame with outside dimensions of precisely 
17 feet-3 inches by 21 feet-11½ inches, sitting nine feet above the sidewalk and receiving 
images from a 2,200-pound projector operating 40 feet away.167  It would, indeed, be 
completed in time for the election, and New York Times reporter Meyer Berger would 
take note, referring to the events in Rockefeller Plaza as “the new trend in Election Night 
customs.”168 
CBS, too, offered intentionally reflexive coverage on election night – that is, 
reporting on the excitement of its own efforts to report the election.  CBS radio sent a 
reporter, Norman Brokenshire, out into the crowded streets of the Midtown Manhattan in 
a mobile unit.  He came on air shortly before 6:30 p.m., and his report quickly turned to a 
description of his own reporting as the center of attention on the streets: 
We’re certainly doing the town tonight. You know, this is nothing 
but a great big, beautiful Plexiglas bubble. And it’s on wheels…Here 
along the sidewalks of New York, the pulse of America beats right out 
loud.  It’s a good thing we’re moving, for the minute we come to a stop, 
this ultramodern mobile studio gets more attention from the men and 
women on the streets than the skaters in the plaza or the blimp that flies 
overhead.169 
A CBS release from late October – found in the files of an NBC executive – also 
promised that the television broadcast would capture the “gala mood of the Great White 
Way,” the storied section of Broadway that includes Times Square.170 While there is no 
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mention of trying to draw a street crowd to CBS, the advance publicity made it clear that 
CBS intended to generate visual excitement using its own newsroom.  Three cameras 
would be “sweeping the vast arena of activity” in the CBS election-night “nerve 
center.”171 They would capture the “tally boards in operation” as well as “interviews with 
celebrities and political personalities” – all part of the plan to show “exciting scenes of 
the broadcasters at work.” 172 
Despite the networks’ enthusiasm for creating a journalistically sound and 
visually exciting experience for their audiences, one important viewer found the 
experience disappointing.  He was Jack Gould, television critic for the New York Times. 
In his estimation, “radio had much the best of it over television, the video art fumbling 
rather badly in its first full-dress effort to cover the outcome of a presidential election.”173  
Gould suggested that while counting ballots might not be inherently exciting as a visual 
affair, television could have done better with more effective preparation.  Large wall 
charts were hard to read, needing to be simplified and presented in larger letters.  Too 
much attention was drawn to the on-air broadcasters rather than the news to be reported.  
On one network the presentation was pretentious.  On another there was “altogether too 
much ‘experting.’”174 And in missing the concession speech of the Republican candidate, 
New York Gov. Thomas E. Dewey, Gould wrote that “whatever their alibis, the 
television boys were caught napping.”175 
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For Gould, it would seem, some of the classic values of election-night reporting 
that we have seen in play over the prior decades – including effort to dazzle with various 
attention-getting gimmicks and a self-conscious attention to the story of the story – had 
interfered with at least the purported role of a news operation:  transmitting the results of 
the election in an intelligent and comprehensible way.  To be sure, by 1948 the television 
broadcasting of election returns had come a long way from the early attempts. But when 
the curtain closed on the last presidential election before 1952, the jury was still out on 
whether television could prove itself a respectable venue for election-night reporting.   
Election-Night “Sublime” 
This tour of election-night journalism during the century or so leading up to 1952 
is not meant in to be exhaustive.  Rather, it is intended to help answer a question.  If 
computer analysis as a tool to aid in news reporting was slow to be widely adopted during 
the early decades of the computer age, how do we explain the use of computers as tools 
for election-night reporting on television in 1952? While it is tempting to view that 
episode as entirely revolutionary, the approach here has been to look for ways in which 
this use of computing might also be consistent with well-established journalistic practices 
on election nights to that point.   
In our tour, the evident linkage between election night and the wonders of 
technology also calls to mind the work of David Nye, who has explored in detail over 
two centuries the “American technological sublime.”176 In Nye’s usage, the awe-inspiring 
wonders of technology have been an important and durable American trope. Their 
                                                 




celebration has been intertwined with celebrations of such holidays as Independence Day, 
and the debuts of new technologies and systems have drawn crowds and tourists.177 As 
this chapter suggests, election nights also have a place among the events in which 
Americans have mixed celebrations of technology and democracy, brought about by the 
intersecting agendas of journalists and their technological collaborators. 
The ultimate wonder on election night may be the spectacle of mass action – 
starting with the election itself, democracy’s main event.  We may tend to take this for 
granted now. But with so few democracies elsewhere during much of the history of the 
United States, and with perpetually deep and strident conflict in the run-up to the voting, 
the wonder may have been that elections spanning a city or a continent could take place 
at all.   This was not lost on reporters of the election-night scene for that century up to 
1952.  The language of the sublime weaves in and out of their descriptions of the crowd 
itself.  In 1860, there was the writer for The New York Herald, in trying to convey the 
“spectacle” of the “living mass,” asserting that “it must be witnessed to be fairly 
understood.”178  In 1896, there was the writer for the New York Tribune, describing the 
street scene as a “sublime spectacle” that called to mind poets descriptions of “the sea in 
its might” and Milton’s rendition of the “gigantic splendors of hell.”179 Photographs of 
the election-night crowds outside one paper or another conveyed the same sort of 
impression – what a 1920 caption in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch called the “immense 
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throngs.”180 Or consider NBC’s Ben Grauer, dispatched in a mobile unit to report by 
radio from Times Square on election night in 1936.  He found “excitement,” “bedlam,” a 
“humanity jammed” place, “choked with people.” 181  Here was wonder suffused with a 
hint of terror, challenging one’s ability to adequately capture the scene in words, all 
elements of the sublime that inform his report.  Unlike newspaper reporters recounting 
such scenes in the past, Grauer was in a location away from the network studio.  But he 
was, in effect, an extension of the studio, and as young men climbed all over his mobile 
unit, he told the radio audience, “The mob is absolutely terrific.  There is no other word 
to express it.”182  
What we have here, then, might be called the “sublime of the crowd” – and, as 
manifest on election night, perhaps, the “American democratic sublime.”  The story on 
election night, as much as it is about the victory of one side over the other, is about mass 
action. When crowds gathered outside newspapers to wait for returns, they became the 
visible manifestation of this mass action.  When they turned to radio and then television, 
they did not disappear. Some, in fact, were still gathering outside and could be heard or 
shown.  Some were invited into the studio and became part of the action there.  Most of 
the crowd was at home. They numbered, eventually, in the tens of millions, a crowd both 
imagined and unimaginable.  And in telling the story of the story of election night, 
journalists made a habit of positioning themselves at ground zero in the act of assembling 
these crowds – whether newspaper writers of the 19th century or broadcasters of the 20th.  
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These real and virtual assemblies would become, in fact, elements of what might be 
called an “election-night sublime,” election after election. 
Still, for any one purveyor of election-night news, there was no guarantee of an 
audience.  It had to be attracted and held.  The dissemination of returns was suffused with 
entertainment values.  And yet the stakes were high in being right – and being early – so 
that sound methods for being able to do both were critical.   Technologies of all sorts – 
the ones for getting the job done and the ones for attracting attention, often one and the 




Chapter 4:  Setting the Stage for Election Night 1952 
Election night 1952 would bring together two worlds – the world of people who 
produced computers and the world of people who produced television news.   This, of 
course, is an oversimplification.  Neither world existed in isolation.  Each world was 
itself a collection of people and organizations with both convergent and divergent 
interests and needs.  And other worlds were part of the election-night picture, too. Among 
them were the dominant news media of print and radio, a host of actors on the political 
stage, the news-consuming public, and pollsters who tied all of them together in reports 
on public attitudes toward office holders and office seekers. But there is much to gain 
from seeing this episode as a coming together of the nascent commercial computer 
industry and the nascent enterprise of television news.  Viewed both in retrospect and 
from a contemporary perspective, each was at a pivot point in its history.   We can now 
see, looking back, that each would go on to become a defining presence in American 
culture.  But at the time, much was uncertain and little was fixed. The players in both 
television news and commercial computing were seeking to be taken seriously in the 
society around them. And within each of these worlds – the world of computer makers 
and the world of news broadcasters – there were battles for supremacy. 
On the night of Nov. 4, 1952, various configurations of news organizations and 
technology companies would join forces, forming journalist-technologist alliances that 
would compete with each other. Each group certainly faced potential setbacks should 
things go poorly.  But they rolled the dice anyway and engaged in live, on-air 




would be colored by fresh memories of election-night gaffs in 1948 on the part of 
pollsters, pundits, and news organizations.  The intersection of computing and journalism 
in a high-stress run-up to election night in 1952, then, offers a window into the 
overlapping interests and various forms of competition and collaboration at work in the 
environment surrounding the early uses of the computer in journalism.   
A High-Stakes Election 
One could argue, in retrospect, that the most significant event of election night 
1952 was not the culmination of a contest for president but the sentinel coupling of 
computers and the mass media.  In the fall of 1952, however, the focus was on politics. 
And while the presidency was the most high-profile race, there was a rich array of other 
political offices and ballot questions to be decided.  They intersected with hot-button 
issues – race, war, taxes, corruption, and Communism – and they contributed, in turn, 
both to an intense interest in the fall elections and to a lack of certainty about who would 
be moving into the White House in January.1 
Maine held most of its elections in September, including balloting for governor, a 
U.S. Senate seat, and three seats in the House of Representatives.  A traditionally 
Republican state, Maine remained in the Republican column.2 This did little to help 
predict the way the rest of the country would vote in November.  In the Senate, where 
Democrats narrowly outnumbered Republicans by 49 to 47, there would be 34 seats up 
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for grabs on election day besides the contest already decided in Maine.3   In the House, 
where Democrats also outnumbered Republicans – by 230 to 200 – there were 432 seats 
to be divvied up on election day. And voters in 29 states would be picking governors on 
Nov. 4.4  
The balloting at the state, county, and local levels would encompass not only all 
manner of other elected offices, but also decisions on more than 200 proposed 
constitutional amendments and other measures in 37 states.5  Some of these attracted 
national attention and became tricky issues for the candidates, especially in matters of 
race and civil rights.  South Carolina’s system of free public schools for all children 
would be in jeopardy under a proposed amendment to the state constitution. The measure 
was intended to bypass any future order from the U.S. Supreme Court banning school 
segregation.  Proponents included the state’s governor, James F. Byrnes, a Democrat who 
was backing the Republican candidate for President.  Race was behind a contentious 
ballot question in Mississippi, too.  A proposed amendment to that state’s constitution 
would make voting rights contingent on literacy and on a prospective voter’s ability to 
interpret of any section of the U.S. and Mississippi constitutions. The measure’s 
opponents alleged it would be used to interfere with voting by blacks.6  In California, 
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Senate contests, 435 House contests, and 30 gubernatorial contests.  
5 United Press, “Voting at 18 Fails; Loyalty Oaths Adopted,” Washington Post, Washington, D.C., Nov. 6, 
1952, 3. 
6 United Press, “Mississippi Set All-Time Record in Election Votes,” Delta Democrat-Times, Greenville, 
Miss., Nov. 11, 1952; United Press, “Voting at 18 Fails; Loyalty Oaths Adopted,” Washington Post, Nov. 




Communist sympathizers were the target of a measure that would require loyalty oaths of 
a half million public officials and employees.7   
Even the race for president was not without a large cast of characters who 
appeared on the ballot in various states.  In addition to the dominant Democratic and 
Republican parties, a variety of minor parties nominated candidates.  These were dubbed 
“serious, sinister or silly” by Time magazine.8   There were nominees from the Socialist 
Party, the Socialist Workers Party, and the Industrial Government Party, operating in 
some states as the Socialist Labor Party.  The candidate of the Progressive Party, Vincent 
Hallinan, a well-heeled, Harvard-educated lawyer who favored cooperation with Russia, 
was serving a prison sentence for contempt of court at the time of his nomination.  He 
and his running mate, Charlotta Bass, the former publisher of an African-American 
newspaper, were also the candidates of the American Labor Party in New York and the 
People’s Party in Connecticut. Three fringe parties each nominated the same military 
icon without his consent – General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. These were the 
Christian Nationalist, Constitution, and America First parties.  The Prohibition Party also 
tried to sign up Gen. MacArthur as its candidate. When he declined, the party nominated 
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Carl Stuart Hamblen, a country-western and gospel singer, actor, and host of “Cowboy 
Church of the Air.”  On election night, an NBC radio commentator said of Hamblin that 
he “had a bout with the booze habit and came out the winner.”9  The Greenback Party, its 
name harking back to an earlier era, was represented by a Seattle grocer.  The Vegetarian 
Party had a candidate, but not the one whom the party most wanted.  Its first choice, a 
retired brigadier general, ran instead as the candidate of the American Rally Party.  A 
New Jersey pig farmer was the standard bearer of the Poor Man’s Party.  The Church of 
God Bible Party fielded a candidate, as did the American Party.  The Washington Peace 
Party had the season’s only female candidate for president, an astrologist who claimed to 
be in touch with George Washington.  
None of these minor-party candidates had a chance to win, and none was expected 
to draw the kind of numbers that some minor party candidates had garnered in the past.  
As recently as 1948, some 39 electoral votes in the South had gone to one such 
presidential candidate, Sen. Strom Thurmond, leader of a group of disaffected Southern 
Democrats.  A story in the New York Times on the day before the 1952 election didn’t 
rule out the possibility of a scenario of that sort – a minor candidate siphoning off just 
enough votes in a state here or there to alter the outcome of a tight race between 
Eisenhower and Stevenson, thus affecting the election at large.10  But this was a long 
shot.     
At center stage in the fall campaign of 1952 were Eisenhower and Stevenson, 
together with their running mates, both of whom were U.S. Senators: Richard M. Nixon, 
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a Republican from California, and John J. Sparkman, a Democrat from Alabama.  This 
was the first time in a generation – since 1928 – that neither a sitting president nor a 
sitting vice president was running in the general election. But there was a sitting president 
bogged down in an unpopular war, and this did not help his party. Republicans were 
hoping to get back into the White House after two decades of Democratic occupancy, 
first by Franklin Delano Roosevelt and then, after his death in office, by his successor, 
Vice President Harry S. Truman.  The Republicans were also hoping to break the 
Democratic majorities in the House and Senate.   Of about 98 million Americans of 
voting age, some 75 million were registered to vote.11   Women slightly outnumbered 
men in the ranks of potential voters – with the differential most pronounced in the cities 
and in the East.   Non-white voters, as they were called, represented just 10 percent of the 
pool, but their numbers had been shifting out of the South and into the North and West.  
The farm population continued to shrink, and by 1952 it accounted for less than one in 
eight potential voters. But voters could be parsed in all sorts of other large and small 
ways besides the easy-to-spot demographics.  War, communism, scandals, civil rights, 
pocketbook issues, and parochial affairs would factor into divisive stands, charges, and 
counter charges in what began a contest between two men widely perceived as high-brow 
candidates.  
By the time election day rolled around, the Associated Press would summarize the 
campaign season this way: 
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About all that is certain is this:  the voters have had a chance to see, 
hear and read about the candidates as never before – in person, by radio 
and television, by newspapers, and by magazines. 
They have heard – or had a chance to hear – the Republicans claim 
that the Democrats have bungled the Korean War, have condoned 
corruption, have been cozy with the Communists, and have been 
responsible for higher prices. 
They have heard – or had a chance to hear – the Democrats claim the 
nation’s economy is safer in their hands, that the GOP is cozy with big 
business and forgets the working man, that the real test of the Republicans 
is not what they say but how they have voted in Congress these 20 years… 
The campaign [,] which started out on a high plane, fell into the more 
familiar name-calling pattern as one taunting word led to a worse one.  At 
the end, many were calling it one of the most vicious in memory. 12 
 
Television and politics became a potent mixture during the 1952 campaign.  One 
of the most iconic events in the 20th century politics of scandal – Richard Nixon’s 
infamous “Checkers Speech” – was aired in the run-up to the election.    Nixon had been 
facing allegations that money from donors went into a slush fund he used for personal 
expenses.  He turned to television in his defense, an event widely seen as helping to 
establish the medium’s place in the culture of American politics.  During the same 
campaign season, political figures were making unprecedented use of television for 
advertising and the broadcasting of speeches and appearances.13  Television journalists, 
meanwhile, were making unprecedented use of politics.   
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TV News in the Early 1950s:  Seeking Respect … and Attention 
Four years earlier, television had covered the 1948 election. But just a fraction of 
one percent of U.S. households were equipped with television sets. The election-night 
audience would be expanded – in light of the early TV-era custom of “guest viewing” 
and “television visiting” by friends, family and neighbors, as well as by the TV watching 
at bars and other public venues. But the television audience was dwarfed by those 
following the returns on radio, which was found in tens of millions of homes.14 The 
technology of television was not entirely new then – experiments had been underway in 
earnest since the 1920s, and regularly scheduled programming had commenced before 
World War II. But television ownership and television broadcasting had both been 
limited by the war and were still in their infancy in 1948.15   Even as sales of TV sets 
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picked up in the late 1940s, a variety of issues, including broadcast signals that interfered 
with each other, prompted a freeze on the licensing of new television stations in late 
1948. The early 1950s would see an explosion in the diffusion of television – more 
stations, more sets, more programming, and ever-larger networks. The first television 
signal to be seen by audiences simultaneously from one end of the country to the other 
would be broadcast in September 1951.16  The freeze on new stations would be lifted in 
April 1952.17 And November 1952 would see the first coast-to-coast network broadcasts 
of election returns. The ownership of television sets had grown markedly – to more than a 
third of all households in 1952.18 Still, the way this story turns out – with television 
reaching more than 90 percent of households by the early 1960s and becoming a 
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dominant medium in American culture – can only be seen in retrospect.  To be sure, in 
many communities with television, other venues for leisure took a hit – movie theaters, 
sporting events, night clubs, bookstores, even libraries. Americans spent less time 
listening to radio – and jukeboxes, too.19 Still, for the parties involved in television in the 
early 1950s, there were no guarantees – either about the future of their medium or about 
their own place in it. Even C. E. Hooper, a leader in the business of measuring ratings of 
the radio audience in the 1940s, saw limited potential for television broadcasting as late 
as 1950, when he sold his national radio and television ratings service to competitor A. C. 
Nielsen.20 
One of the fixtures of the nascent world of television was intense competition 
between the networks – especially between NBC and CBS – which carried over from 
rivalries in radio broadcasting.  NBC was owned by the Radio Corporation of America, 
which had a dual interest in television as both a broadcaster and a manufacturer of TV 
sets.  NBC had the largest number of affiliated television stations.21  In the early years of 
television, NBC also had bragging rights to a majority of the programs with the highest 
audience ratings. But it faced a fierce challenger in CBS, which overtook NBC in the 
early 1950s for largest number of top-rated programs.22 Farther back in ratings, reach, 
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status, and capital were ABC, which also had a radio network, and DuMont, which had 
none. The DuMont television network, founded by a pioneer in the manufacture of TV 
sets, would sign off for the last time in mid 1950s, evidence that not reaching the largest 
possible audience could have repercussions beyond the issue of bragging rights. Ratings 
were of intense interest to advertisers and thus, for the networks, a key to the prospects 
for financial success. 
The threats faced by broadcasters did not just come from competition with each 
other.  The airwaves were regulated by the government, and for broadcasters, fear of 
government regulation was not merely an exercise in the hypothetical.  ABC itself was 
created as an independent network after NBC, which had two radio networks, was forced 
by the Federal Communication Commission and the U.S. Supreme Court to divest itself 
of one of them in 1943.23  In the foreword to her biography of Edward R. Murrow, A. M. 
Sperber laid out a set of questions to frame her study, including one which was by no 
means unique to the legendary figure from radio and the early years of television: “How 
does a responsible broadcaster function in an industry caught between government 
licensing and the marketplace?”24  
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In addition to the very real possibility of aggravating powerful forces in the 
federal government, broadcasters also faced perpetual criticism from various self-
appointed guardians of the nation’s moral, cultural, and ideological well-being. Concerns 
about deleterious effects of television on home life and young people – voiced as early as 
the 1940s and heard forever after – prompted constant scrutiny of television 
programming, especially for dramas featuring crime and violence.25 In 1951, a different 
sort of protest came from members of the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People, offended by negative stereotypes of blacks in the CBS television 
situation comedy Amos ‘n’ Andy.26 A southern governor, meanwhile, complained about 
the “mixing and mingling of races” on other CBS television programs, including black 
men said to be dancing “in juxtaposition to scantily clad white females.” 27  He deemed 
these practices at odds with southern segregation laws and suggested a firm response: 
pressure by southern newspapers on the television industry, action by southern 
Congressmen, and perhaps even a boycott of products made by sponsors of the non-
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segregated shows. In mid 1952, a broadcasting trade magazine, Sponsor, declared public 
relations to be television’s “hottest problem.”28  
One response of the television industry to perpetual criticism, the desire for 
greater respectability, and the fear of more government regulation was the adoption of a 
“Television Code” that promoted self-regulation.29 Internal memos at NBC also show 
that the network armed itself with examples of programs that were primarily educational, 
cultural or informational in nature, and others that included “integrated enlightenment 
material.”30 The TV networks also positioned the broadcasting of news as an antidote to 
critical scrutiny of all sorts, framing their journalistic operations as a public service. 31 
This was especially true for framing the coverage of political conventions and elections.32  
In its 1952 annual report to stockholders, CBS recounted the company’s radio and 
television coverage of the conventions, campaign season, and election under sections 
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titled “Broadcasting in the Public Interest” and “Programming in the Public Interest.”33  
On election night, NBC radio would open its coverage with a pledge to “render a public 
service of trust” in reporting the returns.34 The corporate sponsors of network election 
broadcasts staked a similar claim to serving democracy.  A 32-page guide to the NBC 
coverage of the conventions and elections was published “in the public interest” by 
Philco, a maker of television sets, radios, and other appliances that were touted in the 
printed guide and during the on-air radio and television reports.35 
To be sure, the role of television news in American culture was on the rise. By the 
end of the 1952 campaign season, television received the highest score when Americans 
were surveyed about the medium that provided them with the most information – even 
though there were still well more than twice as many homes with radio sets as the number 
with television sets, and even larger circulation of daily newspapers.36 Still, television 
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news faced its own battles for respect within the realms of broadcasting and journalism.  
Little time on air was devoted to news.37 Airing the news did not guarantee quality or an 
audience, and it took a while for television news operations to move beyond the idea of 
“radio with pictures” and develop practices that made the most of the medium.  In the fall 
of 1951, New York Times critic Jack Gould was commenting – in praise of See it Now, a 
new television news program featuring Edward R. Murrow – about the way television to 
that point had not been very successful as a news medium “on a day-to-day basis.”38  
Murrow himself gave a nod to the strangeness of the transition as a veteran radio 
broadcaster who had not been eager to embrace television. At the debut of See It Now, he 
declared: “This is an old team, trying to learn a new trade.”39  Television news of the era 
was described by broadcast historian Erik Barnouw as “an unpromising child” – “the 
schizophrenic offspring of the theater newsreel and the radio newscast … confused as to 
its role and future course.”40  As late as 1954, a radio and television writer for the New 
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York Daily News, Ben Gross, was suggesting that that television might be okay for 
covering planned events but was too ephemeral for most news – not as good as print, and 
not even as good as radio for the reporting of spot news and ideas.41 Television 
executives, meanwhile, worried whether news was destined to be a money loser.42  And 
journalists from radio – which had won public respect as a powerful and important news 
medium during World War II – worried in the late 1940s and early 1950s that making the 
jump to television might be a poor career move.43 
At the intersection of news, broadcasting, and politics in 1952, the managers and 
reporters in television news were engaged in what Sig Mickelson, director of television 
news and public affairs for CBS, called a “struggle for parity” with journalists from other 
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media.44 The presidential contest was a key venue. And a particularly important battle 
took place inside a movie theater in Abilene, Kansas, where Eisenhower held a press 
conference on June 5, the day after a speech announcing his candidacy for the Republican 
nomination for president. It was not customary at the time for television cameras to be 
admitted to such gatherings, and the more prestigious circle of print reporters leaned on 
the Eisenhower camp to keep up the practice. “To much of the printed press,” Mickelson 
later observed, television “was an intruder with its roots in show business, not in 
journalism.”45 Just before the press conference was to begin, a CBS crew moved into 
position in theater and let it be known that they would not leave unless thrown out by 
force. Eisenhower consented to their staying.46  Starting a month later, the so called 
“gavel-to-gavel” coverage of the political nominating conventions further enhanced the 
efforts of television news pioneers to be taken seriously.47 
The November elections would offer another chance to shine. But it didn’t take a 
long memory to also understand that there was peril involved, too. For starters, the New 
York Times influential television critic, Jack Gould, had panned television’s election-
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night broadcasts in 1948, writing of “the video art fumbling rather badly in its first full-
dress effort to cover the outcome of a Presidential campaign.”48 He explained that, for 
one thing, “counting ballots is hardly a function which lends itself to much visual 
excitement.” 49 And the attempts that were made to present the numbers to viewers fell 
flat: 
Probably the most distracting factor was the large charts on the 
boards used to tabulate the national returns.  They were almost impossible 
to read over any period of time with comfort, it being much easier just to 
listen to the sound channel. Simplification of the tables, with the use of 
larger and more clearly pronounced figures, will be a “must” for the next 
election.50 
There was an even more embarrassing problem for a variety of players on election 
night in 1948. The three leading pollsters of the day – Gallup, Roper, and Crossley – had 
forecast that incumbent President Harry Truman would be beaten by the Republican 
challenger, New York Gov. Thomas E. Dewey.  The pollsters were wrong. The 
shortcomings of their predictions and methods were the subject first of news stories and 
then of close study by both pollsters and scholars, fearing the damage that might be done 
not only to the reputation of survey professionals but to social science research in 
general.51 But the self-inflicted damage wasn’t the only damage done by the pollsters’ 
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errant – and early – predictions. These forecasts colored the expectations and the 
reporting of journalists.  One of the most iconic images in the history of American 
presidential elections is the one of Truman beaming as he holds up a copy of the post-
election Chicago Daily Tribune with the famously faulty headline “Dewey Defeats 
Truman.”52 The New York Times ran a post-mortem on its own erroneous pre-election 
forecast – a mea culpa in which Times correspondents from each of the 48 states were 
asked to explain what went wrong.53 Many of them acknowledged having been 
influenced by the very same polls or by local newspaper surveys.  
The Times and other papers were not the only news organizations to be 
humiliated. One of the best-known radio broadcasters of the day, NBC’s H. V. 
Kaltenborn, was among those who would be ridiculed – by no less a figure than Truman 
himself – for hanging on too long on election night to the belief that Dewey would 
emerge the victor.54 The network also came in for a ribbing in Gould’s New York Times 
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review: “NBC seemed a little too disinclined to believe what the figures were saying 
during the night, their implications in the earlier hours that Dewey would come through 
safely hardly being models of impartiality.”55  Gould went on to observe that “of the 
many, many people heard on radio on election night, there were two who sounded as 
though it could hardly come to end soon enough.  They were Dr. Gallup and Mr. 
Roper.”56 As for the broadcasters, NBC was not alone in its failure to cover itself in glory 
as far as identifying the big story of the night in a timely way.  Edward Bliss Jr., then an 
editor at CBS who went on later to write a notable history of broadcast news, described 
what he witnessed that night. After Truman pulled ahead in the vote count – but with the 
results still incomplete from several key states that were thought to be in the Dewey 
column – “CBS called it a night and closed down.” A fine breakfast was served for the 
CBS staff, but they were unhappy. Edward R. Murrow protested, said Bliss, and John 
Charles Daly, who was working then at CBS, later referred to the episode as “that 
unpleasant night.”57  
On election night 1952, Murrow, Kaltenborn, and Daly would all be key figures 
in the competing networks’ television coverage, with Daly by then at ABC. Avoiding the 
various embarrassments of 1948 would, undoubtedly, have been an important point of 
reference for each, and for the other reporters, commentators, and planners of the 
election-night broadcasts.  It’s not hard to imagine what the common agendas might have 
been – getting attention, getting the numbers right, and providing them in a timely and 
visually engaging way with an accurate assessment of their meaning. But it would be 
                                                 
55 Gould, “Programs in Review.” 
56 Ibid. 




wrong to assume that the memory of 1948 was destined to play out in 1952 as an 
unadulterated aversion to any sort of risk.  Reuven Frank, who would later become 
president of NBC News, describes the period between 1948 and 1958 as a time when the 
people involved in television news “stumbled along, devising ways of presenting news 
and methods of using pictures as news that have become standard, accepted American 
fare. All were arrived at by trial and error.”58 Sig Mickelson, the CBS television news 
chief then, described the early 1950s as a period when “innovation and imagination were 
watchwords in the newsroom.”59 At a time when the existing model for visual stories was 
the newsreel on film, the whole idea of a television news story that was live – or could be 
filmed, processed, and presented to viewers on a tight deadline – was itself an innovation. 
A car battery was adapted for use as a power source for cameras in the field. On 
occasion, film was hastily processed in a restroom or aboard an airplane. 60 Television 
graphics had to be imagined and invented – or at least cobbled together in surprising 
ways from items materials and equipment meant for other uses.  In need of a way to 
identify speakers on the television screen for viewers at home watching the Republican 
National Convention from Chicago 1952, an enterprising young CBS producer-director, 
Don Hewitt, arranged to buy the menu board from a nearby diner.  It had a black 
background that would not show up on screen and movable white letters. Hewitt, who 
would later go on to create one of the most successful television news programs, 60 
Minutes, said of those early years that even though television news had achieved some 
sophistication by the 1952 presidential campaign, “we were still feeling our way and 
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making it up as we went along.”61 Mickelson characterized the early history of television 
news as one of “gambling with untested techniques, of daring to defy convention and 
laws of probability, of flaunting established procedures.”62 And for election night in 
1952, amidst promotion of all the things the network news operations would use to 
distinguish themselves – both human and mechanical – one kind of gadget, in particular, 
would be singled out for special mention. It was the “electronic brain,” common lingo at 
the time for computers. As would be the case in the decades to follow, the computer was 
already being invested with a complex personality and multiple values and meanings.  Its 
place in the world of science, business, and engineering was far from fixed, not to 
mention its place in journalism and the culture at large, and election night would be yet 
another venue for working this out. 
Trotting out a new technology on election night did carry risks for the television 
news operations, and network news managers would have to wrestle with how to contain 
those risks. But using the new technology would address at least one imperative for this 
new venue for news, situated as it was inside a medium best known for entertainment and 
showmanship. When the computer came to Sig Mickelson’s attention as a possible 
addition to the election-night gadgetry, he would see that it could satisfy a variety of 
needs at once for a television news operation.  He recalled these years later in a memoir:  
beating the competition in identifying the next occupant of the White House, doing so 
with a tool that could be touted prominently in advance, grabbing the attention of the 
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print media, and, if all went well, boosting audience ratings.63  Driving these possibilities 
was what Mickelson described as the “novelty value” of computers.64  To most people, 
these machines were invested with mystery. Mickelson had been among them: “I knew 
just enough about computers,” he wrote, “to know that they could perform mathematical 
miracles.”65   
Computers for Sale:  The Uncertain Future of a Nascent Industry 
The intermittent publicity that surrounded computers in general before the fall of 
1952 embodied a wide-ranging set of visions about the machines’ future.  During World 
War II, in the early years of experimentation with the design of machines that would 
come to be known as “computers,” the demands of wartime secrecy limited what the 
public might know about these inventions. With the end of the war, there was greater 
freedom to circulate information and ideas. There were enthusiastic accounts from 
scientists, mathematicians, and business leaders in the late 1940s and early 1950s about 
the promise that computers held for advances in knowledge, productivity, and human 
relations.66  There were concerns, too, such as the ones given voice in Kurt Vonnegut’s 
first novel, Player Piano.  Published in 1952, it painted a troubling picture of technology 
managers teamed up with computers and running the world.  But among the visions both 
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glorious and dark, the use of computers on election night was not the sort of thing that 
sprang to mind before 1952 when technologists and non-technologists alike pondered the 
future of these strange new devices.   That an election night became a way for computing 
to enter journalism and find itself at center stage before the American public was in no 
way preordained.67 
This is not to say that practical ideas about uses for computers were constrained or 
limited. Behind the new machines that would come to play a role on election night in 
1952 were inventors with fertile imaginations.  In 1946, two pioneers of computing, John 
W. Mauchly and J. Presper Eckert Jr., decided to leave their positions at the University of 
Pennsylvania and set out on their own to create from scratch a new kind of business, one 
that would be focused exclusively on the manufacture and marketing electronic 
computers and related devices. This was a bold idea.  Up to that point, there was no 
established “market” for computers – nor agreement that there would be much of a 
market – and the military was a critical source of funds for the development of these 
novel, expensive, and complicated machines. In the mid 1940s, Mauchly and Eckert 
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worked together at the University of Pennsylvania on one such project they had proposed 
to the Army – design and construction of ENIAC, short for Electronic Numerical 
Integrator and Computer.68 As ideas about computers were taking shape, the ENIAC was 
a seminal machine in several ways.  For one thing, it worked. It would be used after its 
completion in 1945 to do calculations related to atomic and conventional weapons 
projects for ENIAC’s sponsor and eventual home base, the U.S. Army’s Aberdeen 
Proving Ground in Aberdeen, Maryland. ENIAC was also electronic, as opposed to 
earlier computing machines that were “electromechanical.” Constructed with about 
18,000 vacuum tubes, weighing 30 tons, and built at a cost of nearly $500,000, the 
ENIAC relied on the manipulation of pulses of electricity, not moving parts, to work with 
the numbers it processed. It was digital, meaning that it processed data divided into 
discrete units.  It was “general-purpose,” meaning that it could be used to solve a variety 
of problems rather than being dedicated to do only one thing. And it could be 
programmed: it could be supplied both with data and a sequence of actions to take with 
the data. It had the capacity to compare numbers and, based on the result, to determine 
automatically what steps to take next. 
ENIAC would be hailed as the first working electronic, digital computer. But 
even before ENIAC’s construction was completed, its inventors and others recognized its 
limitations. For one thing, programming the machine was a laborious affair, one that 
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involved connecting wires on removable “plugboards” in order to establish the sequence 
of steps to be run for any given problem. The improvement over this approach came to be 
known as the “stored program” concept. The sequence of steps would be entered into a 
computer’s internal memory by any of a variety of inputs – metallic tape, punched cards, 
perforated paper tape, or even directly by keyboard. Such programs could be far more 
easily modified than before – and they could even be modified by the results of the 
calculations themselves. 
The combination of these features – digital, general-purpose, electronic, and 
stored program – would ultimately gel as generally acknowledged elements of a 
“computer.” While still at the university and even as ENIAC was under development, 
Eckert and Mauchly worked on the design of a pioneering stored-program computer, the 
EDVAC. But the EDVAC would not be completed by the time Eckert and Mauchly set 
off on their own, prompted to make the move in a dispute with the university over patent 
rights. They had in mind to develop their own computers for sale – faster, more 
advanced, more versatile, easier to use, and less expensive than the ENIAC – and more in 
keeping with the concepts embodied in the EDVAC, including the stored program.   
One of the documents that survive from the period in which Eckert and Mauchly 
were preparing to strike out on their own is a typed, eight-page business plan. It was 
found among Eckert’s papers and auctioned off at Christie’s in 2005, purchased for 
$72,000 by one of the next generation’s computer software pioneers, Mitch Kapor.69 The 
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draft does not foresee uses associated with journalism or politics, but what the document 
does make clear is that the inventors were open to an extraordinary range of possible uses 
in science, industrial research, business, and government. Among the potential users, 
some – such as the “planning departments of large business firms” and “agencies having 
voluminous files and records” – were not so far afield from the engaging in the kind of 
information aggregation and analysis necessary on election night. The plan foresaw that 
the development of “electronic calculation and control equipment” could have such 
diverse applications as automatic navigation, musical instruments with electronic 
components, and translation of artists’ designs into patterns for knitting and weaving 
machines. 
The vision in this document also makes clear a willingness to take on the Goliaths 
in the arena they envisioned entering – the manufacture of machines for complex 
calculation, tabulation, and accounting. There are promises of dramatic advances over 
existing equipment, the latter being machines that used punched cards for the storage and 
analysis of information. At the time – in the era before commercial computers – IBM was 
the leader in the punched-card machine arena, and applications for its equipment ranged 
from work on the U.S. Census to the design of major weapons to the production of 
actuarial tables for insurance companies.  As Eckert and Mauchly made contacts and 
interested a range of clients in contracts, they underestimated the time and cost involved 
in turning their ideas into workable machines. There is no small irony that following the 
articulation of their dreams in 1946, the realities of raising sufficient capital to finance 
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their inventions would see their small firm acquired in 1950 by another major 
manufacturing company and IBM rival, Remington Rand. 70  Then in 1951, they made a 
splash with the first large-scale, stored-program commercial computer, the UNIVAC, 
when it was officially turned over to the U.S. Census – one of the potential customers, in 
fact, that had been envisioned five years earlier in the 1946 draft business plan. 
Remington Rand and IBM had been rivals for more a generation before the 
development of computers. Remington Rand was a more diverse corporation – selling 
products ranging from electric razors to typewriters to adding machines.  Where the two 
businesses competed was in machines to help businesses manage information – keeping 
track of accounts, issuing bills and paychecks, and organizing inventory, for example. 
Remington Rand had been ahead in that field earlier in the century, but IBM came on 
strong and overtook Remington Rand as the leader by the end of World War II.71  With 
the UNIVAC, Remington Rand seemed to pull out in front in the computer competition 
by beating IBM to market with its high-speed, all-electronic, stored-program behemoth. 
But that alone was not going to automatically ensure business success.  
UNIVAC and the Appeal of a Public Stage 
In the early 1950s, rivals in the nascent world of commercial computers did not 
have any guarantees – or even a consensus within their ranks – that there would be a 
large and inevitable customer base for the inventions of their new breed of engineers.  
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Pioneers were aware that the clientele – and the potential uses – had to be manufactured 
right along with the devices.  Ideas were exchanged both informally and at well-attended 
conferences that drew participants from across the country, including some who would 
come to play a role in election-night forecasting.72  The customers who were foreseen and 
sought after in discussions of uses for new computers were typically institutions – 
government agencies, military contractors, large businesses, and academic research 
centers.  It would be decades, in fact, before the general public would come to be seen as 
a potential market for computers, and it would be decades before computers would be 
reduced enough in size, price, and difficulty of use to make a market of individuals even 
thinkable.  But in a pair of documents labeled “Company Confidential,” John Mauchly 
laid out in the early 1950s a vision of the importance, nonetheless, of capturing the 
attention of the public at large. One of these documents was drafted in 1951 and the other 
in July 1952.73   They help us understand why, when the idea surfaced for using the 
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UNIVAC on national television for reporting on election returns, this would make sense 
to someone such as Mauchly, despite the risks inherent in undertaking such a novel task 
live before an audience of millions. 
In the 1951 document – which Mauchly titled “Are Computers Newsworthy?” – 
Mauchly started by taking note of a striking transformation.74  Less than a decade earlier, 
he wrote, there had been skepticism about the prospect of developing an electronic 
computer, and that was followed by disbelief that such a device could have commercial 
applications.  But now, Mauchly reported, there were more than a dozen large electronic 
computers in operation, plus “one hundred electronic computer projects in laboratories” 
and “hundreds of small electronic computers in commercial use,” with “more than one 
million vacuum tubes operating in IBM units throughout the country.”75 Here he was 
clearly casting a wide net in his conception of a “computer” at a time when the meaning 
of that term was not fixed and referred not just to stored-program devices but also 
recently invented electronic calculating machines in the punched-card tradition. But his 
point was that novelty could no longer be taken for granted: “In view of this rapid change 
in the last decade,” he wrote, “computers are no longer front-page news.” 76  And yet, 
Mauchly suggested, “There is a kind of paradox here:  although computers have become 
commonplace, they are still regarded with awe and wonder.” 77  Computers were still an 
                                                                                                                                                 
between Mauchly’s “Company Confidential” documents and the “Company Confidential” newsletter, 
though the five items in the two-page newsletter are each just a paragraph in length – much shorter than 
Mauchly’s documents. 







“abstraction” to most people, who, he said, had “no real understanding as to what they are 
good for and little appreciation of what they can really do.” 78  He underlined the next 
line, which was the wind up to his pitch: “Here is a real opportunity for a public relations 
program to step in and bring computers down to earth.” 79   
The trick in attracting public attention, he argued, was to show the value of 
computers to undertake tasks that ordinary people actually cared about. And he made a 
prediction that would turn out to be prescient:  “it is the application of computers to 
problems affecting our daily life which will make news in the future – not the mere 
existence of a computer having fantastic abilities.” 80  But even within Remington Rand, 
he complained, there were few people who really understood what the UNIVAC could 
do. By describing their own company’s computer in “magical terms,” these insiders were 
doing a disservice, inducing in listeners a “feeling of unreality.” 81  As a result, he wrote, 
“through a lack of education within the organization itself we are at present helping to 
foster the very same attitude of mystery and awe which is displayed by the general public 
toward devices of this sort.” 82 
Mauchly noted that at Remington Rand’s chief rival, IBM, founder Thomas J. 
Watson Sr. had succeeded in continuing to get attention for the company’s Selective 
Sequence Electronic Calculator – based on what the invention could accomplish, not on 
its massive size. The “SSEC” had been placed in service in 1948 and showcased behind a 









glass wall visible from the street in Manhattan, replete with flashing neon indicator lights 
that drew large crowds of pedestrians. By the time of Mauchly’s “Are Computers 
Newsworthy?’” document in 1951, the device was already recognized as a technological 
dead end.83 It was an electronic machine that could run a program, but a machine that 
also included older, slower electromechanical elements – as did the much smaller IBM 
electronic machines, including the many Card Programmed Electronic Calculators then in 
service. But Watson had dedicated the machine to the use of science, and its use as a 
prestige builder and public relations device was undeniable.  While IBM had the jump on 
Remington Rand in publicity, Mauchly saw a golden opportunity for Remington Rand 
with UNIVAC, which had beaten IBM to market with the newer computer technology.84 
UNIVAC, Mauchly argued, was much more capable than any existing IBM equipment to 
attack, in particular, the one sophisticated problem Mauchly thought would be of greatest 
interest to the public.  That problem was weather forecasting. 
For Mauchly, these arguments were clearly being deployed in efforts to find an 
intersection of interests within his own company.  He wanted Remington Rand to become 
fully engaged in a project close to his heart, one that he began researching in 1937 and 
one that helped propel him into a career inventing ever more powerful calculating and 
computing equipment.  As he saw it, Remington Rand could become a fixture in the 
public imagination by doing something in which the public had an interest. He also held 
                                                 
83 Watson’s son, Thomas J. Watson Jr., who would become IBM’s president in January 1952, referred to 
the Selective Sequence Electronic Calculator as a “technological dinosaur,” a “weird gigantic hybrid of 
electronic and mechanical parts, half modern computer and half punched-card machine”; Watson and Petre, 
Father, Son & Co., 90. The development of the SSEC is described in Bashe et al., IBM’s Early Computers, 
47-58. 




out an alternate, more troubling prospect – that without undertaking this sort of work 
itself, Remington Rand stood to be upstaged, again, by IBM.85  
Mauchly continued to develop and expand these themes in the second of the two 
documents labeled “Company Confidential,” this one with a notation that it originally 
dated from July 19, 1952.86 It was titled “A Scientific Research Bureau is Needed.”  He 
articulated more forcefully the value of appealing to ordinary people who did not 
themselves comprise a market for computers.  Mauchly was proposing that Remington 
Rand create a Scientific Research Bureau akin to a similar enterprise launched by IBM. 
In addition to weather forecasting, he proposed that such a center could undertake 
research on the application of computers to something else of widespread interest to the 
public – cancer.  This could be done, he wrote, by developing “efficient methods for the 
coordination of scientific information.”87 Like weather forecasting, the application of 
computers to information management had come to interest Mauchly personally, and 
there is evidence that the inventor was frustrated at the limitations of his role now inside a 
large corporation.88  So again, with the 1952 document pushing for the creation of a 
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scientific research bureau, he was looking to align his own scientific interests with the 
company’s interest in prestige as a gateway to profits.89 
Mauchly began this document by noting that Remington Rand still had a 
competitive advantage while IBM was “struggling” to bring to market an electronic 
computer as fast as the UNIVAC.90 But that advantage was only useful with proper 
promotion, and Mauchly was adamant that the time had come to develop the kind of 
“reputation among laymen” that would come not from advertising but from deeds: 
We must aim our publicity at the public in general because our 
object is to expand the market until computers become as ordinary as 
telephone switchboards and bookkeeping machines.  Everyone must know 
what they do, and take it for granted that certain types of jobs should be 
done by computers.  At present, everyone has heard about electronic 
computing, but to the vast majority a computer is a bit of unreal magic, not 
a part of the workaday world.  We need to bring computers down to earth, 
and this can be done by publicity which parades before the public a 
succession of cases in which computers have been used to get valuable 
practical results.  When an executive hears his friends talk about a 
UNIVAC, not as a piece of magic, but as a commonplace tool which 
everyone knows has done this or that important job, he will think of the 
UNIVAC as a natural purchase – not as an experiment to be approached 
with utmost caution.91 
Mauchly made no mention of using UNIVAC for election analysis – that would not 
happen until later in 1952, providing just the sort of promotional possibilities he had 
envisioned here.  Three years after he wrote this document, Mauchly reprinted it in 1955, 
and after the passage on the benefits of appealing to the general public, he added this 
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parenthetical update:  “UNIVAC has become a household word principally because of 
use on Election TV.”92 
In between that July 1952 document and election night a few months later, 
another opportunity for the kind of publicity Mauchly craved for UNIVAC was presented 
to him, and he grabbed it.  The vehicle – a weekly prime-time science program on 
television – would turn into virtually free nationwide publicity for UNIVAC. He would 
use it to advance his agenda of demystifying the machine for a lay audience – albeit with 
a heavy dose of showmanship. 
Mauchly’s datebook for August 11, 1952, includes an entry reporting that he 
received a call from Lynn Poole, host of The Johns Hopkins Science Review, a half-hour 
television program that originated from WAAM in Baltimore on Monday nights.93  The 
show aired at the same time in New York, Washington, Philadelphia, Chicago, and 
several other cities, and on subsequent dates in yet more cities – about two dozen in all, 
on stations affiliated with the DuMont network. 94  The science program had recently won 
one of the most coveted honors in broadcast journalism, a George Foster Peabody Award. 
It would go on to win another Peabody Award for its offerings in 1952.95  And it had won 
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high praise from the New York Times.96 Poole wanted to do a show about computers, and 
Mauchly – who had earned his Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins – seized the opportunity.97   
When the show was scheduled to air on Oct. 27, Remington Rand circulated a 
city-by-city list of stations to its sales offices, which were urged to show off the UNIVAC 
to their “prospects, customers and friends… Make it a prestige builder for you.  Let it 
show your customers and prospects how far seeing … how advanced your Company is in 
offering the newest and best in Record Keeping and Accounting equipment.”98 
The show featuring Mauchly and UNIVAC was titled “Can Machines Think?” 
The title appeared on screen to dramatic, edgy music at the opening.99  Host Lynn Poole 
appeared standing next to an anthropomorphic robot as a prop, its head a boxy affair that 
seemed to be made of riveted plates.  It had blinking light bulbs for eyes, slowly turning 
gears for ears, cables coming out of its head.  And it was juggling a ball.  When Poole 
threw a switch, the eyes went dark, the juggling stopped, and three themes that would 
dominate the broadcast were in play.  One was the idea that computers were not forces 
unto themselves, but were under human control.  The second was the attempt, with 
various gadgets, to compare computer components to familiar mechanisms and activities 
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in order to explain how these machines worked.  And the third was the almost irresistible 
urge to engage in showmanship.  In one of his “Company Confidential” documents 
Mauchly might have dismissed the trope of magic as an appropriate frame for the 
computer, but he seemed to share the magician’s delight in moments of wonder – even, in 
a paradoxical way, by reducing the computer’s amazing feats to iterations of familiar 
acts.  And juggling – a consummate sort of wondrous performance – appears again in the 
show with a human juggler, and then with Mauchly’s suggestion that this action was akin 
to the way the UNIVAC stored digital information – by the constant cycling of acoustic 
waves of energy through tanks of mercury.  Mauchly also used some specially 
constructed devices to demonstrate such computer features as the combination of units of 
information stored in a binary state – on or off, one or zero. 
The show featured examples of computer use for science and business – ranging 
from predicting the results of nuclear reactions to aggregating census data. For another 
possible use, calculating how much of each type of currency a company needed on pay 
day, Mauchly gave an example with some simple math on a chalk board. The weather 
was mentioned briefly.  And at the very end of the show, which had been prepared during 
the run-up to election-night, Poole called attention to UNIVAC’s upcoming task:  “It’s 
being used in elections to find out what the results are and prognosticate as the results of 
these elections come in by the hour in election campaigns.”100 
After the show first aired on Oct. 27, a Remington Rand sales manager reported 
that it had generated “a considerable number of comments.”101 Poole received a letter of 
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praise from the representative of a New York architectural firm, who wanted to reach 
Mauchly to “get his opinion of floor load requirements or current requirements these 
machines might require in the ‘Office of the Future.’”102   The U.S. Census, the first 
UNIVAC customer, inquired about getting copies of the show.103 Variety, an 
entertainment industry publication, ran a review.104 It concluded that although Mauchly’s 
attempts to explain the computer in simple terms were “overly technical and sketchy for 
lay viewers,” the episode “got across the wonderful achievement which such scientific 
robots represent” and “underlined the importance of the human factor – the machine can 
only do what men direct it to do.”105 
The cooperation of the UNIVAC camp with the Johns Hopkins science program 
and with election-night planners at CBS was evidence of a belief among at least some at 
Remington Rand that in the fall of 1952, there was a critical, competitive need to 
generate as much positive publicity as possible for the nascent commercial computer 
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operation. In memos back and forth, Mauchly and Al N. Seares, a key marketing figure at 
Remington Rand in New York, expressed frustration that there was not more awareness 
of this need and more effective use for that purpose of a magazine published by 
Remington Rand for circulation within the business community.106  In a memo aimed at 
getting the attention of the magazine’s editorial staff, Seares wrote that the Eckert-
Mauchly division, “with their limited staff and facilities, were doing more along this line 
than we have done since they became a part of Remington Rand…”107 
IBM and Competitors Large and Small 
While IBM was lagging behind Remington Rand in getting its first true 
electronic, stored-program computer to market, it was already a key player in the 
evolution of advanced machinery for complex calculation. One of the precursors to 
IBM’s move into commercial electronic computers was the Automatic Sequence 
Controlled Calculator – also known as the Mark I – which the company financed, 
constructed, and then installed at Harvard during World War II. The Mark I was the idea 
of a Harvard graduate student, Howard H. Aiken, who would become a professor there, 
head of the Harvard Computation Laboratory, and one of the biggest names in the early 
history of computing. His giant of a machine – 51 feet long and eight feet high – was not 
electronic, relying instead on electromechanical parts for its operation. And while it could 
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carry out a program, those instructions could not be stored internally.108 The Selective 
Sequence Electronic Calculator that IBM placed in service a few years later within view 
of crowds on 57th Street was more advanced than the Mark I. But it, too, did not 
represent the future of computing technology. And like the Mark I, it was a one-of-a-kind 
machine.  IBM’s bread-and-butter business, on the other hand, was in machines that 
could be produced in quantity. 
In the fall of 1952, IBM was working intensely to bring out the first of its 
commercial electronic, stored-program machines – the Defense Calculator, or the 701. 
This was a computer, the company’s first in the modern sense of the word, but it was not 
given a name that included the word “computer.” That term had not yet become 
permanently attached to a machine of this sort, and Thomas Watson Sr. was said both to 
have disliked giving the machine an anthropomorphic designation – “computer” referred 
to a person before it referred to a machine – and to have wanted to distinguish IBM’s 
product from the Universal Automatic Computer, UNIVAC’s full name.109 But the first 
of the IBM 701 models was not due to be completed and shipped for display at company 
headquarters in Manhattan – to take the place of the dismantled Selective Sequence 
Electronic Calculator – until after the election.110  
Still, being behind Remington Rand in getting the newest computer into public 
view did not mean IBM was behind in preparing the ground for a commercial computer 
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industry. IBM was the leader in the type of information processing that relied on older 
technology – electromechanical punched-card equipment – and after the war the 
company pioneered and became the leader in the application of electronics to that 
technology. IBM did this with a string of electronic calculators – the initial model, 
dubbed the 603, the one-ton 604, and the 605 – which could be set up to carry out a 
limited number of steps in sequence at speeds previously unheard-of for commercial 
machines. Thousands of IBM electronic calculators were eventually placed in service. 
And along the way IBM effected an enhancement by following the lead of one of its 
customers, linking together an electronic calculator and several other pieces of existing 
equipment to carry out longer programs from punched cards and plugboards and to make 
use of electromechanical storage units. These clusters of equipment – marketed as Card-
Programmed Electronic Calculators, or CPCs – were being produced by the hundreds in 
the early 1950s while customers waited for more sophisticated devices to arrive.  
The CPC was not a computer in the sense that word has come to mean, including 
the capacity for an internally-stored program capable of modifying itself as it runs. 111  
But it carried out computer-like functions, and IBM historian Emerson W. Pugh has 
argued that CPCs were critical to laying the groundwork for IBM’s leadership in 
                                                 
111 Works that describe the IBM Card-Programmed Electronic Calculator and discuss its place in the 
history of IBM and the development of the computing industry include:  Bashe et al., IBM’s Early 
Computers, 68-72; Pugh, Building IBM, 143, 152-155; Ceruzzi, A History of Modern Computing, 2nd ed. 
18-20; Williams, A History of Computing Technology, 2nd ed., 251-253; Aspray, ed., Computing Before 
Computers, 244-246; John W. Sheldon and Liston Tatum, “The IBM Card-Programmed Electronic 
Calculator,” in Review of Electronic Digital Computers, Joint AIEE-IRE Computer Conference, 30-36; 
Cuthburt C. Hurd, “The IBM Card-Programmed Electronic Calculator,” in Proceedings, Seminar on 
Scientific Computation, November, 1949, editor-in-chief Cuthburt C. Hurd, edited by the IBM Applied 
Science Department (New York: International Business Machines Corporation, 1950), 37-41;  Saul Rosen, 
“Electronic Computers: A Historical Survey,” Computing Surveys 1, no. 1 (March 1969), 12-13; Frank da 
Cruz, “The IBM Card-Programmed Calculator,” Columbia University Computing History, 
http://www.columbia.edu/acis/history/cpc.html; “Card Programmed Electronic Calculator, ” IBM products 
description, IBM Corporate Archives, Somers, N.Y.; Cuthbert C. Hurd, “Computer Development at IBM,” 




commercial computing. This was not because they were a superior technology. They 
were not. But they were supporting IBM’s massive customer base with equipment and 
experience in programming before the UNIVAC was completed – and then even 
afterwards at a time when only a relative handful of UNIVAC computers were in 
operation.  Computer historian Paul Ceruzzi writes of this time that the CPC’s 
“combination of program cards, plugboards and interconnecting cables was like the 
epicycles of a late iteration of Ptolemaic cosmology, while the Copernican system was 
already gaining acceptance.”112 But while it might have been a technological dead end, 
the CPC was available, it was affordable, and, he writes, “customers needing to solve 
difficult engineering problems … accepted it.”113  
These judgments were foreshadowed by an article about the new computer 
industry that appeared in Fortune magazine in January 1952. Titled “Office Robots,” the 
article reflected the lack of a fixed definition at the time for the term “computer.” 114  It 
featured photographs of the IBM 604 electronic calculator – not now considered to be a 
computer, but a device that the magazine described as the “first practical electronic 
business computer” – and the newer Remington Rand model 406-2, also an electronic 
calculator which Fortune referred to as that company’s “first small-size business 
computer.”115 Some 900 of the IBM 604s were said to be in use, plus over 70 of the 
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CPCs. The article made clear that “to computer engineers, as well as to I.B.M. and Rem 
Rand, these machines are only a first approximation of the electronic business machines 
of the future,”  being “hobbled”  by the speed limitations of using punched cards for input 
and output and “having no real memory organs in the high-speed computer sense.”116 
Still, the piece noted, “they are serving to plow the field of actual commercial operation, 
explore the problems of application, and introduce management to the new language.”117  
In April 1952, a publication of the Institute of Radio Engineers, which closely followed 
developments in a wide range of the electronics applications, also gave a nod to the 
transitional significance of the IBM 604 and CPC in a review of developments in 
electronic digital computing during the prior year. The review noted that, with the first 
UNIVAC being completed and tasked with work on the Census, the time had finally 
arrived for computer engineers “when their machines would begin to be applied to the 
management of certain industrial and governmental operations.” 118 This, it was noted, 
had followed “a gradual building up to this event with the widespread business and 
governmental use of electronic calculators like the IBM 604 and CPC.”119 
While IBM and Remington Rand were deemed the clear leaders in the emerging 
computer field, the Fortune article noted that there was also a “battle of the robots” 
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underway.120 By Fortune’s count at the start of 1952, some 90 organizations were said to 
be “working on some form of computer,” ranging from large-scale, general-purpose, 
electronic digital machines to special-purpose equipment designed for such particular 
tasks as handling airline reservations or magazine subscriptions. Laboratories were said 
to “hum and glitter with the look of another world.”  Of particular note were small-scale 
computers being designed – and some already built – by companies that made calculating 
machines and other sorts of office equipment and were jumping in to the fray in the 
nascent industry of commercial computing. While giving up speed in return for reduced 
size, the small-scale computers, noted Fortune, “begin to foreshadow the true office 
robot.”121 
IBM was taking notice – and, in the top ranks, with concern.  In the late 1940s, 
word had made its way up through the chain of command about various engineering 
conferences around the United States where electronic computing projects were 
discussed.122 Warnings were coming from customers, too, that the days of punched-card 
technology were numbered.123 Within the company, electronics were not uniformly seen 
as the way forward. Thomas J. Watson Jr., son of the founder and then a high-ranking 
company executive, wrote in his autobiography about the “built-in resistance to exploring 
electronic computing.”124 The younger Watson himself admitted to not grasping at first 
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the promise of electronics after having gotten a look at ENIAC. The unanticipated level 
of interest in IBM’s first electronic calculators in the early post-war years helped him 
understand what might lie ahead. But even as IBM focused on bringing out its first true 
computer – big, powerful, and expensive – others were racing ahead in the area of 
smaller and more affordable machines.  
The engineering publications and conferences and the Fortune article were not the 
only visible signs of this ferment.  In May 1952, the Navy Mathematical Computing 
Advisory Panel convened a symposium at the Pentagon with a title reflecting the rising 
interest in smaller machines: “Commercially Available General-Purpose Electronic 
Digital Computers of Moderate Price.”125  By one account, more than 250 people 
attended, and the report’s distribution list includes about that many names – from 
government agencies, the military, universities, contractors, computing equipment 
manufacturers, and other corporations.126 In her preface to the report, Mina Rees, the 
panel’s chair and director of the Mathematical Sciences Division in the Office of Naval 
Research, wrote: 
Until recently, all commercially available general purpose 
automatic digital computers were large and cost many hundreds of 
thousands of dollars. Within the past year, however, a number of 
manufacturers have developed smaller, more compact (usually slower) 
automatic computers for sale at less than one hundred thousand dollars. 
Nearly all of these smaller computers use magnetic-drum storage. With 
this drastic reduction in the cost, it has become possible for agencies with 
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modest budgets to consider acquiring such machines. Interested agencies, 
therefore, can evaluate the now available machines to determine which, if 
any, can best satisfy their scientific-computing or data-handling needs.  
Accordingly, a symposium on "Commercially Available General-
Purpose Electronic Digital Computers of Moderate Price" was arranged by 
the Naval Mathematical Computing Advisory Panel, and representatives 
of manufacturers of small computers were invited to meet with 
representatives of various government agencies in Washington.127 
The symposium report included copies of the talks on seven small computers, along with 
photographs of the machines and diagrams of their operations. None of these computers 
were the work of IBM or Remington Rand – but representatives of both companies were 
on the distribution list and may well have attended. 
The free-for-all that had a variety of firms taking aim at the hoped-for small-
computer market was also not hard to miss in other ways.  The September 1952 issue of 
Scientific American, for example, featured several stories about computing – and ads, too. 
The New York-based Electronic Computer Corporation ran an ad announcing the Elecom 
110 – “A General Purpose Computer to meet all your Computing Needs,” for $62,500.128 
Another firm, Computer Research Corporation of California, ran an add announcing “3 
Important New Electronic Digital Computers,” including a small general-purpose 
machine, the CADAC 102-A.129 Versions of CADAC and Elecom machines had been 
featured at the Pentagon symposium on small computers. And the computer division of 
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Bendix Aviation Corporation ran an ad announcing the development of “Bendix Digital 
Computers,” with more information to “be available shortly.”130 
IBM was itself not a single-minded entity but one in which a variety of camps 
struggled over the best way forward in the face of a variety of threats that had become 
clear by the fall of 1952.131 On the one hand, the company would soon have on the 
market a computer to compete with the powerful and expensive UNIVAC for complex, 
high-speed computing jobs. But IBM was staring at a wave of competition for more 
standard business and scientific applications of interest to companies and government 
agencies that would not be willing to pay for such high-end equipment as either IBM’s 
forthcoming 701 or the UNIVAC. This competition came from several directions. There 
was the threat of a new Remington Rand electronic calculator that would compete with 
IBM’s electronic calculators. And there was the threat of the relatively small, moderately 
priced stored-program computers using magnetic drum technology.  
The way forward for IBM was not clear and engendered what historians of IBM 
and its technology have termed a “chaotic period.” 132 Some at the company favored 
incremental enhancement of existing technology. Others favored its abandonment. But 
there was no doubt that serious competitive threats required action. A memo from IBM’s 
Future Demands Department described the fate that awaited the company if it did not 
move quickly beyond the Card-Programmed Electronic Calculator into the new 
technology of the stored-program computer – the latter referred to as a “sequence 
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calculator” owing to the company’s preference at the time not to describe its computers 
as “computers”: 
The CPC was developed to establish our position in the computing 
field, and to gain time for the development of a stored-program sequence 
calculator. However, card programming of computers has no permanent 
place in computing except as an incidental use of card accounting 
equipment already available for other purposes. 
Several competitive computers are already on the market at prices 
of $70,000 and $100,000 with which the CPC cannot compete in 
versatility, capacity, or speed. As a result the CPC must be recognized as 
competitively obsolete, no longer able to maintain our position, and 
incapable of being improved sufficiently to reestablish our leadership.133 
To meet this challenge, proposals were on the table for different types of stored-program 
computers favored by different constituencies with the company.  On Nov. 12, 1952, 
eight days after the election, a memo from IBM vice president John C. McPherson, the 
company’s former director of engineering, called attention again to the dire consequences 
that would follow if the company did not meet the challenge of magnetic drum-based 
computers by bringing its own to market.134 The technology underlying the IBM 604 and 
CPC was being rendered obsolete, as McPherson saw it, and the relatively low cost of the 
competitors’ models also posed a threat to IBM’s expected market share for one of its 
own planned computer models. A list he prepared, titled “Competitive Drum 
Computers,” and dated Nov. 20, contained the names of seven such commercial 
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machines and their manufacturers.135 They included a “Drum Computer” from 
Remington Rand, machines developed by Consolidated Engineering Corp. and Hogan 
Laboratories, and several computers from names well known for calculating machines 
and office equipment – Marchant, Underwood, National Cash Register, and Monroe.  
Among the seven computers listed was the Monroe Calculating Machine Company’s new 
device, the Monrobot.  
There is no reference in those memos to the Monrobot’s role on election night.  
But during this period, the lack of consensus about a way forward came before Thomas J. 
Watson Jr., by then IBM’s president, to resolve. At a meeting on Nov. 18, Watson 
expressed his concern about the competitive threats, and one of the participants’ notes on 
the meeting reflect that there was “considerable discussion” of a magnetic drum machine 
that had been in the works at IBM for some time.   Watson wanted to know “who or 
what” was holding up that project. 136 Watson made it clear that he wanted to move 
forward with the machine. IBM was then referring to it as the “MDC,” or Magnetic Drum 
Calculator. It had a target date 15 months away, to be followed by proposed completion 
of two other models. Watson’s decision would breathe new life into the MDC.137 It would 
hit the market in 1954 as the “650.” Though not as sophisticated, powerful, or fast as 
IBM’s other computers, the 650 would be compared to Ford’s Model-T – a mass-
produced machine intended for basic business applications that would outsell all 
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competing drum-based models and help move IBM into leadership of the market for 
commercial computers.138 
All of that was in the future, and by no way guaranteed, in the fall of 1952. And 
the memos cited here do not reveal whether the Monrobot and the publicity surrounding 
its role in the election played any part in IBM’s deliberations. It certainly was not the 
most robust of the drum computers. But it was one of a class of machines – smaller, more 
affordable, and less complicated than the room-sized giants – that would play a role as 
computer producers and consumers worked out, over time, what computers should be 
able to do, who should operate them, and how they should be applied.  The competition 
was not merely between companies in the emerging computer marketplace, but between 
ideas about computing.  And the Monrobot was based on a very particular idea that 
would be seen in play on election night – small enough to be trucked to Rockefeller 
Center and installed at NBC’s election-night headquarters, and accessible enough that 
NBC would tout the ease with which it could be mastered and operated. 
Monroe and the Monrobot 
That the Monroe Calculating Machine Company would play a role in 1952 in 
helping introduce the American public to computers operating in real time – and in 
adding computers to the resources available for election-night news reporting – was not 
something in any way destined to happen. In fact, 15 years earlier, Monroe had passed up 
a chance to get in on what would turn out to be one of the important developments in the 
evolution of modern computing. That was when, in 1937, Howard Aiken at Harvard had 
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his idea for a large-scale electromechanical machine that would carry out lengthy and 
complex calculations in an automatically controlled sequence of steps – that is, by 
following a program. Aiken took the idea to George C. Chase, an inventor and Monroe’s 
director of research. Chase, in turn, took this idea to the management at Monroe, hoping 
to enlist his company in Aiken’s plan. But after mulling over it over for several months, 
according to Aiken, Monroe’s management decided not to get involved. Aiken went to 
IBM instead, and IBM ultimately provided financial support and built Aiken’s machine, 
the Harvard Mark I. 139 Its home base upon completion, the Harvard Computation 
Laboratory, would become both a landmark in the history of computing and a place at 
which other pioneers in that world would get their start. 
In the late 1940s, as the contours of a commercial computing market were 
beginning to take shape – especially with the work of Eckert and Mauchly as they set 
about designing and building the UNIVAC – Aiken heard that Monroe had become 
interested in the idea of constructing a small computer. He passed this information on to 
William H. Burkhart, who was then completing an undergraduate degree in mathematics 
at Harvard. Burkhart was also working in Aiken’s computation lab, contributing to a 
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volume then being prepared on the theory and design of electronic computing and control 
circuits.   Burkhart wrote to Monroe, expressing interest in working on the project 
mentioned by Aiken.140 Burkhart’s own vision, he made clear, was that a small computer 
such as Monroe might be interested in building – he called it “a small digital calculator 
with provision for storage and sequencing”– was precisely what he would be producing 
himself if he had the resources.141 Burkhart is representative in some ways of those in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s who had a vision for computers that varied from the period’s 
predominant image of machines that filled entire rooms, worked at lightning speed, and 
required highly trained experts to operate. In his letter to Monroe, he explained that he 
had a “well-founded suspicion that large-scale machines are inefficient when initial cost 
and total number of operation and maintenance personnel are considered.”142  He would 
get the job at Monroe, and by the time of the 1952 presidential campaign, he would have 
already applied for a number of patents for computer components and played a lead role 
in the design and development of the Monrobot computer featured on election night. He 
would even get some nationwide publicity in that role by name, finding himself quoted as 
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the Monrobot’s “manager” in a post-election edition of Newsweek – a memento he saved 
for the rest of his life.143 
Burkhart himself was an unlikely person, in some ways, to have ended up in that 
position.  Hailing from rural Honesdale in northeast Pennsylvania, he would recall 
decades later that he loved learning on his own about math and physics but didn’t care 
about grades, and that, as a result, his high school record was not the best. His 
recollections, committed to writing in a series of biographical sketches he drafted before 
his death in 2000, suggest that he was one of those boys who love taking apart devices to 
see how they and their circuits work, and seeking out books to help him understand what 
he could not figure out on his own. And he loved solving problems. He loved that, he 
would explain, the way a dog “loves to chase squirrels,” adding, “I never got over that 
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sickness.”144 After graduating from high school in 1940, college was not in his plans – 
not immediately, anyway. He went to work as a radio serviceman and then for Western 
Electric testing aircraft radio equipment and telecommunications systems. After the 
United States entered World War II, he found himself in the Signal Corps, studying 
electronics and electricity and waiting his turn to serve. But the trajectory of his life – and 
his future college prospects – would change when the Army sent him to Harvard as a part 
of a group of solders who were tasked with studying engineering. After a semester, the 
Army shipped him off to Europe, where he moved from England to France to Germany 
setting up radio and telephone communications for the American forces.  Following the 
war, he applied to Harvard, he would say later, because he expected that his high school 
record would keep him from a college that cared about those grades. At Harvard, 
ironically, the matter of grades would be trumped, he wrote, by having “done very well” 
there when sent by the Army before his deployment to Europe.145 He was admitted to 
study mathematics and would graduate in 1949. 
Burkhart is not a standard figure in contemporary histories of early computing. 
But he began making his mark on the computing world in two ways while still an 
undergraduate at Harvard.  The first of these – the construction of a machine combining 
electrical circuits and logical reasoning – suggests that from his earliest interest in what 
would come to be called computers, he had an idea that such devices could be small, 
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accessible, and be applied to more than numerical calculation.146 During his sophomore 
year, 1946-47, Burkhart took a one-semester course in mathematical logic from the noted 
philosopher Willard V. Quine. Work in the course involved developing truth tables – 
basically, determining whether one or more statements are true or false based on a set of 
premises. Burkhart and a classmate, Theodore Kalin, had read a paper by another seminal 
figure of the era, Claude Shannon, about a relationship between electrical switching 
circuits and mathematical or symbolic logic. In the spring of 1947, the two students set 
about building a device – from about $150 in materials – that would generate truth tables 
automatically from a set of conditions programmed into it by settings created with 
various types of switches.147 The results were displayed as a pattern of lights, in which a 
glowing bulb was equivalent to “true.” The machine was dubbed the Kalin-Burkhart 
Logical-Truth Calculator. It was small enough to fit under a bed – 16 inches tall, 30 
inches wide, and 13 inches deep.148 But it was robust – said to take less than a minute to 
determine the truth of 100 “cases,” given a set of rules, and it could solve problems in 
which there were up to a dozen different conditions. It received some notoriety in that 
era, both as the first electrical machine to solve problems in logic and for its diminutive 
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size. This included an entire chapter devoted to it in a notable 1949 book, Edmund C. 
Berkeley’s Giant Brains, or Machines That Think, one of the first works of its kind for a 
popular audience. The author himself was a 1930 Harvard alumnus who had returned to 
work in Aiken’s computation laboratory during the war. Berkeley argued that although 
the diminutive Kalin-Burkhart machine had been built at a tiny fraction of the cost of 
other “giant brains” described in the book – including ENIAC and the Harvard Mark I – 
one could “properly call this machine a mechanical brain because it transfers information 
automatically from one part to another of the machine, has automatic control of the 
sequence of operations, and does certain kinds of reasoning.”149 The device was 
demonstrated in June 1947 before several logicians and engineers, and it was moved for a 
time to a life insurance company, where it was studied for its potential application in to 
“drafting contracts and rules.”150 An impediment to its wide use, wrote Berkeley, was an 
inadequate appreciation of its potential applications. But, he concluded, here was “an 
electrical instrument for logical reasoning, and it seems likely that its applications will 
multiply.”151 In fact, Burkhart would later note, as would science writer Martin Gardner, 
that no practical application could be found for the Kalin-Burkhart device itself. But in a 
book first published in 1958 for laymen, Logic Machines and Diagrams, Gardner wrote 
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that Kalin and Burkhart’s invention was of “great historic interest, marking a major 
turning point in the development of logic machines.”152 
Burkhart’s other contribution to the early developments in computing was his 
work at Aiken’s lab while still an undergraduate.153 At the time, Aiken was overseeing 
the design and development of a new large-scale digital computing device – the Mark III, 
the first of Aiken’s machines to incorporate electronics.154 Aiken set Burkhart to work 
designing electronic circuits, to which Burkhart later recalled applying his knowledge of 
symbolic logic for reduction of the number of vacuum tubes needed to carry out 
particular tasks.155 Burkhart received a nod from Aiken in print when Burkhart’s work on 
“control-circuit theory” was included in volume Harvard published in 1951, The 
Synthesis of Electronic Computing and Control Circuits.156  
In his letter to the Monroe Calculating Machine Company in the summer of 1949, 
Burkhart wrote that “Having now completed all but the final editing of the results of our 
research on design of calculator circuits, I feel no pressing obligation to remain at the 
Harvard Computation Laboratory and have turned my attention again to consideration of 
small-scale machine design.”157 He saw, in Monroe, the opportunity to do just that, 
writing that “In the event that construction of such a general purpose calculator at 
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Monroe is still a possibility I should enjoy more than anything else working with such a 
project.”158 
At Monroe, headquartered in Orange, N.J., just outside Newark and about 12 
miles from New York City, Burkhart found a company with thousands of employees 
focused primarily on the design, manufacture, and sale of calculating machines and 
related equipment. The customers were businesses, government offices, educational 
institutions, and the military. The company’s annual report covering 1952 dated the start 
of its “secret” work on computers to 1949, which was the year Burkhart arrived.159  And, 
in fact, the company’s report for 1949, published in early 1950, referenced work on an 
early Monrobot prototype as part of a discussion of the company’s research initiatives: 
“[W]hat seemed most likely to be remembered about 1949’s research was the important 
growth of its effort in electronics. Just where MONROBOT I (our study model) would 
lead nobody knew. But the dimly perceived possibilities were wondrous.”160 
Even as Monroe ventured into the world of electronic computers, the base was 
expanding for its traditional calculating and business machine operations – deemed in the 
report covering 1949 to be “less dramatic but more important to sales.”161  In a later 
report on its activities for 1951, Monroe boasted that the growing company had “made 
and sold more calculating machines than any competitor,” and that it had manufactured a 
                                                 
158 Ibid.  
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160 Keynote, March 1950, 17, records of the Monroe Calculating Machine Company, MSB; this edition of 
Keynote, a monthly in-house publication, was a special issue that provided a report to employees on the 





total of 68,376 calculating, adding, and accounting machines.162 In 1952, the year when 
Monroe would go public with the results of its computer development efforts, the 
company started with 230 domestic branch offices and ended the year with 266, 
increasing the size of the sales force for its core business by 10 percent and recording 
profits approaching $1.3 million on $30 million in sales. The company was also adding 
capacity to a plant in southern Virginia and another to a subsidiary operation in the 
Netherlands. Still, by the end of 1952, those “dimly perceived possibilities” for 
electronics had reached sufficient clarity for Monroe to open a new plant in Morris 
Plains, N.J., and move its electronics operations there, including the “Monrobot 
Laboratory.” 
A description of the work of the Monrobot Laboratory printed just a few months 
after the 1952 election provides a glimpse into the kind of ferment then taking place 
nationwide within companies manufacturing of an array of products, from office 
machines to television sets, where electronics were not only changing the way things 
worked, but the make-up of the workplace at the cutting edge.163 At the Monrobot 
Laboratory, the executive in charge, E.J. “Jay” Quinby, had a long pedigree – more than 
three decades of research experience, much of it with RCA Laboratories and then as a 
senior Navy officer during World War II.164 He held patents from that era related to such 
devices as radios, loudspeakers, phonograph records, and a railway electric signal 
                                                 
162 “The Open Book of a ‘Closed’ Corporation” [1951 annual report], Monroe Calculating Machine 
Company, [1952], 5, in  the records of the Monroe Calculating Machine Company, MSB.. 
163 “Presenting Information on Facilities for Military Production for the Consideration of Armed Forces 
Procurement Authorities,” brochure, Monroe Calculating Machines Company, June-July 1953, 17-21, 
records of the Monroe Calculating Machine Company, MSB. 
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Navy in a memoir dealing primarily with an earlier part of his life; E.J. Quinby, Ida was a Tramp – and 




system.165  After the conclusion of his Navy service in 1949, he was brought in to 
Monroe to “establish the necessary research and development” to help the company move 
into computers, he wrote in a brief reference to Monroe in a memoir about his earlier 
life.166 In addition to Quinby, the Monroe report touted the work being done by its 
“inventors from the new world of electronics and electrical engineering.”167 The “key 
personnel” under Quinby were said to be “young men with an average age of thirty, 
progressive, imaginative men who are highly trained in the techniques of exploring the 
unknown, yet seasoned and practical men with a mature approach to their profession.”168 
Over half had served in World War II. And they came from top schools – including three 
with master’s degrees from Harvard.  Richard LaManna, who would go on to rise through 
the ranks at Monroe, was a freshly minted engineering graduate from the University of 
Maryland when he arrived there in 1951. He was excited about the prospect of being on 
the cutting edge. And the work did not disappoint. “Everything we did,” he said, “was 
new.”169 What was also new, said Irving Gardoff, who came to work at Monroe in 1952, 
was that those designing and touting new computers did not know for sure who the 
customers might turn out to be. And that, he said, was because the customers – the 
potential ones – didn’t know they were going to be customers.170 
                                                 
165 His patents from this era can be found online at http://www.google.com/patents.   
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Calculating Machine Company, MSB. 
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The Monrobot that was the focus of their work was not at all robust. But its 
diminutive features in other ways – size, price, and complexity – placed it among a 
category of early computers that attracted the attention of the Pentagon in 1952 for 
precisely those features. The U.S. military was not only an important early customer of 
computers but an important player in the exchange of new ideas about computing. On 
May 14, 1952, the Navy Mathematical Computing Advisory Panel, meeting at the 
Pentagon, convened its “Symposium on Commercially Available General-Purpose 
Electronic Digital Computers of Moderate Price.”  The Monrobot – with the formal name 
of “MONROBOT III Electronic Calculator” – was one of seven computers featured.171 
                                                 
171 E.J. Quinby, Monroe Calculating Machine Co., “The MONROBOT Electronic Calculators,” in A 
Symposium on Commercially Available General-Purpose Electronic Digital Computers of Moderate Price, 
7-11, NMAH. The Monrobot III is typically the first Monrobot model listed in a number of surveys of early 
computers done in the 1950s and 1960s. Among these surveys are: (a). A Survey of Automatic Digital 
Computers, Office of Naval Research Washington, D.C., 1953, Box 252, Computer Documents, NMAH; 
and (b) Martin H. Weik, A Survey of Domestic Electronic Digital Computing Systems, Ballistic Research 
Laboratories Report No. 971, December 1955, http://ed-thelen.org/comp-hist/BRL.html. One exception to 
the surveys showing the Monrobot III as Monroe’s first working Monrobot is a list of early computers that 
appeared in a computer textbook published in 1963: Ned Chapin, An Introduction to Automatic Computers, 
2nd ed. (Princeton, N.J,: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1963), 190. In a four-page chronology of 
“automatic computers,” Chapin includes “Monrobot-I” as being commercially available, as being installed 
first at Ft. Monmouth, N.J., and with March 1953 as the “estimated date” that it “passed [its] acceptance 
test.” The source of this information is not cited, and I have not to date encountered any direct references 
elsewhere to a Monrobot I at Ft. Monmouth or to a viable Monrobot model before the Monrobot III. 
However, as noted earlier, Monroe’s annual report covering 1950 referred to a Monrobot I as a “study 
model.”  A Monroe brochure from mid-1953 (“Presenting Information on Facilities for Military Production 
for the Consideration of Armed Forces Procurement Authorities,” brochure, Monroe Calculating Machines 
Company, June-July 1953, records of the Monroe Calculating Machine Company, MSB.) mentions, under 
the heading “Military Production at Present,” two “Prime Contracts,” both for an “Electronic Computer, 
Digital Type.” One was listed as being for the “Air Force Cambridge Mass. Research Laboratory,” which 
did get a Monrobot III (per other documentation: “Monrobot Electronic Calculator Model III – Manual of 
Operating Instructions, Prepared for Air Force Cambridge Research Center, Cambridge, Mass.,” instruction 
manual, Monrobot Corporation [subsidiary of Monroe Calculating Machine Company], 1953, in the papers 
of William Burkhart, courtesy of Dorothy Burkhart). The other of these two computers mentioned in the 
mid-1953 Monroe brochure was listed as being for “Army Engineers Research and Development 
Laboratory,” with no location given.  This is consistent, however, with the ultimate destination of the next 
Monrobot model under development, the Monrobot V, which was delivered to the Army Corps of 
Engineers’ Research and Development Laboratory at Fort Belvoir in Maryland in 1955 (“Monrobot V Goes 
to Uncle Sam,” Keynote, April 1955, 5, records of the Monroe Calculating Machine Company, MSB.). 
There is no mention of a Monrobot I or II in William Burkhart’s resumes, which do include references to 
the Monrobot III and later models. His co-worker, Richard LaManna, who arrived at Monroe in 1951 to 
work in the unit developing computers, said he believed there had been two early iterations of the 




The report submitted by Monroe for the symposium, under Quinby’s name, featured a 
publicity photograph showing a young woman sitting at the computer’s keyboard, and it 
included this claim: “The most important single feature of the MONROBOT is its 
simplicity… Even a novice finds it possible to program problems after the first day’s 
acquaintance with the input keyboard.”172 Another big selling point was its economy of 
space – “only 700 vacuum tubes and 200 diodes are employed throughout.”173 And the 
Monrobot looked like office furniture. The “computer” unit in which data were entered 
and programs carried out occupied a cabinet of the size and appearance of an office desk. 
This was connected by cable to the rest of the Monrobot’s equipment, which could sit on 
top of an ordinary office desk. These peripheral components included a small keyboard 
for the entry of data and programs, and a combined printer and device for entering data 
and programs into the computer through holes punched in paper tape. The desk-sized 
computer unit housed a magnetic drum on which data and instructions would be stored, 
along with the vacuum tubes and circuits for carrying out calculations – and even a 
mechanism for piping in air to combat the heat generated by all of those vacuum tubes.   
The computer unit also contained a power source that would allow the Monrobot 
to be started up gradually in order to minimize the chances of vacuum tubes burning out 
at that phase of operation.  And, in fact, one of the challenges for computers and other 
electronic gear of that era was that vacuum tubes did burn out.  Richard LaManna, who 
                                                                                                                                                 
was the computer on which his unit was working (Richard LaManna, telephone interview by the author, 
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worked on the Monrobot, said one of the means of locating dead tubes was to darken the 
room in which it was operating in order to identify those that were not lighting up.174  
The Monrobot could be programmed do sequences of basic mathematical 
operations – addition, subtraction, multiplication and division. It could compare numbers 
and, based on the result, select the next step to take in a program. It could undertake 
calculations on the results of previous calculations. In that way, complicated 
mathematical functions could be carried out by repetitions of ever more refined 
approximations until an answer was reached by a process known as convergence. 
Instructions in a program could also be modified automatically based on the results of a 
particular step. A program could be set up to read data in from punched tape and to print 
out results in text and numbers, including information presented in tabular arrangements. 
Standard paper or special forms could be used with the printer. The Monrobot’s drum 
memory could hold 100 positive or negative numbers of up to 20 decimal digits each, 
with a decimal point fixed between the 10th and 11th digits. The computer’s memory 
could also hold the “operational orders” that comprised a program – listed in various 
Monroe documents as up to either 100 or 200 steps.175 
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Calculator – MONROBOT – A new tool for business and science,” brochure, Monroe Calculating Machine 
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The Monrobot was, when compared to other computers of the day, slow. It could 
carry out 450 additions or subtractions per minute, and 100 multiplications or divisions. 
On election night, CBS correspondent Charles Collingwood would tell viewers that the 
UNIVAC could do 2,000 additions in a second, 500 multiplications, and 250 divisions.176 
The Monrobot was also slow compared to other small computers included in the Navy 
symposium. Monroe made no secret of the Monrobot’s rate of calculations, but tried to 
put the best spin on it.  The Monrobot’s operating manual tried to make a virtue of the 
computer’s speed by comparing it favorably to pre-computing technology. With the 
Monrobot, said the manual, “computation is completely automatic and is carried out at a 
speed greatly exceeding that attainable by mechanical calculators.”177   
Company literature also made sure prospective clients for the Monrobot 
understood that the speed at which a particular operation could be carried out was not the 
only consideration related to time and efficiency. Ease of use was also said to be an 
important consideration along those same dimensions. A brochure that appears to date 
from April 1952 described the “Monrobot Electronic Calculator” as a “general-purpose, 
sequence-controlled, digital computer” and noted that it had “been developed during the 
past three years to meet the increasing demand in many business, military, and research 
organizations for a compact, reasonably priced, and easily operated digital computer 
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having wide numerical range and versatility of application.”178 Readers were reminded 
that: 
The total operating time normally required to solve a problem by digital 
computation includes not only machine operating and printing time but 
also the time necessary for programming (or coding) the problem, scaling 
the problem, converting inputs to the number system used by the 
computer, and converting outputs back to the decimal system. In the 
Monrobot Electronic Calculator, these non-computational procedures have 
been either eliminated or greatly simplified.179 
In addition, the fact that one could operate the Monrobot without a great deal of special 
expertise was also held up as an important factor in considering the time needed for 
computer use. “The programming of problems is straightforward and requires no special 
mathematical training,” said the brochure. “Common sense and facility in handling 
elementary algebraic operations are the only prerequisites for a good programmer.” And, 
it added, “No knowledge of the internal operation of the equipment is required.” 
 Because of the Monrobot’s relative simplicity and its ability to work from stored 
programs, Monroe positioned its new computer in two general ways. One was for 
problems that were not too complicated but involved repetitions of operations on large 
volumes of data – the sort of thing needed in accounting, banking, and the actuarial work 
done at insurance companies. The other general category of use was for complex 
calculations in engineering, applied mathematics, and science – both in applications 
where “the usefulness of electronic digital computers has already been firmly 
                                                 
178 “Monroe Electronic Calculator – MONROBOT – A new tool for business and science,” William 
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established” and in other areas where “the potentialities of these computers are just 
beginning to be appreciated.”180 
Monroe’s characterization of the market was not unlike that of other computer 
makers. But while the computer boosters were eager to expand awareness of these 
“potentialities” in the early 1950s, there is no evidence before the second half of 1952 
that they envisioned journalism as among the potential customer base for their wondrous 
new machines.  The dovetailing of the manufacturers’ desire for attention with the desire 
of those in television to establish a foothold for their medium as a respected venue for 
news was an intersection of interests that was not in either camp’s playbook before 1952.  
Election night would become the crucible for bringing them together. 
 





Chapter 5:  Joining Forces for Election Night 1952 
So how did it come about that computers and journalism were linked for real-time 
election-night reporting and analysis in 1952, and how is it that there was not just a single 
instance of computer use by a single news organization?  These questions can be 
answered only imperfectly because of the passage of time and the limitations of the 
documentary and human record.  But enough pieces of the puzzle have turned up to make 
some relevant observations.  Despite an articulation by some observers of skepticism 
about election-night computer use – and despite an articulation by some participants of 
concern about the risks of prognostication, including memories of pollsters’ and pundits’ 
difficulties in 1948 – players from the worlds of computing and journalism found in their 
intersecting interests the grounds to push through with plans for – and wondrous 
promotion of – their seminal and sentinel convergence.  
The precise origins of intersections at NBC and CBS with the makers of the 
UNIVAC and the Monrobot computers are not yet clear, but there are some hints that the 
perception from the outset of mutual benefit was a driving force. Less is known about the 
origins of plans to use electronic IBM punched-card equipment in several venues: at the 
ABC television network election headquarters; at a New York newspaper collaborating 
with a local ABC station in New York for election-night coverage; and in connection 
with election-night reporting efforts at several wire service offices, newspapers, and even 
an NBC broadcast in Los Angeles.  But from internal network documents and other 




computers were being developed before either network went public with the 
arrangements. 
CBS and UNIVAC Team Up 
The UNIVAC-CBS plan appears to have been hatched several months before the 
election. There is a lack of agreement about the date, but some accounts attribute the 
initial contact to a publicist for Remington Rand, the New York-corporate parent of the 
Eckert-Mauchly Division’s UNIVAC operations in Philadelphia.  Sig Mickelson, then the 
television network’s director of news and public affairs, wrote in a 1989 memoir that the 
idea surfaced “almost by chance” after CBS election-night plans were already well along. 
Speaking of Paul Levitan, a senior member of the CBS election-planning staff, Mickelson 
wrote: 
[He] burst into my office with stars in his eyes. He had just finished 
lunching with a public relations representative of Remington Rand. His 
excitement was generated by an offer he had received to supplement our 
broadcasting of election returns by using a device that would enable us to 
predict the outcome of the election at an early hour, while polls were still 
open in many states. The device, called Univac, he was assured, could 
produce accurate projections, provided we could deliver the essential raw 
material to create a data base and a competent programmer could be found 
to use our data base to write a program. 1 
Elmer W. Lower, who would later work at CBS before becoming president of ABC 
News, wrote in 1970 of some conversations he had with Levitan about the origins of the 
plan to use UNIVAC for the CBS election-night broadcast. In Lower’s account, Levitan 
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had initially approached Remington Rand for equipment to use in the election-night 
broadcast, but not for a computer:  
[In] a search for several hundred typewriters and calculators for use on 
election night, Levitan’s pursuit led him to the home offices of the 
Remington Rand Corporation at Fourth Avenue and Twenty-fourth Street 
in New York City. There he met a veteran newspaper reporter-turned-
public relations executive named Arch Hancock. Before their conference 
was over, Levitan had a brand new idea in his head and a $600,000 
electronic toy in his pocket. The idea was to use an electronic computer to 
project the presidential returns early in the evening, probably before the 
polls closed in many mountain and Pacific Coast states. The new toy was 
Univac I... 2 
Just when this encounter between Remington Rand’s publicist and Levitan took 
place varies in the telling. Mickelson dates it to early August 1952. Lower places it in 
early September – during the week after Labor Day, which was Sept. 1. On election 
night, CBS correspondent Charles Collingwood would report that 25 people had been 
working for the prior six weeks – placing the start of the intense phase of preparations in 
late September – to develop specific plans for using the UNIVAC to generate a 
prediction.3 As for where and when within Remington Rand the idea may have 
originated, there are some indications in accounts left by participants. Herman Lukoff, 
then a senior engineer at the Eckert-Mauchly Division, wrote in a 1979 memoir that this 
idea had come from Arthur F. Draper. 4 The latter would go on to be the human face of 
the UNIVAC operations on election night, when he was introduced to the television 
audience as head of the new products division at Remington Rand’s laboratory for 
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friend and colleague”; Elmer W. Lower, “Use of Computers in Projecting Presidential Election Results, 
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advanced research in Norwalk, Connecticut. Arthur L. Norberg, a historian of Remington 
Rand’s move into computers after World War II, which involved the acquisition of the 
Eckert-Mauchly Computer Corporation and another early computer firm, writes that 
Draper “had been assigned the task of integrating EMCC into Remington Rand” and 
“became the operations/general manager of EMCC as it fit into the daily operations” of 
the larger corporation.5  Lukoff wrote of the election-night forecasting idea that Draper 
approached UNIVAC co-inventor John Mauchly to see if it was feasible, and that 
Mauchly brought in Max A. Woodbury, an associate professor of statistics at the 
University of Pennsylvania, to work out the formulas.6 Woodbury himself recalled in a 
2004 interview that Hancock, the Remington Rand publicist, had reached out to him at 
Mauchly’s suggestion, and that Woodbury and Mauchly had previously gotten to know 
each other when both attended a seminar led by the noted statistician John W. Tukey.7 A 
Remington Rand report authored after the election by Woodbury and Herbert F. Mitchell 
Jr., listed as director of the UNIVAC Applications Department, gave Oct. 7 as the date 
Woodbury was formally engaged to provide a “sound statistical procedure” for the 
election-night work.8  Draper himself, in a paper presented at a conference in early 1953, 
dated the origins of the election-prediction idea to a point months earlier than events 
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described in other first-person accounts, saying that “the possibility of tackling this job 
was first discussed some six months before the election.” 9  Woodbury was called in, 
Draper said, after preliminary work was first done to investigate the problem and as it 
became clear that outside help would be needed – Woodbury’s – “as time began to run 
out.” Draper’s account – which also appeared in a trade publication in April 1953 – does 
not indicate whether or not the idea of a computer-generated prediction surfaced inside 
Remington Rand camp with a particular network alliance in mind.10 
At CBS, when the notion of including a UNIVAC in the election-night broadcast 
was presented to Mickelson, he grasped that there were several ways in which this was 
likely to serve the network’s purposes. In essence, the computer could be used for quick 
analysis, for a competitive edge, and for boosting both ratings and prestige: 
If the parts meshed properly and the program was properly written, 
we could in all probability announce the winner of the presidential race 
while our competitors were still floundering in a sea of unsorted data. The 
novelty value of using Univac was certain to attract attention from both 
viewers and the print media… 
I knew just enough about computers to know that they could 
perform mathematical miracles. I was also aware of the promotional shot 
in the arm that the use of the device would give to our coverage. It was a 
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highly promotable tool and might give us the additional top spin that we 
needed to build our ratings to a level that would permit us to fight it out on 
even ground with the (at the time) far larger NBC.11 
Mickelson would also recall that his “quick and favorable” response to Remington 
Rand’s proposal to use the UNIVAC in 1952 was the “by-product” of his experience in 
covering elections in Minnesota in the 1940s, when the analysis he prepared ahead of 
time of past trends in a few key areas allowed him to use early returns to foresee the 
outcome.12 
CBS did not go public with the computer plans at first – but did refer to them with 
an air of mystery.  On Sept. 25, the network issued a very detailed press release on its 
arrangements for the reporting of election returns, said to have begun taking shape back 
in March. Walter Cronkite was named as “anchor-man” – the term, a relatively new one 
in broadcast journalism, set apart in quotation marks. 13 Key members of the “crack news 
team” were named – Edward R. Murrow, Charles Collingwood, Douglas Edwards, 
Lowell Thomas, and others.14 Don Hewitt – who would go on to launch 60 Minutes, one 
of the most successful television news programs for CBS – was to be “in the director’s 
slot,” controlling the flow of images.15 Levitan was in charge of arranging for “pick-ups” 
from remote cameras around the country. Fritz Littlejohn, the CBS television news 
managing editor, was to control assignments and the routing of incoming news 
dispatches. His duties were to include getting the numbers to the right “computing group” 
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– from the context a reference to people doing calculations, not to electronic computers.16 
And Mickelson was to be in charge of “more than 200 editorial, technical, and production 
personnel in the giant task of showing what happens as the nation’s voters go to the polls 
on November 4.” 17 He boasted in the release that the CBS team “constitutes the largest 
television task-force ever assembled to cover a one-day public event.” 18 There were 
details about the location from with the broadcast would originate – three large studios at 
Grand Central Terminal. The set was described, and there was mention of “new and 
improved visual aids – some of them still a trade secret.” 19 There were descriptions of the 
work of the CBS television research and news art staffs, who had been busy, among other 
things, with “working out trends, significant relationships and background data.” 20 There 
was a nod to the sponsor – Westinghouse Electric Corp. And there was one other 
breathless detail: “Mr. Mickelson said that details of a revolutionary method, involving 
the latest scientific principles, for informing the public of what is happening around the 
country as it happens – along with its possible significance – will be revealed just prior to 
Election Day.” 21 
The September 25 release did not elaborate on this “revolutionary method,” but 
the network opted not to wait until just before Nov. 4 to let the word out. On Oct. 14, the 
network issued a four-page release announcing: “CBS-TV to Use Giant Electronic 










‘Brain’ Election Night.”22 While much of the release was a reiteration of the earlier plans 
– including people and logistics – UNIVAC was now the headliner. Its multiple uses 
were in evidence – as a contribution both to the night’s journalistic tasks and audience-
engaging imperatives. One advantage of this tool, in conjunction with the work of that 
aforementioned “team of crack CBS-TV newsmen,” was to be speed – “lightning-speed,” 
in fact. 23 This “latest and most versatile of the ‘Giant Brains’ that the new science of 
electronics has produced” was to help “give the viewing audience accurate 
foreknowledge of election results at an earlier hour than ever before possible.” 24 CBS 
pointed out that “the ‘brain’ does not think creatively, as yet,” but could do work equal to 
the “combined mental efforts of approximately 400 trained clerks.” 25 At “about 18,000 
times normal brain size,” it was said to be able to do 2,000 additions in a single second, 
500 multiplications, or 250 divisions, taking advantage of a  “a ‘memory’ bank of 
magnetic tapes capable of retaining up to 15,000,000 separate characters of 
information.”26 Returns were to be transmitted by various means to the UNIVAC’s home 
base in Philadelphia, and the results of the computer’s analysis were to be transmitted 
back to the CBS studio by means of a large screen. The UNIVAC itself would also put on 
a show, with the television audience having opportunities to watch it work. 
The CBS announcement provided a summary of the methodology to be used: 
For many weeks prior to Nov. 4, a team of statisticians, 
mathematicians, researchers and political analysts will have fed into 
                                                 








UNIVAC’s fabulous ‘memory’ the election results of each state in the 
1944 and 1948 elections. The material will include total popular and 
electoral vote for each candidate in each state – all broken down to an 
hour-by-hour basis. The total national popular vote for each candidate as it 
stood at each hour during those Election Days will also be fed into 
UNIVAC.27 
In addition, the computer would get the voting history in eight states – New York, 
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Ohio, Illinois, Minnesota, Texas, and California – with 
separate figures for the metropolitan and non-metropolitan vote. One could infer from the 
description that the partial vote totals as they would come in on election night were to be 
used to detect trends consistent with or away from the past vote, though this was not 
made explicit in the release. The plan called for reports from the UNIVAC at least once 
an hour during the broadcast.  
The UNIVAC was envisioned as helping individual CBS journalists understand 
what was going on as the vote rolled in, giving them “broader knowledge” of nationwide 
developments to use in framing their own reports.28 But we can see now, in retrospect, a 
flaw in the one-way flow envisioned for this “broader knowledge.” There was no mention 
of the assessments of experienced journalists flowing back to Philadelphia as a check on 
the predictions coming out of the computer. It was an oversight that would come back to 
plague the operation on election night. That may be, perhaps, because of the way that 
controlling for the risk of “error” was envisioned: 
It is reassuring to note that of the 5,500 electronic tubes in 
UNIVAC’s “brain case,” only 3,500 are actually needed for operation. 
The other 2000 are there to provide the checking circuits that eliminate the 
possibility of UNIVAC making an error without knowing about it. 29 







What if there were to be a problem on election night not with the functioning of the 
computer, but with deciding whether to trust the results if the computer program did just 
what one might wish for in a knockout demonstration of UNIVAC’s power – detecting a 
surprising deviation from what was expected? Whether any consideration was given to 
that possibility, the release provides no hint of it. 
 The story of CBS teaming up with UNIVAC – as the “Electronic Brain,” the 
“Electronic Robot” and the “Machine with Memory” – was picked up by the Associated 
Press and the United Press and made its way around the country to run in newspapers on 
Oct. 15. It turned up in some places as a front-page story and in others as a news brief. 30 
Both wire stories carried a Philadelphia dateline of Oct. 14, and the content suggests that 
Remington Rand put out its own information for the press. Philadelphia newspapers ran 
their own stories noting the UNIVAC as a hometown product.31 There was even a 
publicity photo. It appeared in at least one Oct. 15 edition of The Evening Bulletin in 
Philadelphia, showing UNIVAC co-inventor J. Presper Eckert and CBS’s Walter 
Cronkite conferring over a computer printout as UNIVAC operator Harold Sweeney sat 
at the machine’s console in the foreground.32 The Associated Press story described the 
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UNIVAC with images its audience might grasp – the operator’s control terminal was said 
to look “somewhat like the console for a pipe organ”  – and the prospective methodology 
was described in terms that were also easy to understand as a comparison of the 1952 
vote count to past voting trends.33 Described as “the first use of one of the giant 
electronic computers on election returns,” UNIVAC’s upcoming role was described as 
both an “adjunct” to the CBS coverage and “an experiment.”34 The latter carried human-
vs.-machine overtones:  
The $600,000 electronic computer will be used by CBS television 
to see whether its prodigious capacity for making calculations and 
analyses will make it possible to indicate the final outcome with a fair 
degree of accuracy on the basis of incomplete returns. 
Officials at Remington Rand, which built the machine, emphasize 
that it isn’t psychic. But they and CBS say it will make possible 
comparisons on a scale and at a speed that would be impossible by 
conventional methods.35 
The outcome was yet to be determined, but representatives of both the network and the 
computer maker were clear about their expectations. 
 Not all journalists – some at CBS, included – were ready to buy into that 
expectation. In a late-night broadcast over Washington-based WTOP and the CBS 
Network, CBS newsman Eric Sevareid was not shy about his reservations, which were 
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tacked on the end of a news brief. A transcription service employed by Remington Rand 
recorded his remarks this way: 
In Philadelphia, CBS and Remington Rand have told of a new 
experiment the network will hold on election night. An eight-foot 
mechanical brain called a Univac will be set up to predict election results. 
It will do this on the basis of early returns. Television watchers will see 
lights blinking, then see the predictions typed out. Whether the mechanical 
pundit will better its human betters remains to be seen.36  
Two days later, Walter Cronkite also displayed less than wholehearted confidence in the 
election-night value of the UNIVAC plan when he was interviewed on air about 
arrangements for the Nov. 4 broadcast.37 The host of the interview program on a CBS 
television affiliate in Cleveland, Dorothy Fuldheim, was herself a broadcasting pioneer 
who had taken to the airwaves on radio and then television when female newscasters and 
commentators were a rarity.38 According to a transcript prepared for Remington Rand, 
Cronkite reported that while the “basic formula” was going to be the same as the past – a 
“straight report” of the returns – there was also to be “a little gimmickry" (misspelled in 
the transcript as gimmitry).39 This would be using an “electronic brain” – with Cronkite 
mistakenly referring to it as “the only one now functioning in the country” – to predict 
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the outcome by comparing returns as they come in to returns from 1944 and 1948.40 His 
description included terms reflecting awe for the “fantastic device,” respect for the 
preparations being done “carefully” by “scientists,” and characterization of the 
“gimmickry” as “most interesting.”41 But then he concluded with this: “Actually we’re 
not depending too much on this machine. It may turn out to be just a sideshow, we don’t 
know, and then again it may turn out to be … very unique and of great value to some 
people.”42 
Cronkite’s ambiguous response and Sevareid’s lack of enthusiasm for computer 
use on election night – when both would be called upon for their own reporting and 
analysis – were not universal reactions among network’s news staff. The Oct. 14 press 
release from CBS had noted that Charles Collingwood would have “the unusual 
assignment of working primarily with UNIVAC that night.”43 Collingwood himself took 
to the airwaves several times in advance of the election to talk about his assignment.44 He 
did so enthusiastically. 
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In his Oct. 15 script for Report to the West, a CBS radio news program, 
Collingwood described the UNIVAC-CBS plan at length.45 But he opened first with a 
dramatic flourish and a description of the problem in need of solving before introducing 
the proposed solution: 
We’ve had a big secret around the CNS newsroom – Project X – 
but now it’s out. On election night we’re going to try something new. You 
know what it’s like as the results begin to come in – somebody starts 
rattling off a lot of figures…  You can’t make any sense of it for hours, 
and even then some bulging brained commentator comes on to remark that 
its all going to be different when the returns start coming in from the rural 
areas. You can sit up for hours before you get any clear idea of what’s 
going on.46 
After poking fun at unnamed CBS vice-presidents whom he presumed did some thinking 
of their own to come up with the solution, he announced that the “secret” was that “the 
Remington Rand people are going to let us use Univac, a prodigious monster of 
electronic thought.”47 Collingwood let it be known that he had been assigned to consult 
with UNIVAC and share the results with the audience. “I’m looking forward to it,” he 
said, “because I’ve always believed that there’s a mathematical basis to politics, and 
Univac can do in his head in five seconds what it would take 50 or 60 mathematicians 
with slide rules and adding machines to do in a couple of hours.”48  Collingwood used 
anthropomorphic images throughout the broadcast to aid his audience in understanding 
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the machine. “In private life he is a retiring bureaucrat, providing the census bureau and 
other government branches with statistics,” but on election night, said Collingwood, 
“he’ll come into his glory.”49 The methodology of comparison to past partial returns from 
specific geographic areas was explained, and the plan to get hourly predictions. The 
journalistic imperative was addressed – the goals were not just clarity and understanding, 
but said, Collingwood, “if it works, we should know earlier than ever before who the 
winner will be.” 50 In fact, he said, as the UNIVAC is “crouched in his corner in 
Philadelphia, lights going on and off as he ponders the results,” it will be “quite possible 
that UNIVAC will be the first one in the country to know who the next President will 
be.” 51   
Collingwood also sounded a theme that he would repeat in the run-up to the 
election and right into election night: that the “electronic marvel” had been programmed 
to detect errors when fed inaccurate data, such as a misspelled county name. “If it doesn’t 
work,” he asserted, “it won’t be UNIVAC’s fault.” 52  Here was a trope – a conscious 
comparison of human and machine – that would play out before, during, and after the 
election. And without explicitly stating the comparison of journalist and machine, the 
UNIVAC had been credited with superior abilities in clarity, speed, and now accuracy. “I 
tell you it’s a little uncanny,” Collingwood would tell is audience. “I’m a little scared of 








the thing. I don’t know whether on election night UNIVAC is going to be working for 
me, or I’m going to be working for him.” 53  
The following week, on Oct. 22, Collingwood again devoted his Report to the 
West script to the UNIVAC, which he had visited earlier in the day on a trip to Eckert-
Mauchly facility in Philadelphia to work on plans for the broadcast. And again, the man-
and-machine trope was in play. Reminding the audience of the “mechanical brain” 
described a week earlier, the self-effacing Collingwood said “he and I are going to work 
together on election night – he’s going to do the thinking; I am going to do the talking.”54 
He again described the machine, the theory behind using it, and the plan. He said there 
were some things about that plan that “we’re sort of keeping under our hat,” but he gave a 
clue: that the UNIVAC might be able to predict the vote in the West before the polls were 
closed and before the counting there started. 55 Collingwood returned to the theme of 
UNIVAC’s infallibility – saying “he won’t be the one to make a mistake,” and “he just 
can’t make a mistake” – but there was just a little more qualification to his 
characterization. 56  Because the UNIVAC is “a chap of absolute mechanical honesty” 
and “will admit that he might be wrong” – and is “a gambler at heart” – the prediction 
would be expressed along with the odds that it is correct. 57 Beyond that, while the 
Remington Rand team possessed “a lot of faith not only in their mechanical brain, but in 
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the method that’s going to be used,” he said, “even they admit that it may not work.” 58 
The issue in that case would be human error of some sort, in making assumptions, in data 
entry, in “factors which we haven’t taken account of.” 59 He made clear that they – and he 
– had a lot riding on that not happening.  
It was clear from Collingwood’s remarks that in both camps, there was awareness 
that the public exposure on election night could cut both ways. A few days later, 
however, Collingwood made no mention of those concerns when he appeared on CBS 
television to promote the election-night broadcast, including footage of the UNIVAC in 
action. “The thing really works,” he told the audience. “It works so well it scares me.”60 
And he made good on Mickelson’s earlier assessment that using the UNIVAC was 
promotable. Generating results “faster and more accurately than is humanly possible,” the 
UNIVAC, Collingwood reiterated, could be the first to know the winner on election 
night. “As soon as Univac tells me,” he promised, “I’ll tell you.” 61 Whatever reservations 
some at CBS might have had, this potential for excitement was the public face of CBS’s 
promotion of the computer plan right up to election day, when it was articulated in 
newspaper ads proclaiming that “returns and predictions” would be made on the 
television network by the “new ‘magic brain,’ UNIVAC.”62 Local stations also sought to 
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attach themselves to the same promise, as in Baltimore, where WMAR-TV made an 
appeal to viewers with this pitch: “A ROBOT COMPUTER WILL GIVE CBS THE 
FASTEST REPORTING IN HISTORY.”63 
NBC and the Monrobot 
As at CBS, the precise origins of NBC’s plan to use a computer on election night 
are not specified in the documents located for this study. But records do reveal that the 
arrangement between NBC and the Monroe Calculating Machine Company to employ the 
Monrobot on election night was worked out before CBS and Remington Rand went 
public on Oct. 14 with their collaboration.  And as at CBS, NBC positioned the Monrobot 
in promotional materials as a novel and significant feature of the network’s upcoming 
election-night performance. 
NBC’s plans for the 1952 conventions and for election night began taking shape 
before the start of the year and were announced in the New York Times on New Year’s 
Day.64 The corporation sponsoring the convention and election coverage was to be 
Philco, at a cost of $3,800,000. Here was another battle shaping up for the campaign 
season, which would feature more than contests between candidates and between 
networks: Philco’s rival, the Westinghouse Electric Corporation, had announced a few 
days earlier that it would be sponsoring the convention and election coverage on CBS, 
and ABC would announce later that Admiral would be sponsoring the coverage on that 
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network. One arena in which the three sponsors competed was in the very manufacture of 
television sets, and it was certainly on Philco’s radar that convention and election 
coverage would reach a rapidly widening circle of potential consumers. Philco’s 
executive vice president was quoted on the subject: “So rapidly has television grown that 
this year it is estimated that 18,000,000 homes will be equipped with television receivers 
by election day, with an estimated 70,000,000 to 75,000,000 persons seeing and hearing 
the candidates in action.”65  
 NBC’s plans were not light on roles for new technology. Among the special 
features touted in the network’s announcement was the planned use of a “walkie-talkie-
lookie” – a portable camera to be rolled out for the first time in covering the major party 
conventions, both of which would be held in Chicago in July.66  But the use of a 
computer on election night was not yet part of the array of devices that NBC would be 
employing to get the job done and to get noticed for doing it. 
Plans for election night began ramping up in early August. A memo between top 
NBC executives noted that “It is not too early for us to start planning immediately for our 
election night coverage.” 67  And the election-night programming for NBC’s television 
and radio networks was not the first item mentioned in that memo, which went to 
Sylvester L. “Pat” Weaver Jr., vice president over both broadcast operations.  Reflecting 
a longstanding part of election-night culture nationwide was the memo’s opening: “As 
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you know, it has been the tradition of NBC to build an elaborate studio presentation 
which, while primarily for the service of the two networks, has also been used to invite 
important people to our studios to share in the excitement of an election night.”  
As the planning progressed on all fronts – news, image-making, and public 
relations – NBC crafted a three-page press release on Sept. 12 about its election-night 
arrangements, packed with details and heavy on superlatives. 68   The Monrobot was not 
yet mentioned. And although the headline and first sentence boasted of an “electronic 
brain” to be used, the context – and subsequent releases – make clear that this was not a 
reference to a computer. 69 Rather, it was a term that NBC would apply at that point in its 
planning – but not closer to the election – to refer to a custom-designed arrangement of 
equipment for aggregating and displaying election returns.  
An article in the October issue of Radio Age – a publication of the Radio 
Corporation of America, NBC’s parent corporation – provided more detail about the 
special election-night innovation referenced in the press release, but without calling it an 
“electronic brain.” 70 The account of “Operation Election Night” began this way: “With 
batteries of television cameras, an augmented corps of radio and television commentators 
and eight almost-human computing cash-register-like machines developed especially for 
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the occasion, ready to go, the National Broadcasting Company has completed its plans 
for the most elaborate radio and television news coverage of any national election returns 
in the history of broadcasting.”71 These machines were said to have had their “genesis” a 
few weeks earlier, when Charles H. Colledge, a manager of public affairs for NBC, 
approached the National Cash Register Company with a request for a “fast, visual means 
of presenting tallies to the television audience.” NCR’s head of product development, 
Charles L. Keenoy, reported back with a plan in less than 10 days, according to Radio 
Age. Eight “super-sized cash register machines” were to have various functions: 
tabulating and displaying the presidential vote in each state and the percentage of vote 
counted, giving the national vote count, and displaying the standings in Congressional 
races.72 The design was to allow television cameras to broadcast the numbers directly to 
viewers.  
The October Radio Age article made no mention of the Monrobot. But plans were 
well enough formed by early October to turn up in the minutes of an NBC election-
planning meeting on Oct. 10 – before news accounts about the UNIVAC-CBS plan – 
with this note: “Electronic brain is being supplied by Monroe” and is “called 
Monrobot.”73 Also noted was this: “Answers come out on tape and will have to be 
interpreted by PhD.”74 The Monrobot was to be used for trends, while more ordinary 
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office equipment from companies including Monroe would be involved in tabulating the 
votes and figuring the percentage of election districts with completed vote counts.  
Richard LaManna, then 25, had been working on the development of the 
Monrobot at the time, having come to Monroe after military service, where he was 
schooled in electronics, and after graduating in 1951 from the University of Maryland, 
where he studied electrical engineering. Asked about the origins of the NBC-Monrobot 
plan, LaManna said he was not privy to just how the idea first surfaced. But he recalls 
coming to work one day at some point before the election – he has a memory of the 
weather being warm – and being told that he would be joining two others on a train ride 
into Manhattan. One was William Burkhart and the other was their boss, E. J. Quinby, 
and he recalled that their destination was the offices of David Sarnoff, head of NBC’s 
parent company, RCA, at Rockefeller Center. LaManna had the impression that Quinby 
knew Sarnoff from “way back when.”75 In fact, Quinby, like Sarnoff, had been a 
seagoing wireless operator back in the early years of wireless telegraphy and had, like 
Sarnoff, worked for the American Marconi Company. Affection for those days was still 
on display when LaManna arrived at Monroe: he soon discovered that the Morse code he 
heard being tapped out on payday was coming from Quinby, calling the employees under 
him in by name – in Morse code – to collect their wages. In addition to the Marconi 
connection, Quinby went to work at RCA in 1922 in research and development, and he 
stayed until World War II. In a 1975 memoir on his early years, Quinby wrote that 
“David Sarnoff, who had been one of our fellow seagoing radio telegraph operators, 
                                                 




enjoyed a meteoric rise to become president of RCA.”76  And when Sarnoff’s RCA 
acquired the Victor Talking Machine Company in Camden, N.J., Quinby was among 
those “shifted down to Camden,” he wrote, “in the role of ‘shock troops’ to take over the 
old Victor establishment.”77 Whether – or how well – Quinby and Sarnoff knew each 
other is not discussed. And what role Sarnoff might have had to play, if any, in NBC’s 
election-night arrangements is not clear, either, from available records. He is not 
mentioned in minutes of the meetings an NBC committee planning election coverage, but 
there is a photograph of him at NBC studios on election night.78  
LaManna recalled that when the three men from Monroe arrived at Rockefeller 
Center, he and Burkhart sat in a waiting room while Quinby went into Sarnoff’s offices 
for a meeting.79 And LaManna recalls being told, when Quinby emerged, that the 
Monrobot would play a role in NBC’s election-night broadcasting of election returns.  
LaManna also recalls expressing some concern: work on the Monrobot, he said, was still 
underway. But the plan to use the Monrobot was set. 
On Oct. 14 – the day CBS went public with the election-night role for UNIVAC – 
the fact that CBS and NBC were now locked in a competition over computers was the 
lead item at NBC in the minutes of that day’s election-planning meeting: “Discussed 
electronic brains – CBS’s as compared to ours, with play by play description from C H 
Colledge, who stated that Monroe people claim the Monroe equipment is, without 
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exception, the best and fastest available.”80 That such a claim about speed and capability, 
as exaggerated as it was, could be taken at face value is evidence, if nothing else, at how 
little computers and their distinctions had penetrated public consciousness in the fall of 
1952.  As the discussion continued, it is also apparent that the election-night 
methodology to be used with the Monrobot had yet to be finalized: 
Mr Colledge suggested the possibility of working out a system similar to 
that used in figuring standings of baseball teams during the last month of 
baseball season – when certain teams are eliminated from race 
(mathematically impossible for these teams to win) before final game is 
played.81 
With just three weeks to go until the election, it was also clear that precisely how the 
Monrobot and the NBC news staff would interact had not been worked out until this 
meeting, when one of NBC’s best-known and most-experienced newsmen was be tapped 
for the job and switched from a different election-night assignment:  
Decided that one man should work closely with PHD; that this man should 
be good deal more than newsman and capable of analyzing every vote. 
MORGAN BEATTY selected – unanimously. Mr Colledge to advise Mr 
Beatty accordingly.82 
The Monrobot came up one more time in the memo – reflecting, though not explicitly so, 
one major difference between the CBS and NBC plans.  The giant, room-sized UNIVAC 
could not be moved from its home base in Philadelphia. But the Monrobot was, for 1952, 
portable, with its main operating unit occupying a space about the size of an office desk 
and weighing about half a ton.83 The Oct. 14 memo noted that the Monrobot – and 
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Monroe calculating machines to be used for other election-night duties – would be 
delivered to the NBC election studios between 9 and 10 a.m. on Saturday, Nov. 1. A first 
rehearsal for election night was thus scheduled to begin at 11 a.m., with others to be held 
on that Sunday and Monday before the Tuesday election. 
The day after that meeting, Oct. 15, news of the CBS plan to use a computer on 
election night appeared in newspapers around the country. NBC joined the battle of the 
“electronic brain” press releases on Oct. 16 with one of its own: “Meet Mr. Mike 
Monrobot, ‘Electronic Brain,’ Who Will Compute Election Count for NBC Radio and 
TV; Mechanical Wizard Can Tackle Many Problems at Once.”84  On election night, 
NBC’s radio and television audience, it said, would “meet Mike Monrobot, NBC’s 
‘electronic brain,’ for the first time.” The release went on to tout – with more 
showmanship than accuracy – the machine’s purported qualifications: “Mike is the fastest 
– not the biggest – electronic computer in the country.  From his place in one corner of 
NBC’s election night headquarters (studio 8-H, Radio City, New York), Mike will help 
predict and prove the outcome of Presidential and state elections at the earliest possible 
hour.”85  Being met, then, was a traditional imperative for election-night journalism – 
speedy analysis. The computer was also to help its journalistic counterparts both by 
keeping them “constantly informed on … trends” around the country and by telling them 
“when a ‘doubtful’ state can be put in the ‘sure’ column for one party or the other long 
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before final vote counts are known.” 86 There was even a suggestion, though not said 
directly, that the computer might serve as a replacement for – or at least an equivalent to 
– some human functions on election night:  “In effect,” the release claimed, “Mike will 
analyze national voting trends the way local newspapers and broadcasting analyze the 
trend of voting in their areas.”87 Still, just as the NBC election-night managers had 
suggested in their internal memo two days earlier, the computer was not to be left to its 
own devices without monitoring by a flesh-and-blood journalist: “Morgan Beatty, noted 
news commentator, will be beside him to interpret the figures and the calculations to the 
viewing and listening audience.”88 
 NBC must have known that the Monrobot might not be very exciting to look at 
when compared to what might be expected of the UNIVAC. The latter was not named – 
nor was CBS – but the context suggests the Remington Rand computer was on NBC’s 
radar as a target to take head on. In the release, three strategies are evident to make the 
Monroe machine attractive to potential viewers by developing a compensatory persona 
for “Mike” to go along with his human name. One involved virtue, the second involved 
power, and the third involved sex.  The virtue was that “Mike’s” diminutive size made 
“him” portable and innovative: 
Mike looks like an office desk with an adding machine and an electric 
typewriter on top.  Unlike earlier style computers that bulk so large that 
they can hardly be moved from the place where they were originally built, 
Mike will ride over from New Jersey and be installed in NBC election 
headquarters a few days before Nov. 4. 89 








The power element was what viewers could not see underneath Mike’s modest exterior: 
Mike’s makers, the Monroe Calculating Machine Company of Orange, 
N.J., describe him as a ‘general purpose, sequence-controlled, digital 
computer developed over the past three years.’  Mike’s real name is 
Monrobot and naturally he has a great head for figures.  His electronic 
gray-matter perks so fast that Mike needs a cooling system to keep him 
from working up a sweat.  He weighs 1000 pounds and won’t lose an 
ounce despite constant effort all night long.90 
And as for “all night long,” there was the matter of sex appeal.  In case viewers weren’t 
convinced that Mike provided exciting viewing, NBC appears to have adopted a stock 
element that shows up throughout this era in magazine and publicity photos for electronic 
equipment of all sorts:  the girl.91   The NBC trade release said this of “Mike”: 
He’s fond of pretty girl secretaries, who can be readily trained to operate 
him, but on election night Mike will have a beautiful woman Ph.D. for his 
companion.  The learned doctor will establish the mathematical equations 
necessary to figure the trends of various election races and stuff this 
information into Mike’s maw.  A brief digestive whir and tap-tap-tap at 
600 figures a minute and out will come the answers typed automatically… 
… Like any well-oiled brain, he makes no noise and needs only a bit of 
electricity for his nourishment, and perhaps a wee bit of affection from his 
operator.  That keeps him figuring indefinitely.92 
Here, again, was the “Ph.D.” – and its use is revealing in several ways. Emphasis on the  
“beautiful woman” who was also a “learned doctor” suggests that this, too, was another 
wonder – a surprise to a 1952 audience, perhaps, like the notion of a “brain” that’s a 
machine – that might be used to attract an audience. But in addition, she was not a Ph.D. 
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at all.  Her name did not appear in the release and would be mentioned just briefly on air 
on election night. She would be named – Marilyn Mason – in a day-after release from 
NBC that described her as a “photogenic Ph.D. in mathematics” who “guided” the 
Monrobot.93 But in its Nov. 17 issue, Newsweek would, in a light-hearted account, reveal 
that this “beauteous brunette mathematician” who worked for Prudential Insurance 
Company had been given a “press agent’s doctorate.”94 
The Oct. 16 NBC release hinted at the kind of work the Monrobot might be called 
upon to do on election night, making a claim about what had already been stored away in 
“Mike’s magnetic memory” – “hour-by-hour vote totals for every state and for every race 
– Presidential, gubernatorial and congressional – of the 1948 elections.”95  These were to 
be used to “simplify complicated comparisons and make accurate forecasting possible 
during NBC’s all-night report.”96   Eight days later, on Oct. 30, NBC issued another trade 
release titled:  “NBC Radio and TV Networks, With Staff of 250 Plus ‘Electronic Brain’ 
and Mobile Units, to Bring Election Returns to Nation; Top Commentators to Analyze 
Results.”97  The computer appears as an element in NBC’s comprehensive plan to 
convince viewers that the network had a competitive edge.  In addition to such special 
arrangements as a chartered airplane to transport election-day film, the release quoted a 
network executive as saying: “The Monrobot, our electronic brain, is raring to go.  He’s 
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stuffed full of information that will help him compare this year’s Presidential election 
with 1948… In this all-electronic election we’ll be out in front again with accurate and 
rapid reports.”98 
NBC also engaged CBS in the pre-election publicity battle not just with press 
releases, but with on-air promotions and newspaper ads. On Oct. 23, for example, an 
NBC radio program discussing the upcoming election provided a rundown of the news 
staff who would be reporting and providing analysis on election night, and followed it up 
with this: 
Earlier, we gave you a list of the NBC newsmen who’ll be reporting to 
you on election results.  But you need more than men to cover the myriad 
facts that can predict a trend.  Well, NBC has taken care of that, too.   The 
fastest electronic brain will be computing the results, totaling, analyzing.  
The job of registering and deducting will be done with lightning speed and 
accuracy by the Monrobot, a marvelous new electronic computer, 
especially designed by the Monroe Calculating Machine Company.  The 
individual returns will be fed into the Monrobot, and then this result will 
be compared with the figures of the 1948 returns.  With this, the nation’s 
fastest electronic computer at work, NBC will be consistently ahead with 
the all-important election trends.  Remember, in national affairs, America 
votes for NBC.99  
Meanwhile, an NBC newspaper ad boasted that “500 NBC experts, 1,000 newsmen in 
NBC stations, and the Monrobot – America’s fastest electronic brain – will bring election 
results, trends, and interpretations to you as quickly as the votes are counted.”100 
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Monroe got in on the publicity battle, too, running ads around the country in the 
run-up to the election. Here was a chance to tout other types of Monroe office equipment 
that would also be used on election night – and that were the company’s money makers at 
a time when computers were not yet selling in volume. These ads addressed the 
imperative of speed – not by making comparisons between the Monrobot and other 
computers, but by proclaiming that the audience would see figures “digested in a 
twinkling by the unerring electronic brain of Monroe’s mathematical marvel – the 
Monrobot and many other Monroe calculators.” 101  The mutual interests of the 
equipment’s manufacturer and the network were made clear:  The audience seeking 
election returns was promised this: “You’ll see and hear them faster because NBC is 
using Monroes.”102  Even companies with only a tangential connection to the computer-
television alliance joined in the fray. A few days before the election, a major utility 
company, Con Edison, ran newspaper ads featuring a staged photograph of newsman 
Morgan Beatty, with vacuum tube in hand, leaning over the Monrobot with its top open, 
staring intently at the array of electronic components and wires inside. What was Con 
Edison’s connection? As a power company, its sales of electricity stood to grow right 
along with an expanding market for television sets. Election night was a prime 
opportunity to make the case for both, which is what the company did in this caption:  
Election “Robot.” On election night, this electronic “brain” will help NBC 
bring the returns to you with lightning speed. Morgan Beatty, famous 
commentator, views intricate innards that make Monrobot one of the 
country’s fastest computers. It’s another reason for seeing the election on 
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TV. And remember: 2 hours of TV viewing costs only 1¢ for electricity. 
Con Edison electricity is your biggest household bargain.103 
Philco, which would be sponsoring the NBC broadcast, also ran newspaper ads 
boasting of a first – the “WORLD’S FIRST,” in fact, shouted in capital letters – and a 
“sensational innovation in news reporting”: “ELECTION RETURNS … BY 
ELECTRONIC TABULATOR.”104 The ad, which also carried thumbnail photos of five 
of NBC’s “top reporters” and the names of three others, invited the radio and television 
audience to hear and see “the fastest, most exciting, most complete election returns in 
history with the fabulous Electronic Tabulator – the electric brain that will bring you 
split-second vote tabulations and estimates.” The ad did not mention Monroe or the 
Monrobot, and there is some ambiguity about just what equipment this ad was meant to 
describe. On NBC radio on election night, the anchor, Merrill “Red” Mueller, would refer 
to results from the “Philco tabulator” when giving national and state-by-state returns. But 
Philco did not manufacture such a device and the Monrobot was not used for tabulation, 
but for analysis. Nor is there any mention of a “Philco tabulator” in the NBC network 
television broadcast – originating from the same large studio as the radio broadcast – 
though the Philco logo is ubiquitous, including one announcing “Philco Election 
Headquarters,” which is how both the announcer and the anchor referred to operation at 
Studio 8-H on election night. And at the end of the night, thanks are given to three 
manufactures of equipment for toting up numbers – National Cash Register, Monroe, and 
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the Victor Adding Machine Company. Regardless of just what Philco’s pre-election ad 
was referencing, the theme of touting election-night innovation was familiar – both in the 
run-up to Nov. 4 and in the culture of election-night journalism.  
IBM’s Ambiguous Role 
If IBM engaged in significant efforts to promote its own upcoming involvement 
in election-night news reporting, these have not left much of a trace. IBM is generally 
absent from accounts of election-night broadcasting plans that appeared in published 
wire-service dispatches, newspaper stories, the columns of television critics, and trade 
publications for journalism and broadcasting.105 One exception was New York Daily 
News television writer Ben Gross, who mentioned the upcoming use of “special 
International Business Machines” to “aid in making lightning calculations” at ABC.106 
But in other instances, IBM is not named even where there were occasional references to 
ambiguously nicknamed devices to be used at ABC. The Chicago Daily Tribune 
television writer, for example, followed a mention of UNIVAC and Monrobot with a 
mention of “something frankly called the Monster over at ABC.”107  Variety reported that 
CBS and NBC would use “automatic electric ‘brains’ which will spot trends” – and 
named the UNIVAC and Monrobot – but  referred only to “a ‘Robot Reporter’ and a 
‘Trend Meter’” that ABC would use, with “carbon copies” in New York, Chicago, and 
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Los Angeles, as that network’s approach to providing  “visual means of tabbing the 
trends.”108 Typical accounts of the upcoming use of “electronic brains” in the networks’ 
election-night broadcasts did not extend beyond UNIVAC on CBS and Monrobot on 
NBC.109 
Nor was IBM’s role promoted or even mentioned in newspaper ads in the way 
that the Monrobot and UNIVAC were.  ABC’s ads touted the reporters and commentators 
the network would use on election night but made no mention of IBM.110 What’s more, 
just two days before the election, Philadelphia Inquirer television writer Merrill Panitt 
published a column about the networks’ advance publicity battle. This included ABC’s 
dismissive references to the computer-analysis plans cooked up by its competitors: 
Not to be outdone by the other networks’ press releases on 
electronic brains, ABC has issued a handout declaring that on election 
night, “the trends, percentages, comparisons, analyses, and above all, the 
returns, will be reported over the ABC radio and TV networks by not one 
but 40 of the fastest, most accurate brains known to human science.” After 
describing the brains as weighing approximately 53 ounces each and being 
powered by tiny and manifold electrical impulses, ABC confesses that 
they belong to such gentlemen as Walter Winchell, Drew Pearson, Elmer 
Davis and other ABC staffers.111 
New York World-Telegram and Sun television writer Harriet Van Horne reported on the 
same statement, observing that ABC “sniffs grandly at the opposition’s mechanical 
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marvels.”112 Such sentiments mirrored those noted in an earlier Time magazine item 
announcing the use of the Monrobot and the UNIVAC and reporting that ABC was 
having none of it: “Says ABC's News Director John Madigan, professing a disdain for 
such electronic gimmicks: ‘We'll report our results through Elmer Davis, John Daly, 
Walter Winchell, Drew Pearson—and about 20 other human brains.’”113 
Records that have turned up to date do not make clear why IBM itself did not do 
more to call attention to its role in the run-up to the election. And ABC’s election-night 
headquarters were not the only place that IBM would play a role on Nov. 4 in digesting 
election returns. After the election, IBM published an account in an in-house magazine of 
the various places that its “batteries of IBM Electronic Calculators and high-speed IBM 
Accounting Machines” were used on election night in connection with the reporting of 
returns.114 These included installations at ABC’s Studio 1 in New York, site of the 
network’s national broadcast, and another in the city room of the New York World-
Telegram and Sun, where ABC’s local station, WJZ-TV, would be broadcasting. IBM 
service bureaus in more than 20 cities would be listed after the election as making 
equipment and staff available to wire services and newspapers as well as government 
agencies for election-night work. The Hartford Courant and the Newspaper Printing 
Corporation, which handled joint business operations for the Tulsa World and The Tulsa 
Tribune, arranged help from IBM offices in those cities. The Associated Press was said to 
have lined up help from IBM in a number of cities: Washington, D.C.; New Haven; 
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Albany; Charleston, West Virginia; Indianapolis; Chicago; Minneapolis; Omaha; St. 
Louis; Little Rock; Miami; New Orleans; and San Francisco. The United Press was also 
said to have enlisted IBM service bureaus in some of the same cities: Little Rock; 
Minneapolis; and San Francisco. And at Lockheed Aircraft in Burbank, California, the 
Mathematical Analysis Department was making its IBM installation available for NBC’s 
reporting on affiliate stations in the West – Los Angeles, San Francisco, Denver, and Salt 
Lake City – for analysis of trends to supplement the national broadcast originating from 
New York.   
Precisely what kinds of IBM equipment were in the mix at all of these venues was 
not made clear. The in-house after-the-fact account from IBM does make clear that the 
equipment at Lockheed was a Card-Programmed Electronic Calculator. Also known as a 
CPC, this was an arrangement of existing IBM machines that was serving in the late 
1940s and early 1950s as a transitional technology to carry out some computer-like work 
until IBM could get its first true stored-program commercial computers to market.115 A 
publication of the National Machine Accountants Association, The Hopper, would later 
report that the IBM machines set up at ABC and at the New York World-Telegram and 
Sun for election night were also Card-Programmed Electronic Calculators.116 But the item 
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in The Hopper seems otherwise to be drawn from IBM’s own after-the-fact account, and 
that merely refers to the equipment in these places as “IBM Electronic Calculators” – a 
usual reference at the time to the IBM “604,” a device that was also the calculation and 
programming unit of the CPC. Writing after the fact, IBM described the arrangement at 
ABC and the New York World-Telegram and Sun this way: 
 The IBM procedure was substantially the same at the ABC 
network’s headquarters and at the newspaper. IBM Card Punches 
converted ballots into notations on IBM Cards of the type widely used in 
business and industry. These cards were then used by IBM Accounting 
Machines to produce intermediate and final totals, and by the IBM 
Electronic Calculators to compute percentages of the total estimated vote 
in each race.  The installations at both the ABC headquarters and at the 
newspaper were manned by skilled IBM personnel.117 
This account went on to say that the IBM calculators were set up to compare returns from  
1952 with “pertinent totals” from previous elections. IBM’s after the fact accounts do not 
make clear precisely what equipment the company was making available in the other 
venues where it was playing a role in election-night reporting. 
It would not be a stretch to speculate that there may have been limited desire at 
IBM both before and after the election to call a great deal of public attention to the IBM 
technology to be employed. This electronic calculating equipment was already in wide 
use but could not compete for excitement with archrival Remington Rand’s state-of-the-
art UNIVAC, and IBM would not roll out its first true commercial computer, the “701,” 
until after the election. Whatever the reason, the use of IBM equipment of any sort on 
election night in 1952 has been under the radar in biographical, autobiographical, and 
                                                 




historical accounts of the company, its founders, and the evolution of its machines.118 
Where the election is mentioned in such works, the references are to the use of the 
UNIVAC and the perception of IBM’s leaders that Remington Rand had scored a public 
relations victory.119 
The approach at ABC is even more puzzling, at least on the surface. IBM 
electronic calculating equipment was to play a role at ABC, but as we have seen, 
messages put out by the network were decidedly negative about the idea of using 
technology to digest election returns. And yet IBM equipment was in the mix both at the 
ABC network’s Manhattan studio and in the newsroom of the New York World Telegram 
and Sun, where ABC’s local affiliate, WJZ-TV, would be broadcasting. Was there a lack 
of clarity in advance about what equipment would be used and how? Or was it sour 
grapes, with plans made to use IBM equipment upstaged shortly before the election by 
announcements from CBS and NBC about their more cutting-edge machines? Or was 
there a difference of opinion at the network? As noted earlier, there was a brief reference 
in passing on a radio talk show the day after the election during a discussion of the use of 
electronic brains the night before. The speaker was Dorothy Kilgallen, a newspaper 
columnist who co-hosted the daily radio show with her husband, Dick Kollmar, and also 
served as a regular panelist on What’s My Line?  That CBS television entertainment 
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program was hosted by John Daly during the same period when Daly was a newsman on 
ABC television and radio, and he was featured prominently in ABC’s 1952 election-night 
broadcasting. It is unlikely that Kilgallen would have confused him with someone else. 
Here is what she said, according to a transcript: 
… I know that the network John Daly was on was supposed to 
have one because the first I heard of this he was talking about it and he 
was rather puzzled in advance about what this was going to accomplish 
and I think I told you the story about him – after a 20 minute briefing on 
this by a gentleman at his network who knew all about it he said, “But 
now, when you get all through, what does it do?” And he said, “Well, it’s 
going to figure out” – he said the machine was going to figure out by what 
percentage the person who is leading is leading. And John made the 
classic remark, “But I was figuring to do that in my head.” 
Well, I don’t know how he made out because I didn’t actually see a 
photograph of the Univac or – I’ll never know what that is called on the 
channel were he was.”120 
In a book published in 1954, New York Daily News television critic Ben Gross recounted 
the scene on election night 1952 at the Manhattan studios of the three networks, speaking 
of “electronic brains” at NBC and CBS but an “entirely different atmosphere” at ABC, 
where “it was strictly business,” with “no magical machines.” He does not mention the 
IBM equipment used in connection with the ABC broadcast. He does quote John Daly as 
saying: “The old-fashioned pencil and paper, plus political know-how, are still the best 
equipment of the political pundit.”121 Gross’s source is not cited, but the sentiment 
attributed to Daly is consistent with one that appears in a letter Daly wrote in 1956. It 
suggests that he remained unconvinced the computer was an appropriate journalistic tool 
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for election night. In that letter to the same John T. Madigan who had been in charge of 
ABC’s 1952 election-night broadcast, Daly noted – in 1956 – that to remain competitive 
on election night, “it would appear that I must concentrate on machinery and not 
reporting.. It’s a hell of a way to do business.”122  
But if IBM and ABC weren’t going out of the way to call attention to their mutual 
involvement on election night in 1952, and if the top figures at ABC television news were 
not fans of “electronic brains” or similar devices, at least two newspapers using IBM 
equipment would tout it as an enhancement to their own election-night plans.  In its 
version of the traditional “story of the story” – headlined “The Courant Prepares for 
Operation Election” – the Hartford Courant described the efforts that had been underway 
for weeks to collect “statistics of past elections and other background data.”123 In 
describing how the paper would handle all the returns pouring in from across the state 
and process them quickly, the story gave a nod to help from a machine “obtained” from 
IBM: “large mechanical-brains which by the push of a button can give an up-to-date 
mathematical picture of all election returns in the state in about two minutes.”124  The 
precise type of equipment was not specified in the story. A photo – appearing above the 
caption “MECHANCIAL BRAINS help, too” – shows a woman tending to a device that 
appears to be an IBM accounting machine of the type produced in the late 1940s as an 
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improvement to earlier models. 125  Such electric machines processed data on punched 
cards based on instructions wired into a control panel, and they could produce printed 
summary reports. The accounting machine was not a computer, but it was worth touting 
nonetheless as the latest addition to the newspaper’s election-night number-crunching 
arsenal. 
While the Courant itself would not be broadcasting on election night, it could 
expect that its ability to call the fate of Connecticut’s electoral votes quickly would be 
reported by the Associated Press – a dispatch which, in turn, might be reported to 
national radio and television audiences and attributed to the newspaper. That, in fact, 
turned out to be the case, as the paper presciently predicted that the use of voting 
machines throughout Connecticut would likely enable the state to be the first with 
complete returns. “Because of that,” the Courant’s story reported, “the eyes of political 
leaders and political experts all over the country will be focused here as they look for 
trends.”126  There would be the chance for prestige in being on top of those trends – at 
least in the eyes of the Courant – and the IBM equipment could help, both in speeding 
                                                 
125 A story that ran after the election referred to the “special IBM tabulator” used by “The Courant’s team 
of election experts.” “The Dispatch That Heralded Ike’s Landslide,” Hartford Courant, Nov. 9, 1952, 18. 
The photograph that accompanied the pre-election story resembled one of a sequence of IBM accounting 
machines of the models 402, 403, or 419. When combined with several other pieces of equipment, such 
accounting machines served as one component of the Card-Programmed Electronic Calculator. Sources for 
photographs and descriptions of IBM equipment of that era include: Frank da Cruz, “Columbia University 
Computing History: A Chronology of Computing at Columbia University,” Columbia University, 
http://www.columbia.edu/acis/history/;  IBM Archives, online at http://www-
03.ibm.com/ibm/history/index.html; and Bashe et al., IBM’s Early Computers. 




the tabulation of returns and in the message it conveyed about the newspaper’s cleverness 
in using special technology to get the job done.127 
The New York World Telegram and Sun did even more to call attention to its 
planned election-night use of “super-speed IBM electronic calculators and accounting 
machines.” 128  At first, IBM was absent from the newspaper’s promotion of its plans to 
collaborate with the ABC station, when readers were told on Oct. 22 that “Newspaper 
and TV will link their great crafts in the city room of the World-Telegram and Sun on 
election night.”129 WJZ-TV, it was promised, would bring “its TV audience directly to 
the W-T&S city desk, the heart of a newspaper’s world.”130 But nine days later, on Oct. 
31, a story about the election-night plans featured a breathless account of the IBM role, 
including photos, under the headline, “Lightning-Fast IBM Devices to Help Speed W-
T&S Televised Vote Count.”131 IBM was providing a “battery of IBM equipment of the 
latest design,” all of which would be operated by “trained personnel” from IBM.132 There 
would be a card-punch machine for entering data, an accounting machine that could spit 
out tables at the rate of 150 lines per minute, and an electronic calculator that was said to 
be capable of performing 6,000 calculations per minute. Reports “whipped out” by these 
                                                 
127 The Courant would boast about this after the election in a story about its conclusion, less than an hour 
after the polls closed, that Eisenhower had taken Connecticut: “The Dispatch That Heralded Ike’s 
Landslide,” Hartford Courant, Nov. 9, 1952, 18. 
128 “Lightning-Fast IBM Devices to Help Speed W-T&S Televised Vote Count,” New York World-
Telegram and Sun, Oct. 31, 1952, 25. 
129 William Michelfelder, “W-T&S and Video to Team in All-Night Election Coverage,” New York World-
Telegram and Sun, Oct. 22, 1952, 27. 
130 Ibid. 
131 “Lightning-Fast IBM Devices to Help Speed W-T&S Televised Vote Count,” New York World-





wondrous devices would be handed off for analysis to the newspaper’s “trained political 
observers and reporters,” focusing on the tri-state area, presumably New York, New 
Jersey, and Connecticut.133 The IBM equipment would also help provide comparisons of 
the night’s returns to the 1948 vote. Newsroom activity in the “election drama” was to be 
shared twice each hour with viewers watching the ABC television network.134 
One of the photos, of a young woman tending to IBM equipment and smiling 
brightly at the camera, has the look of the kind of image that might have been provided 
by the company.  But in other ways large and small, IBM missed opportunities for 
advance publicity. One example was a Los Angeles Times account of television 
broadcasting that would be available to local election-night audiences. Writing of 
coverage originating out of the NBC’s new West Coast studios in Burbank, the Times 
wrote that “Lockheed’s giant electronic computing machines will be used for lightning-
fast calculations,” but with no mention of machines’ maker, IBM.135 And on the same 
day that the New York World-Telegram and Sun gave IBM a plug for its upcoming role in 
the city room, a separate column by television writer Harriet Van Horne mentioned the 
Monrobot and UNIVAC but made no mention of the IBM equipment to be used at ABC, 
reporting instead on that network’s dismissal of its competitors’ plans for such electronic 
devices.136  
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Mixed Response: The Case of Bill Henry 
While the NBC public-relations apparatus was positioning the Monrobot in 
exclusively laudatory tones, more revealing of a mixed reception among working 
journalists was a column that ran on election day in the Los Angeles Times.137 The writer 
was the 1952 version of a multimedia reporter – one who would, in fact, also be 
anchoring the NBC television broadcast on election night. The author, Bill Henry, had 
been a Los Angeles Times fixture for 40 years by that point – as a reporter, editor, foreign 
correspondent, and, since 1939, daily columnist.138  He found time to work in other media 
along the way. For 29 of those years he had been a radio reporter and commentator. 
When the political conventions rolled around in the summer of 1952, with the two major 
parties both gathering in Chicago, NBC chose Henry to play a pivotal role, including 
anchoring its television coverage.139 He was comfortable broadcasting live.  He had an 
easy manner and quick wit that won him fans, no matter the medium.  And on election 
night, he would be at Rockefeller Center in New York anchoring the NBC television 
broadcast.  So in his election-day column, he could reveal what he knew of NBC’s plans 
for the Monrobot.  He referred to both the Monrobot and UNIVAC by a host of colorful 
monikers. “Computer” was not one of them.  His more irreverent references – including 
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“fearsome contraptions” and, for the Monrobot, “mechanical monster” – suggest he had 
not completely signed on to NBC’s vision for the Monrobot.  Well, he had not signed on 
to glorify the Monrobot.  But judging from his column, he understood perfectly well that 
grinding through a mass of numbers was not the Monrobot’s only value to the network on 
election night. 
After telling his readers he was hopeful that the election would terminate “the 
disgraceful mudslinging that has characterized this campaign,” Henry turned his attention 
to the business of reporting returns on television – that is, to the story of the story.  He set 
up his column as a contrast of old and new.  Those who had “lived long enough to be able 
to remember the preradio days when you eagerly awaited the shouts of the newsboys to 
buy an extra or waited for the wailing sound of The Times’ siren to cryptically tell you of 
the final outcome you’ll appreciate this TV election service all the more.” 140 Radio here 
was also cast as harking back to a simpler time, when results could be read over the air, 
while television brought its purveyors a new set of challenges. Election-night reporting 
called for innovations. And the most “startling” of these, wrote Henry, “will be the 
official debut of the mechanical brain.”141  In the keep of “some sort of human genius,” 
the networks’ “fearsome contraptions” were to figure results and spot trends faster than a 
human could.142 
Henry played off the image of the machine against NBC’s venerated political 
commentator, H.V. Kaltenborn, and left no doubt that the notorious election-night gaffs 
of 1948 were still a fresh memory, not only at the network but among readers.   And if 
                                                 






the machine had been anthropomorphized to be regarded as a “mechanical brain,” the 
comparison was also useful, in Henry’s telling, by turning it around: The machine was 
“to take the place of the human calculator, like H.V. Kaltenborn for instance, who gazed 
fixedly at figures, charts and maps and kept right on insisting up to the last minute in 
1948 that Harry Truman had been beaten and Tom Dewey had been elected.” Henry went 
on to remind readers that “no less a personage” than Truman later mimicked Kaltenborn 
over the episode – adding to Kaltenborn’s celebrity.143  So now, said Henry, the “great 
minds of the television business” had come up with the plan to use the mechanical brain – 
“to do what Kaltenborn did, only it is supposed to guess right where Kaltenborn guessed 
wrong.  And who knows?”  Henry went on with the comparison, saying that while the 
NBC machine is named Monrobot, “the NBC boys think their machine should really be 
christened Nrobnetlak (Kaltenborn spelled backward) in honor of the dean of radio 
analysts.”144  Henry described the Monrobot methodology by giving an example of 
“Zilch County, California.” Returns from election night in 1952 and the data for the same 
county from 1948 would be fed into the machine.  Then “the bright little collection of 
tubes and wires will whirr for a while and then come up with a prediction…”145  But, said 
Henry, “the darn thing doesn’t ‘think’ – as some people choose to believe – it merely 
                                                 
143 At the dinner of presidential electors in January 1949, Truman’s mimicking of Kaltenborn’s tenacity in 
holding to a Dewey victory prediction on election night was deemed a highlight of the event; Robert G. 
Dixon, Jr.,  “Electoral College Procedure,” The Western Political Quarterly 3, no. 2 (June 1950): 220. 
Kaltenborn also mentioned it in his autobiography, Fifty Fabulous Years, 297. 





calculates.”146 After confessing that “most reporters can’t add 2 and 2,” he writes that the 
Monrobot and UNIVAC should be an improvement.147 
Henry concluded with another mixed message. He was interested, to be sure, but 
ambiguously so: “Most of us who will be grappling with the election problem over at 
NBC, with the assistance of Monrobot, are viewing the activities of the mechanical 
monster with considerable interest.”148 Noting that Morgan Beatty – a correspondent 
whose name would have been familiar to radio and television audiences – was to be 
“nursemaid or interpreter” for the Monrobot, Henry wrote that most who know Beatty 
“would bet on him against any calculating machine extant.”149 And as for Kaltenborn, if 
the Monrobot were to come up “showing Maine going for the Democrats” – which 
readers would have also recognized as an outlandish notion – “we all expect,” Henry 
wrote, “to see H.V. Kaltenborn go after it with a screw driver and a pair of pliers, or 
maybe with a sledge hammer.”150 
Henry’s contemplation of the entry of a computer into his world of journalism 
seems to have left him bemused as much as anything else – not accepting of it, but not 
absolutely dismissive, either.  With humor as his approach, he had framed the computer 
both as a potential aid – for those journalists with no affinity for mathematics – and as a 
potential competitor. And it was clear that he would need to be convinced that a machine 
could outperform a star reporter. While his column did not explicitly articulate just why 









he was amused over the idea of a computer doing election-night work previously thought 
to be the sole purview of humans, he implicitly raised and began to answer the question 
of just what it was that human journalists were good for: providing assessment, meaning, 
and context for whatever it was that the machine might put out. Henry’s amusement 
would be visible on election night – as would his return to this issue.  
On the Television Beat: Reporters Respond 
Bill Henry’s portrayal of the computer in his Los Angeles Times column meshed 
with what a number of print reporters and columnists who covered television wrote as 
they surveyed what the networks would be offering on election night.  Readers were told 
to expect a contest – not just between the candidates or the networks or different types of 
media, but between humans and their mechanical devices.  And that meant addressing the 
question of whether computers would be doing the work of journalists.  Associated Press 
writer Wayne Oliver began his story this way: “It will be men versus machines on radio 
and television election night to see who can pick out trends and forecast the winners most 
accurately on the basis of early returns.” 151  He introduced the computers first – 
UNIVAC and Monrobot – and then the “human contingent.” Oliver explained the 
methodology of the “electronic robot brains” – early returns on election night compared 
to early returns from prior elections. And then this: 
The big calculating machines, however, cannot think but can do only 
what they are told to do.  Their forecasts will be mathematically correct on 
the basis of the data they have been given and [the] way they’ve been 
                                                 
151 Wayne Oliver, Associated Press, “Robots on Video:  Man vs. Machine On Election Night,” Washington 
Post, Oct. 29, 1952, 35.  The story apparently moved on the wire several days earlier; a version with no 
byline and an Oct. 25 dateline appeared as “Men, Machines Will Relay Ballot Tallies” in the Los Angeles 




instructed to use it.  They can be way off base if late returns develop 
unforeseen trends. 
So both CBS and NBC will have all the tried and proved methods in 
full operation, with Univac and Monrobot merely in the role of 
helpers.”152 
Larry Wolters, television critic for the Chicago Daily Tribune, closely echoed the same 
themes in his “Television News and Views” column, though with more dramatic 
embellishments.  His Oct. 27 piece began this way: 
It will be man vs monsters [electronic] on television and radio on election 
night. The TV networks apparently are convinced that robots can pick out 
trends and foresee the winners more accurately than ordinary mortals.  At 
any rate, they are talking more about their fantastic machines and 
gimmicks than they are about such old reliables as H.V. Kaltenborn, Gabe 
Heatter, Fulton Lewis, and Lowell Thomas.”153 
In addition to telling his readers of the UNIVAC and Monrobot, Wolters wrote that there 
would be “something frankly called the Monster over at ABC,” with no further 
clarification.154 Like Oliver, Wolters noted that “these robots will not think for the 
reporters, or for you.”155 And while the devices  “can make calculations and analyses in a 
few seconds that would take even the Quiz Kids hours to do,” he wrote, “the forecasts 
will be mechanically correct based on the data they have been fed.” 156 Whether Wolters 
had spotted the AP story or whether he and Oliver had access to the same news releases 
from the networks, he went beyond both with his own prediction that would not have 
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been in the networks’ preferred script.  “Probably,” he wrote of the computers, “they’ll be 
just as fallible as the straw votes and polls of other years.” 157 
A week later, on the day before the election, Wolters took one more run at the 
subject.158  He suggested that network executives were promising something of a 
spectacle and “predicting that more people will stay up all night Tuesday night than on 
any night in American history.” 159  And while as many as 50 million television viewers 
might have their eyes “glued on the one-eyed monster,” he wrote in a reference to a 
nickname for the television screen, they could expect to see the “electronic monsters all 
tuned up to spew forth trends, foresee winners, and count votes faster and more 
accurately than ordinary mortals.” 160  CBS, he wrote, would be “pulling the wraps off a 
computing machine called Univac,” and “NBC-TV has a mechanical reporter called 
Monrobot warming up in the back room.” 161  This time there were no fine distinctions 
about the machines not replacing humans, as Wolters had felt compelled to point out 
earlier. But that framework was not completely absent, as he reported this time that “the 
networks will have available not only machines, but men – more men than every before 
to report the election story.”162 
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Not all who wrote about the upcoming employment of computers on election 
night felt compelled to work in any digs or humor in that man-vs.-machine vein.163 Some 
whose stories included a straight account of planned election-night computer use 
appeared content to rely primarily or solely on press releases for that part of their 
reporting.  One such story was an item of several hundred words that appeared in the 
Nov. 1 issue of the trade magazine Editor & Publisher. Taken verbatim from the CBS 
release issued on Oct. 14, the E&P item described the UNIVAC and its planned use in 
wondrous terms and included just one original element, the headline:  “Electronic ‘Brain’ 
Will Turn Election Reporter.”164 
Behind the Scenes: UNIVAC and CBS 
While CBS was publicizing its election-night plans in wondrous terms, the work 
behind the scenes at the Eckert-Mauchly plant in Philadelphia was becoming ever more 
intense and drawing in more and more people to make sure that the UNIVAC would have 
a workable methodology to employ on election night.165 Several reports, speeches, 
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articles, and memoirs produced later by the participants paint a picture of a collective, 
pioneering attempt under deadline pressures to bring quantitative precision to an old 
election-night habit of reading meaning into early returns.  
What was not envisioned at first was just how challenging that would be. There 
would need to be a theory – with mathematical, political, geographical, and historical 
aspects – for extrapolating from early returns in one part of a state that might not be 
representative of the state as a whole, and for extrapolating from some parts of the 
country when others had not yet begun to count votes. This theory would need to be 
expressed as a mathematical model. The model would need to be translated into a 
computer program. The program would need to make use of a variety of data gathered in 
advance about voting history if there were to be comparisons made to the past.  There 
would need to be a means for gathering data in real time on election night, transmitting it 
to Philadelphia, coding it into machine-readable form, loading it onto reels of magnetic 
tape, and feeding that data into the computer – paying attention, all the while, to 
possibilities for errors. There would need to be a backup plan in case of a breakdown by 
the particular UNIVAC designated for the analysis, one of several then in various stages 
of completion and operation at the Philadelphia factory. And there would need to be a 
means of producing comprehensible output and transmitting it to CBS in New York for 
reports to the viewing audience. 
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Remington Rand’s Arthur Draper, in a post-mortem presentation prepared for an 
engineering association meeting in January 1953, wrote that the work had begun with 
confidence about being able to solve the problem of election prediction. “We very 
blithely assumed,” he wrote, “that such a calculation was possible and we were sure that 
UNIVAC would be able to handle anything that we could dream up.”166 But that 
confidence within the UNIVAC camp would be tested: 
As time began to run out, we realized that the problem was getting bigger 
and bigger, and we called in a Dr. Woodbury, who is Associate Professor 
of Statistics at the University of Pennsylvania, to work with Dr. Mitchell, 
who is the head of our UNIVAC Applications Department. We began to 
realize at this time that there was not even a vague formula for prediction 
that could be applied, and our mathematical group with Dr. Woodbury set 
out to develop a theory and put this into practical mathematics. This was 
an exceedingly complicated job in almost a brand new field.167 
Even as Woodbury came aboard, there was not yet a full appreciation of the work that lay 
ahead. In a report that Woodbury and Mitchell coauthored just after the election, they 
wrote: “Our first and most serious mistake was to underestimate the magnitude of the 
job.”168 Woodbury, they wrote, was “engaged on Oct. 7 ‘for a few days’ ” to work out the 
statistics to be used. 169 But the work would mushroom – including work using old-
fashioned, hand-operated machines for calculations – beyond anyone’s expectations: 
[Woodbury] asked for a small amount of manual investigation of our data 
and went to work. By October 28, he was using a corps of 8 comptometer 
operators on a 60-hour week. He investigated and was forced to discard 
for lack of sufficient data several promising approaches, and finally, eight 
days before election, completed his set of formulae. Meanwhile, the 
programming group had been busy. From a part-time assignment of two 
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programmers, the group grew to over 6, each putting in from 90 to 120 
hours during that final hectic week. 170 
Two of the programmers singled out for special credit in the report – Margery K. League 
and Hildegard Nidecker – were themselves pioneers in that field whose work with Eckert 
and Mauchly on the UNIVAC predated the Remington Rand acquisition. So, too, had the 
programmer in charge of the work, Stephen E. Wright, another World War II veteran 
who had studied with Howard Aiken at the Harvard Computation Laboratory. Wright 
recalls that he and others ended up essentially moving into the factory at the end, sleeping 
on cots so that they could be available in early morning hours to test out one program 
after another had finished running.171 
The formulas that were finally devised for election night are explained in several 
post-election documents.172 The most detailed of these is Woodbury and Mitchell’s post-
election report, which also appears to have been a source for other accounts. It contains a 
list of more than three dozen equations, explanations of the variables used, and the 
rationale for their approach. Data was gathered in advance for comparative purposes, 
including what was described as “detailed state data for 1944 and 1948, showing at 
hourly intervals the reported returns for each candidate and the percent of precincts 
reported.”173 This was provided by CBS, which also provided “the number of precincts in 
each state and metropolitan county.”174 The UNIVAC team also had a copy of a political 
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almanac put out by Gallup, which contained historical election data – presumably the 
source of state level data for presidential elections back to 1928 that was also used in the 
calculations. The goal was both to produce state-level predictions and to use these in 
generating an aggregate national prediction of likely electoral vote, popular vote, and 
total vote. Predictions would include specific numbers, but these would be associated 
with estimates of their probabilities of being correct. For eight states deemed “non-
homogenous” – based on the “known fact that metropolitan districts are often politically 
divergent from the more rural portions of a State” – separate calculations were made for 
key metropolitan counties or cities and for the balance of the state.175 
There were two basic approaches to generating predictions. One involved 
combining the expected vote from past elections with the vote coming in on Nov. 4, and 
giving greater weight to the current vote as the night went on. The other was an answer to 
a particular election-night problem – and one that would in later years spark controversy 
– which was how to generate national predictions at a point in the evening when many 
states had not begun counting votes, or even finished voting. A member of the CBS camp 
– Sidney Alexander, who had recently been appointed by CBS as an economic advisor – 
was credited with devising a solution. Incoming data on election night from available 
states would be used to calculate any swing away from the expected vote based 
extrapolating from the trend in past elections.  This would provide a factor that could be 
applied to states which had not yet voted to estimate their potential swing away from 
previous trends.  
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As good as the formulas might be and as clever as the programs using them might 
be, there was also awareness that the simplest data entry errors could compromise the 
entire methodology. In fact, wrote Mitchell and Woodbury, with many people involved in 
the data transfer process, “it was a foregone conclusion that erroneous data would appear 
in our input.”176 A system was put in place so that vote counts coming in by teletype from 
CBS on election night to Philadelphia would be inspected and then entered in triplicate 
from keyboard operators onto magnetic tape. The three sets of returns were then 
compared to make sure they agreed.  In addition, even where the three sets might agree, 
the data were screened for “reasonableness.”177 These checks were meant to make sure 
that the total number of precincts with reported votes on election night did not exceed the 
actual number of precincts in an area, and that the total number of votes per precinct was 
not outside upper or lower limits expected based on past elections. In addition, there were 
checks made to ensure that the vote coming in for a particular area was not less than the 
vote for the same area reported earlier in the night. 
While the UNIVAC team in Philadelphia had been concentrating on what the 
UNIVAC would do, those organizing the CBS election-night broadcast in New York 
were focusing on how the UNIVAC would look.  On Oct. 28, CBS issued a release that 
included a feature on the network’s election-night set which had not been mentioned 
when the UNIVAC plan was announced two weeks earlier: 
                                                 





In one corner of the studio will be the New York unit of UNIVAC, 
the giant automatic computer that will make running analyses and trend 
predictions at instantaneous speeds periodically during the night. 178   
Left out of this release was the fact that the UNIVAC doing all this work would be in 
Philadelphia and would be seen on election night periodically from there. What viewers 
would end up seeing in the New York studio would turn out to be an operator’s console – 
the part of the computer known as a “supervisory control panel” that had been described 
in news stories as “somewhat like the console for a pipe organ.” 179 It was not hooked up 
to a computer. But on election night, the audience would see its banks of lights blinking 
on and off as if it were running a program, with newsman Charles Collingwood stationed 
in front of it. In an account written years later, Herman Lukoff, who had responsibility for 
the computer’s physical functioning in Philadelphia on election night, gave this 
explanation of how that so-called “New York unit” came to be as plans for the broadcast 
developed: 
CBS … wanted to have a dummy supervisory control panel located at its 
New York headquarters for use as a backdrop while reporting between the 
hourly Philadelphia TV pickups. A supervisory control panel for one of 
the next systems was commandeered for the cause. However, someone 
thought it would look better of the lights flashed on the panel rather than 
just having it sit there looking stupid. The technicians quickly wired up a 
group of incandescent bulbs to Christmas tree light flashers, then off to 
CBS headquarters in New York went the supervisory control panel. 180 
Though not explicitly stated as a goal in this account – which, like other accounts from 
the UNIVAC and CBS camps, includes no mention of NBC and the Monrobot – the net 
                                                 
178 “Specially Designed and Constructed Visual Aids Will Make It Easier for CBS-TV Audiences to Follow 
Election Night Returns,” press release, CBS, Oct. 28, 1952, CBS-AS. 
179 Associated Press, “UniVac, Electronic Robot, Fattened for Election Duty,” Hartford Courant, Oct. 15, 
1952, 21B; and “CBS to Use Electronic Robot to Forecast Election Results,” Philadelphia Evening 
Bulletin, Oct. 15, 1952, 9. 




effect was that now there would be not only analytical but visual competition between the 
two computer-reporting efforts.   
Behind the Scenes: Monrobot and NBC 
In a head-to-head matchup, the UNIVAC would be expected come out ahead of 
the Monrobot in almost every way. But there was one eminently visible exception: the 
Monrobot, at a fraction of the weight of the UNIVAC, and about the dimensions of an 
office desk, could be moved. It was one of the features of the Monrobot that NBC 
highlighted in its advance publicity: the Monrobot would be installed right on the NBC 
election-night set in Studio 8-H.  But Richard LaManna recalls that this plan turned out to 
be fraught with difficulties before election day ever arrived.181 
The Monrobot was designed in such a way that its computation elements – tubes, 
circuits, magnetic drum memory, and other parts – fit inside a metal unit the shape of a 
desk. Many tubes and circuits were mounted on a surface that flipped up like a lid to 
expose other components beneath. The Monrobot was still under development, said 
LaManna, so work on it had been done with the machine open. In order to truck it from 
New Jersey to Manhattan, the Monrobot did not need to be disassembled, but it did need 
to be closed – the surface with the tubes had to be flipped down into a horizontal position, 
on top of which, said LaManna, the design included a desktop made of glass so that it 
would be possible to view the tubes through it. On top of the glass it was also possible to 
put in place a real desk top, completing the office-furniture look that the Monrobot was 
intended to have. 
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When the Monrobot arrived at Rockefeller Center and was moved up to the studio 
and powered up, the team from Monroe discovered, the hard way, that there was a serious 
problem.  When the Monrobot had been closed up, small bits of solder fell into the 
interior of the computer and ended up doing damage to the computer’s magnetic drum. 
LaManna recalls spending hours bent over the Monrobot’s frame, working with a tool 
like a dentist’s pick to remove small bits of debris from the drum. The Monrobot’s 
keepers were able to get it running, but without all the functionality that was intended. 
For the election-night broadcast, there would not be a need to close up the 
computer again. A design that was intended to make the Monrobot fit seamlessly into a 
business office was not its strong suit when it came to election-night showmanship. The 
computer would run with the lid open, intentionally, and with its electronic components 
exposed and visible. “That’s what they wanted,” said LaManna. “They wanted the jazz. 
They didn’t want it to look like a desk.”182 
The Monrobot’s pre-election difficulties notwithstanding, LaManna said that the 
computer became a curiosity at Studio 8-H in the few days it was there up to Nov. 4. 
Celebrities would come by to have a look. “It was a curiosity,” he said, “like … a freak in 
a sideshow.”183 And NBC broadcast engineers who had some knowledge of electronics 
would come by, too, peppering him and his colleagues with questions. 
LaManna’s own role was to look after the physical operation of the Monrobot, 
and he was not involved in developing the methodology to be used in analyzing the 
returns. Just what that was is not clear from records or the recollections of others.  This 






methodology may have been intended to make comparisons of partial vote counts to 
results from the past. There are references in NBC’s Oct. 16 and Oct. 30 press releases to 
data from 1948 having been stored in the computer’s memory. The approach may have 
also been less ambitious, designed to work more from the incoming vote and to make 
sure that in states with urban and outlying areas of different political complexions, both 
were taken into account.184 But, said LaManna, with the computer operating in a 
somewhat diminished capacity, the backup plan included calculations that might be done 
by hand. And the ace in the hole would be the political expertise of Morgan Beatty, the 
NBC newsman who was assigned to aid in planning the election-night analysis and then 
to report on and provide context for the Monrobot’s output on Nov. 4. 
Such expertise, however, was in itself no guarantee of success for assessing in 
real time the incoming vote in an election with its own unique set of circumstances. As 
had been the case for decades, election night was a chance for journalists to shine, but it 
also carried risks. And journalists were not the only ones at risk of having reputations 
sullied by problematic prognostication. Pollsters had not only their reputations but their 
livelihoods at stake on election night, and their awareness of that – and the way that 
awareness colored the presentation of their final polls – would, in turn, have the capacity 
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to color election-night assessments by various players of the meaning of the vote as it 
came in. 
The Final Polls and the Memories of 1948: Prognostication and Risk 
By 1952 there was already a well-established history of pre-election polls both 
coloring election-night assessment of the returns and coming back to haunt not only the 
reporters but the poll-takers.  Some of these events are legendary in journalism history. 
These include the Literary Digest debacle of 1936, with its large but unscientific straw 
poll, and the embarrassment faced in 1948 by both the new breed of scientific pollsters 
and the journalists whose reading of the returns had been colored by their poll-influenced 
expectations.185 As pollsters and social scientists labored to understand what went wrong 
in 1948 and restore a measure of credibility and public confidence in the survey process, 
collaborative studies were undertaken, books were written, and individual analysts took a 
close look at their methods and assumptions.  But even with all of that attention, one 
wildcard in the fall of 1952 was the number of survey respondents who were not yet 
ready to indicate a preference.  This prompted an open question about how pollsters 
should apportion that slice of the electorate. There were differences, too, in explaining 
what appeared to be a shift in voter sentiment for the presidency away from the party of 
Harry Truman and toward Eisenhower.  Pollsters tried to understand whether there was a 
core of independent voters who might go one way or the other from election to election, 
or if something else was at work.  One of these was Samuel Lubell, a public opinion 
analyst who specialized in the intensive study of detailed voting data combined with 
                                                 




extensive door-to-door interviewing in key precincts across the United States.  After four 
months of a “grass roots” tour, Lubell reported that he saw something more than just 
independent voters at work in the political landscape’s critical middle ground:  “sizable 
defections” of Democrats who had previously voted for Truman and Roosevelt.186  In his 
column for the Scripps-Howard newspapers eight days before the election, Lubell 
concluded that there were enough of these defections to swing the contest to Eisenhower.  
But his report was not completely confident.  On the one hand, a “possible freak of the 
Electoral College” could give Stevenson more electoral votes even if Eisenhower took a 
majority of the popular vote.187  On the other hand, there was a plausible scenario by 
which Eisenhower could win in a landslide and yield up “an electoral alignment unlike 
any in modern times.”188 
The final polls that turned up in newspapers on Nov. 4 were Gallup’s, made 
available to nonsubscribers for publication that day.  The poll was so non-committal that 
an Associated Press story about it appeared on front pages of newspapers around the 
country with completely divergent headlines.  In Bismarck, North Dakota:  “Gallup Says 
Ike Has Edge.”189  In Brainerd, Minnesota: “Stevenson May Hold Lead—Gallup.”190 And 
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in Fayetteville, Arkansas:  “Gallup Poll Notes Possibility of 50-50 Popular Vote.”191   
The story said this:  
 The Gallup Poll, last of the nation’s major political pulse-takers to 
make known its final 1952 presidential election forecast, gives Gen. 
Dwight D. Eisenhower a slight lead, but says Gov. Adlai E. Stevenson was 
gaining so steadily he might be ahead by today. 
The Gallup Poll, which was made available for use by non-
subscribers today, even saw the possibility of a 50-50 split of the popular 
vote.192 
Gallup went on to say:  “The electoral vote, which will decide the winner, 
depends upon four key states:  New York, Illinois, Ohio and California – where latest 
figures show the candidates running virtually even.”193 While Gallup gave 47 percent of 
likely voters to Eisenhower and 40 percent to Stevenson, a whopping 13 percent were 
identified in the poll as undecided. The Associated Press went on to note that three other 
polls released the day before the election – the Crossley Poll, the Elmo Roper Poll and 
Samuel Lubell’s analysis for the Scripps-Howard newspaper chain – gave Eisenhower 
the advantage, but not enough of one to prompt a prediction of an Eisenhower victory.   
A United Press story said pollsters were calling for a “photo-finish.”194 
The Princeton Research Service reported on election day that its final poll, 
completed the Sunday before the election, gave Eisenhower 50.8 percent of the popular 
vote and Stevenson 48.8.  The polling operation had detected a late swing toward 
Eisenhower.  But even here, a lack of certainty reigned.  In a paragraph noting that 
                                                 
191 Associated Press, “Gallup Poll Notes Possibility of 50-50 Popular Vote,” Northwest Arkansas Times, 
Fayetteville, Nov. 4, 1952, 1. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Ibid. 
194 See, for example, United Press, “Samplers of Public Opinion See Photo-Finish for U.S. White House,” 




margins of error had “averaged slightly less than three percentage points since our 
operations began in 1947” – which would seem to point, in this case, to a statistical dead 
heat between the two major party candidates – the article concluded, ambiguously: “We 
never have failed to indicate a winner, and never have been wrong.”195 
Unscientific straw polls of all sorts abounded, too. They were treated as 
curiosities, to be sure, but they were also testimony, if nothing else, to an intense and 
longstanding interest in reading the signs before an election, just as had been done with 
the counting of toasts to the presidential candidates back in 1824.196  In 1952 there was a 
“cigarette poll.”  The Louisville Tobacco Blending Corp. marketed cigarettes with 
competing presidential labels, one that said “I Like Ike” – precisely 26,731,740 were 
reported sold – and the other that said “Stevenson for President,” coming in second at 
23,531,600.197  There was a nationwide barbershop poll – it favored Stevenson by a few 
points – and a feed-sack poll among patrons of farm supply stores in the Midwest, 
favoring Eisenhower by a few points.198 There were two surveys of more than 2,000 
newspaper editors and political correspondents, carried out and reported by the 
Associated Press, about voter sentiment in their areas.199 Editor & Publisher magazine 
surveyed newspapers about their own editorial positions. Two-thirds favored Eisenhower, 
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and of the rest, more had made no endorsements than had backed Stevenson.200 And not 
to be left out, bookies in Nevada found that their own predictions – in the form of betting 
odds – were reported as a news item by the Associated Press on election day.  The odds 
favored Eisenhower, but Stevenson bets were said to be were “pouring in.”201 
Ahead of the election, pollsters came in for a ribbing for what some newspaper 
editors and reporters took to be timidity linked to the missteps of 1948.   “Straws in the 
Wind Hit Dead Center,” was the headline in an editorial in the Press-Telegram of Long 
Beach, California.  It said:  
If the actual returns amount to an eyelash decision, our Mr. 
Roper, Dr. Gallup and Mr. Field of the California Poll can settle 
back and take a bow. 
But if the majority turns out to be fairly substantial either 
way, we would hate to have to answer the mail of any of these 
gentlemen or most of their rivals.202   
The Oneonta Star, in Oneonta, N.Y., put this headline on a front-page brief about the 
cautious pre-election polls – “U.S. Pollsters Remember 1948” – even though 1948 was 
neither mentioned nor alluded to in the article’s three paragraphs.203  A story by 
Associated Press reporter Arthur Edson was more direct: 
Usually at this late hour a favorite has been well established 
and the outcome confidently predicted. 
Not so this time.  Possibly because most of the opinion 
samplers went wrong four years ago, and possibly because this is a 
hard-to-figure election, the best guess is now: 
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It could go either way.204 
The Florence Morning News in South Carolina poked some fun at the pollsters, 
too, but not before setting a serious tone for the day with an unusual and striking front 
page.  Most of that page was left blank. Below the masthead, in the center of a sea of 
white, there was a single, 17-line item, one column in width, with a small headline that 
said, “BE SURE AND VOTE TODAY.” 205   It began, “We have always reserved the 
front page of this paper for the most important news of the day, and there is no more 
importance to every citizen today than to go to the polls and cast his VOTE.”206  What 
would otherwise have been the front page ran on page three, with two prominent stories 
including accounts of the non-committal pre-election polls.  But at the bottom of the 
page, in one more nod to the matter of polls and forecasts, was a photograph just as goofy 
as the front-page presentation was serious.  The picture showed the newspaper’s acting 
editor, Jack O’Dowd, wearing a turban, his hands around an ersatz crystal ball 
(apparently a goldfish bowl), and his face eerily lit from below.  “TELL ME, SWAMI,” 
began the caption that identified O’Dowd as “a man of little faith in polls and none at all 
in forecasts,” trying to “learn in advance how today’s presidential election will turn 
out.”207  
 No less a journalistic figure than Arthur Krock, the legendary Washington bureau 
chief of the New York Times, weighed in with a column about pollsters on the eve of the 
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election. He took to task the “professional vote-statisticians, who fear they can never 
again sell their wares if they go wrong again, as in 1948.”208  They were “hiding behind 
bomb-shelters,” Krock declared, and were “not taking even the smallest of chances this 
year.” 209 And yet Krock was not going out on a limb, either. He did note that his 
colleague, David Lawrence, was “courageously” willing to make a prediction without 
reservation – for Eisenhower. 210 Meanwhile, the Times’s own ambitious efforts to report 
in detail about how the voting might go concluded on the day before the election with the 
last of seven surveys carried out by its correspondents nationwide. The Times deemed the 
presidential contest to close to call.211   
The Culture of Demonstration and the Element of Risk 
If some reporters and commentators at the networks were less than thrilled about 
the inherent risk in employing a machine that might outperform them when it came to 
election-night analysis, those organizing the broadcasts had gone out of their way to put 
human-computer interaction at center stage – as a performance of sorts. The 
arrangements between CBS and the Remington Rand team, for example, called for 
Collingwood to interview the UNIVAC – or at last to make a show of interviewing the 
UNIVAC by asking it questions directly.212  While this would be an election-night 
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novelty, it was not an entirely new concept at the network.  The year before, in December 
1951, CBS newsman Edward R. Murrow had done a television news broadcast 
showcasing the Whirlwind computer at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
During this era when television broadcasters where working to establish their medium as 
a legitimate venue for news, Murrow’s weekly See It Now program had debuted in the 
fall of 1951 and was immediately hailed by New York Times critic Jack Gould as a 
“striking and compelling demonstration of the power of television as a journalistic 
tool.”213  Episodes included reviews of the news, the airing of documentary film, and live 
conversations between Murrow in New York and reporters or interview subjects 
elsewhere. In December 1951, less than a month after See It Now was launched, MIT’s 
Whirlwind generated headlines following an announcement that it had completed trial 
tests and was capable of handling some 20,000 operations a second – a computer fast 
enough, for the first time, to operate where “real time” data processing was necessary, as 
in air traffic control.214  A few days later, on the afternoon of Sunday, Dec. 16, the 
Whirlwind debuted for a television audience on See It Now.215  Murrow informed his 
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viewers that they were going to be taken to the MIT computer lab. He opened the 
segment with a note of wonder:  “These are the days,” he said, “of mechanical and 
electronic marvels.”216 But there was also a hint of ambivalence – expressed through 
tongue-in-cheek humor – along with a degree of self-consciousness about human-
computer interaction: “With considerable trepidation,” he continued, “we undertake to 
interview this new machine.”217   
While effecting a tone of spontaneity, the show was clearly a well-scripted affair.  
One of two small television monitors on the set brought the viewers to MIT, where the 
message “HELLO MR. MURROW” flashed repeatedly in points of light, like a movie 
theater marquis, on the video screen of an oscilloscope.218  This, in fact, was one of the 
innovative features of the Whirlwind – the capacity to display its output graphically as 
text and images on a screen.219  Jay Forrester, director of MIT’s digital computer lab, 
gave a tour and then asked Murrow, “Would you like to try to use the machine?”220 Back 
in New York, Murrow replied that he thought they should switch down to the Pentagon, 
given the roll of the Office of Naval Research in the Whirlwind project. On a second 
monitor appeared Admiral Calvin M. Bolster, the head of naval research. He offered up a 
question for Whirlwind about the fuel consumption and speed of an 11,000-pound Viking 
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rocket.  The computer set to work.  Its oscilloscope displayed a pair of bar graphs 
representing changes in fuel use and speed while a sequence of dots on the screen traced 
out a parabolic rocket trajectory.  Forrester narrated and the admiral approved, but 
Murrow played the Luddite: “I’m just a middle man here,” he said with a chuckle. “I 
didn’t understand the question, and I don’t understand the answer.”221 He posed a 
problem “on a little more personal level.” If he had been an Indian back in 1626 and had 
gotten $24 for Manhattan, he asked, would that have been a good investment? Forrester 
explained the process of getting the answer as viewers watched two members of the lab 
staff demonstrate the routine of entering the data on a punched tape and loading it onto 
the machine. The Whirlwind typed out the answer that, at six percent interest per year, 
the investment would have generated a return of more than $4 billion.  Murrow approved. 
Setting up the Whirlwind’s final trick, Forrester said there was “another kind of 
mathematical problem that some of the boys have worked out in their spare time in a less 
serious vein for a Sunday afternoon.”222 One of the most complicated pieces of 
machinery of its day then belted out a flat-toned version of “Jingle Bells.” 
Even then, in 1951, this mix of the technical and the frivolous, showmanship in 
the midst of a serious endeavor, and human-computer interaction was already part of an 
evolving culture of demonstration in the nascent computer world.223   An even earlier 
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landmark event had taken place in 1946 for the public debut of the Electronic Numerical 
Integrator and Computer – ENIAC, for short – which was conceived of during World 
War II and built in secret for the military at the University of Pennsylvania.  After the war 
ended and the machine was operational, reporters were invited to watch the ENIAC in 
action during a two-day series of dedication events. Lights that were part of the ENIAC’s 
regular operations were even enhanced for the affair.  Because the ENIAC’s work was 
classified, including calculations for nuclear weapons development, special programs 
were crafted for the demonstration to show the ENIAC running through its paces. The 
New York Times hailed the ENIAC on the front page, and its blinking lights were featured 
in a MovieTone newsreel. 224 
What the election-night computing plans in 1952 had in common with these 
earlier events – these publicity-minded demonstrations of wondrous new computers – 
was a consciousness among the devices’ inventors, engineers, and marketers of the 
advantages of enveloping their very serious endeavors in a bit of showmanship.  But 
there was a big difference this time. Unlike other sorts of demonstrations that could be 
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worked out in every detail ahead of time, there would be no way to do that on election 
night. 225  The data would be live, and the computer would be processing it in real time. 
The journalists and the technologists would be performing a high-wire act of sorts, and 
there could be no canned set of results to serve as a net. 
So the publicity that had been invited for the computers and their network 
broadcasts could cut both ways.  There was a prescient observation in a Variety review of 
UNIVAC co-inventor John Mauchly’s performance on The Johns Hopkins Science 
Review program featuring his computer a few days before the election: 
... as regards its use in deciphering voting trends on Election Night, the 
value of UNIVAC will depend on the interpretations the newsmen make 
on what factors UNIVAC is to measure.  Unless the significant polling 
places are watched, one shrewd politico and a man with an abacus could 
scoop the electronic marvel.”226  
The UNIVAC camp had made efforts to hedge their bets. Though they could not 
can the results, there were several UNIVAC computers in the Philadelphia factory in 
various stages of preparation for their eventual customers, and a backup plan was in place 
in case there might be a problem with the computer designated for the election-night 
work. They also had systems in place to detect a variety of problems that might crop up 
in the quality of data being fed to the computer. The broadcasters had also hedged their 
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bets in various ways – primarily by continuing to use more traditional means of reporting 
on returns. Collingwood had made efforts to prepare his audience, too. He wrote in his 
Report to the West scripts before the election – and he would remind his audience again 
early on election night – that if there were to be a mistake, it would be the fault of 
humans, not the machine. But in one of those reports just two weeks before the election, 
his remarks also reveal that he was not completely free of concern: 
When I left Philadelphia today I asked the scientist in charge of UNIVAC 
what he would do if UNIVAC turned out to be dead wrong. “Well,” he 
said slowly, “on November 5th there’s a United Fruit boat leaving for an 
obscure part of South America.  If UNIVAC is wrong that’s where I’ll 
be.”... Me too.227 
A great deal of thought had gone into the mechanics and methodology for data 
processing and analysis on election night. We can see that the application of new 
computer technology offered the chance to serve election-night night’s traditional tandem 
imperatives – journalism on the one hand, with a premium on speedy and accurate 
analysis, and showmanship on the other hand, with a premium on attracting an audience 
and enhancing the news organization’s prestige. But there would be no adoption of this 
innovation without a willingness to take risks. The players were not blind to the risks, and 
they had made efforts in advance to contain them. In the end, however, there was no 
guarantee that all contingencies could be foreseen.  Despite all the preparation, 
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Collingwood noted in his Oct. 22 script, “we’re all keeping our fingers crossed here at 
CBS and at Remington Rand.”228 
                                                 





Chapter 6:  Cultural Competition for Attention on Election Night 
On election day in 1952, Americans learned from their local newspapers about 
options for getting returns that evening – news they could obtain without waiting for the 
next day’s editions.  As had been the case for generations, election night would be 
offering up a rich confection of news, performance, promotion, and technology.  
Opportunities for getting election returns would appear at a wide variety of venues and at 
the intersection of a diverse array of interests.  The mix of television and computers 
would be just one element in a culture-wide competition for attention.  
Election Returns in Public Venues 
Even the organizers of religious events were not immune from intertwining 
democracy’s main event with their own.  In Albuquerque, New Mexico, Billy Graham 
had just launched a month-long campaign of evangelism.  Thousands of people would 
come each night to hear him preach at the crusade tabernacle on San Mateo Boulevard.  
On election day, the Albuquerque Journal devoted several paragraphs to a description of 
Graham’s Bible-based sermon from the night before.  And his upcoming sermon was 
clearly designed to offer a spiritual double entendre for a timely secular theme: “The 
Greatest Election Ever Held.”  Readers thinking about attending were assured they would 
not miss the results of the earthly election underway that day.  Returns would be 
announced both before Graham’s sermon and after the meeting.1 
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In Oneonta, New York, an American Legion Post was promoting a dance with 
old-time music from the Woodhull Boys – and election returns.2  Regular updates on the 
vote count were promised at a nightspot in Jensen Beach, Florida, during an “election 
dinner dance” sponsored by the Jaycee-Ettes.3  In Manhattan, ads for the National Horse 
Show in Madison Square Garden promised jumping contests, teams of giant Clydesdales, 
and “ELECTION RETURNS announced frequently tonite!”4 In Lincoln, Arkansas, Hazel 
Walker’s Arkansas Travelers, a women’s basketball team that toured small towns playing 
– and beating – men’s teams, would be playing that night at a local high school 
gymnasium. A news item in the Northwest Arkansas Times promised some special 
features. At half-time, Walker – a former All-American – would challenge all comers in a 
free-throw exhibition. She would shoot standing, sitting, and kneeling. And during the 
game, election returns would be announced every 10 minutes.5  
At a time when a majority of Americans did not yet own a television set, 
businesses of all sorts offered a place to watch.  In Fitchburg, Massachusetts, the La 
Conca d’Ora restaurant placed an ad inviting readers of the Fitchburg Sentinel to come 
watch the election returns while enjoying their favorite Italian and American foods.6   In 
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Greeley, Colorado, a home-furnishings store placed an ad that read: “Democrats and 
Republicans – We cordially invite you to watch the election returns on our television 
sets.”7  The proprietors promised to stay open until the broadcasters went off the air.  In 
Modesto, California, four Maddux & Van Sandt stores ran an ad that began: “If You 
Don’t Own A TV Set … SEE THE ELECTION RETURNS on One of Ours!”8  Two of 
the stores even promised “facilities for ‘drive-in’ television.”  And in New York City, 
commuters who would be heading home from Penn Station on the Chesapeake and Ohio 
Railway learned from an ad that they would not be left out of the election excitement.  
Trains were to carry “up-to-the-minute” election returns by way of speakers installed in 
“special lounge cars and coaches” – “in recognition,” said the ad, “of the intense interest 
in the elections.” 9   Even those local television stations that did not plan to broadcast an 
all-election diet of programs were not blind to the fact that a complete void of election 
news would not be good for business.  One Los Angeles-area station announced plans to 
televise a boxing match – Jesse Fuentes versus Willie Vaughn, live from the Olympic 
Auditorium – but with returns promised “throughout the evening.” 10  
Across the nation, movie theaters also promised – as entertainment houses of all 
sorts had been doing for generations – that patrons would not miss out on the day’s 
political theater.  In Helena, Montana, the Marlow Theater advertised a “last chance” to 
see its feature, The Greatest Show on Earth, Cecile B. DeMille’s 1952 hit about life in 
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the Ringling Brothers and Barnum & Bailey Circus.11 Here was a movie that married the 
art of the spectacle from two of spectacle’s greatest names – the legendary producer-
director and the legendary circus.  But the biggest, boldest letters in the Marlow Theater’s 
ad were reserved for another attraction: “ELECTION RETURNS.”   Vote counts were to 
be announced at a theater in Canandaigua, New York, where The Miracle of Our Lady of 
Fatima was showing.12  In Walla Walla, Washington, a set of newspaper ads for four 
local theaters – including one showing “the greatest horror shows of all time,” 
Frankenstein and Dracula – noted that at each venue, patrons could “enjoy a good 
movie” and “keep up with the presidential race!”13  In and around Oakland, California, 
where several theaters were promising returns, the Paramount – featuring a screen 
adaptation of Ernest Hemingway’s The Snows of Kilimanjaro – offered election news in a 
special “television lounge.”14  The entertainment industry trade publication Variety, in 
fact, reported a few days ahead of the election that theaters around the country were “set 
to fight the TV bid for attention on Election Day” in two ways – by pitching the idea that 
the outcome won’t be known until after theaters close and by arranging to keep patrons 
posted on trends.15 The International News Service was reported to have made a deal 
with theaters to install teletype machines for $130 to $150 apiece on election night.16 
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Not every theater was offering returns, and one in Oshkosh, Wisconsin, made a 
point of advertising that fact:  “Got the Election Day Jitters About Who Is Going to Win 
Tonight?” asked its ad. “Relax and Forget for a Few Hours.”17  But another Oshkosh 
theater was going all out with “THE ELECTION NIGHT CLOCKWATCHER 
PROGRAM!”  Patrons could see five movies for the price of one.   Featured was Don’t 
Bother to Knock, a psychological thriller starring Marilyn Monroe as a disturbed former 
mental patient working as a babysitter.  The theater’s ad didn’t miss a chance to link 
Monroe’s status as a sex symbol with the election-night theme: “Meet the new Secretary 
of the Exterior! Every Inch a Woman…”   The theater promised “ROUND-THE-CLOCK 
ENTERTAINMENT WHILE YOU GET ELECTION RETURNS.”18 
In Syracuse, New York, theaters formed various election-night alliances with 
local print and broadcast media.   The ad for one theater, RKO Keith’s, suggested that 
with the polls closing at 9 p.m., “DECISIVE ELECTION RESULTS won’t be known 
until late tonite [sic] or early tomorrow.” 19  Movie-goers could take in a double feature – 
a Gary Cooper western and a Cesar Romero murder mystery – and hear returns courtesy 
of a local radio station, WSYR.  A different station, WAGE, was to provide returns at 
Lowes’s State.  And at Schine’s Paramount, where John Wayne and Maureen O’Hara 
were playing opposite each other in a romantic comedy, The Quiet Man, returns would be 
read from the stage after arriving by “direct wire” from a local newspaper. 
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In fact, as had been the practice for generations before the advent of radio and 
television, many of the ways in which Americans could get their election night news in 
real time were the creation of the newspapers themselves.   New sorts of arrangements 
and synergies were being conjured up, but old practices persisted, too.   
Years after radio broadcasting became the dominant medium for disseminating 
the vote count after the polls closed, newspapers in towns across America were still 
holding themselves out as prime locales for live election-night news.   In Pocatello, 
Idaho, “election tally sheets” were to be displayed in the lobby of the Idaho State 
Journal.20  In Rhode Island, the Newport Daily News ran a front-page story letting 
readers know that the local vote on national, state and city races and issues would be 
“posted on a huge board in the newspaper’s counting room window.”21  The paper also 
promised it would announce returns “over an amplifying system to those gathered in the 
street.”22  In Greenville, Mississippi, a front-page headline proclaimed: “Election Party 
Set at Democrat-Times.”23  “Everybody is invited,” said the story. “There will be a 
loudspeaker set up to broadcast the election returns to anyone who wishes to park in the 
street and listen to the figures as they come in…”   In Flagstaff, Arizona, readers also got 
a page-one invitation: “If you want to be in on the fun tonight, come on down to the SUN 
office.”24  “It’ll be a great election party,” said the Dixon Evening Telegraph in Illinois. 
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“We ask you to join us.”25  In addition to the party atmosphere promised by some papers, 
one in Oxnard, California, cast the newsroom activity as itself worthy of drawing 
spectators:  “The Press-Courier invites the public to drop in at its office at any time of the 
night to watch the gathering of returns.”26 
The Oxnard paper added this caveat: “The public is requested not to phone the 
newspaper, however, since lines must be kept clear for reports from the precincts.”27  But 
other papers – including some of the same ones that were disseminating returns by 
bulletin board – also invited calls. In Lima, Ohio, a paper serving Allen County ran a 
large front-page headline – “Call 3-1610 for Returns” – above a story that said, “A staff 
of veteran observers will feed Allen-co returns to telephone operators at The Lima News 
thruout the night.”28  The Lima News was also one of a number of afternoon papers 
around the country that promised extra editions available at dawn on downtown streets 
and newsstands.  Morning papers, meanwhile, promised to hold deadlines as long as 
possible during the night or to issue extras during the morning.29 
Many papers made plans to cooperate with broadcasters, including radio stations 
owned by newspaper publishers, as was the case with the Idaho State Journal and its 
radio station, KJRL.30  The Arizona Daily Sun would be playing host to two local radio 
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stations.31  In such cases, local newspapers could be expected to supply a bigger news 
staff featuring one or more seasoned political reporters and an apparatus for collecting the 
area vote.  The radio stations could bring live access to the listening audience and had 
experience in making the narration of live events engaging.32     
Of course, not every paper was geared up for the election-night excitement. In 
Ohio, the Athens Messenger let readers know in a box on page seven that no one would 
be on duty at the newspaper office “because of expected delays in counting due to an 
anticipated heavy vote today.”33   In Redlands, California, the Daily Facts also noted that 
with “no contests to be decided within the city, or within the township, or within the 
supervisorial district,” the afternoon paper was going to close up shop on election night.34    
Engaging the Audience: The Story of the Story, Technology, and Celebrity 
The approaches in Athens and Redlands appeared to be the exception.  The way 
in which the election results would be gathered, aggregated, analyzed, and disseminated 
was itself a story, continuing a long election-related tradition of journalism about 
journalism. Newspapers reported with gusto on the arrangements they had made for what 
promised to be a busy and high-stakes evening.  The Oshkosh Daily Northwestern 
boasted: “A corps of Northwestern reporters will stand by at polling places throughout 
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the city ready to rush the final returns to the newspaper offices.”35  At the Oneonta Star, 
readers were asked not to call because “all telephone lines and personnel will be busy 
compiling results.”36 In Ventura County, California, a local radio station and three area 
newspapers had plans – reported in a front-page story in Oxnard – to pool their efforts.37   
Technology of various sorts figured into newspapers’ accounts of the way they 
would report the election.  One small-town paper boasted about the installation of 
“special telephones … to speed returns.”38  This news was accompanied by a request for 
precinct-level election officials to phone in with their tabulations – at the newspaper’s 
expense – as soon as possible after the count was completed.39 A paper in Middleboro, 
Kentucky, described at length the “special reporting facilities” it had arranged jointly 
with a local radio station.40  The arrangements included “a direct wire” in the county 
courthouse for local and county returns, plus an “extraordinary wire system” for state and 
national returns, the key being a “coast-to-coast trunk wire,” from which national returns 
and “trend roundups” would be relayed onto “special state and regional circuits.”   
Not to be outdone by the hubbub about television and computers and not to be 
denied its share of the glory over election-night journalism, Western Union released 
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figures on election day reminding the nation that the telegraph system was still an 
important link in the reporting of election news.  Newspaper and wire services added this 
to their reporting on the reporting. More than a century after the telegraph entered the 
election-night saga, this mature technological system still had the capacity to generate 
wide-eyed stories. These were replete with astounding figures and accounts of the high-
stakes, behind-the-scenes drama that had made the timely transmission of election news 
possible during the campaign season and right into election day.41 One item reported that 
“some 35 million words of election news have been carried by telegraph wires,” making 
this the “wordiest election campaign in the nation’s history.”42  About a third of this total 
had come from the candidates’ campaign trains. Western Union had special 
representatives on these trains assigned to handle the daily crush of copy coming from 
some 80 to 100 reporters traveling with Eisenhower and 100 traveling with Stevenson.43  
A 24,000-mile network just for the “flash handling of news stories” was a key element of 
Western Union’s system, but the human actors in that system were portrayed as equally 
important.  They experienced the campaign season as unseen links in the chain of 
technology that transmitted election news to the American public through newspapers, 
magazines, radio, and television: 
Work on a campaign train is a day and night assignment 
permitting little sleep. One Stevenson trip was called “Operation 
No Sleep.”  Western Union press men are used to a quick switch 
from train to plane and a motorcade trip in a cold, driving rain over 
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muddy, back-country roads adds to the challenge of getting the 
press file through under any conditions.44 
The reporting to come on election night was expected to generate another 1.5 million 
words for the telegraph company.  
Of course, the election-day “story of the story” in 1952 often took special note of 
television. Though not entirely new, television was still novel.  And wonder was attached 
to the new coast-to-coast arrangements of the networks for transmitting images in real 
time. Television would be knitting the nation together as an audience after the voting had 
knitted people together through their common democratic act at the polling place.  The 
United Press reported on this with dramatic flourish in a story that appeared in 
newspapers around the country, and in some places on the front page: “Across America, a 
hush will fall. There are 19,000,000 television sets now, according to a research firm, 
compared with 700,000 in 1948.”45  And even larger than the television audience, the size 
of the potential radio audience was staggering, with some “44,000,000 radio homes.”   
This wire story, carrying on a long election-journalism tradition, even marveled at the 
combined global audience that would be focused on the day’s upcoming events via all 
manner of technologies of communication, transportation, and analysis:  
The biggest audience ever tonight begins reading about, listening to, 
and looking at the American election finale. 
 Around the world, newspapers will be held for extra editions.  
Radios will be tuned to returns.  Bulletin boards will light up….  
Ships at sea will get the news.  Transcontinental airplanes will pipe 
the returns to passengers in flight via loudspeaker systems….  
The Voice of America, pouring out news in 46 languages to 
countries outside and behind the Iron Curtain, will address itself to a 
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potential radio audience of 300,000,000 outside the North American 
continent…46 
And then there was the technology that millions would be seeing for the first time 
on election night.  In national wire stories, local news stories, the columns of writers 
covering television, newspaper ads, and on-air promotions, the computers to be employed 
were identified in election-day copy by monikers like those that had been applied in the 
weeks leading up to the vote. There was the by-now familiar “electronic brain,” as well 
as “mental marvel,”  “electronic prophet,” “robot computer,” “electronic crystal ball,” 
“mechanical brain,” or just “the ‘brain.’”47   
A nexus of celebrities and election returns was to be a feature of election-night 
broadcasting in some venues.  The ABC affiliate in Hollywood, KECA, was going to 
have a “celebrity room” where, it was said, “well-known stars will drop in from time to 
time to be presented.” 48  Some independent television stations were making plans that 
included a combination of celebrity entertainers and election returns.  One of these was 
going to broadcast an “election night ‘jamboree’ ” at a local theater, and the public was 
invited to attend.49  The bill included Lawrence Welk, a folksy favorite of older 
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Americans for his orchestra’s fare of polkas, waltzes, and other conservative, easy-
listening music.50   
Celebrity is a matter of context, and the competition for attention on election night 
featured those whose names might be more familiar, locally or nationally, to followers of 
political news.  There were local reporters known for their savvy coverage of politics.  
There were network television and radio reporters and commentators whose names, 
voices and faces were widely recognized.  There were the pollsters – Roper, Gallup, 
Lubell.  There were even leading scholars.  In New York City, WNYC had lined up two 
of them – sociologist Robert K. Merton, a professor at Columbia University, and political 
scientist Harold Lasswell, a professor at Yale University – to analyze election-night 
trends.51  
For the Active Audience: Scorecards and Vote-Watching Guides 
For those watching or listening at home, some newspapers provided readers with 
the means to become their own experts, active participants in tabulating and analyzing the 
vote counts they were to hear over radio and television.  Just as NBC sponsor Philco had 
circulated a 32-page national election guide before the convention-and-election season, 
with historical data and a place to keep track of state-by-state returns, newspapers around 
the country ran blank tally sheets on election day.52 They also published “guessers’” 
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guides to help viewers become “experts.”  The demystification of special expertise and its 
replacement with do-it-yourself instructions was certainly not an unknown phenomenon 
in the early 1950s nor was it limited to politics.  A “paint-by-numbers” craze attracted 
adults who had no artistic training and newfound leisure time in their hands.  Hobby kits 
for assembling model trains, planes, and cars from injection-molded plastic parts sold 
briskly. Betty Crocker’s Picture Cook Book, with illustrated, step-by-step instructions, 
had sold its first million copies within months of its publication in late 1950.53  Even 
homes could be built by following a best-selling how-to guide. But the invitation to be 
part of the election-night forecasting excitement also had a long pedigree of its own, as 
we have seen. 
The do-it-yourself scorecards published on election day came in a variety of 
forms and sometimes took up half a page or more – a significant amount of space hinting 
at the belief of editors and publishers that readers would find this service interesting and 
useful.  Some of these scorecards were circulated to local papers by wire services. One 
from the Associated Press announced at the top: “You Can Keep Your Own Record of 
Returns.” 54  It had the number of electoral votes and the number of precincts or other 
voting units in each state.  There was space to list returns at four separate times during the 
night, and the columns for Eisenhower and Stevenson were marked by their parties’ icons 
– the elephant and the donkey. At least one paper – the Kerrville Times in western Texas 
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– ran this scorecard prominently on the front page.55   The North Adams Transcript in 
western Massachusetts gave advice on how to fill out its scorecard, which ran just above 
an ad urging readers to listen to the returns to be broadcast on radio from the Transcript 
newsroom.56  
In Syracuse, the Post-Standard and station WSYR ran a scorecard that was even 
more elaborate, with detailed data from the 1948 presidential vote, including state-by-
state pluralities and percentages. There were spaces to record election-night figures for 
county assembly seats and other races of local interest, along with historical data.  The 
newspaper also ran a brief guide, “How to Assess Returns,” with advice to compare the 
night’s returns with the figures from the most recent elections, and somewhat ambiguous 
hints such as these: “It should be borne in mind that Gen. Eisenhower, to be elected, must 
do relatively better locally and nationally than the candidates in the last election.”57   The 
New York Times published an elaborate “guide and tally sheet.”58  It listed, for each state, 
the number of electoral votes and the top vote-getter in 1948.  There was room to record 
returns, and there was a historical note or trend-spotting hint for each state. The one for 
Texas, for example, said: “Normally Democratic.  Gov. Shivers, Democrat, endorsed 
Eisenhower after Stevenson backed U.S. ownership of offshore oil lands.” 59 West 
Virginia’s note said: “Normally Democratic. Coal miners for Stevenson.” 60  New York’s 
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note advised: “Close vote in Democratic New York City would favor Eisenhower.  Close 
vote up-state, normally Republican, would aid Stevenson.” 61  To no one’s surprise, 
Maine’s note on the presidential race said simply: “Normally Republican.” 62 
In a widely printed story, the Associated Press wrote, “Two systems – neither 
unconditionally guaranteed – are available to election night guessers seeking to project 
early returns into the final outcome of the presidential race.”63  One involved watching 
states with “hefty” electoral votes.  Just seven states had a combined total just 61 votes 
shy of the total needed for victory. The other system was based on the notion that 
“history is likely to repeat itself,” so one could “concentrate on ‘compass pointer’ states 
which have generally turned up on the winner’s side in past elections.” 64  For example, 
since Theodore Roosevelt was elected in 1904, “Missouri, Montana and Idaho have 
picked the winner consistently in the last 12 presidential elections.” 65 Three other 
Western states had “been ‘right’ since 1912.”  And so on. 
Some papers ran stories suggesting that watching the local vote would tell 
observant readers how the country was going to go.  In Ohio, the Lima News ran a front-
page story that began, “Political experts from thruout America will be watching election 
returns from Limaland Tuesday night for an early indication of a nationwide trend.”66  
The story went on to note:  “It was the farm vote in half a dozen northwestern Ohio 
                                                 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 See, for example, Associated Press, “Vote Counters Tonight have 2 Systems to Follow,” Brainerd 
(Minn.) Daily Dispatch, Nov. 4, 1952, 2. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 




counties which was credited by many expert observers with providing the Democratic 
gains which finally swung Ohio into the Truman column four years ago.  Gov. Dewey 
conceded his defeat in 1948 only after Ohio definitely had gone for Truman, shortly 
before noon on the day after the election.” 67  With Ohio in the Eastern time zone, 
watching a few of these counties – Auglaize, Putnam, Mercer, Van Wert, Shelby and 
Henry – could provide a “strong hint” of how farmers in the Western states would go. 
In Wisconsin, the Associated Press took a bit more whimsical approach, mixing 
facts and figures with the wink of an eye.  Running in the Oshkosh Daily Northwestern 
under the headline, “Handy Guide In Wisconsin Vote Watching,” a lengthy article began 
by acknowledging the special place in American culture of election-night forecasting: 
“Vote-watching comes in for its quadrennial one-night stand as the nation’s most popular 
parlor pastime and Wisconsin has some contests of special interest to keep track of as the 
votes returns come in.”68  The story went on to offer “a handy guide by which you may 
become your own expert and be just as confused as anyone over what’s happening before 
the decisive totals emerge from the adding machines.” 69 The counties that gave the 
biggest boost to Truman were listed, and then this: “If you could detect a shift in 
sentiment in these counties … you might make a quick reputation among your friends.”70  
In the Senate race, the anti-communist crusading Republican incumbent, Joseph 
McCarthy, was running for reelection. While McCarthy had won by a landslide in 1946, 
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the story listed several counties – the ones to watch for trends – that had gone for the 
Democratic presidential candidate, Truman, two years after Republican McCarthy’s 
election. Readers had the chance, if they followed the story’s advice, to “emerge as a 
minor prophet.” But, the story cautioned as the final word, “don’t bet on it.” 
National magazines, too, got in on the task of educating readers on becoming 
experts at reading the election-night signs.  Collier’s did so in a piece written by two CBS 
veterans, Robert Trout and Paul W. White.71  After enjoying “a good dinner and early 
movie” on Nov. 4, interested readers were invited to “sharpen a handful of pencils, sit 
down by your radio or television set, spread open this issue of Collier’s, and settle down 
for some practice in the more or less fine art of keeping score.” 72  Western states had the 
best track record, but since they reported late, Missouri would be the best single state to 
watch – “it hasn’t been wrong since 1900, when it voted in favor of William Jennings 
Bryan.” 73 There were some good bellwether counties – Coos and Stafford in New 
Hampshire, for example, and Vanderburgh in Indiana.  Readers were cautioned about a 
technology gap to watch for on election night:  states in which the larger cities, which 
tend to be more Democratic, had voting machines and hence more rapidly compiled 
returns than the machine-less rural areas. An elaborate chart was published with the story. 
The states were broken into three groups – “Probable Democratic,” “Probable 
Republican,” and “In Doubt.” The number of electoral votes for each was given.  For 
each hour between 9 p.m. and 4 a.m., the cumulative percentage of returns was listed for 
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the 1948 election, along with a color-coded means of spotting the hour at which “the 
candidate who eventually carried the state went into the lead and never lost it.” There was 
also a “squeak-through column” for the states where the margin of victory was less than 
two percent. After recounting some colorful stories of election-night forecasting – 
including the exploits of Salo Finkelstein, the “lightning calculator” – Trout and White 
concluded with an account of “an ultramodern ‘mechanical brain’” to be used on at least 
one network, comparing returns to figures from prior years. 74  Their account of the 
tradition of election-night reporting finished this way: “Nothing better spotlights the 
scientific advances of our age than the simple fact that a machine very likely will be the 
first to know the identity of the thirty-third man to be President of the United States.” 75 
Technology and the Times Square Tradition 
The Collier’s piece asserted that “elections are basically stories told in numbers” 
– a radio sort of thing. Television’s proper domain, per Collier’s, was “pictures instead of 
words and figures,” a task demanding “a large share of imagination and enterprise.” 76 
Trout and White predicted that television would make more use than radio had of “street 
scenes like Times Square.”  Just as vote-watchers had little choice than to turn to the past 
to make sense of the present, the turn to Times Square on election night was surely an 
American reflex in 1952.  In Traverse City, Michigan, in Valparaiso, Indiana, and in 
Hayward, California, wire editors chose for their readers a telling United Press summary 







of the way election returns would be broadcast to an audience of millions in the nation 
and the world. 77  The piece included mention of several technological wonders.  These 
included the “electronic brains” to be featured on television and radio, but also a 
paragraph or two on a unique device installed for election night in Times Square – the 
“new electric election indicator” – to attract and serve the expected crowds there. 
Indeed, on election night 1952, the New York Times wasn’t leaving anything to 
chance when it came to Times Square.  The paper might have a reputation as serious and 
elite, but it also had showmanship in its genes.  And recent history suggested that 
showmanship might now be more important than ever in attracting and holding an 
election-night crowd.  In the era of radio and then television, NBC had made efforts to 
compete with Times Square by erecting election-night displays outside Rockefeller Plaza.   
And in recent elections, New York Times reporter Meyer Berger had been among those 
chronicling a change in the character and size of the Times Square crowds.  The wartime 
gathering in 1944 was massive – numbering between 250,000 to 500,000 – but was not as 
boisterous as in earlier elections. 78  After that, both the energy and size of the crowds fell 
off from what New Yorkers had come to expect in elections for city, state or national 
office.79  At first, police officials were baffled, not quite able to fathom what was taking 
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place.80 Reporters sensed apathy.  Later, broadcasting came to be seen as a factor.81  And 
there was no small irony in the fact that broadcasters, looking to add color to their 
reports, turned to Times Square.  In 1948, Meyer Berger noted that radio commentators 
set up camp to relay bulletins as they appeared on the Times display, and television 
cameras were there to bring the Times Square scene into American living rooms. 82 In the 
same story, Meyer declared flatly in his lead that “Times Square saw the death of a 
tradition yesterday.” 83  It’s not that no one was there.  But the thousands who did show 
up were not packed shoulder to shoulder.  One could even find bare spots on the 
pavement.  Again in 1949 and 1950, Meyer penned obituaries for the massive outdoor 
gatherings of past generations.84 
Still, the New York Times wasn’t ready to give up in 1952.  The newspaper 
management arranged for an overlapping set of technological wonders – some dating 
back to the 19th century, some decades old, and some brand new – to attract attention, 
                                                 
80 See, for example, “Times Sq. is Quiet, Crowd Apathetic,” New York Times, Nov. 7, 1945, 2: “Even 
veteran policemen shook their heads over this utter lack of emotionalism.”  And in a 1946 story, one police 
official was quoted as muttering, “I’ve seen bigger crowds at county fairs in Ireland”; Berger, “Crowds 
Apathetic In Times Sq. Area.” 
81 Meyer Berger, “Election Night Crowd in Times Sq. Is Thin, Silent and Without Spirit; Some Observers 
Attribute Decline From Old Days of Teeming Throngs Alive With Noise to Lure of Radio, Television in 
Home,” New York Times, Nov 3, 1948, 16; Meyer Berger, “Times Sq. Crowds Muster Thin Line; Radio 
and Television Blamed for Passing of an Old-Time Election-Night Tradition,” New York Times, Nov. 9, 
1949, 3. In 1950, veteran policemen were also quoted as blaming radio and television for diminished 
crowds in 1950: Meyer Berger, “Dwindling Crowd Threads Times Sq.; Time and the Air Waves Cut More 
Deeply Into Tradition and Even Whistles Go,” New York Times, Nov. 8, 1950, 6. 
82 Berger, “Election Night Crowd in Times Sq. Is Thin, Silent and Without Spirit.”  
83 Time magazine also took note after the 1948 election of the notably diminished Times Square activity: 
“The vast throng which normally invades Manhattan’s Times Square with horns, bells, whistles and 
placards simply did not materialize.  Broadway crowds were smaller than normal on any normal Saturday 
night.” “Election Sidelights,” Time, Nov. 8, 1948. 
84  In 1949, Berger wrote that thin crowds “confirmed the death of a tradition” and that “municipal officials 
in Times Square accepted the obvious obituary;” Berger, “Times Sq. Crowds Muster Thin Line.” In 1950, 
Berger wrote: “The election night crowd tradition died a quiet death in Times Square last night, and fewer 




display the vote count, and call the election when the time was right. These non-print 
media were hyped in the pages of the Times – repeatedly – in advance of the election.   
The oldest of the technologies was the traditional searchlight that would signal the 
outcome – when the newsroom was ready to do so – by a prearranged code published in 
the paper.85  The news “zipper” that circled the Times Tower with headline versions of 
the news was by 1952 a mature technology – a generation after it debuted on election 
night in 1928 – but it was still capable of generating excitement and its role was touted in 
advance.   
The newest in this mix of glitzy technological offerings on election night in 1952 
was an 85-foot high “electric election indicator” running up the north wall of the Times 
Tower, described in detail for readers as the culmination of months of painstaking 
work.86   It was to measure, like a giant thermometer, the rising count of electoral votes 
for each candidate until one of them reached 266, the threshold for victory.  It would, 
predicted the Times, “tell the dramatic story of the election in the simplest terms.” 87 A 
second sign, just below the zipper, would provide periodic reports on a state-by-state 
basis, one state at a time.88 
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The Times arranged to employ still other technologies of communication to get 
the word out on election night far beyond Times Square, too. Every half hour, updates 
were to be sent by teletype from the newsroom to 30 campus radio stations.89 The 
newspaper’s own radio station, WQXR, would be setting up a 20-person news operation 
for the night right in the Times city room, where its announcers could broadcast returns 
and Washington bureau reporter William Lawrence could provide analysis.  And in 
addition to providing listeners with live reports from Democratic and Republican 
headquarters, WXQR arranged to position an announcer in the Paramount Theater 
marquee – to report on the scene in Times Square.  In addition to being carried on its own 
station, reports of the Times “election service” were to be carried on 21 other stations 
from Boston to Washington.90 
Times Square has been effectively studied as a place where all sorts of cultural 
values have intersected – spectacle, commerce, amusement, and religion among them – 
and where the very notion of a national audience for popular culture had roots predating 
the ascendancy of Hollywood and broadcasting.91 Certainly, democracy, technology, and 
journalism could be added to that list of intersecting interests most salient in Times 
Square on election nights.92  And in 1952, just blocks away from Times Square, in 
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election night spectacles originating from state-of-the-art television studios, the Monrobot 
and the UNIVAC were the latest iteration of election night gimmicks.  They surfaced in a 
city famous for election night confections of news, technology, and spectacle – and in a 
nation wholly attuned for generations to election-night exuberance and wizardry. 
 
The rich array of election night choices across the United States by 1952 was 
testimony, if nothing else, to Americans’ well-established desire to know the outcome of 
the day’s voting without undo delay and without waiting for an official tally.  Around the 
country, newspaper editors certainly understood that their readers would not want to wait 
for the next day’s paper to get the headlines. And so it was to be a night in which election 
returns would be delivered in a wide variety of venues and media, often featuring an 
alliance of news and entertainment – from returns at the movie theater to parties thrown 
by newspapers.  Interests would overlap, with furniture and appliance stores seizing on 
the election as an opportunity to draw in customers.  A range of technologies would be 
used.  Competing arms of the news business – radio, television, newspapers, and wire 
services – would also find ways to collaborate.   Interactivity of a sort would be featured 
in some places – from the invitation to watch a newsroom at work to the publication of 
scorecards that a broadcast audience could fill in with the help of historical data and tips 
on forecasting. And there would be ample reporting on the reporting, so that the diverse 
ways in which returns would be gathered, analyzed, and disseminated were themselves 
the subject of news stories.  In 1952, the wondrous technologies that would be employed 




century.93  In short, the salient features of election night reporting that had been 
developing for generations continued to be part of the election night scene.   
And so a profound public appetite for election returns – and a long history of 
satisfying it with a marriage of news, entertainment, and technology – formed an 
important part of the landscape in which the “electronic brains” would make their 
election-night appearances.  This continuity helps us understand why, despite the costs, 
difficulties and risks, computers operating live found a receptive venue for their insertion 
in American culture through election-night reporting.   
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Chapter 7:  Election Night 1952: After Promotions, the Live Event  
The morning papers greeting Americans on Nov. 4, 1952, carried front-page 
headlines about violence at home and abroad.  There were updates on rioting that had 
been underway for several days at a state prison in Columbus, Ohio, where the State 
Highway Patrol had fired on inmates and where the National Guard had moved in with 
fixed bayonets and machine guns at the ready.1  A fierce battle for control of hilltops and 
ridges in the central Korean peninsula, including hand-to-hand fighting, was reported to 
have resulted in a deadly stalemate between Allied and Chinese Communist troops.2 But 
the biggest headlines were reserved for the American elections.  Wire stories carried 
reports on final pre-election polls in the race for the White House, with the pollsters’ 
analyses clearly colored by caution over the embarrassments of 1948. Eisenhower was 
said to be ahead – but with Stevenson gaining enough ground that a victory for the 
Illinois Democrat was possible.3  Beyond the drama of the presidential contest, the 
Democrats’ hold on both the House and the Senate was at stake. Contentious races and 
ballot questions faced voters at the state, county, and local levels. Across the nation, a 
record-setting turnout was predicted.4   
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Once the polls opened, the turnout was no longer just a subject of speculation.  
Reporters in communities with afternoon papers scurried to tell the story.  “Early Vote Is 
Record” blared a headline in Bismarck, North Dakota.5  “Voters Jam Polls; Set New State 
Mark” was the word in Flagstaff, Arizona.6   “Valparaiso Early Vote Heavy” appeared in 
bold black type across the front page of the Vidette Messenger in Indiana.7 Precinct-by-
precinct tallies were listed to back up the Valparaiso story, which reported on emergency 
requisitions of extra ballot boxes. But the heavy vote wasn’t just a scattered local 
phenomenon.  “The big news in the early hours of voting was the size of the turnout,” 
reported the United Press. “It was massive.”8  Voters were said to have been “stirred up 
by the roughest campaign of modern times.”9  Good weather across much of the country 
helped. But even in locations with poor weather, voting was heavy.  Nationwide, 
estimates were that 55 to 60 million Americans would get to the polls – exceeding the 
prior record, just shy of 50 million, set in 1940.10   
The heavy turnout led the United Press to make a prediction – or an assumption – 
about the counting of votes: “Not until some time Wednesday will the result be 
known.”11  There was even an Associated Press story laying out a scenario, albeit remote, 
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by which the results of the election might not be known for more than two weeks.12  It 
went like this.  The national vote would have to be so close that it hung on California’s 
32 electoral votes, and the California vote would have to be as close as it had been four 
years earlier, when Truman edged out Dewey by fewer than 18,000 votes. With an 
estimate of at least 150,000 absentee ballots received in California – and an unusual state 
law that forbade unsealing them right away – those ballots were not due to be counted 
until Nov. 21.  But even without that scenario, the lack of a clear consensus that 
Eisenhower was sure to win would come to affect the role computers would play on Nov. 
4 in their election-reporting debut. 
Election night would also provide a contrast between the wondrous place that had 
been established for computers in efforts to draw an audience and the actual place allotted 
to computers in the live broadcasts. Complete broadcast footage from the CBS and NBC 
television networks, along with the first several hours of NBC radio and transcripts of 
some brief segments on CBS radio, reveal that the computers – UNIVAC at CBS and 
Monrobot at NBC – were deployed as just one way among many ways of making sense 
of returns and detecting the likely outcome.  Official counts from state election 
authorities would not be completed and certified until well after election night. That left 
to news organizations the job of informing the public of the vote tally and the outcome 
that was taking shape. In the hours, days, and years after election night, a commonly told 
story about the UNIVAC computer’s role, in particular, would come to involve a claim 
that the computer, in a prediction which was held back, had been able to detect early on 
what humans could not: a sweeping victory for Eisenhower. But an examination of the 
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broadcasts provides a chance to explore this claim and to place the computer forecasts in 
the context of other efforts to detect and report trends.  In national broadcasts, these 
varied ways of knowing – not explicitly described as such, but certainly part of election 
night’s information landscape – also included straight news reports of the vote count, 
commentary and context provided by journalists, on-air analysis by pollsters, the reported 
declarations of pundits and partisans, wire dispatches about newspapers that had called 
the presidential race in their own states, the statements of campaign officials, and, in the 
end, the speeches of the candidates themselves, including the loser’s concession and the 
winner’s acceptance of it. At the same time, broadcasts on both CBS and NBC evidenced 
a tension between an interest in reading the returns for clues to the outcome and 
cautiousness about reaching premature conclusions. As election night played out, the 
performance of the computers and their keepers stood to be judged both against the other 
ways of assessing returns and in the context of this tension between detection and 
restraint.  And the networks themselves stood to be judged by their decisions to adapt 
these novelties to traditional election-night tasks – both analytical and promotional. 
Shortly before the election, Business Week had run an article about those with a stake in 
the outcome – other than politicians.  There were the pollsters, of course, who were 
hoping to make out better than they had in 1948. And there were the broadcasters who 
were trying something new, what the headline referred to as “Robot Brains.”13 “For the 
electronic computers,” Business Week observed, “it’s a test of whether or not they have 
any real place in the Election Night hurlyburly at radio-TV studios.”14  
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Promoting the “Brains” on Election Day 
On election day, the networks continued to promote plans for election night with 
newspaper ads prominently featuring the reporters and commentators whose names 
would have been known to radio and television audiences.  In New York, an ad for 
ABC’s WJZ radio and WJZ-TV carried in large, bold letters the names of Walter 
Winchell, John Daly, Drew Pearson, and others.15  Ads for the NBC and CBS broadcasts 
featured thumbnail photos of their star reporters and commentators – and included a 
mention, too, of the technological marvels the networks planned to deploy.  In a CBS ad, 
which urged readers to “see your vote count … through the eyes of television’s foremost 
reporters,” among the photos was one of Charles Collingwood, accompanied by text 
indicating that he would be assigned to provide “returns and predictions as made by [the] 
new ‘magic brain,’ UNIVAC.”16  An NBC ad that occupied the entire back page of the 
New York Times reminded readers of the network’s television and radio ratings victories 
during the political conventions.  The ad had photos of a dozen broadcast journalists, 
together with the assignments they would have that night. It also described a massive 
array of other resources that would be brought to bear, including the Monrobot, along 
with exaggerated claims about the computer’s speed: “Beginning at 8:00 on Radio and 
9:00 on Television, 500 NBC experts, 1,000 newsmen in NBC’s stations, and the 
Monrobot – America’s fastest electronic brain – will bring election results, trends and 
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interpretation to you as quickly as the votes are counted.” 17  A smaller version of the 
same ad – without the images or names of the reporters but including the Monrobot – 
appeared elsewhere, including the Washington Post.18 These ads continued a theme 
established in the run-up to the election that the “magic” and “electronic” brains would be 
an integral part of the two networks’ competition to provide the most timely and 
comprehensible coverage. 
Extant records also show that NBC and CBS were promoting their election 
coverage on air during the day – and featuring their “electronic brains.” Available records 
for NBC – “Master Broadcast Reports” that survive at the Library of Congress – indicate 
that during election day, the Monrobot was clearly part of the network’s attempt to 
generate excitement about its election-night offerings.19 The computer was featured on at 
least three daytime programs.  On the Today show, then in its first year as a pioneering 
blend of news briefs, feature stories, and conversation, host Dave Garroway is seen in 
these documents as playing up the Monrobot during his morning broadcast while telling 
viewers what to expect on election night:  “Today, we’re going to take you on a tour of 
NBC’s complex election center in Studio 8-H...  In about 45 minutes, we’re going to have 
the first public showing of the center’s electronic brain … Mike Monrobot … a machine 
that not only computes the results but analyzes what they mean.”20  NBC’s Morgan 
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Beatty led the tour of Studio 8-H and appeared on camera in front of the Monrobot.  A 
publication of the Monroe Calculating Machine Co. – Keynote, a monthly in-house 
magazine – reported later that Marilyn Mason, an “expert mathematician” who would 
operate the Monrobot on election night, was also shown with the machine during two 
segments of the Today show that morning.21 
In the afternoon, viewers of NBC’s The Kate Smith Hour were introduced to the 
network’s election plans by the variety show’s announcer, Ted Collins, according to 
NBC’s record of the show.22  Stationed at NBC’s election headquarters, he said, there 
were “news printers, telephones, lights, cameras, special sets, and miraculous machines 
that seem like something out of Buck Rogers.”23 The viewers were promised they would 
“hear and see a good deal more about these machines.” Later in the show during another 
segment from Studio 8-H, Collins elaborated in the network’s multifaceted plans: “NBC 
is certainly prepared to do this job as quickly, as accurately, and as graphically as 
possible.  All in all, something like 250 people – not to mention any number of machines 
from the simple, old-fashioned pencil to the most complex mechanical brain, and other 
interesting devices, will be devoted to keeping you informed on who’s winning.”24  
Still later in the day, after Howdy Doody, Rootie Kazootie, Skitch Henderson, and 
several other shows and the news, the Monrobot got another promotional outing on NBC 
during Advancing Human Frontiers, at 7 p.m.25  This program was designed to acquaint 
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viewers with the latest developments from the world of scientific research.26 The host, Ed 
Herlihy, said, per NBC’s record of the show, that “the big thing we want to talk about in 
the second half of the program is the tabulation of records in our NBC studios here, using 
the new electronic brain machine.”27  Howard Fleming Jr., a Monrobot engineer, 
explained how the machine worked, answering questions about “automatic sequence 
control,” the storage of results, and “uses in business.”28  
As for CBS, less detail has been found to date about the on-air election-day 
promotion of its planned coverage of the voting. But there are indications that the 
network was not shy about touting its election-night line-up, human and otherwise. 
During a break in afternoon programming on CBS television, for example, an announcer 
named some of the journalists who would be providing “trends and reports” – Edward R. 
Murrow, Douglas Edwards, Don Hollenbeck, Charles Collingwood, and Lowell Thomas 
– and noted that they would “be assisted by Univac, the electronic brain that works faster 
than human beings can think.” 29 
Behind the Scenes: Final Preparations 
While CBS was confidently promoting its electronic brain, the situation behind 
the scenes was hectic. At Remington Rand’s Eckert-Mauchly plant on Ridge Avenue in 
Philadelphia, members of the UNIVAC team were still busy checking out the programs 
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that had been developed on a tight schedule.30 The Eckert-Mauchly Division had also 
developed detailed plans for the logistics of “Project ‘Election Return,’” specifying who 
could be in the plant and how they would be identified.31 There were to be green-striped 
passes for visitors, white passes for employees working on the project, and red-striped 
passes for employees who were normally scheduled to work at that time but would not be 
working on the project. Since there were several UNIVAC computers at Ridge Avenue, 
either operating or being completed, individuals working on those, such as employees of 
the U.S. Census, were to be given special passes, too. Arrangements were made for 
anyone who might appear on camera to sign a release, and there was a bit of advice about 
appearance: “All persons likely to be in the critical area should be freshly groomed 
(shaven, hair cuts, etc.) and not wear white shirts or blouses as white does not televise 
well.”32 CBS would also be sending a team to take care of the remote telecast from plant. 
The memo mentions “CBS engineers and technicians,” and of course there would be 
camera operators.33 There is no indication in the memo that CBS would be sending a 
correspondent – and none would appear from Philadelphia during the telecast. The task of 
interacting on-air with the UNIVAC’s keepers would fall to correspondent Charles 
Collingwood, who was in the CBS election headquarters at Grand Central Terminal in 
New York and had a phone line to the Philadelphia plant.34 Teletype lines had also been 
readied to transmit incoming returns from CBS to the Eckert-Mauchly group. 
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At NBC’s headquarters at Rockefeller Center, that network’s plans had included 
several rehearsals before election night, and now the team from the Monroe Calculating 
Machine Company was preparing the Monrobot for its election-night computing debut.35 
Meanwhile, invited celebrities and other guests – more than 1,000 of them – were 
gathering at Rockefeller Center.36 The guests’ experience had been anticipated down to 
the level of fine detail. Arrangements were made for food and drink.37 NBC staffers 
designated as “guidettes” were in place, and NBC records include an undated script – two 
pages, single-spaced – that had been assembled for them, though they were to memorize 
whatever facts they would use from it in showing guests around the studio.38  The script 
included the names of the various newsmen and their responsibilities. Among these was 
Morgan Beatty, who had been assigned to “interpret the findings of the Monrobot 
electronic brain to both radio and TV audiences.”39 The Monrobot was also mentioned a 
second time in the guidette’s  script: “Directly to your left you see the Monrobot, the 
electronic brain, used to compute important trends as ballot counts pour into the 
headquarters from 48 states.” 40  Monroe was to provide pamphlets describing the 
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machine.41  Once the tour of the set was over, guests would be urged to take a seat in the 
Studio 8-H balcony, where they could watch the action. 
Broadcasting on WNBC, NBC’s radio station in New York, Ed Herlihy also 
described the scene for listeners at home in an early-evening preview of the coverage to 
come.  
I speak to you tonight from Election Headquarters in Studio 8-H, which 
right now is just beginning to get up to speed for our complete returns of 
the election returns to you. 8-H is now full of electricians and mechanics 
and television people, all trying to get the last things together, the last 
wires in place, just so that everything will be in apple-pie order for the 
correct reporting. Now 8-H is a large studio – we think it’s the largest in 
the world. It is 78 feet wide by 132 feet long, every square inch of it used 
to the best advantage. In the center of the studio … is the commentators’ 
platform. Behind that, tabulating machines. To the side, the 
communications facilities which will bring in points from all over the 
country at an instant’s notice.  And editors, news writers, reporters, all 
flocking around, ready to take their place and do their job for you.” 42 
After a discussion with several area newspaper editors who would be helping to analyze 
the local and regional voting, Herlihy was joined by celebrities Jinx Falkenburg McCrary 
and Faye Emerson, who would be taking part in the NBC radio coverage. Herlihy 
expanded on the story-of-the-story theme, noting that this was his fifth election for NBC: 
“The first one was in 1936, and the first big coverage that we ever did of elections, in a 
little tiny office on the fifth floor, and when I look at this vast spectacle of 8-H tonight, 
I’m just completely amazed.”43 
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CBS Television Coverage Begins 
CBS launched its election-night television coverage at 8 p.m., an hour earlier than 
the television broadcast would begin on NBC.44 Viewers could see for themselves what 
anchor Walter Cronkite would describe during the evening as a “teeming … beehive.”45  
The camera opened with a long sign that said “CBS Television Election Headquarters” 
installed along one wall of the massive studio.46 There was ambient sound – the click-
clacking of teletype machines. Beneath the sign, and in view for the first few seconds, 
was a piece of equipment – about the dimensions of an organ console – with a keyboard 
and rows of lights that were blinking on and off. This was a UNIVAC operator’s control 
panel, the one that had been installed on the CBS set as a prop, and the lights were just 
for show while the UNIVAC that would be doing the election-night forecasting was 
actually in Philadelphia and would introduced about 20 minutes into the broadcast.47   
As Cronkite greeted the audience, the camera panned across one side of the studio 
to zoom in on the anchor’s desk.   People could be seen everywhere, men and women, 
members of the election-night staff. Some were standing to off to one side of the anchor 
desk watching Cronkite. Some were milling about or moving purposefully to confer with 
each other, even passing in front of the camera. Others were sitting at desks loaded with 
telephones and stacks of paper. On either side of Cronkite were his two assistants. One 
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was a young man who appeared to be carefully checking a set of papers on the desk in 
front of him. The other was a woman in a dark, scoop-necked dress with a pen or pencil 
in one hand and a cigarette in the other. She also examined some papers, and then as 
Cronkite was introducing the program, she picked up one of the telephone receivers on 
the desk and put it to her ear. She would be giving Cronkite cues throughout the 
broadcast. Other sorts of activity related to the infrastructure of the broadcast would be 
seen throughout the night, too, including typing and calculating and the movement of 
cameras on rolling platforms, their cables snaking across the floor. The audience at home 
would be in on the excitement not only of the election but of the newsroom at work – 
both its sights and its sounds, including muted conversations, the periodic distant tinkle 
of bells – perhaps from the teletype machines – and at one point even a hammer. 
Cronkite set the stage with the first news of the evening, not about the direction of 
the vote but its unprecedented volume: “a record turnout apparently throughout the 
United States.” 48 He would explain in the first few minutes that there had been long lines 
at polling places everywhere and that the vote could reach as high as 60 million, far 
outstripping the previous record of under 50 million in 1940.  
 At the outset of the broadcast, the popular vote stood at 264,000 for Stevenson 
and 282,000 for Eisenhower, the numbers displayed underneath head shots of each 
candidate. The electoral vote standings were listed in another display which reminded 
viewers that 266 were needed to win. Stevenson was said to be leading in eight states 
worth 96 electoral votes, and Eisenhower was leading in 15 states worth 144 electoral 
votes. Polls had closed in 30 states, and they would close in another 12 by 9 p.m. Early 
                                                 




returns were already trickling in from 23 states, though Cronkite reminded viewers that 
these were only scattered returns. 49   
Here was the start of an early tension in Cronkite’s own presentation: a tension 
between the desire to read some meaning into the early returns, on the one hand, and to 
issue notes of caution, repeatedly, about the limited nature of the available information on 
the other hand. One could suppose any one of a number of reasons for this, from the solid 
journalistic practice of sticking with what is known, to the showman’s imperative to hold 
onto an audience with the lure of an uncertain outcome. And then there was the specter of 
1948. A telling memo on this issue circulated several weeks before the election to 
Associated Press bureaus around the country in connection with advance planning for 
election-night. The memo was written by Alan J. Gould, executive editor of the wire 
service. It included the following guidance: 
With the experience of the 1948 upset in mind, all of us must guard 
against any prejudging of the outcome. 
Roll out the returns as quickly as they can be tabulated. Give them 
proper backgrounding and they will tell their own story.50 
In the same memo, however, it was made clear that even when the AP was not willing to 
declare a race over, there was news in the forecasts of other news organizations – 
newspapers, and especially the most notable ones or those calling the election for a 
candidate they had not supported: 
Bureaus should make advance arrangements with leading 
newspapers for forecasts on election night trends in their states.  It is 
particularly newsworthy, of course, when a paper supporting one 
candidate concedes its state (or the nation) to the other candidate. Also, 
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there are some papers so well known that it is news when they make a 
definite statement that any candidate will carry their state – even one they 
are supporting.  All of this, of course, is before such time as we feel 
justified in “electing” anybody on our own.51 
On election night, such wire service dispatches would be reported by network reporters 
and anchors who themselves were not comfortable making the same sort of forecasts 
themselves. 
About two minutes into the CBS television broadcast, Cronkite began a rundown 
of the states in alphabetical order, a process that would take just eight minutes since 
reports were not yet in from many, including those where the polls were still open.52 
Despite Cronkite’s tendency during the early hours of the broadcast to be cautious about 
drawing definitive conclusions from limited returns, the surprises seemed to be going in 
just one direction – Eisenhower’s – as Cronkite’s roll call came to states deemed key to 
any Republican reversal of the 1948 election or states where any swing away from a  
toss-up would be significant. One of the latter was Connecticut, and Cronkite reported 
that Eisenhower had “jumped into an early lead in [that] pendulum state,” with 13 percent 
of the vote in.53  The states of the “Solid South,” a traditionally Democratic stronghold, 
were also of special interest. In Florida, where Cronkite said the Republicans had hoped 
to crack the Solid South, Eisenhower was also off to an early lead, though Cronkite 
cautioned that most of these early returns had come from the state’s “southern resort 
counties,” where Republican strength was expected. 54 In Kentucky, which in 1952 was 
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typically considered one of the so-called border states in between the South and the band 
of states from the Northeast to the Midwest, Cronkite reported a “surprising lead for the 
Republican Party so far,” though he noted that it had come from urban areas that tended 
to vote Republican. 55 Maryland, also a border state, was described as “another one of the 
bellwether pendulum states the Republicans are hoping to crack.” 56 With five percent of 
the vote counted, Stevenson was ahead, but just barely – 22,500 to 21,700 – and Cronkite 
noted this: “The early returns are mostly from Baltimore, which should be heavily 
Democratic, according to past performances, but so far the Democratic lead there is very 
narrow, indeed.” 57 In Ohio, Eisenhower was ahead by more than two to one. The total 
vote count was not large – from about one percent of precincts – but its source was 
portrayed as significant: 
Those early returns are partly from the city of Cleveland in Cuyahoga 
County and that may be an indication there that the Democrats are in some 
trouble.  They need to carry Cuyahoga and Cleveland by a pretty heavy 
majority and nothing of the kind is indicated as yet from Ohio. 58 
Cronkite appeared to attach the most significance to the returns from South Carolina, 
where the polls had closed two hours earlier:  
[The] Republicans are showing a large majority, a good lead in South 
Carolina, one of the states that the Republicans counted on cracking in the 
South, or thought they might crack, and so far, with nearly a fourth of the 
vote counted, in South Carolina, the first real trend seems to be indicated 
from any of the 48 states. There the Republicans running ahead by a rather 
sizable majority. 59 









In yet one more southern state, Tennessee, Stevenson was ahead, but just barely. Cronkite 
deemed it a very slim margin – the board showed 36,200 to 35,200 with almost a fourth 
of the vote counted. That margin was not, said Cronkite, what the Democrats “might have 
hoped for from their heavily populated areas of western Tennessee, where they expected 
to get a margin to counterbalance Republican eastern Tennessee.” 60 And there was 
Virginia, “another state that the Republicans are counting on cracking in the South.” 61 
There, said Cronkite, Eisenhower had “jumped into an early lead,” though he cautioned 
that “this might have been expected in Virginia inasmuch as that early vote is counted in 
the strong Arlington County and Alexandria areas outside of Washington, D.C., where 
Republicans were expected to gain their largest strength.” 62 
In recapping, Cronkite came back to South Carolina, which he described as “the 
big surprise so far.” 63 He explained that the state’s governor, a Democrat, had endorsed 
the Republican candidate. And he ventured a modest assessment: “It looks as if General 
Eisenhower at this moment may be cracking the solid South, in South Carolina at least.”64 
A few minutes later, just after 8:15 pm, Cronkite ended a review of the national vote 
count by returning to the situation in South Carolina once more. He termed it “the only 
really startling surprise in the returns.” 65 And then a minute later, after noting again that 
polls had closed in 30 states and would close in 12 more in about 45 minutes, he offered 










this remark, with no elaboration: “Looks as if we’re going to get an early trend tonight 
and it may not be very long before we see definitely which way the wind is blowing.” 66  
There was some color thrown in. Eisenhower was said to be following the returns 
at his residence at Columbia University, where he was president. Stevenson was said to 
have waited in line for 30 minutes to cast his vote in Chicago. And there was a brief item 
on Stevenson’s ex-wife and a question about how she might have voted. Cronkite also 
talked about several big states in which Republicans hoped to have some success – 
including New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and possibly California. In only one of these 
was there any trend to report – Stevenson’s home state, where he was ahead due to the 
early returns from traditionally Democratic Cook County. Here Cronkite made use of the 
kind of historical data that had been employed for generations to judge early returns. 
“The previous Cook County margin for the Democrats has been around 54, 55, 
sometimes up to nearly 60 percent,” he said. 67 Stevenson was running ahead in Cook 
County by “five to three,” which would put him “considerably ahead” of the historical 
figures,” said Cronkite, leaving the governor “in fairly good shape in his own home 
state.”68 
As the first 20 minutes of the broadcast came to an end, it was the UNIVAC’s 
turn on air. Betraying no sense of a disconnect between his own cautious approach and 
the computer’s bold task, Cronkite set up the segment this way: “And now for perhaps a 
prediction on how this voting is going, what the vote that is in so far means, let’s turn to 
that miracle of the modern age, the electronic brain, UNIVAC, and Charles 







Collingwood.” 69 The camera panned slowly from the anchor desk to veteran CBS 
newsman, who was seated and holding a large microphone attached to a harness looped 
over his neck and shoulders. Behind him was the blinking UNIVAC console. 
Collingwood’s first task was to introduce the forecasting challenge, the 
equipment, and the methodology – and to do so in terms that might be comprehensible to 
his audience. His demeanor was relaxed and folksy. He began this way: 
This is the face of a UNIVAC.  A UNIVAC is a fabulous 
electronic machine which we have borrowed to help us predict this 
election from the basis of the early returns as they come in.  UNIVAC is 
going to try to predict the winner for us just as early as we can possibly get 
the returns in.  UNIVAC lives down in Philadelphia.  He’s one of a family 
of electronic brains made by the Eckert-Mauchly Division of Remington 
Rand, and in a little while we’ll go down there and take a look at it. 
But first of all, let me tell you a little bit about the theory of this. 
This is not a joke or a trick.  It’s an experiment.  We think it’s going to 
work.  We don’t know. We hope it’ll work.70    
Collingwood had positioned the computer as something that might tell viewers what they 
most wanted to know – the election’s outcome – but he had also hedged his bets by 
avoiding any outright claims. He had invested the arrangement with seriousness of 
purpose, and he had been direct about the risk that things might not work out as 
planned.71 
Collingwood first told the audience about how much effort had gone into the 
planning: “… for the last six weeks or so, some 25 mathematicians, statisticians, and 
researchers, including some of the country’s best mathematical brains, have been 
working on the problem which we’ve given to this electronic brain to try to solve for us 







tonight.” 72 The theory behind their work, however, was “pretty simple,” he explained. “It 
is that if you knew all about previous elections, if you knew how the votes came in and so 
forth, then, as the votes come in in this election, you ought to be able to compare them 
with what happened in the past and judge what the result will be tonight.” 73 While that 
would take hundreds of people doing calculations by hand, said Collingwood, the 
UNIVAC could complete hundreds and even thousands of calculations each second. The 
goal was to get a “prediction from UNIVAC based on statistical principles.”74 But in case 
trouble cropped up, Collingwood was absolving the machine in advance: “Now as I say, 
if it does give a wrong answer, if it does make a mistake, it won’t be the machine which 
does it.  It will be some fault of ours, some assumption that we made, something we 
didn’t foresee in giving it the figures.”75 This echoed of a theme Collingwood had 
sounded in his radio coverage of the UNIVAC plan before the election, and it would turn 
out to foreshadow some of the night’s events. 
 What the audience saw next was the scene in Philadelphia, at the Eckert-Mauchly 
plant. Collingwood continued to narrate as he gave a remote tour of the UNIVAC 
installation and its various components. Collingwood’s approach was to make the 
equipment comprehensible – by describing various components in familiar language, by 
making analogies to familiar objects, and by addressing questions directly to the machine. 
In an account of the CBS-UNIVAC plan written decades later, Sig Mickelson, who in 
1952 was CBS television’s director of television news and public affairs, provided a 








glimpse into what might have been the thinking behind Collingwood’s approach on 
election night. First, according to Mickelson, the correspondent tasked with the UNIVAC 
assignment would need to “have a sympathetic attitude toward the experiment.”76 There 
had also been, according to Mickelson’s 1989 account, a conscious assessment of just 
what sort of approach – in the role assigned to the computer and in the CBS staff’s 
interaction with it – was most likely to minimize the risks of failure and humiliation. 
Options had been weighed: 
We could take it seriously and offer election projections as serious news 
reports. If we did so, we would run the risk of being ridiculed for 
preferring the output of a machine to that of the human mind. Even worse, 
if the machine had balked or its output was patently in error, we could be 
subjected to unmerciful criticism. We could go a step further and make it 
the centerpiece of our coverage. That would greatly increase the risk and 
make us a laughingstock if for any reason it failed. Or we could slough it 
off as a gimmick and risk the loss of any benefit it might deliver.77 
Mickelson wrote that a decision was made “humanize it, to treat it gently and 
semihumorously but at the same time give full attention to the data it would produce.”78 
In addition to minimizing the risks, wrote Mickelson, this approach had another potential 
benefit. It would, he wrote, “appease an audience that we speculated might not yet be 
ready for overly rich doses of high technology.” 79  In Collingwood, as Mickelson saw it, 
the network had a correspondent who could use “a soft touch without degrading the 
results,” and Collingwood’s “obvious warm relationship with the machine would help 
deliver the mood we were seeking.”80 
                                                 








  As Collingwood gave his remote tour of the UNIVAC installation in Philadelphia, 
where CBS had stationed a crew to transmit television images and sound, he pointed out 
the control panel – looking like the one in the studio – where the operator “pushes those 
keys and punches the buttons and tells it what to do.” 81 There were reels of magnetic tape 
– “those round things [that] look kind of like candy mints.”82 There was the “brain of 
UNIVAC” against a wall, with “all those tubes and things” and some “spiny things which 
are mercury tanks.”83 These, he told the audience, were UNIVAC’s memory, which could 
store millions of digits or characters. Playing off a cliché about keen memory, 
Collingwood said of the UNIVAC, “He’s got a brain that would put to shame the whole 
race of elephants.”84 Next to the computer console was a piece of equipment that looked 
like a typewriter. Mixing the anthropomorphic and the familiar, with a bit of the language 
of a magic show, Collinwood explained: 
That’s the way UNIVAC talks.  When he wants to say something, the keys 
move with no hands touching them and UNIVAC says his piece.  That’s 
the way he communicates to us, through that typewriter there.  And it’s on 
that typewriter which moves without any human agency that we hope 
UNIVAC will give us his predictions.85 
Now, it seemed to be the computer’s chance to perform. Collingwood gave a cue: “Can 
you say something UNIVAC? Have you got anything to say to the television 
audience?”86 But the typewriter was silent, at first. Collingwood ad libbed: “You’re a 
                                                 









very impolite machine, I must say. But he’s an awfully rapid calculator.” 87 Then there 
was a bit of activity, a few characters typed, and then the typing stopped. “There he 
goes,” said Collingwood. “What’s he saying?” When the words did not seem to form a 
message, Collingwood ad libbed again: “I think he’s saying hi, anyway.”88 
 Things did not seem to be going quite as planned. Collingwood continued after 
that with his discussion of the UNIVAC’s features, but when the camera returned to the 
studio and focused in on Collingwood again, he tried once more to communicate with the 
computer, saying: “I got so interested in telling you about UNIVAC, I forgot to ask him 
what his prediction is.” 89  He directed another question at it: “UNIVAC, can you tell us 
what your prediction is now on the basis of the returns that we’ve had so far?  Have you 
got a prediction for us, UNIVAC?” 90 Collingwood turned around toward the console and 
seemed to glance up briefly. Out of view was a large monitor that had been installed to 
convey UNIVAC’s output to the television audience. The camera stayed focused on 
Collingwood, who seemed to be waiting for a response. But again, nothing happened. 
Once more, Collingwood ad libbed. “I don’t know – I think that UNIVAC is probably an 
honest machine, a good deal more honest than a lot of commentators who are working,” 
he said, letting out a brief chuckle, “and he doesn’t think he’s got enough to tell us 
anything about yet, but we’ll be back with him later in the evening.” 91  









With that, Collingwood turned the broadcast back over to Cronkite. The segment 
had lasted five and a half minutes, but Cronkite simply moved on to his next order of 
business, with no comment or even reference to what had just transpired.  In fact, another 
hour would go by before Collingwood had a second turn on camera to talk about the 
UNIVAC. Cronkite, meanwhile, returned to election results.  Eisenhower was said to be 
leading in states with 154 electoral votes to Stevenson’s 114. There was a report from 
Douglas Edwards on several Senate races. Cronkite then reiterated “the rather startling 
results so far” in South Carolina, where Eisenhower was in the lead with more than a 
quarter of the votes counted. 92 And, in noting the “rather heavy Republican majority 
building up in Connecticut,” he added a new detail. 93 In the city of Danbury, “a normally 
pendulum area” that had slightly favored Democrats in previous elections, Eisenhower 
was running ahead by about 3,000 votes. 94 But Cronkite was not willing to draw any 
sweeping conclusions yet, about a half hour into the broadcast, or to explicitly connect 
the dots from bits and pieces of evidence in the South, the border states, the Midwest, and 
New England, which together might have suggested that things were not going so well 
for Stevenson.   
Just after 8:30, it was time for a segment – some eight minutes in length – not 
about the election, but about the CBS arrangements for reporting on the election. 
Cronkite turned the floor over to veteran broadcaster Lowell Thomas, who was standing 
in front of the anchor desk. Thomas was asked for his thoughts on the election so far. 
“I’m not actually thinking about the returns at this hour,” he said, explaining: “I am more 







interested in what is going on around me here in this house of television.” 95 He 
continued: 
It seems to me that television has certainly come into its own this year. At 
the previous election night four years ago, why, it was a case of television 
portraying radio. But this time, everything seems to be specially designed 
just for television. And if those of you who are looking in will come along 
with me for a moment or two, I’d like to take you on a tour of this 
establishment. 96 
Thomas proceeded to walk around a bit, pointing out the various features of the studio, 
and directing the cameramen to show these to the audience. He called attention to various 
individuals – from the managing editor to the switchboard operator. He described the 
flow of news coming in by telephone and by way of 14 teletype machines from “the great 
press associations and from every other source under the sun.” He pointed out the large 
display along one wall with state-by-state vote tallies in the presidential contest. He 
pointed out the “computers,” by which he meant a group of men at a desk with ordinary 
calculating machines, and a cadre of uniformed young men – all wearing double-breasted 
jackets and bowties – whose job it was to take the numbers from the “computers” and 
post them on the presidential board. 97 There were displays for Congressional, Senate and 
gubernatorial races, and a large map to show states leaning one way or the other in the 
presidential contest – black for Stevenson and striped for Eisenhower. When Thomas 
came to the display for presidential totals – showing Eisenhower ahead 655,000 to 
Stevenson’s 575,000 – he commented, “it is so early that that may not mean a thing.” 98 








One change from the past, Thomas indicated, was that not a lot of space had been set 
aside this time for an in-studio audience, the layout being designed primarily with the 
television audience in mind. “Practically all wives have been left at home,” he said, “for 
the first time.” 99 At one point in his tour, Thomas pointed out Betty Furness, pitchwoman 
for Westinghouse, who mugged for the camera. She was working her way around the 
studio taking photographs and would appear in commercials later in the program hawking 
a variety of products and appliances for their convenience, aesthetics, technical 
superiority, and novelty – from light bulbs to television sets to a clothes drying machine 
that bleated out the musical notes to the ditty “How Dry I Am” when its work was 
done.100 
 Absent from Thomas’s tour was the UNIVAC. But it was there, perhaps, as an 
unseen foil. When introducing the “super duper engineer” in charge of the layout of all 
the studio gear, Thomas said of him: “From now on [he] is to be known as the 
mechanical brain.” 101  And when introducing Sig Mickelson as the other “genius” 
responsible for the night’s arrangements, Thomas quipped: “From now on he will 
probably also be known as the brain, but not the mechanical brain.” 102  
 At about 8:40 p.m., the first reported predictions came not from the UNIVAC or 
members of the CBS news staff, but from two political partisans. Republican National 
Chairman Arthur Summerfield was cited by Cronkite as saying “it looks like a 
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Republican landslide to him.” 103 Cronkite also reported that former Minnesota Gov. 
Harold Stassen, who was shown among the small audience at the CBS studio, had 
concluded that Eisenhower would be elected by the largest popular vote ever.104 Stassen, 
then president of the University of Pennsylvania, had himself been an unsuccessful 
candidate several times for the Republican presidential nomination.105 
As Cronkite continued to report significant state results, he asserted shortly before 
8:45 that “on the basis of these early returns, it does appear that General Eisenhower has 
gone into early lead in most areas including the critical areas.” 106 The one exception was 
said to be Illinois, where the Stevenson was still in the lead owing to the vote from 
Democratic Cook County. But as more state results came in, there continued to be more 
developments in Eisenhower’s favor. Oklahoma was showing greater Republican 
strength than had been expected.  And shortly before 9 p.m., Cronkite announced, “we 
have a report from the Hartford Courant predicting that General Eisenhower is going to 
win the pendulum state of Connecticut this year.” 107  Cronkite would repeat this 
prediction several times without endorsing it, and even commenting ambiguously on it a 
few minutes after 9 p.m. “No state has been decided as yet with the very possible 
exception of Connecticut,” he said, but then added, “We couldn’t say that. The Hartford 
Courant only is the source for that.”108 Not until about 9:45 p.m. did Cronkite report that 
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it looked like Eisenhower was going to “ring up a sizeable victory in Connecticut, where 
the Democrats had high hopes.”109 And it wasn’t until about 10:20 p.m. that the anchor 
reported flatly that Eisenhower had won the state by 127,878 votes based on “complete 
returns.”110 This was about two hours and 40 minutes after the Courant’s prediction had 
first been circulated by the Associated Press before the CBS broadcast began.111 
Among the notable news early in the CBS broadcast’s second hour was surprising 
Republican strength in two areas that tended to favor Democratic candidates for 
president. One was Marion County, Indiana, which includes Indianapolis and which 
Cronkite said had slightly favored Democrats before. The other was Tarrant County 
around Ft. Worth, Texas, which Cronkite reported was usually heavily Democratic.112 
But then there was an odd report, given the direction of the night’s events. Shorty before 
9:30 p.m., Cronkite reported on the national figures, first giving Eisenhower’s continuing 
lead in the popular vote count – more that 2.5 million to about 1.7 million. This was 
consistent with the details Cronkite had been reporting. But then he showed and 
announced the electoral vote standings, which had Stevenson ahead. The Democrat was 
said to be leading in 13 states with 195 electoral votes, seven more than the 188 electoral 
votes which Eisenhower was said to have in 22 states here he was leading. This would 
have likely been jarring to members of the audience who had been tuned in for awhile, 
but Cronkite reported these figures without comment – and then repeated the same count 
a few minutes later, again without explanation. It was not until 15 minutes had elapsed, 
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just after 9:30 p.m., that Cronkite reported a new set of electoral vote standings which 
had Eisenhower clearly and strongly ahead: the Republican was still leading in 22 states 
again – but with 279 electoral votes showing this time, more than the 266 needed for 
victory. Still, Cronkite reiterated in his conservative approach, saying “These are 
scattered returns.  No state is complete.” 113 In addition to the lack of commentary on the 
odd count that had prevailed for about 15 minutes, that count also raised a question that 
was not addressed during the time Cronkite had been referring to electoral vote standings: 
just what it took for CBS to list a presidential candidate as “leading” in a particular state 
and what it might take to have that designation switched to “sure.” 
Shortly before 9:30 p.m., and immediately after the first odd report of a Stevenson 
lead in the electoral vote, Cronkite set up the second UNIVAC segment this way: “And 
now to find out perhaps what this all means, at least in the electronic age, let’s turn to that 
electronic miracle, the electronic brain, UNIVAC, with a report from Charles 
Collingwood.” 114 But there would be no report forthcoming from the computer just yet, 
as Collingwood explained: 
UNIVAC, our fabulous mathematical brain, is down in Philadelphia 
mulling over the returns that we’ve sent him so far.  He’s sitting there in 
his corner, humming away.  A few minutes ago I asked him what his 
prediction was and he sent me back a very caustic answer, for a machine.  
He said that if we continue to be so late in sending him the results, it’s 
going to take him a few minutes to find out just what the prediction is 
going to be.  So he’s not ready yet with his prediction, but we’re going to 
go to him in just a little while. 115 







Instead, Collingwood was ready with a feature – in the “story of the story” vein. He had a 
guest with him and made the introduction this way: 
Well you know, I got to thinking, what with UNIVAC and this studio here 
with all of its mechanical gadgets and its hundreds of people milling 
around trying to bring you the election returns, that television has never 
done such an elaborate piece of work as this. And I got to thinking about 
the days before television and radio. We have with us here in the studio 
sitting here beside me Mr. Harold Arlin, who is the first radio announcer. 
He was the first man to be an announcer on radio on station KDKA, 
Westinghouse station, back in 1920.116 
Arlin, who was still with Westinghouse, had been at KDKA in Pittsburgh for several 
years in the early 1920s when it was a pioneering commercial radio station, and he and 
Collingwood reminisced about that era and the changes that had taken place in 
broadcasting. 117  
A few minutes after the UNIVAC was a no-show, veteran CBS correspondent 
Edward R. Murrow had a turn to weigh in with an analysis. Cronkite set up the segment 
by suggesting that Murrow would address “the big picture.” 118 Murrow began with what 
sounded like a dig at prognosticators – both animate and inanimate – and he had a hint of 
mirth in his face when he did so. “As Walter Cronkite just suggested,” Murrow began, “it 
may be possible for men or machines to draw some sweeping conclusions from the 
returns so far, but I am not able to do it.” 119 Yet Murrow then proceeded to do something 
not so far afield from that, reading great meaning into the returns from a few areas in just 
over two minutes: 








The most surprising thing undoubtedly to date has been Connecticut.  I say 
surprising because the Republicans did not reckon to win it by more than 
about forty or fifty thousand. With only a few scattered returns still to 
come, they have an advantage of about 110,000 in Connecticut, which 
certainly registers as a landslide.  They carried it in 1948 by only 
14,000.120 
After pointing out that Connecticut was also sending two Republican Senators to 
Washington, he did some extrapolation: “The interesting point of speculation there is that 
a great many of the voters in Connecticut, particularly in the industrial areas, have the 
same interests, the same concern, as a great number of the voters in the state of New 
York, a crucial state, of course.” 121 And he kept going:  
One thing one notices in looking about over the scattered returns so far, 
and that is a very considerable number of communities and precincts that 
are switching from the Democratic to the Republican column. But we find 
no similar switch in the other direction.122 
He reported on a couple of developments – that figures later than those Cronkite had just 
reported showed Stevenson, not Eisenhower, leading in the partial count from 
Massachusetts – but then Murrow concluded with a telling detail from that state. The first 
Massachusetts city with a complete vote count was Brockton, a place Murrow described 
as Democratic stronghold in the shoe industry. There, he said, Eisenhower had claimed 
19,000 votes to Stevenson’s 13,000.123 
One more of CBS’s notable political reporters, Eric Sevareid, would also have a 
chance to offer his take on the vote count just before the end of the second hour. With 
Sevareid seated next to him now at the anchor’s desk, Cronkite asked, “Eric, how is this 








thing going in your opinion?” 124 Sevareid exhibited less professed restraint than Murrow 
had shown about 20 minutes earlier, but otherwise, Sevareid’s approach to reading the 
signs was similar: 
Well it’s still going, I think, Walter, the way it started to go at the very 
beginning. That was an Eisenhower trend from the start. I’ve seen nothing 
really substantial to change that. He is running far ahead of where Dewey 
ran at this time in the same places four years ago and Stevenson is running 
well behind where Truman was running in the same places four years ago. 
Where the Republicans were strong four years ago, as in Maine, for 
example, they are far stronger. And where the Democrats were very 
strong, in a good many industrial cities, such as those in New Jersey and 
places like Lynn, Massachusetts, and so on, the Democrats are far too 
weak, for happy results in those particular states from their point of 
view.125 
Sevareid was not making a prediction, exactly, but the chances of a Democratic 
turnaround were now hard to imagine without some sort of major surprise. 
UNIVAC’s “Rough Ride” 
Just after Sevareid concluded his remarks, Cronkite said this to the audience: “So 
far, as you have noted, a slight trend has begun to develop and some of our people think 
the trend may be indicative of the final result.”126 It was now the beginning of the 
broadcast’s third hour, around 10 p.m. While no one at CBS had come right out and said 
so – and while Cronkite was characterizing the trend as slight – the direction was 
unmistakable. A great many indicators were pointing toward not just an Eisenhower 
victory, but one with surprising strength in many places. Various players had been heard 
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from on the CBS broadcast – newsmen reporting vote counts, political reporters weighing 
in with their analyses, at least one newspaper declaring a state result, and political figures 
declaring the presidential contest a landslide. On CBS radio, the public opinion analyst 
Samuel Lubell had weighed in at 8:35 p.m. with a key development. He mentioned 
having referred earlier to five indicators that should be watched for detecting whether 
there might be a landslide. Now, he said, based on “special telephone calls,” he was ready 
to predict that Eisenhower would “crack the South.”127 
Before making that prediction, Lubell had posed a question to Robert Trout, 
anchor of the CBS radio broadcast.  “First of all,” said Lubell, “I want to find out, has 
UNIVAC reported yet?” 128 “No,” replied Trout, adding in an effort at humor, “It hasn’t 
conceded yet either.” “Well then,” said Lubell, “I’m ahead of UNIVAC.” In fact, the 
UNIVAC and team of experts in Philadelphia had yet to weigh in with an on-air 
prediction even by 10 p.m.  But that did not mean that there had been no prediction from 
the computer. Famously, there had, and by all accounts, it had been the prediction of a 
landslide. But it was not aired at the time, and its existence would not be revealed on air 
until after midnight.129   
Shortly after 10 p.m., viewers watching NBC would have seen the Monrobot get 
its turn on air, followed by a segment on radio.130 But at CBS, Cronkite was again 
engaged in another state-by-state rundown showing more developments in Eisenhower’s 
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favor, and then there was a brief switch to the Commodore Hotel in New York, where 
Eisenhower had come not to claim victory but to greet his wildly enthusiastic followers. 
No such event was being held in Springfield, where Stevenson was still ensconced in the 
governor’s mansion.  In fact, Cronkite reported, an aide to Stevenson, Richard Nelson, 
has said this soon after 10 p.m.: “The news is not good and it looks pretty grim.”131 
Cronkite noted that Stevenson’s campaign manager, Wilson Wyatt, speaking “a little 
later … said it’s far too early to definitely say what the final result of the election will 
be.” 132 While trying to temper what Nelson had said, Wyatt’s remarks were just as 
indicative of the Stevenson campaign’s defensive position at a time when the Eisenhower 
camp was jubilant. It was yet another way of reading the signs. And there were more. 
Several minutes before 10:30, Cronkite was reporting on more newspapers that had 
called their states for Eisenhower – the Baltimore Sun in Maryland and the Boston Post in 
Massachusetts. The first five percent of the vote was tallied in New York – a state with 
45 electoral votes. Eisenhower was well ahead there, and he was holding on to his leads 
in several pivotal southern states – including Virginia, Florida, and Texas – as more votes 
rolled in. Cronkite characterized Eisenhower’s lead as a “heavy majority” in the popular 
vote – 4.3 to 4.1 million votes, and Eisenhower was holding on to an even more striking 
differential in the electoral vote standings, where he was said to be leading in 29 states 
with 293 electoral votes to Stevenson’s lead in 14 states with 184 electoral votes133. 
Finally, just before 10:30 p.m. Cronkite was preparing to switch to Collingwood 
for a third shot at a UNIVAC-generated prediction. “Now let’s find out how our 
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electronic brain is getting along on the prediction of the trend tonight,” said Cronkite. 
“We turn for that story to Charlie Collingwood.” 134 But things were still not going as 
planned. Collingwood was clearly disappointed, but he was not giving up: 
Well, as a great believer in the machine, I hesitate to say that we’re having 
a little bit of trouble…. with UNIVAC. It seems that he’s rebelling against 
the human element. We’ve fed him some figures which were a little out of 
line of the sort of thing that he’d been expecting, and so UNIVAC came 
up and said he just wouldn’t work under these conditions. However, the 
people who operate him are so loyal to him that they say that it wasn’t his 
fault at all, that it was their fault and our fault for giving him the returns in 
the wrong order. 135 
Collingwood had a few state results that he said had come from UNIVAC, and he read 
the first few in alphabetical order. They contained no surprises, and Collingwood seemed 
to be trying to buy some time. The camera switched briefly to Philadelphia and then back 
to New York. Collingwood continued to speak, and then from off camera, someone 
tapped him on the arm to get his attention, cuing him, perhaps that something was about 
to happen. “Have we got anything through there yet coming up on the teleprinter?” he 
asked, referring to the large video monitor, unseen by the audience, that had been 
installed on a wall in the studio to display typed output from the UNIVAC as transmitted 
from Philadelphia.136 Again, Collingwood made a comment about the UNIVAC 
“humming away in his corner,” and then the camera once more switched to the activity at 
the Eckert-Mauchly plant. Several individuals could be seen, attending in an intense way 
to their work at various parts of the computer – including the console and the printer – as 
if they were trying to get the computer to respond. And Collinwood was trying to get 







someone to speak with him.  “Have we got a return down there?” he asked. “Can anyone 
down there hear me?  Tell me whether we’ve got a national figure yet from UNIVAC?  
Draper? 137 Arthur Draper, a Remington Rand executive, replied, “Yes, here.” 
Collingwood asked him, “Have you got a national prediction from UNIVAC?” “Yes,” 
Draper answered, adding, “UNIVAC’s finally come through.” Collingwood asked for the 
prediction, and Draper, who was heard but not seen, obliged, as the commotion around 
the UNIVAC console continued: “We’ve got Stevenson, 20 states, Eisenhower 28 states. 
That adds up to an electoral vote for Stevenson of 217, for Eisenhower 314.  The 
prediction on this basis is 24,456,000 and some for Stevenson, 27,445,000 for 
Eisenhower. “138 
That was it. After two and a half hours and three segments, here was a prediction 
from UNIVAC that, at best, did not leave the audience with anything more than they 
could already see for themselves at that point – a comfortable victory for Eisenhower, in 
general terms. And the total vote predicted, at just under 52 million, was well below the 
kind of turnout numbers that Cronkite had been reporting during the evening as likely.  
Collingwood thanked Draper and then offered only a one-line comment: “In other 
words,” Collingwood summed up, “it looks as though Eisenhower is going to get it as far 
as UNIVAC is concerned. Now back to Walter Cronkite.” 139 
 Cronkite, too, barely acknowledged the report, saying only this: “And that’s the 
prediction from UNIVAC, the electronic brain.” 140 He then moved on from the computer 








prediction segment to a look at what he termed the “actual totals.” 141 This was followed 
by a report that another newspaper, the Boston Herald, with one sixth of the 
Massachusetts vote counted, had predicted that Eisenhower would take that state. 142 For 
its part, CBS now showed Eisenhower’s electoral vote tally having reached and soon 
surpassed 300 in states where he was deemed to be “leading,” and at about 10:40 p.m. the 
first state would be moved to the “sure” column. 143 It was Virginia. About 15 minutes 
after the UNIVAC prediction, Cronkite returned not to Collingwood but to an 
announcement with a bit more detail about UNIVAC’s prediction: the associated odds of 
an Eisenhower victory: 
Incidentally, you know our UNIVAC machine, our electronic brain, has 
predicted that on the basis of present returns, General Eisenhower has a 
three-to-one chance – its figures – to win this election. He would win with 
over 300 electoral votes – according to UNIVAC’s prediction – the 
presidency in this year of 1952. 144 
 This was the first instance in the broadcast that a UNIVAC prediction was simply 
integrated into Cronkite’s report as a straight news item among the various other items 
that included statements – from political partisans, newspapers, and the networks’ own 
commentators – about the meaning of the vote. But it did not mean that Cronkite had now 
irreversibly accepted the computer’s prognostications as a worthy addition to the 
broadcast. Any idea of doing that would be sabotaged by a bizarre report which was soon 
to emerge from the UNIVAC’s own camp. 145 









 First, however, the subject of predictions in general – and their pitfalls – came up 
in a conversation with Robert Trout, anchor for the CBS radio broadcast, who had joined 
Cronkite at the television anchor’s desk. 146 Shortly after Cronkite reported that a second 
state had been added to the “sure” column – and that there was word from Springfield of 
“deep gloom” setting in at Stevenson headquarters – Cronkite introduced Trout as 
someone who might have covered more election nights than any other CBS reporter.147 It 
was nearly 11 p.m. Trout began by praising the “magnificent studio,” and then made a 
cautious assessment: “It’s been awfully dangerous to make predictions, but it certainly 
looks as if it is a landslide in the making.” 148 Just as Murrow and Sevareid had done 
before him, Trout talked about all the communities around the country that seemed to be 
switching from Democratic to Republican in the presidential voting since the last 
election, and all the places that had been Republican in 1948 and were even leaning more 
strongly in that direction now. 149 Still, he had come armed with examples of states that 
had flip-flopped late on election night and into the next morning in 1948, leading him to 
suggest, “We’d better not be prophets so early, don’t you think?” 150 Cronkite made 
reference to Trout’s words nearly 20 minutes later – just after 11:15 – when noting that 
Eisenhower would win if he held onto the states where he was leading – and by a 
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landslide – but that he was saying this “without making any predictions – that’s simply 
the way the vote looks at this time.”151   
All signs continued to point with increasing strength in Eisenhower’s favor, but 
then just around 11:30 p.m., the UNIVAC was about to stumble badly – as if some sort of 
complete isolation from other election-night news had set in at the Philadelphia plant. 
Cronkite turned the floor over to Collingwood, who began with great enthusiasm: 
Well UNIVAC is rolling now. UNIVAC is chewing up figures as fast as 
we can give them to him and turning out results. It’s down there, in its 
corner there, all the tubes working, so let’s go down to Philadelphia and 
take a look at UNIVAC as it works on the election problem that we’ve 
been giving it.152 
As the camera switched to Philadelphia, Collingwood repeated the previous prediction – 
Eisenhower with a margin of 314 to 217 electoral votes with odds he gave as four-to-one. 
He noted that the UNIVAC had 2,000 vacuum tubes assigned to “watching” some 3,500 
others “to make sure that it won’t make a mistake.”153 Cued that a prediction was ready, 
Collingwood asked that the camera be brought back to the studio and pointed at a screen 
on which the computer’s output would be shown magnified enough to be legible to the 
audience. He read the prediction out as it scrolled up on the screen, and someone out of 
view could be heard to say, “Aw, come on!” – as in disbelief – at what came up: 24 states 
each for Stevenson and Eisenhower, with Stevenson to get more popular votes – 26 
million to 25 million – but with Eisenhower edging out Stevenson in electoral votes, 270 
to 261, and slim, eight-to-seven odds of an Eisenhower victory.154 At a point in the 








evening when each fresh dispatch seemed to bring mounting evidence of a powerful win 
for Eisenhower, here was UNIVAC essentially declaring the race a toss-up. “That’s 
even!” Collingwood said, astonished, as he first began reading out the prediction to the 
television audience and came to the 24-to-24 state count. But when he was done, and 
without missing a beat, he injected some humor. “If you ask me, UNIVAC is beginning 
to act like a pollster,” he quipped. “Anyway, this is what UNIVAC says, Walter, so now 
back to Walter Cronkite.” 155 
 Collingwood was grinning at that point. And Cronkite also wore a bemused 
expression as he, too, ad libbed, extending the man-vs.-machine comparison that 
Collingwood had introduced: 
Charlie, very interesting indeed on that UNIVAC prediction… We who 
are only human and have to operate with flesh and blood instead of with 
electronic gadgets still think this thing looks like it’s pretty much on the 
Eisenhower side at the moment. We’ll be back to you a little later to see 
how you’re getting along with that machinery over there though. 156 
A few days later, the New York Times critic Jack Gould would say that the UNIVAC’s 
on-air troubles during the evening lead several CBS stars – Cronkite, Murrow, and 
Sevareid – to give it a “rough ride.”157 But Collingwood soldiered on after the latest 
UNIVAC segment. He took a turn at the microphone for CBS radio listeners, where he 
tried to put the best face on the computer’s odd prediction, judging from a brief portion of 
the broadcast captured in a transcript found among Collingwood’s papers.158 
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Collingwood was introduced by a member of the CBS radio news staff as having been 
“out consulting with one of the mechanical marvels of the age, that CBS Radio specialty, 
the peculiar device known as Univac.”159 Collingwood recounted UNIVAC’s election-
night chronology to that point, starting with “a little trouble at first” due not to any 
failings of “one of the mechanical marvels of the age” but “because we gave it some 
figures which it didn’t like.”160 “And you know,” Collingwood continued, “the human 
element’s very important in this.” 161 He then told of  UNIVAC’s first on-air prediction of 
an Eisenhower win with 28 states, followed about an hour later – a few minutes before 
Collingwood appeared on radio – by the prediction of the thin Eisenhower victory just 
seen by television viewers. “I merely quote this to you as Univac’s prediction,” said 
Collingwood, who proceeded to talk about a UNIVAC prediction for Connecticut that 
came out at the same time as the computer’s first national prediction. 162 In 
Collingwood’s telling, this prediction was remarkable because with “only” 60 percent of 
Connecticut’s vote in, UNIVAC had forecast an Eisenhower win in that state by 128,000, 
just 2,000 less than the final tally. 163 “You can’t do much better than that,” he said. Not 
mentioned was the fact that the Hartford Courant had called the state as a landslide for 
Eisenhower nearly three hours before the first UNIVAC prediction.164 










Meanwhile, a few minutes after the televised report of UNIVAC’s prediction of a 
toss-up, Cronkite cued Murrow again for his take on the election-night developments. 
Murrow spoke with gravity, at a steady clip, glancing in turn at his notes, the camera, and 
what appeared to be a stopwatch that he picked up and held in the palm of one hand. “I 
think it is now reasonably certain that this election is over,” he began.165 “Traditionally, 
the Democratic strength comes from the big cities, and they have failed to deliver in this 
election.” 166 He cited several – Chicago, Boston, Kansas City – where Stevenson’s lead 
was too thin to overcome Republican strength outside the cities. He introduced yet one 
more way of assessing the returns on election night – a concession by New York’s top 
state Democratic official that Eisenhower was the victor there.  He concluded his 
analysis, 79 seconds in duration, as he had begun: “It seems clear on the basis of the big 
city reports, and on the general trend, that General Eisenhower has won the election.”167 
 But as the camera switched back to the anchor desk, Cronkite, again exhibiting 
that tension that had marked his reporting from the state – between reading the signs and 
taking a cautious approach to saying anything that might sound like a prediction – was 
about to use the UNIVAC’s latest utterance and a statement from a Democratic partisan 
in ways that served as counterpoints to Murrow’s unambiguous analysis. Cronkite read 
out the latest vote count – Eisenhower had passed 10.3 million while Stevenson’s tally 
was just under 9.1 million. Together, Cronkite noted, that was “not quite 20 million out 
of an expected 55 to 60 million total. 168 “So you see,” Cronkite remarked, “that 
                                                 







prediction of UNIVAC a moment ago that perhaps this will come out with 24 states for 
each of the gentlemen and Governor Stevenson with a little higher popular vote – General 
Eisenhower just a four-vote or five-vote margin on the electoral side – well, with all the 
votes yet to be counted, of course it’s still conceivable.” 169 And he followed this 
immediately by passing along a statement from Sen. Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, who 
had campaigned unsuccessfully for the Democratic nomination for the presidency. 
Addressing a crowd of Democratic election workers, Kefauver predicted that Stevenson 
would come out the victor when all the votes were in from the cities and the West. 170 
Cronkite was about to give primacy to his human colleague, Murrow, when there 
soon followed an announcement that UNIVAC had issued a new prediction more in line 
with Murrow’s declaration. Shortly after 11:45 p.m., Cronkite interrupted a report on the 
latest vote count to read out the latest results of the computer analysis, which had been 
handed to him on a slip of paper by one of his assistants: 
And now, UNIVAC – UNIVAC, our electronic brain – which a moment 
ago, still thought there was a 7 to 8 chance for Governor Stevenson, says 
that the chances are 100 to 1 in favor of General Eisenhower. I might note 
that UNIVAC is running a few moments behind Ed Murrow, however. Ed 
Murrow, some 15 or 20 minutes ago said he thought it was in the bag for 
General Eisenhower. 171  
A few minutes later, Collingwood, smoking a cigarette, appeared seated next to Cronkite 
at the anchor desk. After reporting that Eisenhower had “forged into a lead” in 
Stevenson’s home state of Illinois, Cronkite explained Collingwood’s presence: “Charlie 







Collingwood has a report from that electronic predictor, Mr. UNIVAC.”172  “Well, 
Walter,” he began, “Mr. UNIVAC suffered a momentary aberration…”173 He was 
referring to that brief prediction of a tight race at 8-to-7 odds before the reversal back to 
overwhelming odds of an Eisenhower victory. Collingwood gave details of the new 
prediction:  Eisenhower with 424 electoral votes with just 107 for Stevenson, and the 
Republican with a lead on the popular vote of 29 million to 23 million. Stevenson was 
predicted to take only eight states. 174 
Cronkite offered no commentary, but Sevareid did so a few minutes later, just 
before midnight – at the end of the fourth hour of broadcasting – when it was his turn to 
offer an analysis. Instead of speaking first about the election, he chose to begin the brief 
segment by calling attention to the computer’s difficulties and extending the man-vs.-
machine – or journalist-vs.-machine – theme: “Well, since our time is short, Walter, I will 
only say that I’m delighted that UNIVAC, our machine competitor, was wrong for awhile 
and we were consistently right with a human voice or we’d all be victims of 
technological unemployment pretty soon.”175 Cronkite chuckled and replied, “I’m 
beginning to wonder, as I do every election night and every campaign, if there isn’t a 
marginal point though where it’d be nice if machines took over.”176 
At about 20 minutes after midnight, with Eisenhower continuing to extend his 
lead in popular vote and electoral vote – including returns in Missouri, the home state of 
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the incumbent Democratic president – Sevareid and Murrow took a turn in front of the 
camera together for several minutes of analysis. Murrow spoke of the failure of the big 
cities and labor unions to deliver for Stevenson. Sevareid spoke about a national mood 
that may have trumped any issues, though he also said that the Korean War, inflation, and 
corruption had been key. And he spoke of the importance of the individuals in the race: 
“the most popular single figure in the country against a man who was utterly unknown 
three months ago.” 177 
Then it was back to Collingwood for what would turn out to be the final UNIVAC 
appearance, just before 12:30 a.m., though the broadcast still had more than two hours to 
run.  Cronkite set up the three-and-a-half minute segment with a quip, foreshadowing the 
kinds of remarks that would be made after election night by others who might be seen as 
probing, through juxtapositions meant to be humorous, the place of computers in the 
mental landscape of journalism and the culture at large:  
Now let’s go over to UNIVAC, the electronic brain, which some time ago 
predicted this victory for General Eisenhower.  Everyone else seems to be 
predicting the victory now for General Eisenhower, so perhaps – it is 
suggested - Univac and Charlie Collingwood can tell us who’s going to 
win the World Series – next year. 178 
Collingwood picked up where he had left off about 45 minutes earlier, talking about what 
he termed UNIVAC’s “momentary aberration” with Eisenhower having only 8-to-7 odds 
of victory.179 Continuing with his approach of investing the machine with human – or at 
least animate – characteristics, Collingwood said of UNIVAC: “… he shook himself, all 
5,500 electronic tubes of him, and came up a few minutes later with a prediction that the 







odds were beyond counting.” Then Collingwood, suggesting that the whole episode had 
been personally unsettling, gave the Remington Rand camp a chance to dig its way out: 
Now I’ve got a lot of faith in this machine, and I was sadly shaken by this 
aberration that it had. So let’s go down to Philadelphia and see whether we 
can get an explanation of what happened to UNIVAC from Mr. Arthur 
Draper who is  the head of the New Products Division of Remington 
Rand’s Laboratory for Advanced Research.  Art, what happened there 
when we came out with that funny prediction? 180 
The camera switched to Philadelphia. Draper was seated by the UNIVAC console. He 
had a headset on and held a microphone. He had a pleasant smile on his face as he 
prepared to launch into an explanation. The story that would be told for decades 
afterward about UNIVAC’s election-night debut would come to hinge on what he said. 
Of more immediate relevance, certainly, was the near-term, and whether the election-
night difficulties could be cast into a useful narrative for Remington Rand’s still nascent 
commercial computer business.  Draper would not only be seen on television. His words 
were also broadcast on CBS radio and would be recounted – on air and in print – the next 
day.181 
“Well, we had a lot of troubles tonight,” Draper began, speaking slowly and 
calmly. 182 “Strangely enough they were all human and not the machine.”  Speaking of a 
prediction that the audience never saw, Draper said: “When UNIVAC made its first 
prediction with only three million votes in, it gave five states for Stevenson, 43 for 
Eisenhower, 93 electoral votes for Stevenson, 438 for Eisenhower. We just plain didn’t 
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believe it.”183  Draper and others would say after election night that a number of factors, 
including the expectation of a close race, had prompted the disbelief which first greeted 
this prediction. But on election night he offered no details to the viewing audience – 
about when this prediction appeared, about why it was not believed, or about who, 
exactly, comprised the “we” who did not believe it. He simply moved on, attempting to 
explain to Collingwood and the audience how, from that point of disbelief, the prediction 
process morphed into generating something the audience did see. He used language that 
might have made sense to someone steeped in the forecasting methodology but must have 
been challenging for most of the audience to follow: “So we asked UNIVAC to forget a 
lot of the trend information that we had put into it, assuming that that was wrong.  So 
UNIVAC worked on a smaller margin of knowledge. This won’t give a wrong answer, 
but it’ll throw the odds to the extent that you saw.”184 
Draper did not elaborate. But he had, with this description, compressed two 
events into one – the first prediction that had aired two and a half hours into the 
broadcast, at around 10:30, which showed Eisenhower winning by an electoral vote of 
314 to 217, and the second aired prediction, about an hour later, which foresaw a 
Stevenson lead in the popular vote and a very close electoral vote favoring Eisenhower, 
with odds of just 8 to 7. Draper did not mention these details. He wrapped up by 
reiterating his message – the one that would end up at the core of the UNIVAC narrative 
thereafter, which was less about what the audience saw and more about what, in Draper’s 
account, had happened out of view: “As more votes came in, the odds came back, and it 






was obviously evident that we should have had nerve enough to believe the machine in 
the first place.  It was right, we were wrong.  Next year we’ll believe it.”185 Collingwood 
jumped in: “You mean four years from now, Art?”  Draper replied, “Well, yes.”  
Collingwood had the floor again in New York. Here was just the sort of scenario 
he had foreshadowed four hours earlier – a mistake – and Draper had taken the fall. 
“Well,” said Collingwood, “I think that was very handsome of Mr. Draper and the people 
down there to take the blame for UNIVAC’s error.  It just goes to show that you can’t 
outsmart the machine.”186 But as Collingwood extended the segment briefly to talk about 
one of UNIVAC’s state predictions, the computer’s on-air troubles were not quite over. 
An hour earlier, Cronkite had reported that three Massachusetts newspapers had called 
that state for Eisenhower, who had a significant lead in the vote count with more than one 
fifth of the precincts reporting, and that trend had even strengthened over the next hour 
with one third of the vote in.187 So Collingwood was struck by what UNIVAC was 
forecasting for Massachusetts now in the early morning hours of Nov. 5: “One interesting 
thing is that UNIVAC still shows that Massachusetts will probably go for Stevenson,” 
said Collingwood.188 “We may see whether that works out right or whether UNIVAC 
changes its mind.” He concluded the computer’s election-night performance with one 
final iteration of the human-vs.-machine trope: 
At the moment, then, UNIVAC predicts, as everyone else is predicting 
now, that Eisenhower is way ahead in a big sweep. UNIVAC says he’ll 
carry all but eight states.  So that’s the way it stands now with our 
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electronic brain back in working order and agreeing with all the human 
brains.  Now to another human brain, Walter Cronkite. 189 
Cronkite picked up the cue: 
Thank you, Charlie Collingwood.  I suspect that’s the nicest thing that has 
been said about me tonight and the nicest likely to be said.  I also like that 
report of Mr. Draper in Philadelphia, proving that humans shouldn’t 
tamper with the thinking of electronic machines.  Very nice, indeed. 190 
Cronkite made no mention of that Massachusetts prediction which was as odd, under the 
circumstances, as UNIVAC’s brief late-night national prediction of a tight race. But just a 
few minutes later, Cronkite would join those Massachusetts newspapers in describing that 
state as “definitely in the Republican column” for the first time in 28 years.191 A 
subsequent Remington Rand report would reveal what the Philadelphia team did not 
know at the time, despite the systems in place to screen returns and detect problems: the 
vote counts given to UNIVAC for Massachusetts had been in error throughout the entire 
night.192 
UNIVAC Behind the Scenes 
There are some curious features of the account Draper provided on election night 
about what had happened behind the scenes at the Eckert-Mauchly plant, along with 
similar accounts – in post-mortem reports, speeches, and articles – that he and several 
others provided, starting immediately after the election. Some of these accounts differ 
from each other in key details, or they are at variance with the content and timing of what 








can be seen on the broadcast. There are also discrepancies between these behind-the-
scenes accounts and what was reported in various post-election news stories, though 
some of these stories were themselves also at odds with each other or with what can be 
seen in the broadcast.  Such discrepancies are to be expected, perhaps. Memory can be 
tricky – even in the short term – for a fast-moving set of very intense events. But the 
issues raised by these discrepancies are not trivial. Versions of the seen and unseen 
events from the CBS-UNIVAC collaboration have gelled over time into a standard, 
incomplete, and, sometimes inaccurate narrative. The questions raised by the various 
discrepancies cannot be perfectly answered with the evidence that has surfaced so far. 
Even so, because much has been made over time of the claim that the computer was able 
to detect early on election night what journalists using traditional means could not, a 
more thorough treatment may help us assess what happened and appreciate in a more 
nuanced way some of the issues surrounding this rollout of new technology in the service 
of an old journalistic and cultural purpose. 
What is clear from all available accounts is that at some point well before the first 
on-air prediction from UNIVAC, which could be seen at around 10:30 p.m., the computer 
had processed the early returns and generated at least one prediction that was met with 
disbelief and was not aired.193 This prediction was said to be based on 3.4 million votes 
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counted at that point in the evening – a figure sometimes rounded down or up. And it was 
said to foresee an overwhelming victory by Eisenhower – by 438 to 93 in electoral votes, 
by 43 to 5 in states won, and by a popular vote of about 33 million to about 19 million, 
with overall odds of an Eisenhower victory figured at or above 100 to 1. There are 
several documents that have been described as copies of the actual printout of this 
prediction, which in each is preceded by these two lines: 
IT’S AWFULLY EARLY, BUT I’LL GO OUT ON A LIMB.  
UNIVAC PREDICTS -- with 3,398,745 votes in -- 194  
In some of these versions the odds in favor of an Eisenhower victory are listed as “100 to 
1” and in others as “00 to 1.” The latter – “00 to 1” – was said to have been a result of the 
programmers not accounting for odds of victory so large that three digits would be 
needed to express them.195 Some of these copies have a handwritten notation – “8:30 
PM” – at the top, though in different handwriting on different versions. But what they all 
have in common is that they lack a computer-generated time stamp. 
What is not certain – though it is relevant to the larger discussion of the 
computer’s touted election-night advantage – is just when this early prediction of a 
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landslide was generated. Because of the fast-moving nature of any election night – and 
this one in particular, as evidence of an Eisenhower victory mounted steadily – the time 
of UNIVAC’s early prediction would be useful to assess. The most commonly cited time 
given for the first prediction was 8:30 p.m. – including the time cited in a subsequent 
account by Draper – but there are also accounts that give the time as 9:15 p.m., including 
one written by Arch Hancock, the Remington Rand publicist.196 In fact, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, a report from the Eckert-Mauchly Division prepared after the election and 
authored by two participants – Max Woodbury, the University of Pennsylvania statistics 
expert, and Herbert F. Mitchell Jr., head of the UNIVAC Applications Department – has 
turned up in two versions that are virtually identical except for this one detail – 8:30 p.m. 
in one version and 9:15 p.m. in the other.197  
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 One possible clue to the time of the first, unaired prediction of a landslide is the 
vote count on which it was said to have been based – that figure typically given as of 3.4 
million, similar to the round figure of 3 million votes mentioned by Draper during his 
mea culpa for the CBS audience.198 This is one of the curious features of Draper’s and 
others’ accounts, and checking it against other available evidence provides a sense of the 
difficulties in saying for certain just what happened, and when, behind the scenes at the 
Eckert-Mauchly plant on election night.  In short, there do not appear to have been 3.4 
million votes available to analyze until well after 8:30. And that does not take into 
consideration the lead time needed to ready the data for analysis nor the several minutes 
needed to run the computer program.199 By all accounts, the vote counts being used by 
the UNIVAC team in Philadelphia were coming via teletype from the CBS election 
headquarters in New York.200 CBS was relying primarily on wire service reports for vote 
counts, which were being posted on displays in the studio and being passed on to 
Cronkite, who, in turn, updated viewers frequently.  Cronkite opened the broadcast at 8 
p.m. with a total combined vote under 600,000. At about 8:30 p.m., just after the segment 
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in which Collingwood introduced the UNIVAC, the total vote count was about 1.2 
million.201 At 9 p.m. the total vote had reached 2.4 million. The tally shown to CBS 
viewers first topped 3 million a few minutes before 9:15 p.m. and stood at 4.1 million by 
about 9:20 p.m.202 These figures are also consistent with an early edition of the Baltimore 
Sun reporting that at 9 p.m., the national vote count for Eisenhower and Stevenson 
combined stood at about 3.4 million.203 And just to complicate the picture further, the 
International News Service generated a dispatch that ran in the Hartford Courant the day 
after the election reporting the UNIVAC forecast of an Eisenhower win with 314 
electoral votes – the one the television audience saw at about 10:30 – was based on 
3,398,745 votes – in other words, the precise figure that would later be said to have been 
the basis of the never-aired 8:30 prediction.204 
 Another important feature of Draper’s early-morning confession was the reaction 
to the initial UNIVAC prediction of a landslide – disbelief – and a few more details 
turned up in subsequent accounts. In their post-election report, Max Woodbury and 
Herbert Mitchell wrote of what happened as that prediction appeared on UNIVAC’s 
printer and clashed with pre-election forecasts of a close race: 
[T]here was a hurried consultation among the top Remington Rand people 
present and Dr. Woodbury. Could this prediction be correct? In view of 
the obvious state of fatigue of all of us who had programmed the job and 
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the lack of time to test the entire procedure on prior election data, it was 
decided that it would be too risky to release this prediction.205 
Herman Lukoff, the engineer in charge of keeping the UNIVAC in working order, gave a 
similar account in his memoir. “Our election officials, Herb Mitchell, Max Woodbury, 
Art Draper, and Phil Vincent looked on in disbelief,” he wrote. “The officials put their 
heads together and said ‘We can’t let this go out. The risk is too great.’”206 
Vincent’s account, in a speech given a few years later, included this observation: 
“Unfortunately, some of us had more confidence in the Gallup Poll prediction than in the 
UNIVAC extrapolation, and decided that the machine could not possibly be right.”207 
After the election, Draper would credit several factors for the disbelief that met the first 
prediction. The expectation of a close race was one. There was also the fact that the 
prediction had been based on a small fraction of all votes cast, that it gave a number of  
southern states to Eisenhower, including states with barely any returns, and that there 
were many states for which votes had not yet begun to come in at all. Under those 
circumstances, “it was beyond comprehension,” said Draper, “that the machine could 
predict with such a degree of certainty that the odds would be greater than 100 to 1.”208 
 Following the original stunned reaction, the next reaction, according to those 
involved, was to look for programming errors.  And finding none, the next step after that 
was to water down the part of the program that had detected a wide swing away from 
previous voting history and applied that swing to areas with votes that had not yet come 
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in. As the evening wore on, according to these accounts, the mounting raw vote swung 
the prediction back to 100-to-one odds of an Eisenhower victory.209 Not clear is exactly 
how all of this translated into the UNIVAC predictions seen and heard during the evening 
on CBS:  the 314-to-217 electoral vote in Eisenhower’s favor at around 10:30 p.m.; the 
very close 270-to-261 electoral vote prediction at odds of just eight-to-seven at around 
11:30 p.m.; the 100-to-one odds of an Eisenhower victory announced by Cronkite at 
around 11:45 p.m.; and the details provided by Collingwood a few minutes later that gave 
these odds as greater than 100-to-one, with Eisenhower taking 424 electoral votes and all 
but eight states. A number of accounts of behind-the-scenes activity and how that 
translated into results released to the CBS audience are at variance – in the number, 
chronology, and timing of various predictions – both with each other and with what can 
be seen in the broadcast itself. 210 
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One other part of the behind-the-scenes story that has not been fully resolved by 
available accounts is whether the UNIVAC team in Philadelphia made a unilateral 
decision to withhold the first prediction of a landslide from CBS, or whether members of 
the CBS staff in New York knew of it and were involved in the decision not to air it. The 
various accounts by those working on the UNIVAC predictions in Philadelphia contain 
no suggestion that CBS was informed of that first prediction.211 And in some cases, the 
accounts suggest that the initial prediction was withheld and that only later was a 
subsequent prediction deemed okay to release to CBS.212 In an account published in 
1972, Mickelson wrote that the initial projection of a landslide was not released to “the 
impatient CBS news executives who were not aware at that time that one run had been 
made.”213 Consistent with this is another account he published in 1989, in which he 
describes the decision to withhold the first prediction as having been made in 
Philadelphia.214 A 1999 news article about UNIVAC’s famed prediction reported that 
“Mickelson made the call not to use the odds,” but the source for this is not specified.215 
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Neither Collingwood nor Cronkite gave any suggestion on air that they had known at the 
time of that first UNIVAC prediction of a landslide. Their on-air demeanor – including 
both Collingwood’s surprise and then frustration at not getting a prediction until 10:30 
p.m. – would seem consistent with not knowing about the early forecast of a landslide. In 
addition, had they known of that prediction, it is reasonable to think that they might have 
proposed airing it once evidence of a strong Eisenhower victory began to mount and long 
before a UNIVAC prediction of a landslide was aired just before midnight. In his script 
for a radio broadcast the next day, Collingwood places the responsibility for suppressing 
the first prediction with the “miserable statisticians who were handling him.”216 But no 
documents have surfaced to date that provide unambiguous evidence, one way or the 
other, to answer the question of whether CBS played a role in suppressing the initial 
forecast. 
One other question is worth addressing at this point, and that has to do with 
whether journalists and others taking part in election-night reporting and analysis would 
have greeted the early landslide prediction as preposterous had they known about it. Or, 
to ask this another way, were there signs available, to those looking closely at the details 
of early returns, that an Eisenhower sweep was developing? It is clear that in the CBS 
newsroom, there was a range of comfort levels with reading an outcome into the early 
returns. And Collingwood himself wrote in a radio script the day after the election that 
the desire of journalists not to repeat the errors of 1948, when they underestimated 
Truman’s strength, left them underestimating Eisenhower’s. “Reporters can cover 
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football games, fires, every variety of human experience,” Collingwood said, “but put 
them on an election and you can’t get them to believe their eyes and ears.”217 Yet there is 
also evidence that soon after election returns began coming in to newsrooms in a number 
of places, reporters and analysts were taking note of a string of surprising developments 
favoring Eisenhower. On the CBS broadcast, Cronkite found them in South Carolina, 
Connecticut, Florida, Baltimore, Cleveland, and elsewhere. The Hartford Courant had 
reported even earlier, at 7:40 p.m., that Eisenhower had carried the much-watched state 
of Connecticut.218 Douglas Cornell of the Associated Press Washington bureau wrote 
after the election that “the outcome was obvious almost from the start” and that “by 8 
p.m., we were writing that Ike had crashed into the lead and was running strongly.”219 
And in the first few minutes of the radio network coverage at NBC, correspondents in the 
field were filing dispatches of surprising Eisenhower strength in various states by looking 
at complete returns from particular cities and towns and how they compared to 1948.220 
At the New York Times, experienced reporters were working their contacts around the 
country to get a read on the early voting.221 One checked with the managing editor of the 
Miami Herald and was told by 8:30 that Eisenhower would take Florida.222 After word 
came at 9:05 p.m. that Eisenhower was ahead by 2,000 votes in industrial Rome, N.Y., 
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another veteran New York Times reporter remarked to one of the editors, “Looks like it’s 
all over.” 223 And in a post-election recap, Time magazine would report that by 9 p.m., 
with less than 5 percent of the vote counted, “almost every indicator was beginning to 
point Ike’s way.”224 In addition, the Republican National Chairman, Arthur Summerfield, 
was making pronouncements at about 8 p.m. that a “landslide” seemed to be 
developing.225 Before 9 p.m., Summerfield had escalated his imagery, with CBS 
reporting that he had claimed victory and deemed Eisenhower to be “rolling on like a 
tidal wave.”226 Summerfield was a partisan, to be sure, but his remarks were reported 
nonetheless by CBS, and his assertion certainly introduced he notion of a landslide early 
on into the evening’s discourse.227  
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the UNIVAC camp’s reluctance to believe 
the early forecast, then, is what this might tell us about how they and CBS envisioned the 
computer’s role. It was to be a thing apart. It would be included in the broadcast, to be 
sure, but its use would not be integrated with the other means by which journalists on 
election night try to make sense of the returns.  There was a camera crew in Philadelphia 
but no correspondent. As Collingwood had put it, the computer was “sitting there in his 
corner.”228 The experts in programming, statistics, and engineering had anticipated a 
great many sources of error and built in a variety of means by which to detect them. But 
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they do not appear to have anticipated the scenario – surprising in light of the fresh 
memories of 1948 – in which the computer would generate a correct prediction so 
surprising that it would not be believed. Their implicit methodology on election night, 
then, was to compare the prediction to expectation rather comparing the prediction to 
other sorts of fresh data points, easily obtained, by listening to the radio or watching 
television or brainstorming with experienced reporters and political observers. Draper 
dismissed as impossible in real time a solution that might have involved checking the 
calculations.229 He and his colleagues looked, instead, for errors in their statistical model 
and their program. No clear evidence has emerged that built into the process was a means 
by which the UNIVAC team would discuss the predictions with the CBS staff, both 
groups together assessing both the validity of the computer-generated predictions and the 
validity of assessments made by other means, with each perhaps reflecting on the 
implications of the others’ findings for their own work. 
In the end, the UNIVAC had been added to the election-night formula – to attract 
and interest viewers and generate headlines – but it was not well integrated into the 
journalism of election night.  At CBS, this even had a physical dimension, with the 
computer operating in another city. At NBC, where the Monrobot had been used to attract 
viewers, there would also be a lack of integration on election night. This would be 
manifested, in part, by not incorporating the Monrobot into the NBC television and radio 
broadcasts until well into the evening, just after 10 p.m. Still, in one of the details of this 
election night that would be lost until now from the historical record, the Monrobot 
would beat its giant competitor to the airwaves with an analysis of returns. 
                                                 




The Monrobot’s Election-Night Debut on NBC Radio and Television  
NBC started its television coverage of the election an hour later than CBS, 
allowing a regular variety show, the Buick Circus Hour, to run until 9 p.m. in its usual 
time slot, albeit with a special guest star, the highly popular Milton Berle.230  NBC radio 
took to the air with its coverage at 8 p.m. Many of the themes paramount in CBS 
election-night broadcasting could also be seen at play on NBC from the outset.  Among 
these was the highlighting of the night’s drama and the positioning of the network at 
center stage. In doing so, mention of the Monrobot would have a role in touting the 
special nature of the NBC effort, even if the computer itself would not be heard from for 
another two hours.  As with the UNIVAC at CBS, the Monrobot would be a player in the 
NBC broadcast on radio and television – described in wondrous terms at the outset, but 
then not quickly or tightly integrated into the evening’s agenda for delivering news.231 
 At NBC, the wonder of the election’s mass action, the wonder of the radio’s 
nationwide audience, and the “story of the story” were combined to position the network 
at the center the night’s events along with the sponsor of its radio and television 
broadcasts, Philco. “From all over the nation,” said announcer Bob Murphy, “your votes 
are coming in – votes from free Americans in a free election.” 232 Together NBC and 
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Philco were presenting the results in the “in the public interest,” said Murphy. 233 And the 
audience could hardly have missed the sponsor’s self interest, too, as Murphy proceeded 
to run down a list of Philco products: radios, television sets, radio phonographs, 
refrigerators, freezers, electric ranges, and air conditioners. These were not just 
appliances notable for their special or innovative features, but throughout the evening 
they would be touted as technological wonders, and the radio audience would hear 
repeatedly about the television set with a unique “golden grid tuner.”234  
The anchor, Merrill “Red” Mueller, was introduced in heroic terms as a 
distinguished reporter whose career included covering World War II in North Africa, 
Europe, and Asia, and other key stories since. Mueller, in turn, noted that there were not 
yet any meaningful trends. He promised that there would be a state-by-state rundown of 
returns at the beginning of each hour, and he invited the audience to take part in 
analyzing them: “So get your pencils ready, have your charts at hand, and sit back and 
enjoy the 1952 election with the greatest NBC radio staff ever assembled for political 
coverage.” 235 
H.V. Kaltenborn was introduced as the “dean of American news analysts.” 236 But 
his initial remarks gave the appearance, at the outset anyway, that he might not have 
learned his lesson from the drubbing he received in 1948 after letting expectations of a 
Dewey victory interfere with the ability to see the developing Truman victory.  
“Everyone agrees that the popular vote will be close and the early returns suggest that 








that will be the case,” he told his audience now in 1952. “That will make it all the more 
difficult to determine the electoral vote.” 237 
Next, it was time for another member of the NBC radio news staff, George Hicks, 
to extend the “story of the story” with a description of Studio 8-H. There was the raised 
table with six microphones for the radio broadcasters. There were four half-room sets for 
television commentators to report on various contests, with Hicks noting that this was the 
first time NBC had combined radio and television operations in this way. There was 
machinery – tabulating and adding machines operated by several dozen people, teletype 
machines bringing news “from every hamlet in the country.”  And there was one more 
device. “Over our shoulder against one wall is the Monrobot,” said Hicks. “This is a huge 
machine. It will add, subtract, give odds, multiply.  All you do is feed in the new figure 
and out on a square card comes the printed result you want.”238 The studio arrangements 
also included, he acknowledged, means for monitoring other broadcasts to see how NBC 
was doing in comparison.239 
 Despite Mueller’s initial statement about the absence of discernible trends and  
Kaltenborn’s assertion that the race looked close, as NBC switched to correspondents 
around the country, listeners could hear about vote counts which, when compared to 
historical patterns, pointed in Eisenhower’s direction. Noting that Connecticut was a state 
which might point the way to a broader trend in the presidential election, Mueller 
introduced a reporter from affiliate WTIC in Hartford. There, it was said, “General 
Eisenhower is scoring a smashing victory in Connecticut on the basis of unofficial but 







substantial returns.” 240 Upside surprises were reported for Eisenhower in a number of 
cities, including Bridgeport – a city Truman had carried by 7,000 votes in 1948 but which 
Eisenhower carried this time by three votes. 241 In Boston, the complete vote from several 
small towns was dissected to show a similar pattern. In Boxford, for example, a 
community north of Boston, the Republican candidate had won handily in 1948, but this 
time the margin in Eisenhower’s favor was even more overwhelming.242 
 Even this far into the era of network radio, the switches back and forth to 
correspondents in cities far from New York were treated as wondrous. Mueller 
introduced a report from the West Coast this way: “Now it’s time to go really jumping 
across the country – out across the wide Missouri, over the continental divide, and 
through the Sierras, to California.”243  And when that report was over, Mueller set up the 
next one in similar fashion. “And now it’s time to keep up with the speed of electronics, 
having jumped back from Hollywood to New York 3,000 miles we go halfway back 
across the country again,” he said excitedly. “For another report from the Midwest, we 
switch to St. Louis and station KSD.”244 
 The Monrobot would not be brought out during the broadcast’s first hour – or its 
second – but at about 8:50 p.m., Kaltenborn was given a second turn at the microphone 
for his analysis of the returns in the presidential race. He was still cautious, but the 
Republican national chairman’s comments about a developing landslide gave him an 









opening to talk about signs in Eisenhower’s favor – a “glimmering” of a landslide, he 
conceded, but “not yet bright sunshine.”245  Deemed especially interesting was South 
Carolina, with Eisenhower leading in a traditionally Democratic state where he had been 
endorsed by the Democratic governor. But Kaltenborn’s efforts to parse the vote in 
particular areas hit a wall when he talked about Eisenhower’s steady lead in the national 
popular vote. While that, if it continued, might mean a landslide, he said, “since we don’t 
know exactly from what states and what areas in each state these votes come, the vote is 
too small out of the expected total of 55 to 60 million to be definitely indicative.”246 
At 9 p.m., with the NBC radio broadcast already underway for an hour, NBC 
launched its television coverage from the same headquarters, Studio 8-H in Rockefeller 
Center.247  Newscaster John Cameron Swayze, who would be covering the presidential 
contest throughout the night, opened by explaining a map behind him with oddly-shaped 
states that were proportioned according to the size of their electoral votes. After a general 
discussion of the regions of the country and their voting history, he launched right in to 
returns from what he termed eight “key” states – implicitly important, judging from the 
content of his remarks, for their predictive potential.248 In six of these, there were 
surprises favoring Eisenhower – Connecticut, Florida, Ohio, South Carolina, Virginia, 
and Maryland, the latter said to have gone with the winner in all but one presidential 
election since 1888. One of the other states was Illinois, and Stevenson’s lead there he 
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attributed to the city vote. The eighth state was Tennessee, where Swayze deemed 
Stevenson’s lead to be no surprise.249 
With television, the network had the ability to present in a visual way the “story 
of the story,” and the program’s producers made use of this to allow viewers to see the 
studio arrangements. During much of the program, the shots would be mostly close-ups, 
with fewer of the CBS-style sweeping views of the studio and its infrastructure of 
cameras, cables, lights, and support staff. But after Swayze concluded his initial report 
from selected states, the NBC television broadcast was more grandly introduced by an 
unseen newscaster, Kenneth Banghart, who described what the audience was seeing as a 
camera began to slowly pan around the studio. 250 The network had assembled a team 
with the “hardest-headed political observers,” Banghart said in dramatic fashion. 251 And 
while the Monrobot was not immediately mentioned by name, it was among the novelties 
that NBC was using to promote its broadcast at the outset. “Our experts will be aided for 
the first time by amazing new machines,” said Banghart, “scientific brains rallied by 
NBC television to bring you the most accurate picture with split-second timing.” 252  
The first thing seen by the television audience in Banghart’s tour of the studio was 
the audience in the studio – men in coats and ties and women in evening wear, milling 
about in a roped off area to one side of the studio – along with a number of young men 
and women in uniforms, presumably NBC ushers or guides. The camera picked up a long 
desk on a raised platform with seats where at least 10 individuals – the radio staff –were 








working, already in their second hour of broadcasting. There were others working at a 
bank of teletype machines, where wire-service dispatches were bringing election news 
and returns, and there were individuals seated at desks with calculating machines. As the 
camera continued its sweep, there were camera operators and others operating 
microphone booms. There were three small sets – each with a desk, a wall display, and 
prominently displayed PHILCO signs – for the Electoral College vote, the House of 
Representatives results, and the Senate results, along with a display for reporting on the 
governor’s races. There were banks of the special National Cash Register machines that 
had been assembled for showing the state-by-state results to the television audience. And 
then, said Banghart, continuing with his excited tone: “Let’s come around to the fabulous 
electronic indicator – Mike Monrobot, we call it – stuffed with information to compare 
speedily the figures with those of 1948, to show the trends. Morgan Beatty is there, ready 
to report those trends. “253 The audience could see, behind Beatty, the desk-sized 
computer, with its cover flipped up vertically as a backdrop, showing some of its 
electronic components. In front of Beatty and facing him across another desk was a 
young woman tending to the computer’s keyboard for input and automatic typewriter for 
its output, both of which sat on the desktop. The tour was completed as the camera 
circled back to the studio audience again, and Banghart promised that the returns would 
be brought to the viewing audience as fast as the “battery of computing machines can 
work.”254  






Finally, Banghart came around to Bill Henry, the anchor. Henry was the 1950s 
version of a multimedia journalist who had penned an election-day column in The Los 
Angeles Times talking about the Monrobot, comparing it to Kaltenborn, and poking some 
fun at both.255  Henry began with a report on the weather, including transparent cartoon-
like drawings of a smiling sun or an umbrella that said “RAIN” being passed clumsily 
over various parts of a map of the United States. 256 The rest of the first half-hour of the 
television broadcast included a state-by-state rundown by Swayze. All the latest surprises 
were in Eisenhower’s favor among states with at least four or five percent of their votes 
counted: Kentucky, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island.  At about 9:35 p.m., it was 
Kaltenborn’s turn to join in at the anchor desk for his first television appearance of the 
night, and he was ready to shed the cautious approach he had taken earlier on radio. 
Introduced by Henry as a “veteran expert” and an “old friend,” Kaltenborn launched right 
in: “Well, if you want me to make a prediction, I predict that Eisenhower is going to be 
elected.”257 The overriding reason for his call: “Eisenhower is ahead in every doubtful 
state from which we have sufficient reports to indicate any kind of a trend.” 258 He went 
on to talk about a few states and the South, where he said Eisenhower’s strength was 
especially important. At the end he came back to the point with which he had started, that 
“one might be safe in saying that it looks quite definitely like General Eisenhower at this 
hour.” 259   
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The Monrobot would get its first turn before the television audience a half hour 
later, at about 10:05 p.m.260 Though the small computer would not get quite the “rough 
ride” that the UNIVAC was said to have gotten from some of the CBS news staff on 
election night, the enthusiasm of the newsman assigned to it, Beatty, was not the response 
of others on the broadcast. There seemed to be a look of mirth on Henry’s face – as if he 
were holding back laughter – when he cued the first Monrobot segment. “One of the 
more interesting features of our election coverage here,” said Henry, “is the mechanical 
brain, the Monrobot, which is being watched now by our man Beatty, who is riding heard 
on it.  And Morgan is ready to explain it, so now to Morgan Beatty.261 
The camera switched to Beatty with the desk-sized Monrobot behind him. Its 
operator, Marilyn Mason, was sitting across a desk in front of him. On top of that desk 
were the Monrobot’s controls and printer, connected by unseen wires to the computer. 
Without missing a beat, Beatty launched right in after Henry’s cue:  
And the Monrobot, the electronic brain, has raced far ahead of the election 
returns at this moment, and they have tabulated five million votes and 
combined them with millions of digits that have run through these 
electronic tubes here and have calculated the odds at this point of the 
election returns and they show General Eisenhower is favored to win six 
to five on an isolated basis. 262   
Referring to a recent bulletin that an aide to Stevenson had said the news looked grim, 
Beatty boasted: “That was confirmed a half hour ago by the electronic brain.” 263 But as 
would be the case with the UNIVAC later in the evening, the audience would have to 
                                                 







take the word of someone associated with the computer project – Beatty here, as it would 
be Remington Rand’s Draper on CBS – that the computer had been a genius behind the 
scenes. No records have surfaced to explain why no analysis was reported from the 
Monrobot until after 10 p.m. One possibility – given the degree of advanced planning for 
the NBC broadcast – is that the Monrobot was simply not scripted to be part of the 
television or radio program until the second hour, when there might have been an 
expectation before election night that the contest might still be close.  Or, given Richard 
LaManna’s account of the Monrobot’s pre-election troubles, with bits of solder falling 
into the computer’s drum memory, perhaps there was some behind the scenes intrigue 
over the computer’s operation.264 Or, perhaps the computer was simply seen more as a 
promotional tool than one what might yield valuable insights. We do not know, in part, 
because unlike those promoting the UNIVAC, there does not appear to have been much 
of a post-election campaign to tell the Monrobot story. 
Beatty had not introduced the machine the way Collingwood had, with a 
presentation of the election night problem, a discussion of the methodology to be used, or 
a description of the computer and its operations.  The well-known NBC broadcaster’s 
presentation was, in all likelihood, baffling to much of the audience. He did not explain, 
for those who might not be familiar with statistics or horse racing, what odds meant 
generally. He did not explain, either, what it meant to refer to particular odds as being 
“on an isolated basis.”265 And at times he presented the odds in such rapid-fire fashion 
that it might have been hard for knowledgeable viewers to follow.  He did present 
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comparative data – such as the odds at the same time of the evening in 1948 that favored 
Truman five-to-four – but he did not explain what to make of that in connection with the 
six-to-five for Eisenhower.  His enthusiasm led him to return several times to the 
Monrobot’s powers of detection, though even here, his report could be confusing. For 
example, he said the odds favoring Stevenson were six-to-four in Illinois, but that the 
“brain has raced far ahead of that” by taking the “downstate” vote into consideration and 
thus favoring Eisenhower one-and-a-quarter-to-one. 266 What he apparently meant was 
what he said next – not that the current odds favored Stevenson, as he said at the outset, 
but that they showed Eisenhower ahead in the odds “despite the fact that Governor 
Stevenson is far ahead” – apparently in the Illinois returns themselves. 267 At one point, 
Beatty asked Mason for fresh information on Connecticut. She pulled a sheet of paper out 
of the printer and handed it to Beatty, and he used that information to return to the point 
he had made at the outset. Referring to the dark assessment given by a Stevenson aide, 
Beatty said that “the suspicions of the governor of Illinois that things look pretty grim 
were confirmed well over – well ahead of the governor himself – by the electronic 
brain.”268  
Notably, in comparing machine to human, the humans Beatty chose as foils were 
Stevenson and his aides – not for being wrong, but for being slow. And in making 
machine-vs.-human comparisons, he avoided skewering the pollsters for predicting a 
close race or some of his journalistic colleagues for their cautious approach on election 
night to making a strong statement about the likely outcome based on early returns. He 







was not positioning the Monrobot as an improvement over either the journalist or the 
pollster. 
The Monrobot segment had lasted two minutes. Next on camera was Swayze to 
report, as well, on the presidential contest. Swayze made no reference to the Monrobot or 
to Beatty’s report and repeated the same news with which Beatty had begun – about the 
Stevenson aide describing the situation as grim.269 Beatty and the Monrobot would not, in 
fact, come back before the television audience until after midnight. Nor would the 
computer or its output be discussed before then, with the exception of one quip by Henry, 
who, when adding up presidential votes in his head, said, “That’s just a rough guess – I 
haven’t got that Monrobot at my fingertips here.”270 
Minutes after concluding the first televised Monrobot segment, Beatty did make 
his way over to the radio desk – apparently accompanied by Marilyn Mason, the 
Monrobot operator – for a turn with the listening audience.271 Mueller set up the segment 
with the human-vs.-machine motif, speaking of the “two brains” that just sat down with 
the radio staff.272 “One,” said Mueller, “belongs to a very famous Washington 
correspondent of ours, Mr. Morgan Beatty, and the other one belongs to a mechanical 
genius that he’s operating over here in the corner of the room.”273 Mueller then asked 
Beatty for “the report from the dual brain.”274 
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 Beatty picked right up with the same theme. “I’ve got a lot of respect for this 
mechanical genius over there,” he said, and then in a bit of self-deprecation, added: 
“Marilyn, I don’t think you need my brain anymore at all.”275 Beatty gave the radio 
audience a report much like the one he had given on television, including a claim that 
“our mechanical brain was exactly one hour ahead” of the Stevenson aide “in figuring 
that things looked pretty grim.”276 Beatty came back to the same notion of the machine as 
faster than the Stevenson camp after talking about the results both in the Chicago vote 
count and the national returns, saying “this machine was a little smarter than the governor 
of Illinois.”277 Beatty spoke of the Monrobot as being so fast that it could “figure the odds 
while the race is being run.” 278 And in a quest, perhaps, to find new ways of describing 
the odds, he came up with one set of curious terms, an apparent reference to a female 
figure with proportions larger at the bottom than the top: 
… I would like to point out a solid state.  One that’s got a nice good, 
round-sized vote, this is a luscious pear-shaped vote we’ve got here, and 
it’s very indicative of the situation in the East.   Eisenhower odds, with 
nearly half the vote counted in the state of Connecticut, odds in favor of 
Eisenhower five to three, meaning there are eight chances there and 
Eisenhower has five out of those eight in his hands already. 279   
And that was it. Beatty turned the microphone back to Mueller, who, in an attempt at 
humor, offered up an image suggesting that he may have found Beatty’s assignment hard 
to take seriously. “We’ll excuse you to get back and fan those tubes,” said Mueller. 









“Don’t let that blow out over there, boy.” 280    
 In addition to computer analysis, the various ways of divining the direction and 
meaning of the vote that had been seen on CBS television were also in play at NBC. In 
between accounts of Senate, House, and gubernatorial races, the NBC coverage of the 
presidential contest skipped around among a wide range of voices: reports by NBC staff 
in the studio, reports by correspondents in other cities, the dispatches of newspapers, the 
observations of those seen as keen observers of politics or public opinion, the statements 
of national party figures, and the concessions of state party chairmen. Those who 
appeared live on NBC radio and television were generally introduced in a deferential 
matter by Mueller and Henry. And one of the most notable differences among the various 
commentators who appeared live was their comfort level at various points in the evening 
in saying something definitive about the outcome based on a largely common set of 
available facts. 
  The pollster Elmo Roper had appeared first on the radio broadcast at about 9:35 
p.m., when Mueller introduced him as a “real expert.”281 He was introduced on television 
about an hour later as someone who could “really explain” the situation as more votes 
came in.282 In both segments, Roper chose to lay out a scenario by which Eisenhower, 
who had an increasingly solid lead in the national returns, could win the popular vote but 
still lose the electoral vote. He made clear that he was not deeming this probable, but 
possible. And in his television segment, he went on to mention not just the surprising 
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Stevenson weakness in parts of the South, but also developments in Pennsylvania that 
could break in Stevenson’s favor. 283  
Kaltenborn got another chance just after 11 p.m. to offer up his analysis of the 
presidential vote count before the Monrobot’s return to the air, and he used the occasion 
to remind viewers of the very definite prediction they had already heard from him of an 
Eisenhower victory, which was made at about 9:35 p.m.284 He went farther this time, 
saying that Eisenhower was about to score one of the most convincing Electoral College 
wins in American history. 
Henry wrapped up that segment by commending Kaltenborn for his early call, 
while making it clear that this was Kaltenborn’s, not the network’s, assessment: “Well, 
H.V., I’m glad to have that analysis of the situation from you because this certainly is a 
very crucial moment now in the night’s returns, and I think that we got in first with our – 
with your, uh, suggestion that Eisenhower was very vitally in the lead.”285 Henry 
continued, as Cronkite had, to waiver between what was apparent – mounting evidence in 
favor of Eisenhower – and an apparent need to make clear that the counting was not done 
and the outcome was not certain. A few minutes after the Kaltenborn segment, and after a 
report reiterating the concession of New York to Eisenhower by the state Democratic 
Party chairman, Swayze poked some fun at “political observers” who had been unwilling 
to make definitive statements about the likely outcome before the election, and Henry 
joined in, saying it was looking like they had been “fooled.”286 But Henry would go on 
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then, and later, to note that results were definite only for a few states. Just before 
midnight, for example, after Swayze reported a Democratic concession in another state, 
New Jersey, Henry pointed out that “there’s no such thing as a forfeit in politics,” with 
nothing definite until a state’s final vote count.287 He also painted a scenario by which the 
tide could turn in Stevenson’s favor with a few key states – including California, 
Pennsylvania, and Illinois – even though Eisenhower would win easily if he claimed all 
of the states in which he was then leading.  
Just before the Monrobot’s second appearance, one more sort of election-night 
voice of analysis was heard from – James Farley, a Coca-Cola executive and former 
national and New York Democratic Party chief who had served as postmaster general 
under President Franklin Roosevelt.288  He said he was sorry to have to admit the 
apparent Democratic defeat. “That was evident to me,” he said, “from the early 
returns.”289 Then it was Beatty’s turn with the Monrobot again – at about 12:10 a.m. – 
and Henry again had a mirthful look on his face as he gave a cue for the segment: “And 
now, let’s go across the hall to the ‘brain’ and to Morgan Beatty.”290  Though there was 
little mystery left about who would win, Beatty’s enthusiasm had not waned. He was 
given nearly six minutes for his segment, and he repeatedly praised the computer’s 
performance, starting with his opening: “And over here at Monrobot, the electronic brain, 
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we’ve been ahead of these trends all evening long.”291 He recited in rapid fire the 
changing odds projected by the Monrobot during the evening – six-to-five, nine-to-seven, 
five-to-four, and now three-to-one. He compared Truman’s odds at midnight in 1948 to 
the much more favorable Eisenhower standings at midnight in 1952, even though the gap 
in the popular vote was similar. He took a shot at explaining the methodology being used, 
Pointing his pencil over his shoulder where some of the Monrobot’s electronic 
components could be seen, he said, “You know we run the popular vote in through these 
electronic tubes in comparison with mathematical formulas based on the last election and 
the expected vote, and the result is that trends are established.”292 He added, by way of 
explanation, “We’re not predicting anything on the mechanical robot.” 293 Beatty 
discussed some state votes and, in connection with one, suggested that “the electronic 
brain here has picked up something that everyone else seems to be missing.” 294 It was the 
odds favoring an Eisenhower win in Tennessee – which he confirmed by asking Mason to 
check them for him – though NBC had been reporting for well over an hour that 
Eisenhower had a surprising lead in Tennessee and Roper had remarked on it even 
earlier.295 
 Beatty signed off, and Henry, smiling, thanked him “for that very enlightening 
information on the situation.”296 Then, without any commentary on the content of 
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Beatty’s report, Henry called Roper in again as “the noted expert on these things.”297 And 
even this late in the evening, while conceding that an Eisenhower victory was looking 
likely, Roper cautioned that “there are still some big question marks.” 298 But it was also 
soon Kaltenborn’s turn again, at about 12:35 a.m. Again, he reminded viewers of his 
televised prediction for Eisenhower, the one made at about 9:35 p.m. And again, Henry 
remarked on Kaltenborn’s call, this time saying that it was “mighty fine” that Kaltenborn 
had been “the first one to state the situation.”299 
Within an hour – just after 1 a.m. – Henry was about to cue Beatty at the 
Monrobot one more time, but noted first that those who had been predicting a landslide 
seemed to have been correct as New York had clearly sided with Eisenhower and the 
California Democratic Party chairman had conceded his state, as well.300 
The Monrobot was up for its third and final appearance about a half hour after 
CBS had retired UNIVAC for the night. Beatty might have been forgiven for losing his 
enthusiasm by then, but he didn’t. And again he brought out the machine-vs.-human 
theme – and again claiming not that the Monrobot had been ahead of the journalists and 
commentators, but a safer target: the politicians, also part of the election night mix for 
voices offering analysis and prognostication. Perhaps as a follow-up to Henry’s report of 
the California Democrats’ concession, Beatty opened with this: “Very interesting that our 
electronic brain has stayed ahead of the politicians all night, and we’re very proud of 
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it.”301 Again he cited the history of the night’s odds and said that Mason was calculating 
the latest national odds. He continued to talk about a number of states while he waited – 
including the ambiguous remark that Eisenhower was favored one-to-one in 
Pennsylvania, and in Montana, too. He returned to ask Mason whether she had finished 
calculating the odds, but as she began to answer that she had, Beatty cut her off and said 
“I think we’re getting them now” as someone he addressed as “Rex” handed him a sheet 
of paper from outside the camera’s view.302 Reading that sheet,  Beatty said the odds had 
now risen from three-to-one up to ten-to-one, and then, laughing and tossing that sheet of 
paper off to the side, he added, “you’d just as well make it 100 to 1.”303 If the Monrobot 
was having troubles on election night from the bits of solder that had damaged part of the 
memory several days earlier when the computer had been moved to Rockefeller Center, 
Beatty betrayed no hint of it – though he may have left the audience wondering why the 
final round of odds he cited had come to him not from Mason but from someone off 
camera.304 
Once more, Henry was in command back at the anchor desk, and this time he did 
make a comment about the computer, but not a complimentary one. “One of the things 
that I don’t think that that brain can tell is what accounts for some of these things that 
have happened.”305 And here Henry seemed to have been holding himself up as one of 
those who could deliver the kind of sense-making that the computer could not. Perhaps in 
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response to Beatty’s report that Eisenhower was favored to win in Arizona, Henry talked 
about how remarkable it was to see that state go Republican, but that the recently-elected 
Republican governor there was a “ball of fire” – and former “radio man” and “alumnus of 
this particular business” – who had been successful in running the state.306 
 A short while later, there was one more important election-night voice to weigh 
in: the New York Times. Henry told his audience a few minutes after 1 a.m. that the Times 
would be announcing Eisenhower’s election in the next edition. “They are ready,” said 
Henry. “They’re not going to wait for anybody to concede.”307 His remarks suggest that 
in 1952, no matter what reporters and pundits and even computers might say, the fact that 
a newspaper was going to call a race over before the candidate had conceded was still 
news for an election-night broadcast audience. 
As NBC was wrapping up its television broadcast for the might, Beatty got one 
more turn before the cameras, but this time joining Henry at the anchor’s desk. Like a 
dog on a bone, Henry was himself not ready to concede the relevance of the Monrobot to 
the broadcast. One could hear it in his tones and his words, including, again, an image 
giving primacy to humans unaided by electronic brains. But Beatty, too, was not giving 
up his boosterism.  Henry opened the segment this way, as Beatty chuckled at his words: 
We’ve had quite a time this evening, and one of the interesting features of 
what we’ve been doing tonight has been the work of Morgan Beatty with 
the Monrobot, the wonderful electronic thinker, and we want to prove to 
you that it is possible for Mr. Beatty to speak, think, and act without 
having an electronic tube in one ear. And Morgan, tell us what you think 
of this election.308  
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And again, without missing a beat, Beatty, delayed his own analysis to heap praise on the 
computer: “Well, I think Mike Monrobot, our new star, performed beautifully.”309 And 
then he went on to reference a methodology that seems highly unlikely to have been used, 
but this, perhaps, gave Beatty an opening to make a point about an electorate in which 
women had reached numbers in equity with men: 
Seems to me the most important thing about Mike was that he was right 
because for once, he gets the women. Now I think we’ve got a very 
important element there. It’s quite obvious that a high proportion of these 
voters were going to be women this time and they weren’t voting 
according to past party loyalties because they didn’t need to have any.  
And if you assume that 50 or more percent were women, you assume that 
they didn’t like the idea about withholding and inflation, all at the same 
time, and also assume the Korean – interest they had in the Korean issue – 
and when we put that factor into Mike Monrobot over there, he gets the 
women.” 310  
And one more time, he referenced something he had said four and a half hours earlier 
when he had gotten his first turn on camera with the computer. It was that 45 minutes 
before word had come from Stevenson’s camp that things looked grim for the 
Democratic candidate, the computer had come to the same conclusion. What Beatty did 
not say at this early morning hour was that this feat of prognostication was not aired right 
away, and was only announced at a point in the broadcast when both the stream of returns 
and one of Stevenson’s own aides were hinting strongly at his defeat. 
 At 3 a.m., the NBC national television broadcast from New York ended as it had 
begun, with the story of the story. The camera pulled back and panned the room once 
more – now, as Henry put it, “this rather deserted scene before you, just a few people 






left.”311 Henry noted by name some of the correspondents and news managers who had 
taken part in the network’s coverage of the campaign and elections, and thanked the 
companies that had brought their expertise and equipment to bear on election night, 
including the Monroe Calculating Machine Company, National Cash Register, and the 
Victor Adding Machine Company. “The excitement is now over,” he said. “But those of 
us who have had a part in it are not going to forget it for a long time.” 312 
Wrapping it up at CBS: Mysteries and Messages of the Voters 
CBS also wrapped up its broadcast after nearly seven hours with no reference to 
the UNIVAC but with brief remarks from Lowell Thomas, Edward Murrow and Eric 
Sevareid – a summing up, as Cronkite called it.313 What had happened in the election, an 
Eisenhower landslide, was known and agreed upon by all the various sources of analysis 
– journalists, commentators, pollsters, political party officials, wire services, newspaper 
editors, computer, and, finally, Stevenson’s concession and Eisenhower’s acceptance of 
victory.  The remarks that ended the evening for CBS were almost epistemological in 
nature – taking on, in part, the question of what led to that outcome and what could and 
could not be known about those causes.  And there were digs at those who would deign to 
be able to know what the voters had been thinking and predict what they might do.  The 
resistance here was not to technology – UNIVAC was not mentioned – but to the notion 
that people could be reduced to simple ciphers and that by whatever means, their 
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intentions and motives could be known to a certainty. And yet, these journalists, among 
the best known and most respected broadcasters of the day, might be said to want it both 
ways, trying as best they could to offer their understanding of what it was the voters had 
done and what the vote meant. 
Thomas kicked it off with a dig at the pollsters:  “One interesting sidelight on all 
this victory of General Eisenhower is the way the eminent gentlemen who conducted the 
polls were fooled. Don’t you think so? I wonder if they were just too scared this time.”314 
He went on to tell some anecdotes about meeting or encountering Eisenhower – in France 
during World War II, in a New York restaurant, and even in Thomas’s own home – the 
point of these stories to communicate the personal traits that transcended Eisenhower’s 
initial lack of political know-how and accounted in a large measure for his eventual 
success: “Don’t you believe that that personal warmth played a great part in winning this 
tremendous political victory? I do.”315  The victor had exuded, as well, “simplicity” and 
“forthrightness.”316 And Thomas made no pretense to objectivity in ending his segment 
with this description of Eisenhower: “the man we need, the man the world needs, at this 
time.”317 
Murrow was up next. Speaking in measured and serious tones, looking alternately 
at his notes and the camera, he was still striving for eloquence at the end of a long and 
hectic night: “Walter, it seems to me that this was the end of an era in American politics, 
a great exclamation point in our national history – because tonight, after 20 long years, 
                                                 







the traditional concessions of defeat came not from Republicans, but from Democrats.”318 
And then he raised the epistemological question – what could be known in advance, or 
even after the fact – about the voters: 
To me the most impressive thing about tonight is again the demonstration 
that the people of this country are sovereign, that they are unpredictable, 
and that somehow in a fashion that is as mysterious to pollsters as it is to 
reporters, the great normal majority in this country made up its mind as to 
the man it wanted to lead it. And I believe as of now, no man can say what 
produced this result or indeed what consequences may flow from it.319 
That said, Murrow was willing to offer his own speculation, which echoed, in some ways, 
the understanding offered by Lowell Thomas that Eisenhower had an appeal transcending 
narrow political categories. “The figures indicate,” said Murrow, “that Eisenhower did 
not win with the indispensible aid of Senator Taft or the farmers or labor or the South. He 
broke the whole traditional voting patterns of this country. He owes his victory to no 
man, and to no segment of our society.320 Murrow talked for almost four minutes, and he 
concluded, as he had begun, with a dramatic flourish. The new president, he said, “will 
face decisions upon which the whole history of the free world may pivot,” and the 
“magnitude and completeness of his victory” would only increase the “awesome 
responsibility” he would assume. 321 Murrow then leaned back, as if drained, and in a 
fluid motion brought an unlit cigarette to his lips, then reached into his pocket for a 
match, and lit up. 








Cronkite made a few brief remarks about the challenge Republicans would face in 
playing “offense” after having played defense for so long, and then it was Sevareid’s 
turn. 322 After Murrow’s “eloquent words,” Sevareid said at first, “there isn’t a great deal 
that I really feel much like saying.” 323 He then went on to offer a cogent analysis of the 
political challenges Eisenhower would face. But throughout, he, too, remarked on the 
transcendence of the voters: 
I think that it’s been rare in American history that one individual has had 
such overwhelming endorsement, a vote of confidence from the American 
people, obviously of all classes, of all sections, of all creeds. I think this 
places upon him personally a magnified degree of responsibility in the 
presidency such as few presidents have exercised. 324  
And again, the mystery of deciphering the voter was on the table. “I think that one of the 
things the vote shows,” said Sevareid, “is that the independent voters, so called, have 
been very much misinterpreted, misunderstood.” 325 How was one to make sense of this 
group who were thought to have been important to the election’s outcome? He thought 
Senator Taft had it right:  These were not people who normally participated in the 
political process and organization was more important than argument in getting them to 
the polls. And, said Sevareid, “a great name, a great figure, will bring them out more than 
any kind of persuasion.” 326  
The epistemological question and the methodological questions had been lurking 
beneath the surface all night. What could be known? And how could it be known? The 









broadcasts featuring computers for the first time would not resolve these questions. But 
the computers had clearly appeared in a landscape in which such considerations were 
important to the journalistic imperatives for timeliness, accuracy, and an intense need to 
make use of what use of what was visible and what was not so easily visible in making 
sense of the world. 
The Demise of Times Square as a Venue for Election-Night News 
There were other imperatives on election night, including the quest by news 
organizations to position themselves at the center of attention. In New York, Times 
Square had survived as an election-night gathering place well into the era of commercial 
radio broadcasting, and it had seen crowds that numbered in the hundreds of thousands as 
late as the wartime presidential election in 1944.327 But after the war, Meyer Berger, 
chronicler of city life for the New York Times, began writing post-election stories taking 
note of both the diminishing crowds and speculation that radio and television were to 
blame.328 Still, in 1952, the Times had not giving up on drawing a crowd to Times 
Square. Elaborate new displays to track the returns had been commissioned to 
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accompany the traditional searchlight and the “zipper” of news spelled out in a band of 
lights that ringed the building, itself an election-night innovation from 1928.329  
The displays in Times Square were orchestrated from the newsroom, where 
decisions were also made in advance of election night about the timing of press runs. 
Management at the Times had opted not to rush early editions to print until there was 
definitive news. The managing editor, Turner Catledge, concluded that with television 
and radio providing reports through the night, “we can afford to hold back until we have 
a fairly complete picture.”330 The first Times editions hit the presses at 10:52, an hour 
later than usual, with a headline that Eisenhower was in a strong lead. 331  Then, at 12:40 
a.m., the Times was ready to declare the race over in multimedia fashion and with precise 
timing.332 A bulletin was to be read over the Times’s radio station, WQXR, which had set 
up shop at a broadcast desk in the Times newsroom. Orders were given for a search light 
atop the Times Tower to signal Eisenhower’s victory by a prearranged code that had been 
shared with readers, a beacon shining steadily to the north. Orders were also given for the 
“zipper” to carry the news around the building and for a stories-high, thermometer-like 
display on the side of the tower to shoot to the top on the side tracking Eisenhower’s 
electoral vote tally and flash word of his win. The top management at the Times – 
Publisher Arthur Hays Sulzberger and Maj. General Julius Ochs Adler, vice president and 
general manager – were eager to see for themselves both the Times Square displays and 
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the crowd’s reaction. The executives and some of their aides walked into Times Square 
just before 12:40 a.m., and the scene was captured in Times Talk, an in-house publication 
of the New York Times: 
Mr. Sulzberger found himself standing beside an excited watcher – 
a stranger – whose eyes were glued to the board and to the running golden 
letters above it. The publisher quietly told the man, “I’ll bet that 
Eisenhower thermometer will shoot right to the top at 12:40.” The man 
snorted without taking his stare from the board. 
12:40 – and all the signs, and the turret beacon broke out in sudden 
concord. The little man’s head slowly looked in wide-eyed disbelief at the 
quiet prophet beside him. Mr. Sulzberger smiled and turned back to the 
office.333 
 But what the Times Talk piece did not capture was the thin crowd itself. This can 
be seen in newsreel outtakes – a crowd so thin that there was enough room in the square 
for vehicles to pass through easily.334 The scene was also captured by Meyer Berger, who 
authored his final obituary for Times Square as a gathering spot for crowds seeking 
election-night news.335 No more than 10,000 were in the square between 9 and 10 p.m., 
and fewer than 25,000 were estimated to have been there at any time, including theater-
goers. Police suggested that television and radio were the only plausible explanations. “A 
tradition was dead,” Berger concluded, “with only a few thousand pallbearers to see it 
peacefully interred.” In an editorial, the New York Herald Tribune concurred, and pinned 
the blame on television.336 
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The venues for election night news were shifting, and the technologies that would 
be employed both to generate and transmit that news were changing. But there had been a 
constant, too, though it had not worked out in Times Square. That constant was the 
deployment of innovations to use in attracting an election-night crowd, whether the sort 
of physical crowd that gathered at places such as Times Square or the virtual crowd of 
millions watching and listening at home. 
Computers on Election Night: An Uncertain Future 
When the counting was done, Eisenhower had, indeed, won by a wide margin. 
Stevenson carried only nine states, all in the southern part of the nation. And even there, 
Eisenhower had eroded the traditional Democratic base. He took Florida, Kentucky, 
Virginia, Texas, and Oklahoma. Eisenhower won Missouri, too – the home state of the 
sitting president, and the state that Collier’s magazine had declared the best one to watch 
on election night, having sided with the victor in every election after 1900.  Stevenson 
could not even carry his own state, losing nearly as badly there as he did nationwide.337  
Eisenhower’s national margin of victory was more than 10 percentage points. More than 
61 million votes had been cast – exceeding expectations – and Eisenhower had claimed 
about 34 million of them.338 In the Electoral College, Eisenhower’s victory was a 
blowout: 442 to 89.   
Eisenhower ran ahead of his own party.  Massachusetts was a case in point.  He 
carried the state even though his national campaign chairman, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., 
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lost a bid there for reelection to the Senate, knocked out of office by a young Democratic 
Congressman, John F. Kennedy.  Still, it had been a remarkable night for the 
Republicans.  They had recaptured the White House after losing it a generation earlier to 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt.  They picked up enough seats in the House and Senate to 
become the new majority party in each chamber.  They also won five new governorships, 
extending the lead they had established two years earlier.339 
While the night’s big news was a power shift in politics, only with the benefit of 
hindsight can we now see that the broadcasts carrying this news to Americans had also 
served as another sort of sentinel event. They showcased two technologies – television 
and computers – that would arguably come to define public and private life far more over 
the subsequent decades than the outcome of the day’s political contests.  Television had 
extended its reach from coast to coast for the first time in the live coverage of a 
presidential election, and it would go on within a few years to reach nearly all homes and 
become the dominant American news medium.  And millions of Americans had gotten 
their first glimpse of computers in action. These new machines had played a role – 
however imperfect – in the kind of prognostication previously delegated exclusively to 
humans, foreshadowing the devices’ increasing integration into the most fundamental 
aspects of daily life. 
But in real time, the historic nature of that night’s deployment of “electronic 
brains” – both in the general context of American life and the specific context of election-
night reporting – was not clear to those at the center of events.  In fact, for at least some 
of the key players, what prevailed when they reflected on this innovative use of 
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computers was a sense of unease.  After his nationally televised mea culpa, Remington 
Rand’s Arthur Draper would go on to describe this as one of the worst nights of his 
life.340 NBC News executive Charles “Joe” Colledge, whose duties had included 
arranging for the Monrobot to have a place in the Studio 8-H broadcast, did not feel 
triumphant at the end of the night, either.  Reuven Frank, then a young NBC staffer who 
would rise to become head of the network’s television news operation, recalled Colledge 
saying he left the studio that night wondering whether his career was in jeopardy after 
facing withering criticism of the program from the NBC “brass.”341 
Despite later accounts portraying election night 1952 as a landmark in an 
unstoppable trajectory of computers, the place of computing in election-night 
broadcasting – let alone in journalism – seemed unclear. It remained to be seen, as 
Business Week had written before the election, whether computers would be acclaimed as 
appropriate tools for the “Election Night hurlyburly.”342 
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Chapter 8:  Aftermath of the 1952 Broadcasts 
The story of election night 1952 has, over time, become one in which the 
computer – and in almost all accounts this is Remington Rand’s UNIVAC alone – scores 
a publicity coup by getting the outcome right, being smarter than its human keepers, and 
being seen in action by an audience of millions.1 That story has some problematic 
features that do more than miss the variety in the election-night experience. For one 
thing, if Americans were more acquainted with “electronic brains” by the morning after 
the election than they were before election day, the CBS broadcasts featuring UNIVAC 
were just part of that exposure. NBC television, which featured the Monrobot, scored 
higher election-night ratings than CBS, according to a report from the Trendex rating 
service that NBC was happy to share with the press.2 The Monrobot was also featured on 
radio, which was still the dominant broadcast medium. And the Monrobot was presented 
to NBC viewers during at least three daytime programs on election day, as well as being 
mentioned in other publicity in print and on air. The standard UNIVAC-CBS story also 
misses the wide range of responses to the journalistic use of “electronic brains.” This, in 
turn, contributes to the impression that a single event alone, the computer’s election-night 
debut, changed the course of computing history, popularizing the computer and fixing a 
place for it election-night broadcasting.  The record suggests a more complicated story 
and calls for a more nuanced understanding the process of change. And the available 
evidence suggests that what kept the UNIVAC story going was not so much what 
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happened on election night, but a combination of after-the-fact efforts to keep the story 
alive and the inherent appeal of a certain version of election-night events that supported a 
strong wow factor – machine outsmarts human.  This episode did open a door to a 
consideration of computers as tools with a place in journalism. And it engendered a 
widening circle of interested parties. The 1954 elections saw what may be the first use of 
a stored-program, electronic computer to help call an election for a newspaper – the 
Detroit Times, using a computer at nearby Wayne University. And the 1956 elections saw 
an aggressive push by IBM to secure a place on the election-night stage as the company 
fought its way to leadership in the developing commercial computer industry. But the 
events of election night in 1952 did not close the door to naysayers – or to active 
resistance among journalists. The process of coming to terms with computers for even a 
limited use in journalism – election-night analysis – would by no means be an automatic 
response to the events of 1952. The framing of computer use as human vs. machine 
would continue to have appeal both in the circumstances in which they were employed 
for election use and in the critiques of that use.   And even as the 21st century arrived, the 
election-night marriage between journalism and computing continued to have shaky 
episodes. 
Responses among the Collaborators 
With the long view of a half century, we can see election night 1952 as a seminal 
and sentinel event that featured bold experiments and a willingness to take risks before a 
live audience of millions. Here was an attempt to quantify in a new and more precise way 




And here were computers emerging from behind closed doors of academia and the 
military and the government – where they worked on such tasks as the preparation of 
census tables, the calculation of missile trajectories, and the solution of problems in 
thermodynamics – to do something that ordinary people cared very much about.  One 
could date the dawn of the computer age to this event as well as any to other. But for at 
least some of those in the middle, the use of computers on election night did not have a 
triumphant aftertaste. 
For public consumption, NBC issued a post-election press release that included a 
glowing account of the Monrobot’s performance. In the studio audience, NBC boasted, 
“Notables in the arts, science and industry watched the Monrobot, widely heralded 
‘electronic brain,’ predict General Eisenhower’s election on the basis of incomplete 
returns three hours before Stevenson conceded defeat.”3 And NBC boasted, too, of 
drawing more election-night viewers than the competition on election night in the 10 
cities surveyed by the Trendex ratings service.4 But Joe Colledge’s conclusion that the 
network brass were not happy with the broadcast was echoed a few days later in a 
behind-the-scenes memo between network executives Davidson Taylor and Joseph 
McConnell. Though pleased by the ratings, Davidson wrote, “I agree that our coverage 
did not live up to our own expectations.” 5 As for the Monrobot and its assigned NBC 
correspondent Morgan Beatty, Davidson wrote, “Beatty was commanding and informed 
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as usual, but I think maybe we could have used him to better advantage away from the 
baleful influence of our mechanical brain, the monrobot.”6 Taylor, whose own tasks on 
election night included keeping an eye on the competition, was not impressed, either, 
with the computer experience at CBS. “We weren’t the only ones who had troubles,” he 
wrote. “The CBS Univac was a real embarrassment. They kept asking the machine 
questions and it wouldn’t give any answers.”7 
In the wake of the 1952 experience, the trajectory of computers as potential tools 
for election-night journalism was not one of automatic adoption at NBC.  For the mid-
term elections in 1954, in fact, NBC would retreat from computer use altogether. In a 
1954 press release that was said to recount a memorandum to the staff, news director 
William R. McAndrew described an election-night plan that would focus heavily on 
correspondents reporting in from around the country. “A good local reporter,” he 
explained, “is better than the best out-of-town statistician or mechanical device.” 8 In the 
wake of that election, NBC issued a press release making the same assertion and 
extending the journalist-vs.-machine comparison:  “Prognostication and trend-following 
was left to Joseph F. McCaffrey, a veteran Capitol Hill observer who was informally 
billed as ‘NBC’s improvement on election computers.’”9 
The Monroe Calculating Machine Company, meanwhile, would celebrate its 1952 
election-night appearance on the national stage with a two-page spread in Keynote, a 
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magazine for its employees, describing the NBC broadcast as “the most widespread 
publicity Monroe has ever had.”10 And the election-night role, along with photographs, 
would be included in a brochure the company put together in 1953 to solicit contracts 
from the military and other customers for electronics and other engineering products.11 
But there is not much evidence of concerted efforts by the company to keep the story of 
the Monrobot’s election-night debut alive.12 No Monrobot would again be part of an 
election-night broadcast on network television. The line of computers did go through 
several iterations over the next decade and a half. A Monrobot III – this was the model 
used on election night – went to an Air Force research facility in Massachusetts in 1953.13 
A subsequent model, Monrobot V, was like the Monrobot III but was built to be carted 
around over rough terrain – vacuum tubes and all – to aid the Army in mapping.14 The 
company became part of Litton Industries in the late 1950s and its products continued to 
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include computers. 15 One of these models was the Monrobot Mark XI, which captured 
the attention of the New Yorker in a 1960 “Talk of the Town” piece that began this way: 
“More news from the spooky world of automation!”16 As with the features touted by 
NBC on election night 1952, the New Yorker noted the latest Monrobot’s surprising size 
– at just 375 pounds it was deemed in 1960 to be “completely portable” – and its equally 
diminutive price, for the times – $24,500.17 The Monrobot line of computers faded out in 
the 1960s.18 And Monroe itself – after being bought and sold several times, adding and 
removing other product lines, and changing names to Monroe Systems for Business – is 
focused today, as it was when the company was originally founded in 1912, on the sale of  
calculators.19 
As for the 1952 election-night experience at CBS, the network did not pull away 
from computing and would use a UNIVAC computer again for the 1954 mid-term 
elections and the next presidential election in 1956 – which would also draw the attention 
of the New Yorker.20 Unlike the Monrobot, the UNIVAC would have a long and storied 
history – including continuing attention to its election-night role in 1952 – and Unisys, 
the eventual successor company to Remington Rand, is still in the business of providing 
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computer-related products and services to customers worldwide.21 But the immediate 
reaction in 1952 also appears to have been well short of ecstatic at CBS. In a four-page 
post-election press release that went on at length with details and superlatives about the 
network’s television broadcast, a single line was reserved for the computer use: “Univac, 
the electronic ‘brain,’ as early as 10:30 p.m. predicted the sweeping victory of the 
Republican standard bearer.”22 And at Remington Rand’s Eckert-Mauchly Division, 
UNIVAC engineer Herman Lukoff would write later that some officials were “kicking 
themselves” after the election for not having aired the first prediction.23 But Sig 
Mickelson, the CBS news and public affairs director, was more upbeat about the 
UNIVAC election-night role in a letter to one leader of the Eckert-Mauchly effort 10 
days after the election: 
I have held off writing to you to thank you for your enormously important 
Univac contribution while awaiting reaction from the country. I can assure 
you now that the reaction is almost without exception very favorable. 
While Univac had its troubles at one point, the public was very tolerant of 
the error and quite appreciative of the quick correction. 
After consulting with a member of the CBS research staff and a publicist for Remington 
Rand, Mickelson wrote, “I think it is our unanimous feeling that we were completely 
right in using it and that Univac can be enormously important in anticipating election 
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trends in the future.”24 And at least some at CBS felt upbeat enough about the UNIVAC  
performance to seek a Peabody Award for 1952 with a tightly edited 30-minute version 
of the election-night broadcast featuring the computer – but not all of its problems – and 
playing up the human analysis, as well.25 
The night after the election, Charles Collingwood crafted a self-deprecating script 
for a weekly radio broadcast in which he poked fun at himself and other journalists for 
missing the signs of an Eisenhower victory out of the fear of repeating the mistakes of 
1948.26 His remarks about the UNIVAC prefigured in some ways the mixed responses to 
computer use that would come from observers who were not involved in the broadcast. 
He called attention to the UNIVAC’s difficulties.  He reported that machine’s early 
prediction was off by just four electoral votes but had not been believed by its keepers, 
who then tinkered with the data and made the computer “look silly.”27 He referred to the 
UNIVAC as “my machine” and “him” and said that he had believed in it and was proven 
right. His conclusion: “It just goes to show that the trouble with machines is people.”28 At 
the same time, Collingwood scored the election’s unexpected outcome as “victory for the 
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ordinary man” over the “soulless political scientists” who would “treat him like a 
cipher.”29  
Observers Respond: Journalists, Talk-Show Hosts, and Comedians 
Beyond the ranks of those involved in the election-night broadcasts featuring 
computers, a range of others weighed in with reports, observations, and opinions – 
journalists, columnists, talk-show hosts, on-air celebrities, and comedians. These 
responses covered a continuum from praise to dismissal. In addition, one of the most 
common elements was humor – whether it was laughing with or laughing at those 
involved. In fact, the UNIVAC, in particular, soon became a foil for comedic routines. 
There was not, early on, a single or uniform narrative thread, though there were common 
elements.  
In post-mortems that appeared in the popular press and trade publications, 
network television broadcasts in general came in for high marks. 30 Where distinctions 
were made between them, CBS was seen by several critics as having had the best 
coverage overall.31  As for election-night computing, some accounts evidenced wide-eyed 
wonder. In the genre, perhaps, of “man bites dog,” some observers were enthralled by the 
idea of a machine outsmarting is human keepers as evidence that a wonderful new 
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technology had arrived. A Philadelphia radio station, for example, began its day-after 
broadcast this way:  “At eight-thirty last night, a weird robot capable of juggling page-
long equations with amazing dexterity and even operating alphabetically, passed along 
word that the chances were one-hundred-to-one that Eisenhower would win!  Its name is 
UNIVAC.” 32  The story included an interview with a UNIVAC spokesperson who 
explained the decision not to go with the computer’s initial prediction by saying, “Well, 
we lost our nerve!” 33 The piece ended the way it began, praising UNIVAC’s “complete 
ease” and “uncanny accuracy,” and added:  “When you think about it, the whole thing is 
almost frightening!” 34 A newspaper column by Alistair Cooke in the Manchester 
Guardian ran under the headline “‘Univac’ Forecast the Landslide” and reported that the 
computer “was a couple of hours ahead of everything that walks and talks.” 35 On the 
morning after the election, a talk-show host on the Rural Radio Network in upstate New 
York referred to the UNIVAC in amazement as a “kind of a look into the future.”36 
Those writing and speaking about the television coverage of the election were by 
no means unanimous in their assessment of the role played by – and performance of – the 
computers and the decision by election-night broadcasters to include these novelties. And 
here the frame of human-vs.-machine trope – and its variant, journalist-vs.-machine – 
could cut both ways. The entertainment industry newspaper Variety reported that NBC 
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and CBS had gone to “extraordinary and expensive lengths to ‘gimmick up’ the Ike-Adlai 
ballot coverage, with robot-like calculators occupying a prominent place on the TV 
rostrums.” 37  The value of the computers to the broadcast was deemed “dubious at 
best.”38 The issue was not that these devices performed poorly, but that they could not 
deliver meaningful analysis. While they looked “expensive and awesome,” the Variety 
reviewer argued, the machines did not know or understand “what the voter felt in his 
heart or what disturbed his mind.”39 That was deemed to be a job for the likes of Edward 
R. Murrow, H.V. Kaltenborn, Bill Henry, Lowell Thomas, John Daly, Walter Winchell 
and others. The message, in short, was spelled out in the lead of the Variety review: “If 
anything, TV’s unprecedented coverage of last Tuesday’s … election returns 
demonstrated that the machine will never take the place of the human.”40 For the 
reviewer, the UNIVAC and Monrobot – mentioned by name – became props in the 
service of lavish praise for fellow flesh-and-blood journalists. 
On their New York-based radio talk show during the morning after the election, 
hosts Dick Kollmar and Dorothy Kilgallen skewered the computers as unfit for election-
night work. And Kollmar said of Remington Rand, “I would hate to be a member of that 
company this morning if I’d had anything to do with the Univac.”41  Television writers 
for the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Philadelphia Inquirer had equally 
dismissive accounts.  At the Times, Jack Gould, who heaped praise on the CBS coverage 
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in general, wrote of UNIVAC and Monrobot that “Tuesday also saw the first use on 
Election Night of the supposedly super-duper electronic brains, which can think in terms 
of a couple of quintillion mathematical problems at one time.”42  Gould then added a 
series of digs: 
The C.B.S. pride was called “Univac,” which at the critical moment 
refused to work with anything like the efficiency of the human being.  
This mishap caused the C.B.S. stars, Walter Cronkite, Ed Murrow, and 
Eric Sevareid, to give “Univac” a rough ride for the rest of the evening in 
a most amusing sidelight to the C.B.S. coverage.  At a late hour, N.B.C. 
still was taking its electronic brain, “Mon-Robot,” pretty seriously…43 
By contrast, Gould praised the “old journalistic technique” used by William H. 
Lawrence, a political correspondent for the New York Times, to report several scoops 
over the Times radio station, WQXR.44 “When votes came in from doubtful states,” 
Gould wrote, “he called newspaper men in different cities who could interpret what a 
relatively few ballots in key areas would indicate by way of state-wide trends.”45 In the 
Washington Post, television writer C.E. Butterfield hit the networks, too. While 
computers might be good at solving complicated mathematical problems, he wrote, the 
Monrobot and UNIVAC were still “in the kindergarten stage as far as TV returns are 
concerned,”  failing to live up to their advance billing.46  And at the Philadelphia 
Inquirer, television writer Merrill Panitt’s snickering review opened this way: “Say, those 
electronic brains NBC and CBS had for their election result telecasts were really 
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impressive, weren’t they? Made you feel kind of – if you’ll excuse the expression – 
humble. Amazing the way the gadgets accepted questions, flickered their tubes for a few 
seconds and, bingo! Wrong answer.”47 Panitt actually cited, in error, the first prediction 
from the UNIVAC – an Eisenhower lead in electoral votes of 314 to 217 – as one that 
had come from the Monrobot. But from the context of the piece, it seems likely that he 
would have been equally critical of both computers for not calling for an all-out landslide 
early on. Computers, in Panitt’s telling, were just the wrong tool to use on election night. 
While they could make quick work of specific mathematical problems, he conceded, 
these problems must be precise and clear. But as for their use by the networks, he 
wondered, “How can anyone determine precisely what basic information to give a 
machine before putting to it the question of how an election will come out?” The headline 
captured the sentiment of the column: “Electronic Brains Prove They Need Smart 
Men.”48  
In fact, one common theme among reviews that did not count the use of 
“electronic brains” a success was to assign the blame for UNIVAC’s misadventures, in 
particular, to its human keepers.  In some cases, CBS and Remington Rand were targeted 
together. In others, a distinction was made between the two, with CBS itself cast as 
something of a victim. In the New York Daily News, television critic Ben Gross recounted 
the “about-face” in predictions attributed to UNIVAC in an item that began: “UNIVAC 
Like A Woman.”49 He dismissed the machine as being as consistent as “you-know-what,” 
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by which he made clear he was referring to “gals.”50 He also made clear that there was 
also some post-election finger-pointing. “The boys around CBS are taking a lot of ribbing 
and they admit the laugh’s on them,” Gross wrote. “But one thing they emphasize:  These 
predictions did not come from the mouths of their commentators, but from the mouth of 
UNIVAC.”51 Another reviewer described the UNIVAC as having “brought the real laugh 
of the evening” and as “very nearly being the ‘goat’ of the evening” with the prediction 
of a close outcome at a point in the evening when an Eisenhower sweep was obvious, a 
turn of events that both “irked” and “embarrassed” Collinwood.52 
But even when CBS or Remington Rand or the UNIVAC itself came in for 
bruising treatment, there was a tendency to make a distinction between the machine’s 
operation – deemed to have worked as programmed – and the operation of its human 
operators, deemed to be the source of the UNIVAC’s troubles. These stories seem to have 
absorbed in some way – sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly – the explanations 
offered by the CBS or Remington Rand camps. The Associated Press quickly turned out 
a story about Arthur Draper’s early morning mea culpa from Philadelphia before the CBS 
audience. This story ran in the 6 a.m. edition of the Baltimore Sun under the headline: 
“Electric Brain’s Aberration Is All Its Masters’ Fault.”53 One broadcasting trade 
publication reported that “CBS-TV, which won praise from many for speedy reporting of 
returns, encountered a less happy experience in the use of the Univac ‘brain’ as a 
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prophet.” 54 “Spokesmen” were said to have laid the blame with “outside statisticians 
employed to operate Univac.”55  While the computer’s keepers were questioning its 
initial predictions, Edward R. Murrow was said to have “scored a beat on Univac.”56 In 
the same camp of dismissive approaches was the Chicago Daily Tribune’s Larry Wolters.  
In his column about television several days after the election, he included a two-
paragraph item headed “Man vs. Machine.” The “somewhat inglorious behavior of those 
highly publicized election night electronic marvels” – both the UNIVAC and “Mike 
Monrobot” – was said to have been the fault of “the people charged with presenting the 
problems in solvable fashion.” 57 For that a share of the blame also went to the fallout 
from “overcautious pollsters.”58  
In its monthly issue after the election, Electronics magazine also panned the 
performance of computers on election night. Lumping together the UNIVAC on CBS, the 
Monrobot on NBC, and the “IBM Calculator” on ABC, the magazine reported, “In the 
opinion of many viewers and listeners, the results were considerably less spectacular than 
they were led to expect by advance publicity.” 59   But the article went on to note: 
“Technically speaking, the calculators did what they were expected to do, but difficulty 
arose in selecting appropriate past election data for setting up the problems and 
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interpreting results.”60 Featuring advance publicity photos of the UNIVAC and Monrobot 
in operation, the caption noted the contest between the two – “Univac (left) and 
Monrobot (right) also ran on November 4 in race to predict outcome of election on basis 
of preliminary returns and past elections.”61 The two-deck headline framed the machine’s 
use in a different sort of contest in which both were found wanting in the story: 
“Computers Sweat Out Election Results; Nonpartisan electronic machines vie with 
human experts to predict outcome.”62 
In between kudos and outright dismissal, there was a middle ground of responses 
characterized by attempts at humor pointed in various directions. A tongue-in-cheek 
Washington Post editorial, titled “Unhappy Univac,” began this way: “Well, it now 
seems that Professor Univac, the celebrated mechanical brain, damn well knew what he 
was talking about… The trouble was that none of those stupid humans, including his 
inventors, would believe him.”  The piece went on to speculate about whether the 
computer’s feelings were hurt and whether it might be “sensitive to a degree quite beyond 
the power of our coarse and callous species even to imagine.”63  Another attempt at 
humor ran in the San Francisco Chronicle the following week when columnist Stanton 
Delaplane tossed around the idea of just running UNIVAC for president in another four 
years.64 In fact, there were a number of pieces in print and on air that applied a light touch 
to the human-vs.-machine theme that was common in post-election accounts. At least 
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twice on the morning after the election, newscasters on a Los Angeles radio station 
recited the events of Arthur Draper’s difficult night in this way. One referred to it as “a 
lack of faith that turned into a serio-comic battle of the machine against man in which the 
machine finally triumphed with and the man turned up with a collective red face 
unparalleled in election history,” and the UNIVAC was described as “the mechanical 
monster which will apparently treat you right if you treat it right, and if you only trust 
it.”65 The other advised the audience: “Take a firm grip, you humans, we have evidence 
this morning that the day of the flesh and blood brain may be waning.”66 
On-air celebrities got in on the comedic references to election-night computer use. 
On his program the day after the election, Arthur Godfrey aimed for laughs with this 
tongue-in-cheek account of the UNIVAC’s first prediction, as captured in a transcript 
made for Remington Rand: 
It’s supposed to be an amazing electronic device that would, at an instant’s 
notice, before any human being could possibly detect a trend, it would 
predict which way the voting was going. So what happened? So first of all 
it wouldn’t work at all. I understand they fed the very first returns into the 
thing, and you know what came out? The winner of the fourth race at 
Hialeah.67 
Two days later, Godfrey brought up the subject again – this time saying he owed the 
UNIVAC an apology after learning that it had been “uncannily accurate.”68 Still reaching 
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for a laugh, he told someone else on the program, “You could be replaced by six vacuum 
tubes and a roll of wire.”69 
Beyond injecting humor into discussions of the election-night broadcasts, the 
UNIVAC also became a foil for comedic routines.  In his television comedy program, 
Ernie Kovacs latched onto the UNIVAC for material the morning after the election and 
was still milking it the next month.  The day after the election, he reported that J. 
Burlington Gearshift – the character of an oddball inventor played by Kovacs himself – 
would be on the next day with a “brain machine that will confound the nation,” to be 
called the “Koviac.”70 When the Koviac appeared the next day, it was described this way 
by a transcription service hired by Remington Rand: “a burlesque model of an electronic 
computing machine,” on which “various levers, control knobs and electric light bulbs 
were arranged in ludicrous fashion on the top and sides.”71  In an outing on Dec. 1, the 
Koviac was also said to have “a slit marked “For Used Razor Blades,’” along with “two 
small marks with “His” and “Hers” written under them” and, on the side, “an opening 
marked ‘Out.’”72 In the center was a switch Kovacs used to turn the machine on and off, 
and special effects included sounds of a motor, thuds, and a bell. Kovacs seemed to aim 
for laughs by extending the anthropomorphic way in which the UNIVAC had been 
framed on election night. Although the Koviac never seemed to function as expected, 
Kovacs said, in the role of Gearshift, that he wanted to reward it.  The device “is almost 
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human in its likes and dislikes,” he said, “and I find that, much as throwing a fish to the 
seals, a shot of beer or two to the Koviac rewards this little machine.”73 Thus nourished, 
the Koviac was heard to exhale in apparent satisfaction.74 
What the Broadcasts Meant to Viewers at Home 
While the most enduring documentary record of responses to computer use on 
election night was certainly left by print reporters writing about television and partial 
broadcast transcripts prepared for Remington Rand, a smattering of available letters and 
telegrams from ordinary viewers also suggests a range of response to the broadcasts. 
Some of these communications survive in the papers of the late Walter Cronkite.75 They 
reveal a sense of novelty at watching news on television, excitement at being brought so 
close to the action in a newsroom, and awe at seeing broadcast journalists handle the 
election-night chaos with the calm of officers in battle.76  Letter and telegram writers 
deemed the performance of Cronkite and others to have been “excellent,” “magnificent,” 
“marvelous,” “terrific,” and “a whale of a job,” among other terms of praise.77 It was not 
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lost on viewers that all of this was taking place in an atmosphere of competition, as the 
writers would refer to checking out the various networks’ offerings and settling on CBS. 
One enclosed Jack Gould’s column, and another referred to it: “I agree with Jack Gould’s 
opinion in the New York Times: CBS (and Cronkite!) won by a landslide.”78 Typical of 
this enthusiasm was a letter written by a couple from Closter, N.J.79  They didn’t get the 
name of Cronkite’s network right – praising his “really great N.B.C.” – but his  “expert” 
handling of the night’s events, they wrote, “made our spines tingle.”80 The letter 
expressed the “hope we will long remember these historic hours which you all brought to 
us in our homes.”81 Not all letters, however, were positive. For one writer from 
Jacksonville, Florida, the notion of watching news on television – which she did at a 
friend’s house – was not at all a happy one. “The way your announcers put on was the 
most nerve-wracking thing,” she wrote, explaining that they “couldn’t say the simplest 
things without stuttering.” 82 She concluded: “I do not ever want no damn TV set, and I 
don’t care much for my radio.  The printed words in newspapers and magazines do not 
stutter or stammer.”83 
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Many of the letters praising the broadcast did not mention UNIVAC, but two that 
did are instructive.  One, from the president of a floor covering company in Chicago, 
adopted an anthropomorphic tone: “I am certainly glad that UNIVAC recovered from its 
workout and is in good shape today.”84  The other provides evidence that in the 
ephemeral circumstances of a television broadcast, it was easier to remember that a 
computer had been used than to remember whether the computer had been right or 
wrong.  The owner of a furniture store in Keokuk, Iowa, wrote to ask Cronkite to settle a 
wager: 
When your Remington Rand Uni-Vac or mechanical brain went off the 
beam and gave a report of 100 to 1 odds about midway through the 
evening, who did it report had the odds in his favor, as that is the argument 
we are engaged in… One says the odds favored Stevenson and the other 
Eisenhower.  Your written reply stating the man favored by the 100 to 1 
odds will be greatly appreciated by return mail.”85 
It is not uncommon for journalists to field complaints of bias when reporting on 
politics, and they may take some satisfaction when the letters are equally distributed 
among partisans on either side of the political spectrum.  But one letter suggests that the 
process of calling elections from limited and skewed early returns might lend itself to 
such complaints.  A viewer in Brooklyn, favorably disposed to Cronkite before election 
night, wrote two days later that she was “bitterly disappointed and annoyed by your 
election coverage.”86 She concluded that Cronkite was “an Eisenhower man”:   “You 
deprecated every lead the Democrats had during the evening and in certain instances 
where the margin of lead was much greater in some states for the Democrats than it was 
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in other states for the Republicans, you made statements like ‘the Democratic margin is 
to[o] narrow to hold’ and ‘the Republican margin is a sure sign of victory.’”87 
Morgan Beatty’s papers contain 89 items in a folder of correspondence with 
listeners or viewers for November 1952, but only two dealt with the election-night 
coverage.88 One was a letter from an old school mate who noted having seen the 
broadcast and praised Beatty for a “swell job.”89  The other item referenced a letter from 
a man in St. Louis who wanted information about Monroe’s “mechanical brain.” 90 The 
letter itself does not survive, but a response to the letter does.  In Beatty’s absence – he 
was on vacation in the latter part of November – his secretary wrote to inform the writer 
that she was forwarding his letter to the Monroe Calculating Machine Company.91 
As for Edward R. Murrow, his papers include a relevant letter sent by an old 
acquaintance, Ed Beattie.92  The two had known each other in London during World War 
II when Murrow was famously reporting for CBS Radio on the German bombing of the 
city and Beattie was reporting for the United Press.93  Charles Collingwood, referenced in 
the letter, had also been a United Press reporter early in the war before becoming one of 
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the “Murrow Boys” at CBS Radio in London.94 Writing to Murrow two days after the 
election, Beattie adopted the same tone of humorous ambiguity seen in various accounts 
of the broadcasts. “Dear Professor,” he began:  
Having followed with some fascination the difficulties experienced 
by one Charles (Toujours L’amour) Collingwood with his friend Univac 
two evenings ago, not to speak of certain admissions of tampering with the 
latter’s cerebration, I feel it is opportune to suggest that in the future, 
Univac be left to its own devices and that, precautionarily, it be equipped 
with a gadget which will promptly spot any tampering and illuminate a 
small sign saying “TILT.”95 
The letter writer also called attention to the varying comfort levels that broadcasters 
showed in calling the election for Eisenhower: “Bill Henry was still playing it close to his 
chest a couple of hours after you and Eric [Sevareid] had labeled the trend for what it 
obviously was.”96 
The Notion of “UNIVAC” as Household Word 
Though just a small number of what was in all likelihood a larger volume of mail 
sent to broadcasters after Nov. 4, these letters, taken as a whole, do not contradict the 
conclusion that election night was less than an immediate and unequivocal shot in the 
arm for computers – UNIVAC in particular. That idea would take more time to gel.  And 
the story itself – and the version in which the night’s comedy of errors starred fallible 
humans rather than a fallible machine – may have gotten a shot in the arm from 
Remington Rand’s publicity apparatus. 
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A week after the election, an editorial appeared in a Florida newspaper, the 
Jacksonville Journal, under the headline, “A Machine Makes a Monkey Out of Man.”97 
The UNIVAC was seen as such a remarkable device that it was described in terms of 
both wonder and terror, including the description of election night as “the dawn of a 
horrendous new day.98  The “world-famed … electronic brain,” working with both 
greater speed and accuracy than humans, was said to have “made monkies out of the 
political prophets and the statistical experts.”99 Why was the story – certainly old news by 
Nov. 11 – being recycled? The editorial gives a clue: “The full story of the UNIVAC’s 
fruitless efforts to convince its human operators that General Eisenhower would win by a 
landslide – a prediction that was overruled by human experts – has been disclosed by its 
makers, Remington Rand.”100 
Additional stories and references appeared. Two days after the Jacksonville 
Journal editorial, Ernie Kovacs featured another “Koviac” segment in which he indicated 
that the UNIVAC, which he felt compelled to lampoon yet again, had been “brought 
again to the light and publicized,” and “seems to have caught on with the public 
fancy.”101  And another two days after that, on Nov. 15, an article depicting the UNIVAC 
as “America’s newest conversation piece” appeared in the Christian Science Monitor.102 
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Written from Washington by Mary Hornaday, a respected veteran reporter, the article 
described the UNIVAC as “an uncanny electronic brain that burst upon most of our 
horizons on election night when the Columbia Broadcasting System featured it in its TV 
coverage.”103 There was little ambiguity in Hornaday’s piece.  She was in the camp of 
UNIVAC admirers, and she described Remington Rand’s “harrowing election night 
experience” as one in which the computer’s human keepers lost their nerve.  “A lot of 
people,” she wrote, “seemed to get the impression that UNIVAC wasn’t much good, 
when actually the mistakes were all human.”104  Her account covered the UNIVAC’s 
impressive price tag ($600,000), its dimensions (including a cabinet 14 feet long, eight 
feet high, and eight feet wide), its memory (12,000 characters), and its speed (2,000 
instructions per second), for which, she wrote, “the human is no match.”105 She also 
described the UNIVAC’s “potentialities,” from tracking freight cars to solving higher 
mathematics problems “in matrix algebra and in elliptic partial differential equations.”106  
Partisans from the Remington Rand camp were also busy with efforts to spread 
the word. Arch Hancock, a company publicist, authored an article for the December issue 
of Systems Magazine, a Remington Rand publication that circulated in the business 
community.107 Hancock held up the UNIVAC’s behind-the-scenes election-night prowess 
                                                 
103 Hornaday, “UNIVAC–Conversation Piece,” Christian Science Monitor; Hornaday’s role as a pioneering 
female correspondent covering Washington politics can be found in Maurine H. Beasley, Eleanor 
Roosevelt and the Media: A Public Quest for Self-Fulfillment (Chicago:  University of Illinois Press, 1987), 
43, and Maurine H. Beasley, Holly Cowan Shulman, and Henry R. Beasley, editors, The Eleanor Roosevelt 








as evidence that a new era had dawned, one in which the previously dominant technology 
in information management – high-speed punched card equipment – was made 
obsolete.108 And Arthur Draper reprised and expanded on his own election-night 
revelation of UNIVAC’s early prediction of landslide in a January 1953 presentation to a 
meeting of the American Institute of Electrical Engineers in New York. 109 He kept up the 
drumbeat of the humans, not the machine, as fallible. “There have been five major 
occasions of extreme importance where we have doubted that the UNIVAC was correct,” 
said Draper. “In every single one of these occasions it has come out that UNIVAC was 
right and we poor humans were wrong.”110  He concluded with what he said was the 
moral of the story: “Don’t THINK, let UNIVAC Do It For You!”111  This last line, in all 
likelihood, was meant not only to tout UNIVAC, but to serve as a double-entendre dig at 
Remington Rand’s chief rival, IBM:  “THINK” was an IBM motto, as well as the name 
of an IBM magazine.112  
In addition to these efforts by Hancock and Draper, Max Woodbury – the 
statistics professor who had devised the algorithm for predicting the election in 1952 and 
continued to be associated with the UNIVAC in several subsequent elections – recalled in 
a 2004 interview that Hancock involved him over time in efforts to spread the word of 
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what the computer could do.113 But it was also apparent that the version of events from 
election-night 1952 in which the UNIVAC had made an accurate prediction that its 
keepers did not believe made for a good tale, that “man-bites-dog” sort of story and one 
relevant at a time when computers were being called “electronic brains” and the 
comparison to human capabilities was part of the landscape.  Warren Wightman, who had 
helped produce the episode of The Johns Hopkins Science Review television program 
involving the UNIVAC and its co-inventor John Mauchly in the fall of 1952, called 
attention to just that aspect of the night’s events in a letter he wrote to Mauchly a week 
after the election: 
We watched CBS on election night and were all very much 
interested and considerably amused when it was announced that somebody 
somewhere along the line had lost his nerve and refused to believe the 
“brain”. Seems to me that it makes a good story, if not better, for publicity 
purposes, the way it turned out.114 
Four years later, Phillip S. Vincent, who had been part of the 1952 election-night effort at  
Eckert-Mauchly, gave a talk about the experience to the Stamford Engineering Society in 
Connecticut. 115 While it had been a difficult night, he saw later what could not be seen at 
the time as an enormous benefit in the decision not to release that first prediction, early in 
the evening: 
Although we can take no credit for it, our reactions were one of the 
very fortunate occurrences in Remington Rand history. If we had released 
the first prediction, a few lines would have appeared in the next day’s 
papers under some such heading as “Ain’t science peachy!”, but our very 
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evident human frailties coupled with Art Draper’s public confession … 
gave the whole performance a human interest slant and resulted in making 
UNIVAC almost a household word.116 
In the end, perhaps, what also made this a good story was that it could be 
deployed, like the computers on election night themselves, in the service of many 
agendas, and that a variety of meanings could be attached to it.  Over time, the Monrobot 
largely disappeared from accounts of election night 1952, and, as noted previously, the 
UNIVAC-only story became standard. This was true even for those involved in the 
nascent computer industry who would have been aware that two computers – quite 
different from each other – had been in play on that election night. One of these was 
Edmund Berkeley, an early advocate both for computer use in the insurance industry and 
for general public knowledge about computers.117 He knew William Burkhart from the 
Monrobot camp, and, as earlier noted, Berkeley had featured a Burkhart invention in a 
1949 volume on computing machines for a general audience, Giant Brains, or Machines 
that Think. And in January 1953, Berkeley had featured both the Monrobot and the 
UNIVAC in “Automatic Computers on Election Night,” an article he coauthored.118 It 
appeared in a publication he had started – The Computing Machinery Field, later renamed 
Computers and Automation – an early computer journal.119 But just three years later, 
when he coauthored a 1956 follow-up book to Giant Brains, the Monrobot had 
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disappeared from Berkeley’s account of election night 1952. 120 Though it mentioned that 
computers “including a Univac” were tasked with election night predictions for television 
audiences in 1952 and 1954, the telling in detail of the 1952 story was a UNIVAC-only 
tale.121 The oft-repeated events were recounted in a dramatic way – something that had 
not been associated with the few retellings of the Monrobot’s role – and Berkeley and his 
co-author used the UNIVAC story to illustrate a section of the book on then-current and 
future uses of computers in areas other than business and the military. “It seems evident,” 
they concluded, “that automatic computer commentary on elections will henceforth be a 
regular feature of election nights.”122 
1954: The Detroit Times and Wayne University Collaborate 
At NBC, meanwhile, the election-night experience in 1952 did not provide the 
network with incentive to keep the Monrobot story alive apart from the boasts that 
appeared in a post-election press release. And while 1954 saw NBC openly opt to retreat 
from computers as potential election-night tools, that was not the response of one local 
newspaper to the events of election-night 1952.  In 1954, the Detroit Times embraced the 
idea of employing a computer for its own election-night reporting, with award-winning 
results. The Times teamed up with the computation laboratory at Wayne University in 
Detroit in a plan to predict the outcome of the Michigan governor’s race from early 
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returns.123 It is a telling episode from the early intersection of the worlds of computing 
and journalism via election-night forecasting and does not appear to have been previously 
explored. That the story of the Detroit Times’s pioneering election-night efforts has not 
survived is not so surprising, considering that the newspaper did not survive long to keep 
the story alive.  Within six years, the Times would be gone.124  But in 1954, it was part of 
a robust competitive news environment in a city with several newspapers and broadcast 
news outlets.    
The Wayne University computation laboratory was headed by Arvid W. 
Jacobson, who, until the early 1950s, had a dark past that had not caught up to him in his 
new role as a leader in establishing computer science as an area of study in higher 
education. Several years after leaving school at the age of 13 to work, Jacobson lost 
several fingers in a farm accident at the age of 18.125  With the compensation he received 
for his injuries, he resumed his education, eventually graduated from college, and began 
teaching high school mathematics in a Detroit suburb.126 He also joined the Communist 
Party. 127 In the early 1930s he was dispatched by his party superiors to Finland.128 There 
he was arrested on espionage charges, convicted, and spent nearly three years in prison 
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before American officials helped secure his release.129 Once back in the United States, he 
went on about his life, continued his education, and ended up on the mathematics faculty 
at Wayne, where his past was not initially known.130  He discussed it with the university 
leadership privately when his name appeared in a 1950 book, Seeds of Treason, along 
with associated newspaper stories.131 No connection was made publicly then between his 
past and present, and the university did not reveal it, supporting him instead in his efforts 
to build up the computation laboratory.132 But in 1952, with the publication of Whittaker 
Chambers’s Witness, the name “Arvid Jacobson” was again in print as an American 
Communist from the 1930s.133 Chambers did not make the connection to the Arvid 
Jacobson at Wayne University, but that connection did emerge.134  When the story did 
become public, the administrators at Wayne University stood behind Jacobson.135  So did 
the members of Detroit’s business and industrial community, whom he had gotten to 
know through cooperative efforts to support the laboratory and have it do research to 
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benefit local enterprises.136 The crisis passed, and Jacobson continued his work in the lab, 
in the classroom, in the community. He secured an experimental computer from the 
Burroughs Corporation, the UDEC, or Unitized Digital Electronic Computer.137 And in 
the summer of 1954, he was instrumental in organizing a national conference at Wayne 
University on training individuals to work in the fast-growing computer field.138 Speakers 
and attendees came from around the country and included such luminaries as Harvard’s 
Howard Aiken and UNIVAC co-inventor John Mauchly.139 
A log book maintained by Jacobson’s laboratory from 1953 to 1955 shows that a 
variety of groups sought assistance.140 Among them were the Ford Motor Company, U.S. 
Rubber, Detroit Edison, the Detroit Health Department, and, from his own campus, the  
Economics Department.   In the midst of this list was item number 45, “Election 
Problem,” from the Detroit Times.  The first entry for this project was dated Oct. 19, 
1954.141  It noted that Jacobson and others from the lab had talked with Times reporter 
Lou Arkles about election prediction. There was already a sample of Detroit precincts 
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selected, and more were to be chosen from other areas of Michigan. The prediction 
method was to be worked out by Jacobson and Saul Rosen, who himself would go on to 
become a notable figure in the early history of computing.142  
The work of processing historic data to use as a basis of comparison began on 
Oct. 22 and was not completed until 4 p.m. on election day, and time ran out to continue 
the work of checking for errors.143 The Times, an afternoon paper, reported in late 
editions on the day after the election that its pre-dawn extra had rolled off the presses 
with a forecast that seemed “fantastic” in a nationally-watched U.S. Senate race: 
Democrat Patrick V. McNamara, who was then behind in the vote count, was predicted to 
emerge the victor with a margin of 42,380 votes over his opponent, the Republican 
incumbent Homer S. Ferguson.144  By the next day, that prediction had proven correct, 
and the margin of victory was off by just a few hundred votes.145 The Times celebrated its 
own journalistic victory with a front-page story that began this way: 
The Detroit Times scored a major ‘first’ yesterday when it 
successfully utilized the $200,000 computer, UDEC, as a practical tool for 
newspaper election coverage. 
Previously such computers had been used in making broad 
predictions on radio and TV early on election nights, but no newspaper 
had adopted them for serious election coverage because the results were 
not considered reliable.146 
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The Times story also mentioned that CBS’s Murrow had announced during election 
night, “with a lifted eyebrow,” that although Ferguson was ahead in the vote count, the 
Times was predicting a win by McNamara with a margin of 42,000 votes.147 
In recognition of the unusual election-night project, the Detroit Times later 
received an Associated Press award in Michigan for best coverage of a breaking news 
story.148 Even before winning that accolade, however, the newspaper’s election-night 
computing effort was singled out for recognition in publications including Time and 
Editor & Publisher.  Echoing what the Times itself had proclaimed, Editor & Publisher 
reported that this was, “so far as is known, the first time that such a device has been 
utilized by a major newspaper as a practical instrument for election coverage.”149 And 
Time magazine compared the Detroit computer effort favorably to the CBS’s 1954 
election-night experience with UNIVAC, noting that the latter had been plagued for a 
time by errors in the data being fed to it.150  The same issue of Time also noted that the 
New York Times had to recall about 80,000 early-edition newspapers on the same election 
night in 1954 out of concerns, as more returns came in, that its declaration of a victory for 
Averell Harriman in the New York governor’s race had been premature.151  
On election night in 1956, the Detroit Times, encouraged by its 1954 experience, 
teamed up directly with the Burroughs Corporation. Burroughs provided a new 
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commercial computer, the E-101. It was set up in the Times newsroom – where its use 
was heavily promoted in advance. Its predictions were broadcast live to Detroit area 
television viewers on election night and then celebrated later through stories in the 
newspaper and in a Burroughs publication.152  The disappearance heretofore of the story 
of the Detroit Times’s role as an early adopter of computers for election-night journalism 
may be due, in part, to the disappearance of the Times itself.  But in its efforts of 1954 
and 1956, the Times had extended the pattern of election night as a venue for the coming 
together of journalists and technologist based on both an intersection of interests and on 
the ability of the computer to fulfill multiple roles – including analysis, promotion, and 
after-the-fact bragging rights.  
The Lure of Election Night at IBM: A Calculated Risk for 1956 
Although the Hartford Courant, the New York World-Telegram and Sun, and the 
Associated Press Washington Bureau would mention in 1952 post-election accounts that 
IBM equipment had contributed in their election-night efforts, IBM itself appears to have 
done little beyond an article in an in-house publication to publicly celebrate its election-
night role.153  One likely explanation is that the IBM equipment in use – though 
employed in a number of newspaper and wire service offices and even in conjunction 
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with an NBC broadcast on the West Coast – was not the very latest technology since IBM 
was not quite ready to debut its first stored-program commercial computers.154   
In 1954, though IBM had brought some of those computers to market, they did 
not play a role in the national broadcasting of election returns, either. But immediately 
following the 1954 elections, as IBM was battling Remington Rand for leadership in the 
emerging market for commercial computers, key IBM executives were working up to a 
conviction that their new machines needed to be in on the election-night action – in a big 
way – in 1956.  Records of behind-the-scenes deliberations and efforts at IBM provide a 
rare look – not available in the same kind of detail for the Remington Rand and Monroe 
efforts leading to their 1952 election-night roles – at that the degree to which seeking a 
place at center stage on election night could involve a great many players and even reach 
to the highest levels at a major corporation. These records also reveal something else 
which appears to have been the case with computer use in 1952 based on after-the-fact 
accounts but is established with more even certainty in 1956: that the technology provider 
– in this case, IBM – sought out an alliance with a news organization, ultimately NBC, by 
framing election night as an event in which their agendas would intersect. 
Memos and reports of meetings at IBM suggest there was awareness from the 
outset, however, that this path of action was not without considerable risk. The 
conversation came to include key executives and managers with responsibilities related to 
the company’s media relations, image, sales, customer relations, technology, and overall 
management. Where the idea started is not made clear in the available memos. But in late 
November 1954, within days of a meeting of several of these individuals to discuss the 
                                                 




possibilities for IBM role in reporting and analyzing 1956 election returns, an IBM 
executive vice president, Louis H. LaMotte, was receiving memos and was soon 
reporting, in turn, the company’s president, Thomas J. Watson Jr.155 
While the end result of the efforts at IBM would be collaboration with NBC, that 
specific arrangement was not envisioned at the outset.  Telling is a Nov. 24, 1954, memo 
to LaMotte, the executive vice president, from Harry T. Rowe, IBM’s director of 
information, about a recent meeting with several company officials in the office of T. 
Vincent Learson, another veteran company executive whose promotion to vice president 
in charge of sales would be announced a few days later. 156 On the table was a proposal to 
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use an IBM innovation – a “740” cathode ray tube that had been the subject of a brief but 
wondrous account just days earlier in the Wall Street Journal for its ability to provide a 
graphical display of a computer’s calculations.157  In the election memo, Rowe reported 
on a proposal to use the cathode ray tube for displaying the progress of the 1956 vote 
count as compared to the 1952 count. He noted that the best means of acquiring live data 
on election night and comparative data from past elections would be “collaboration with 
the Associated Press,” and he added: “Of course, the facilities of one of the principal 
television networks would also have to be made available.”158 Not envisioned here was a 
lopsided arrangement in which the eventual story of the story, so to speak, would position 
a news organization with top billing and IBM merely in the role of helper. As the idea of 
IBM involvement on election night began to take shape, it was conceived of as an event 
in which IBM would play a starring role. 
As the exploration continued, IBM’s working group on the issue soon came 
across the work done by the Wayne University computation laboratory for the Detroit 
Times in the 1954 Michigan elections. A memo that circulated among several IBM 
officials referred to this project as “the job that Burroughs UDEC did for the Michigan 
elections” – a reference to the computer manufacturer and the model used – and noted the 
conclusion of one IBM manager “that this is the most sensible approach yet that he has 
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found for the contribution of computers to election returns.”159 LaMotte, IBM’s executive 
vice president, saw the memo and wanted to know more about the Michigan project.160 
Cuthbert C. Hurd, a leading figure in IBM’s move into the computer field, 
reached out in another direction to Sig Mickelson at CBS to learn what he could about the 
network’s forecasting in 1952.161 After hearing about the role of Max Woodbury and the 
actions taken behind the scenes in the face of a “wide discrepancy” between the early 
UNIVAC-generated results and the pre-election polls, Hurd sounded a cautious note 
about election–night forecasting in memo to Roger M. Bury, a key IBM executive in the 
area of advertising and promotion.162 “I want to point out the very large extent to which 
the whole forecasting procedure depends on individual judgment,” wrote Hurd.163 This 
ranged from the selection of particular counties for extrapolation to decisions about the 
mathematical models to be used. “Finally, and most importantly,” wrote Hurd, “if you 
obtain a result which is a startling one, as in 1952, do you then trust your formulas or do 
your change your formulas in midstream as Dr. Woodbury did.”164  Only if IBM were 
willing to spend a lot of money and hire the nation’s top statisticians, Hurd argued, could 
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the company jump into election-night forecasting. And writing in February 1955, more 
than 20 months ahead of the 1956 election, Hurd added: “it is already late to start.”165  
Hurd’s caution generated more discussion and exploration on several fronts. One 
memo suggested that IBM solicit the names of potential consultants from John Tukey at 
Princeton, a major figure in the study and application of statistics, and Solomon 
Kullback, the head of research and development at the National Security Agency.166 
Other memos voiced concern about risks of various sorts. Should IBM try to engage in 
forecasting on election night, or should the company focus instead on a system for 
reporting the vote count?  Going in either direction posed some peril. Bury, the executive 
in advertising and promotion, argued for the latter. “It seems to me,” he wrote, “that if we 
invest a large sum of money to develop a dependable mathematical pattern, the most that 
we could achieve in the minds of the general public, is that IBM too was doing some 
predicting.”167 But beyond that potential for a ho-hum result, Bury offered up a darker 
scenario. “There is also the possibility,” he wrote, “that were we to predict on NBC, and 
Univac predict on CBS, a battle of giant brains conceivably might be built up by some 
energetic publicity man, with a hazard of being discredited in the public’s mind, if our 
predictions were not completely accurate.”168 Another IBM official, Walter H. Johnson, 
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pointed out the problem with not taking a run at developing a method of forecasting to 
use with its machines, referred to generically in his memo as “EDPM,” or electronic data 
processing machines: “It seems reasonable to expect the competitor to produce another 
election forecasting show in 1956, which would be substantially more dramatic than the 
use of EDPM for simple compiling and reporting.”169 The value of showmanship that had 
been inherent in the television networks’ promotion of their computer use in 1952 was 
also, it seems, one of the values informing the deliberations at IBM with an eye to the 
1956 presidential election.  
As the conversation continued, Rowe, the director of information, summed up the 
situation as it stood in late March 1955.170 He talked about the difficulty of making 
overtures to “the TV people.”171 There was disagreement at IBM about what the 
company’s involvement on election-night might look like, and doubts from some about 
whether “a stunt” using the cathode ray tube display, given the need to code the data and 
enter it onto punch cards, would produce results faster than “a person with a crayon can 
mark the same results on a board.”172 And even at that, Rowe continued, “we merely 
would be reporting progress of the vote without any more dramatic impact  than it can be 
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obtained by conventional means.”173 He noted, too, that the Associated Press “was not 
enthused” about providing information directly to IBM, and that “in the last election” – 
perhaps a reference to 1954, though this was not made explicit in the memo – “NBC was 
not interested in using ‘giant brains.’”174 But his memo suggests that he saw no choice for 
IBM but to continue seeking a path to involvement in election-night broadcasting, despite 
the risks, and he reported on a conversation with Charles Collingwood to drive home the 
point: 
I think it is academic to say we must be on TV next election if we 
don’t have a gimmick. It seems to me we have to do some stunt that may 
be a calculated risk. 
I was talking with Charles Collingwood at CBS-TV Sunday… He 
felt, and I agree, that even the last UNIVAC stunt, despite its kidding 
press, was worthwhile and had generally favorable results.”175 
As the search for a solution continued, those working on the issue at IBM talked 
about contacting top pollsters, reached out to Woodbury, and even considered developing 
“a continuing program of election coverage which might involve support of a fellowship 
for example for a long term investigation.”176 By the fall of 1955, more than a year ahead 
of the election, IBM was in talks with J. Davidson Taylor, the vice president in charge of 
public affairs at NBC. IBM had found its partner. In late October 1956, the ultimate 
arrangements were touted in a pair of breathless NBC press releases that were passed up 
the chain of command at IBM to Watson, who by then was the company’s CEO as well 









as its president.177 The memo to Watson, dated six days before the election, indicated that 
the public relations advantage would extend to more than election night, with an “all-out 
advanced promotion” by NBC: “Spot announcements showing our equipment will be 
appearing frequently and we will participate in two or three of their regular programs 
between now and election night.”178 In addition to working with NBC on the national 
broadcast, the IBM memo reported to Watson that once every 30 minutes, NBC would be 
switching to local stations around the country, and IBM branch offices would be working 
with 16 of these. For 10 stations in nine cities, IBM model 650 computers would be used. 
In San Francisco, the more powerful IBM 705 computer – identified as the “Bank of 
America 705” – would be used. And in five cities, IBM would provide help using 
“conventional punched card equipment,” its specific type not listed.179 
The NBC-IBM plan for its national broadcast did include the use of data for trend 
analysis, without any mention of “forecasting” or “prediction.” But the centerpiece of the 
arrangement turned out to be an extremely elaborate arrangement to report the vote – 
what NBC touted as “a major innovation in collecting and transmitting election returns,” 
an “ingenious” and “unique transcontinental electronic system that will enable the 
                                                 
177 Smith to Watson, Oct. 31, 1956, IBM-CA. The memo identifies the attachments as copies of the “NBC 
press kit given to reporters” on the afternoon of Oct. 30. The two attached NBC releases – “Electronic 
Computing Wizardry and Instantaneous Communications Setup Pace Swifter Election Returns Than Ever 
Before on NBC-TV and Radio” and “Here’s How NBC’s Electronic Election Computing and Reporting 
System Will Work” – are dated Oct. 30, 1956. The same two releases with the same date are in the archival 
collection of the papers of a director of information at NBC: Box 179, Folder 13, Michael Horton Papers, 
NBC Records, WHS. One of these two press releases – “Electronic Computing Wizardry…” –  appears 
with the same content but a different date, Oct. 23, 1956, in  a collection of NBC trade releases at the 
Library of American Broadcasting, College Park, MD. The second of these releases is not in the LAB 
collection. 





network to report returns faster than ever before.”180  In early October and later that 
month, NBC issued press releases touting the “electronic computing wizardry” that 
would be critical to election-night coverage.181  A second technology partner in this 
system was the Teleregister Corporation, which would provide a 50-foot-long bank of 
tally boards to display the vote counts generated by IBM’s equipment. Davidson Taylor, 
NBC’s vice president for public affairs, deemed four goals to be paramount: “speed, 
completeness, accuracy and analysis.”182  Unspoken were other paramount values for the 
journalist-technologist alliance: showmanship and bragging rights for technological 
wonders.  NBC boasted that “the special electronic network marks the first major 
departure from traditional manually based collection and transmittal of returns in 
years.”183 An elaborate array of equipment was to be installed at Studio 8-H in New 
York. And out of view would be the guts of the new system, involving the deployment of 
hundreds people and a nationwide network of computing equipment and 
telecommunications facilities to aggregate returns from the Associated Press at the state 
level and speed them to New York. The data was to be used both in updating tally boards 
at the studio and for use by reporters and analysts in reporting on trends.  Analysis for the 
benefit of the NBC broadcast was also to be done at IBM’s Manhattan headquarters. 
Taking part in the operation there for the benefit of the NBC audience would be a veteran 
political analyst, Joseph C. Harsch, and a pollster, George Gallup. One NBC release 
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reported that the “huge ‘705’ IBM ‘electronic brain,’” which was due to “be utilized in 
1957 to track the U.S.-launched manmade satellite,” would be used on election night to 
“project voting trends, a relatively simple job for this giant.”184 
In fact, NBC was sending out mixed messages about its computer use in 1956. On 
the one hand, newspaper ads in cities around the country promoted the network’s 
coverage by promising the use of “a new IBM electronic system that analyzes returns and 
automatically spots trends.”185 A two-page ad appearing in Life magazine went even 
further. It touted not only an “ingenious all-electronic system” to speed results and 
“specially adapted IBM equipment” that “eliminates all chance of human error,” but the 
use of “the miraculous IBM electronic brain to analyze the data and project the ultimate 
direction of the election.” 186 And this: “NBC will be first to bring you all developing 
trends, and first to announce the final winners.”187 A pre-election item in a trade 
publication, Broadcasting Telecasting, also lumped all three major networks together in 
using their “electronic accessories” to “predict the outcome of the balloting.” But at least 
two newspaper columns, one before and one after the election, suggest that NBC had 
made a point of distinguishing its analysis from the process of predicting winners based 
on early returns. Val Adams, writing in the New York Times two days before the election, 
reported that NBC would not be using computers for projection of winners.188 There was 
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to be a “battle” between “electronic ‘brains’” on election night, Adams wrote, but it 
would be between ABC and CBS.189 NBC was said to be “a bit conservative,” deciding 
to “forego the battle of the electronic forecasters” and focus instead on its new system, 
with IBM and Teleregister, to speed up the vote count.190 No mention was made of the 
use of IBM computers both in the studio and at IBM headquarters to aid in analysis.  In a 
column after the election, a New York Daily News columnist wrote that “NBC snubbed 
what it termed ‘guess work’ and, instead, chose to employ IBM and Teleregister 
machines for speed and accuracy … content to allow the actual votes unfold the battle of 
the ballot.”191 
Despite the mixed messages coming from NBC about computer use for prediction 
and regardless of precisely how NBC employed the computer equipment on election 
night, there is one striking sign of movement over the space of two years.  In 1954, 
NBC’s publicity machine cast humans – and specifically reporters – as superior to 
mechanical devices and the statisticians associated with them.  Now, in 1956, the same 
publicity machine had hoped to assure the public and other intermediaries who might get 
the network’s releases ahead of the election that “all computations will be done 
electronically to eliminate all chance of human error.”192  And this:  “Each item of IBM 
and Teleregister equipment will have a vital functional role in the operation; none will be 
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used merely as set dressing.”193  The election-night coverage was, as it had been in 1952 
and 1954, still under the supervision of William R. McAndrew, director of news.  But 
machines were now being given billing as not only “vital,” but serious.  Perhaps the 
references to “human error” and “set dressing” were inside jokes or digs aimed at CBS, 
with that network’s past use of a faux UNIVAC on the election-night set and the troubles 
blamed on humans who caused the real UNIVAC to go astray.  But in any event, at NBC 
the acceptance of computing equipment and collaboration with technologists as both 
having a place in journalism – at least in election-night journalism – had taken a step 
forward.  By comparison, in the week before the 1956 election, an independent television 
station in Newark, New Jersey, went to the trouble to announce, in the words of a two-
sentence item in the New York Times, “that its coverage of election returns would not 
involve any electronic wizardry.” 194 A spokesman for the station, Channel 13, was 
quoted as saying: “The only machines used on this program will be a news ticker and 
possibly a slide rule for late returns.”195 
Mixed Message at ABC - But Continuity in Election-Night Culture 
When computers were introduced into the election-night mix at ABC in 1956, 
they were inserted easily into the by-now familiar election-night trope of “man vs. 
machine.” But this time the network did not wait for the newspaper and magazine writers 
to employ that framework. ABC built that structure into its own framing of the way a 
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computer would be used. And for the computer’s manufacturer, Underwood, another 
election-night tradition was in play: this would be the occasion to debut its newest 
computer system, the Elecom 125.196  
Judging from one piece of evidence, it’s likely that for at least some at ABC, the 
stance toward computers may not have been one of enthusiastic embrace. It’s found in 
the papers of John Daly, ABC’s well-known and award-winning newscaster who held the 
lengthy title of “Vice President in Charge of News, Special Events, Sports and Public 
Affairs.”197 In September, 1956, Daly wrote a message to a former colleague from ABC 
in New York that referenced election-night arrangements which NBC had made with 
IBM and CBS with Remington Rand. He wrote with apparent disdain that he would now 
have to move in the same direction.198 There was no little irony, then, in the way 
Associated Press television writer Charles Mercer referred to Daly in a pre-election 
rundown on the networks’ computer plans: “On ABC-TV we have Elecom 125 
developed by the Underwood Corp., with John Daly at the controls, which will make its 
own forecasts of the outcome approximately every half hour.”199 
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On Oct. 30, ABC put out a pair of press releases with Daly announcing that the 
network would debut the Elecom 125 on election night.200  And Daly turned up on the 
same day at the Elecom’s home base – One Park Avenue in Manhattan – for a preview 
arranged, according to Underwood, for business writers, newspaper reporters, and 
“television personalities.”201 Though the ABC press releases mentioned several means for 
detecting trends on election night, they did not say explicitly what The Nation magazine 
made clear a few days later in its pre-election issue: “John Daly at ABC will pit human 
brains against Elecom.”202 And Daly himself spelled out the arrangement explicitly in an 
account that ran after the election in an Underwood publication.203 It suggests that if he 
were feeling compelled to join the computer age in order to satisfy the imperatives of 
election-night showmanship, he was going to remain grounded in what was familiar. 
Computer use would be cast as an experiment rather than an abrupt transition to 
something new, at least new for ABC. “Since scientists tell us we are entering the age of 
automation with machines increasingly taking over tasks formerly done by humans,” 
Daly was quoted as saying, “our approach to the election coverage this year was inspired 
by a natural curiosity to find out … just what role electronic automation can play in 
predicting election results of the future.”204 So he set up a contest, one he himself framed 
as “Man vs. Machine.” It might tell whether the machine was efficient in predicting 
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elections, or, on the other hand, “whether man, creator of the machine, could beat the 
machine at its own game.”205 The “Man Unit” was to be headed by pollster Louis Harris, 
working with a team from Collier’s and making use of 54 voting areas selected in 
advance based on demographics and other characteristics, with data available on their 
voting history. Harris would have access to more than 100 correspondents around the 
country with phone lines to New York, where another 25 people were to help Harris 
compile the results. On the Elecom side of the ledger would be Louis Bean, author of a 
book on predicting election outcomes.206 And the audience at home had been invited to 
join in, too. Ahead of the election, Collier’s ran an elaborate guide to the 54 voting areas 
– their characteristics, location, voting history, and a place to write in the 1956 returns – 
along with an article by Harris titled, “Be Your Own ‘Armchair Expert’ – A TV Game 
for Election Night.”207 
 The contest notwithstanding, Daly also made clear that the “Man vs. Machine” 
arrangement was itself just a supplement to ABC’s traditional election night routine. 
“Our principal tool,” he was quoted as saying after the election, “was still the team of 
some 300 newsmen, technicians and clerks.”208 
In the end, Underwood conceded after the election, “the fact that Eisenhower’s 
decisive margin of victory became so apparent so soon lessened the challenge between 
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the Elecom and the Collier’s unit.”209 Still, Underwood insisted, there remained “plenty 
of visual excitement … created by the seemingly all-knowing” Elecom.210 Even now, in 
the third election featuring computers, the machine’s tendency to serve intersecting 
agendas and have multiple meanings – from tool to prop – still mattered. And, as Daly 
and ABC had arranged it, computing could be tried out and observed in action by 
collaboration with the technology’s providers but without dismissing or replacing 
traditional means to the same ends.   
The Critics: Coming to Terms, Slowly, with Election-Night Computing 
Just as there was no preordained trajectory for computers to enter journalism on 
election night 1952, and just as that episode did not then guarantee the future use of 
computers in journalism or even just for election-night reporting, there was also no 
immediate acceptance of computers as appropriate for election-night broadcasting among 
the writers for newspapers and magazines who covered television news both as 
journalism and as performance. A sampling of the responses of the writers on that beat 
provides ample evidence that although some journalists were experimenting with 
computers – and then deciding whether and how to keep going – the willingness to 
embrace this new technology amongst the wider ranks of journalists was in no way 
universal after 1952. That would take years, and even then, as the technology and its 
application changed over time, it could never be taken for granted that the marriage of 
journalism and computing was a done deal. And the “man vs. machine” approach to 






evaluating the worthiness of computers for employment in journalism – at times an 
explicit or implicit “journalist vs. machine” comparison – would also live on after 1952. 
Several days after election night in 1954, when CBS was the only network opting 
to employ a computer, New York Times television critic Jack Gould weighed in with a 
column that ran under the dismissive headline, “Election Projection:  A Great Click-
Clack in the Back of the Sacred UNIVAC.” 211  Gould delivered a pointed critique that 
gathered steam as it went along.  The column began this way: 
Television’s coverage of the election returns on Tuesday night was 
probably not too bad in light of the general confusion arising from the 
close contests and unforeseen late shifts in tabulation.  If some of the 
broadcasters got caught with their statistical projection showing, so did 
most of the assorted experts, both mortal and electronic.212 
Gould reviewed the various networks’ arrangements, dishing out compliments but also 
attaching a note of dismissal to each.  NBC’s four-way screen was “intriguing” but “did 
not add too much in terms of straight news coverage.”213 CBS had tally boards that were 
deemed elaborate, but the studio operation sometimes lacked coordination. ABC’s 
arrangements did not rate a description, except to say that they “had the considerable 
advantage of simplicity.” Gould’s most scathing comments, however, were reserved for a 
computer not clever enough to know that it could not rely, again, on its human keepers, 
who supplied it, at times, with flawed data: 
… there isn’t much doubt that Tuesday night will best be 
remembered for woefully wrong guesses of UNIVAC, the electronic 
brain, in predicting over C.B.S. a sweeping democratic landslide. 
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As UNIVAC’s valet, Charles Collingwood, explained on the air, 
the electronic brain can only solve those problems presented to it:  the 
gadget doesn’t choose the problems in the first place. 
UNIVAC’s mistake, it seems, was simply to trust the human race 
on election night.214 
Time magazine’s take on the computer’s role was no more generous in a recap of 
election-night reporting on television. 215  Time declared: “Probably the outstanding TV 
casualty of the night was Univac.”216 After first predicting a Democratic return to 
majorities in both the House and Senate with large margins in each, Time noted, the 
UNIVAC reversed course late in the evening and left Collingwood facing a prediction of 
a Republican majority in the House.217  The memory of 1952 was still fresh, and Time 
quoted Collingwood as saying this:  “We didn’t know what to do. Should we change the 
machine? After all, last time the experts were wrong. I decided to stick with the 
machine.”218 The mistaken assignment of a House majority to the Republicans was 
attributed to a transcription error by a teletype operator. And the mistaken predictions of 
the size the Democratic majority was attributed by Collingwood to a model that gave too 
much weight to outsized Democratic margins in two states that were early to report. As in 
1952, Collingwood’s take on the situation – and on the computer – was said to be 
defensive: “After all,” he was quoted as saying, “Univac is only human – that is, it can 
only make predictions based on the material that humans feed into it.”219 
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On election night in 1956, the New Yorker’s Philip Hamburger, writing as the 
peripatetic reporter with the moniker “Our Man Stanley,” visited the UNIVAC 
installation at Remington Rand’s Manhattan headquarters and chronicled the scene in a 
wry piece in the magazine.220 Hamburger’s response was, at best, ambiguous, and humor 
was his medium.   He captured the hubbub this way:  
Room a madhouse. Close to a hundred human brains, attached to bodies, 
occupied room, some bending over teletype machines, others poring over 
stacks of papers at desks, others standing before restaurant-refrigerator-
type machines with glass fronts and whirring disks inside. Control boards 
everywhere – red, green, amber. Terrifying.221 
 Hamburger met with Max Woodbury, who had moved on to the Mathematics 
Department at New York University’s College of Engineering, and was introduced as a 
“tall, tense brain.” 222 The professor explained the use of past data and told Hamburger 
the machine “brain” was working “like a dream.”223 Hamburger met with UNIVAC co-
inventor John Mauchly, a “quiet-looking man.” 224 The writer captured Woodbury’s 
manifest pleasure, at first, that the computer’s work was turning out to be “perfectly 
splendid,” spitting out a forecast of an Eisenhower victory with such confidence that odds 
of 100-to-one were attached to it.225 But then there was trouble, a problem with the 
Tennessee forecast. The computer said it was going Democratic. Woodbury thought that 
must be wrong and was validated when a courier arrived with a United Press dispatch 
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saying that Tennessee was, in fact, going Republican.  Then a courier arrived with some 
more disconcerting news.  The machine, said Mauchly, had “become persnickety about 
accepting some data.” 226   There was debate between Mauchly and Woodbury about the 
human and machine roles. “‘Error lights,’ said Dr. Woodbury,” and then “ Easy to blame 
the machinery,’ said Dr. Mauchly. ‘Could be human failure.’” 227  A problem cropped up 
with the Senate numbers. “She’s goofed on the Senate,” said Woodbury. 228  And that’s 
where Hamburger left things, with one last subtle dig: “Drs. Woodbury and Mauchly 
joined technicians at control board.  I went home and listened to returns on radio.  
Eisenhower by landslide.” 229  Hamburger was not alone in his tongue-in-cheek 
skepticism.  The Times’s Gould also wrote dismissively of computer use in reviewing the 
election-night broadcasts:  “All three chains employed their own versions of electronic 
computers, which brilliantly confirmed the obvious.”230    
The critics notwithstanding, computers did become a fixture on election night and 
the computer-makers continued to see the exposure as valuable. In a 1960 ad after the 
election, IBM made this clear by running a newspaper advertisement that asked: “Who 
won the computer battle last night?”231 IBM’s answer to that question – telling readers, 
“You did” – was, perhaps, predictable.232 But then IBM also made clear the stakes for 
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itself: “Election reporting is a dramatic way to demonstrate the reliability of modern 
computer systems under conditions of stress and urgency.”233 That might be, but the 
writers who covered broadcasting were still not all ready to concede that this was good 
journalism or good television. Variety, for example, generally heaped praise on television 
for the unexpected “Alfred Hitchcock touch” in covering the seesawing that went on in 
the election-night conclusion to the close contest between John F. Kennedy and Richard 
M. Nixon.234 But the use of computers was panned outright: 
The electronic brains used by the three nets again raised a serious 
question as to their value. The fact that the patterns of this election (by far 
the closest since such electronic wonders were devised) didn’t follow 
normal courses confused the machines, of course. This is to give an excuse 
as to why they erred so often, but it is no excuse for why they should have 
been used in the first place. At best, they confused televiewers, and made 
the webs look a little silly. They should, in fact, be good source material 
for comedians.235 
Finally, in 1962, Gould – and the Times’s copy desk – announced the marriage of 
computing and election-night to be solid.  The headline read:  “TV: Election Coverage; 
Electronic Computers Prove Value in Forecasting Results—C.B.S. Excels.” 236  The 
technology that Gould saw as a questionable part of the process a decade earlier now got 
top billing. “Electronic computers,” he wrote, “clearly have taken over the drama of 
reporting returns and introduced a new sophistication in quick forecasting of results.”237  
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Gould showed a willingness to part with what had become another sort of post-election 
tradition. “Computing machines have been the target of almost as many jokes as mothers-
in-law,” Gould wrote, “but on Tuesday evening there was no gainsaying their influence.  
Their projections of probable winners on the basis of limited returns proved almost 
uncannily accurate…” 238 Gould also drew a larger lesson about the value of computers 
going forward – for analysts and for the viewing public: “Political analysts always have 
been more impressed by the results in pivotal districts than in early total returns.  The 
computing industry now has placed an incredibly fast tool at their disposal and television 
has been the means of acquainting the mass public with the procedure. “239 
One can read Gould’s take on the election-night reporting as a sort of bookend – 
acceptance of computers, with their use evolving in sophistication over a single decade, 
as a worthy fixture of these broadcasts.   He would go on to make a similar 
pronouncement a year and a half later, when, ahead of the 1964 California primary, he 
would declare: “The incredible computing machines have led the revolution in election 
reporting.”240 
But acceptance was still far from universal, complete, or permanent.  On the same 
1962 election night that saw Gould tip his hat to computer analysis, another significant 
television critic of that era, Lawrence Laurent of the Washington Post, was full of 
concerns.241  “Election Night, 1962,” he wrote, “just about did away with men and 
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replaced them with machines.”242  Humans, it seemed, even had to put up with the 
machines’ required working conditions: “… chilled CBS reporters … had to shiver while 
a cool, optimum, temperature was maintained for computers.” 243  Laurent’s critique was 
that somewhere in the ascendancy of computer analysis on election night, serious 
questions had become manifest about turf that had once been the purview of journalists 
unaided by technology: 
An electronic brain is surely an awesome instrument and certainly 
civilization has to depend on them for solutions to complex problems.  
However, TV newsmen have been intimidated and it is just about time to 
take the devices out of the newsrooms and return them to space 
laboratories.  For reporting, there remains that nagging doubt that some 
human being might have given the machine a bad diet of statistics or that a 
computer, in surpassing human capacity, may have taken on some of the 
doubts that are the beginning of true wisdom. 
I am not attempting to discredit the men who labored so long 
through the night.  What I am suggesting is that the reporters return to the 
one trade for which they are fitted:  Accurate details, given with calm 
assurance and without the mania for beating the opposition – by three-
tenths of one second – to a forecast of a winner. 244 
Gould’s own admiration for election computer-use in 1962 and 1964 did not mean 
that he was beyond criticizing the way they were employed. Just as radio broadcasters 
earlier in the century had wrestled with the best way to keep from overwhelming listeners 
with returns, Gould was arguing in 1966 that the new ability to provide very detailed 
analysis with great speed should be tempered with the need for clarity. 245  “The 
computers need to be kept in their place lest a torrent of information merely clog the 
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channels of communication,” he wrote.246 What was wanted, Gould argued, was more 
“careful reflective commentary that gives shape and perspective to the meaning of the 
electorate’s will.” 247  Two years later, in his final column about election-night television, 
Gould echoed similar sentiments and some old themes.  Computers on election night 
were still inviting the evergreen comparison of cold machine vs. human journalist.  They 
also seemed to invite a contest involving an alliance of computers and pollsters on the 
one hand and, on the other hand, the voters as players who could not be reduced to 
predictable patterns of thinking and acting. “The era of automation could not cope with 
the tightest presidential race in years,” Gould wrote. “Old-fashioned vote counting 
became an overnight vogue as the human beings took over from the machines.” 248   
 
It is not my intent here to provide a detailed account of the evolution of computer 
use in election-night reporting since 1952.  In brief, just as the permanent campaign 
became a feature of 20th-century politics, the networks developed a more or less 
permanent apparatus for election coverage, with long-term planning before each new 
political cycle. The creation and development of the unit at CBS, for example, is detailed 
in 1983 dissertation by Michael Anthony Russo. 249  The calling of elections based largely 
on formulas applied to early returns was superseded over time with a methodology that 
relied heavily on exit polling. The race to be the first call the presidential contest fueled 
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controversy over the projection of the winners while polls were still open on the West 
Coast. That in turn led to studies, journalistic soul-searching, congressional hearings, and 
a form of self-regulation over projecting the outcome where voting is still underway. 
Major news organizations formed a series of alliances to share the cost of exit polling and 
the aggregation of returns. Enormous amounts of advance planning went into the 
arrangements for being able to project winners on election night. Even, so snafus 
involving computerized analysis and controversial calls continued to be part of the 
election-night story, most notably in 2000, which featured seesawing reports of the 
outcome in a presidential contest that would ultimately be decided only five weeks later 
by a Supreme Court ruling.250 A study commissioned by CNN afterward concluded that 
“television news organizations staged a collective drag race on the crowded highway of 
democracy, recklessly endangering the electoral process, the political life of the country, 
and their own credibility.” 251 Decades after computer-based methodologies for election-
night analysis first appeared, election nights offered an increasingly rich buffet of data 
points to seasoned commentators and journalists, but the hoped-for abatement of risk 
over issues of timeliness and accuracy was still not a settled affair. 
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Chapter 9:  Conclusions 
The path that led to this dissertation began with curiosity about why journalism 
evidenced a very limited acceptance of computer analysis as a reporting tool for decades 
into the era of commercial computing.  For me, this was also part of a larger interest in 
innovations – how they arise, how they are received, how choices are envisioned and 
made about their use. When I looked for a starting point for computer use in journalism, 
the limited literature dealing in any way with the intertwined histories of computing and 
journalism pointed toward election-night forecasting in 1952.  Here was an exception to 
the generally slow pace of diffusion I had witnessed for computer analysis in the 
newsroom during much of my own newspaper career. For at least one sort of use, 
election-night reporting on returns and trends, some journalists and their news 
organizations had been early adopters of computer analysis. As I began to explore the 
events of that election night in 1952 and the context for those events, I discovered – as I 
have chronicled in the preceding chapters – a much richer story than was previously 
understood. For one thing, here was not just a single network using one computer, but a 
competition between networks teamed up with makers of some of the latest computing 
equipment, known at the time as “electronic brains.” There was CBS working with 
Remington Rand, manufacturer of the massive UNIVAC computer. There was NBC 
working with the Monroe Calculating Machine Company, manufacturer of a diminutive 
computer, the Monrobot. And there was ABC working with IBM, manufacturer of a 
transitional technology, actually a cluster of existing pre-computer IBM devices marketed 
together as the Card Programmed Electronic Calculator and capable of certain computer-




variety of other journalistic settings on election night in 1952, including tabulation for 
some wire service offices and newspapers. 
Given what appears to have been the limited deployment of computer analysis in 
the newsroom for so many decades, it was surprising to see such an early use of 
computers in journalism for election coverage. It was paradoxical, too, to see journalism 
as the route by which computers made such a visible entry into popular culture. And so 
beyond the question of what happened on election night in 1952, my study of this episode 
gave rise to the question of how it came about.  That is, how do we make sense of this 
particular use of computers so early in their history as commercial products? How do we 
account for election night as the means by which computers would find their way into 
journalistic endeavors? And do events from this former era of new technology provide 
any help – in terms of questions to be asked, if not answers to be obtained – in thinking 
about our current era of new technology and the striking mixture of challenge and 
opportunity that it poses for journalism? 
I have found that while the deployment of computers for election-night coverage 
appeared revolutionary, both then and in subsequent retellings, it was actually part of a 
pattern of what I have called here cultural continuity.  Election night has been an 
underappreciated event in American life. Well back into the 19th century, election night 
offered a chance for newspapers to shine.  That’s because it offered the promise of what 
in the Internet era would come to be known as “eyeballs.” Aided by the telegraph 
bringing results from great distances, newspapers positioned themselves at center stage, 
providing aggregate information that could not be officially provided by any single 




street, newspapers offered not merely information, but also various amusements. New 
technologies were deployed to serve multiple purposes – to disseminate information to 
waiting crowds and, in the process, to serve as wonders for attracting public interest and 
enhancing prestige. Systems for rapid tabulation of votes – from the organization of 
armies of accountants to the deployment of early calculating machines and even the 
employment of humans with celebrated prowess in mental calculation – were important 
features of election night for decades before 1952. So were methods for detecting trends 
from early election results, and this was already an acknowledged science well before the 
20th century.  All of these factors – leading to ever more rapid reporting of results and 
trends to ever larger and more enthusiastic crowds – served well what I have called here 
the “story of the story.” This was a feature of accounts that newspapers and later radio 
and television news operations would tell about election night, positioning themselves at 
the center of attention, and doing so through a rich confection of information, 
showmanship, technology, planning, and organization. 
In 1952, the epicenter of computer activity on election night was New York, the 
same city where these patterns had been part of the election-night scene for generations. 
In that year, election night served as a venue for the intersecting interests of the nascent 
television news business and the nascent commercial computing industry. And the new 
technology to be deployed was capable of playing multiple roles. These were devices for 
calculation, but they were also props for showmanship and icons for enhancing the 
prestige and bragging rights of the networks employing them. 
Still, there was nothing automatic or obvious here.  Computers did not march into 




they might be touted in network promotions of various sorts in advance of their use, there 
was a clear risk that they might not do what they were touted as being able to do on 
election night.  For the broadcasters, these risks could be contained by using both human 
analysis and machine analysis, by deploying them as independently functioning 
operations, and by giving primacy to a range of human players and their established or 
purported expertise in the arena of political prognostication and analysis.  What is also 
clear is that there was resistance and skepticism in some quarters, expressed in subtle 
smirks or humorous remarks – or even overt glee – that the time had not come for veteran 
reporters and commentators to be replaced by machines.  Computers might have made an 
entry into journalism on election night, but there were also signs that this was not a 
technology to be universally accepted in the newsroom for reporting and analysis. 
While I have been emphasizing in this study what surprised me the most – the 
degree of continuity with past practices and values that was evident in the debut of new 
computer technology in journalism – I am mindful of the warnings of Gordon Wood 
about focusing on continuity in history. Toward the end of my work on this project, 
Wood published The Purpose of the Past: Reflections on the Uses of History, a collection 
of his essays on the works of other historians and commentary on the historian’s craft.1 
He writes: “In graduate school I was taught that the task of a historian is to describe how 
people in the past moved chronologically from A to B … Since people rarely stay the 
same between A and B, describing and explaining change through time always seems to 
me to lie at the heart of a historical reconstruction.”2  It is always easy, indeed, to 
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highlight items from the past, to cherry-pick anecdotes, to be guilty of so-called 
“confirmation bias,” to see what one sets out to see.  This is a cardinal sin in the work of 
history just as it is a cardinal sin in journalism – or at least in the ideal practices of both. 
But the continuity that I found was not at all what I expected to see.   
What has been especially salient to me in this study is the degree to which the 
cultural continuity I witnessed served as a foundation for change.  Or, put another way, 
change – the introduction of the computer into the work of the newsroom – was made 
possible, despite some elements of resistance, because it was done in a way that rested on 
a solid foundation of practices and values from decades of election-night journalism. The 
adoption of the new tool was not wholesale, it was not immediately completed, and it was 
not evidence of a sharp break with the past.  Also important was the capacity of this new 
tool to serve a variety of purposes, satisfy a variety of agendas, and meet a variety of 
needs. It had a purported utility as a device for computation. But it was also useful as an 
image and an icon even if, in its application on election night, its utility as a device for 
computation was less than convincing. 
It is here that the two theoretical frameworks I discussed at the outset of this study 
– the diffusion of innovations, from the field of communication studies, and the social 
shaping of technology, from the history of technology and culture – are worth bringing 
back into focus.  I believe they have a point of intersection in the notions I have 
articulated here about the relationship between continuity and change in the introduction 
of the computer into journalism. What is important in both of these frameworks is the 
factor of continuity – the ability to adopt change in some dimensions without a sharp 




consistent with old ends and old values.  The findings of this study of election night 1952 
and its historical context are of particular value, I believe, in providing an example of the 
way in which a technology and associated practices may not merely spread from one 
domain to another – from the world of engineers and programmers to the world of 
journalists, in this case. Rather, this diffusion may be facilitated, especially where there 
are elements of risk and resistance, by the capacity to serve multiple agendas in both 
domains and by taking advantage in each domain of a range of meanings associated with 
the new technology – from tool to symbol to means of commanding center stage in a 
larger cultural competition for attention and respect. 
The More Things Change… 
Among the themes explored in this dissertation is a twinned pair – the place of 
election night as a venue for showcasing technology, and the place of election night as a 
venue in which the use of technology is both embraced and contested.  The appearance of 
the computer as a new technology for use in election-night journalism was greeted as a 
promising tool, a needless intrusion, a wonder to behold, and a gimmick with little if any 
redeeming journalistic value.  If evidence were needed that these themes are not limited 
to past eras in the intertwined histories of journalism and technology, the most recent 
decade has surely offered some prime examples.   
Consider, for example, the degree to which computers, decades after their 
adoption as tools for election-night journalism, continued to engender resistance from 
some quarters and continued to call up the computer-vs.-journalist motif – even from 




Consider, too, election-night’s seemingly endless capacity to serve up new technology to 
serve old purposes – with surprising plot twists and wrapped in a great deal of fanfare. 
In 2000, there was the late Tim Russert, one of the big names in political 
journalism, Washington bureau chief for NBC News and moderator of the Sunday 
morning staple, Meet the Press. In the tight 2000 presidential contest that would provide 
more controversy than clarity about the outcome in the hours, days, and then weeks after 
the polls closed, some of the buzz about the intersection of election-night journalism and 
technology focused on a throwback, with Russert at center stage.3 As Russert tried to help 
the audience comprehend the meaning of the electoral vote count, he jotted down the 
names of key contested states on the back of a legal pad and held it up to the camera. As 
more results came in, he crossed some states out and added others and revised his 
arithmetic, exploring the possible and likely outcomes. As the pad became messier, an 
NBC producer sent out for a pair of hand-held dry-erase boards and markers, and that’s 
what Russert used as the evening wore on and turned into the next morning.  Russert 
reveled in his low-tech approach.  At one point, when asked a question by his colleague 
and NBC Nightly News anchor Tom Brokaw about how the Republican candidate might 
win without Pennsylvania, transcripts show Russert replying this way: “Tom, forget all 
the high tech computers. Take out your slate and your pen and it's the good old days are 
back.  George W. Bush can get the 276 electoral votes if he wins Arizona, Arkansas, 
Colorado, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oregon, Tennessee, West Virginia, 
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Wisconsin and, of course, Ohio.”4  Later in the evening, again speaking with Brokaw, 
Russert advocated grouping states that were too close to call at that point and looking at 
their past performance: “It's better than the computers tonight, Tom. Trust me.”5  And 
still later, several hours after midnight, Brokaw was recounting the embarrassing 
performance of various television networks, including NBC, when it came to calling the 
pivotal state of Florida, prematurely announcing a victor there and then prematurely 
doing it again. Russert’s reply: “If you’d just stayed with these simple boards, you 
wouldn't have those problems with those highfalutin computers, Tom.”6  
Russert’s down-to-earth, low-tech approach would itself become a subject for 
news stories and even a display on the Web site of a journalism think tank, The Poynter 
Institute.7  TV Guide and TV Land deemed it one of the top 100 moments in television 
history, and it was included in a televised special about those landmark events.8  Russert 
would use the episode to open his 2004 autobiography.9 And a year after Russert’s death 
in 2008, his colleague Keith Olbermann referenced Russert’s use of the whiteboard on 
election night 2000 in an on-air tribute: “As the technology increased and overwhelmed 
                                                 
4 “NBC News: Decision 2000,” NBC, Nov. 7, 2000, 8 p.m. segment, available via Lexis-Nexis. 
5 “NBC News: Decision 2000,” NBC, Nov. 7, 2000, 10 p.m. segment, available via Lexis-Nexis. 
6 “NBC News: Decision 2000,” NBC, Nov. 8, 2000, 4 a.m. segment, available via Lexis-Nexis; a transcript 
of this exchange is also online: “Countdown with Keith Olbermann,” MSNBC, June 12, 2009, 
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7 “Tim’s Tablet: The Story of an Upgrade,” The Poynter Institute, 
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Viacom International Inc. Item 68 in the TV Guide list was labeled “Tim Russert Tallies the Vote,” with 
this description: “On a confusing night, NBC’s Russert turns his low-tech election whiteboard into a board 
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the news, he alone had the presence of mind to throw on the brakes and reduce the chaos 
of that election night to terms and means that were unmistakably clear.”10   
Here was election-night’s relationship with technology turned on its head – the 
novelty was Russert’s return to an old-fashioned tool and a time-honored election-night 
methodology.  But the story doesn’t end there.  On election night 2004, NBC broadcast 
from glass-walled studio space set up overlooking Rockefeller Plaza, dubbed 
“Democracy Plaza,” decked out in patriotic colors and outfitted with a variety of 
“multimedia bells and whistles,” as one newspaper described the setting.11 Devices 
constructed to enhance the broadcast were reminiscent of the long history of election 
nights in New York, not to mention NBC’s efforts over the years to compete for a street-
level audience.  The famous ice-skating rink in the plaza was converted into a map of the 
country, the states to be colored blue or red to mark electoral votes gone to one candidate 
or the other.  Harking back to the thermometer-like display of lights running up the Times 
Tower in 1952 to keep a tally of the candidates’ progress, NBC arranged for enormous 
banners – one red, one blue – to be pulled up the face of its building at 30 Rockefeller 
Plaza by window-washing platforms until one candidate or the other reached the magic 
number of 270 electoral votes – at the 12th floor. 
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Tim Russert was there again, too, doing his math by hand. But, as anchor Tom 
Brokaw put it, “We’ve upgraded him this year.” 12 In place of the “old grease board,” said 
Brokaw, “he’s gone electronic on us.”13 Russert had been outfitted with a device about 
the size of his previous legal pad and dry-erase board:  the “Stylistic ST5000 Tablet PC” 
manufactured by Fujitsu, which also proudly issued a press release touting its election-
night role.14  This time, as Russert jotted down his electoral-vote arithmetic on the face of 
the electronic device, he could hold it up to the camera, as in 2000. But what he wrote 
could also be transmitted directly from the device to the television image seen by viewers 
and to a display above “Democracy Plaza” measuring 22 by 30 feet. The gadget also 
allowed Russert to write his numbers under photos of the contenders and to manipulate a 
color-coded map of the United States. 
Once again, election night had offered a chance to showcase technological 
innovation – even if it was in the service of a methodology used to contest the dominance 
of computer-based projections. Here, too, Russert was apparently set to contain the risks 
of machine failure.  USA Today reported that he had one of the old-fashioned boards 
under his desk – just in case.15 
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Another pair of examples that suggest the staying power of some of the patterns 
explored in this dissertation played out on the Cable News Network during reporting on 
the 2006 and 2008 elections. Two years after Russert’s “upgrade,” veteran journalists 
Wolf Blitzer and Jeff Greenfield were covering the 2006 midterm Congressional and 
gubernatorial races for CNN. In a very tight race for governor of Virginia, the counting of 
votes was swinging one way and then another, back and forth, leaving the outcome too 
uncertain for a projection.  “I have to admit to you,” Greenfield told Blitzer, “that I really 
like watching races where all of the computers and all of the projections and all the 
modeling are thrown out the window and people sit there and actually count votes.” 16  
Blitzer replied, “The good, old-fashioned way of actually counting the ballots. It's 
encouraging….”17 On a roll, Greenfield added: “If we hadn't banned smoking in this 
room, I would have had an old-fashioned politician with a cigar in his mouth, a pencil 
and some crumpled paper chucking the numbers for us.”18  
But two years after that, in 2008, Blitzer was playing another role, more now like 
the P.T. Barnum of election night, preparing the audience to be dazzled.19 “I want you to 
watch what we're about to do,” Blitzer said, “because you've never seen anything like this 
on television.”20 There was a drum roll and dramatic music, and then before him an 
image materialized, not quite life-size, but close, outlined in shimmering light.  Clapping 
                                                 




19 Election Night Coverage, CNN, Nov. 4, 2008, 7 p.m. segment, LexisNexis; the video is available on 
YouTube, titled “CNN 1st Time on TV, Jessica Yellin Hologram - Star Wars,” CNN television program 
excerpts, Nov. 4, 2008, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0SIS2ZwkWDg. 




could be heard from somewhere off-screen in the studio. “Alright, a big round of 
applause. We did it,” said Blitzer. “There she is, Jessica Yellin.”21 It was a CNN 
correspondent actually hundreds of miles away in Illinois, where she was waiting along 
with a massive crowd for Barack Obama, the soon-to-be President-elect. Blitzer 
addressed her: “I know you’re in Chicago, but we’ve done something, a hologram, we 
beamed you in.”22  Yellin gave her report and answered Blitzer’s questions, and then they 
returned to a discussion of the technology. “How excited are you Jessica, that this is the – 
you’re the first one that we’ve beamed in to the CNN election center?”23  “It’s like I 
follow in the tradition of Princess Leia,” she replied, a reference to an iconic holographic 
image from the 1977 science fiction film, Star Wars.24 
This bit of CNN showmanship, which also included beaming in musician and 
Obama supporter William “will.i.am” Adams, was met with a range of responses.  There 
were some admiring accounts – not the least of them a story on CNN’s own Web site. It 
explained how “CNN showcased groundbreaking technology” on election night. 25 
Jessica Yellin, the reporter, weighed in. “This is about what we can do,” she said, “about 
pushing the envelope and pushing the boundaries.” 26   The Web site of Wired magazine, 
which reports on the intersection of contemporary technology and culture, deemed the 
CNN technology “cool” – a day after the site also ran a tribute to Univac’s 1952 election-





25 Chris Welch, “Beam me up, Wolf! CNN Debuts Election-Night ‘Hologram,’” CNN.com, Nov. 6, 2008, 
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night performance.27  The Baltimore Sun’s television critic began an election-night blog 
entry this way: “I know it's technological razzle-dazzle and some purists will argue that 
the money could somehow be better spent on nuts-and-bolts, boots-on-the-ground 
journalism, but at 7:15 p.m., CNN beamed a hologram of correspondent Jessica Yellin 
from Grant Park in Chicago to its election headquarters in New York, and it was 
stunning.”28  One of CNN’s technology providers featured laudatory excerpts from news 
coverage on the company’s own Web site, along with this headline from Time – 
“Election Night: Whiteboard Out, Holograms In.”29  
From the world of the technological purism, meanwhile, came grousing that this 
wasn’t really a true hologram – that is, not a three-dimensional image projected onto the 
CNN set – but a two-dimensional image mixed digitally into what the audience saw but 
not seen on the set by Blitzer himself.30  And especially interesting, for our purposes, 
were the responses of a number of journalists on the television and technology beats who 
were covering the election coverage – including some writing in a venue, the World 
Wide Web, which was itself still in the early years of finding legitimacy as a medium for 
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news. One writing for the Dallas Morning News Web site – in a news form relatively 
new in election-night history, the blog – said this ahead of time about the CNN plan: 
“The technology sounds undeniably cool … but I have no idea how this will make 
CNN’s election coverage any better… CNN is clearly determined to be the pioneer of 
extravagant, dubiously-useful election technology.”31  The next day, he deemed the 
whole affair “dumber than I thought.”32   A writer for The Guardian’s Web site was 
equally dismissive: “This was one of the most gleefully pointless election-night 
gimmicks of them all.”33  The Washington Post’s Tom Shales, one of the leading 
American television critics, was also underwhelmed.  “It was a cute trick,” he wrote, “but 
how did it substantially contribute to the coverage? No one seemed to know.”34 Here 
were shades of Jack Gould, perhaps, dismissing computers in 1952 as inconsequential 
additions to the CBS and NBC election-night coverage. 
As for the question of whether holograms might have any redeeming journalistic 
value, CNN returned the day after the election with an iteration of what I have been 
calling in this dissertation the “story of the story.” 35  Blitzer boasted that CNN’s use of 
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“holographic interviews” was “one of the most talked about issues online” and introduced 
a reporter who covers the Internet for CNN, Abbi Tatton.36 Tatton turned to a giant 
screen showing Google’s “Hot Videos” page and noted that after the most-watched 
recording – President-elect Obama’s acceptance speech – the next in popularity was a 
clip of Yellin being beamed into the CNN studio, viewed hundreds of thousands of times. 
Tatton recited with excitement some of the buzz from blogs and news sites – though not 
any of the unflattering critiques. Then Wolf Blitzer turned to David Bohrman, CNN 
senior vice president and Washington bureau chief. Blitzer began with a nod to the 
standard measure of television’s election night success, congratulating Bohrman for 
CNN’s election-night ratings.37 Bohrman reported working for years on the high-tech 
concept that played out on election night. The plan had moved into high gear about three 
months before the election, and in the fall he made a quick trip to Israel to see a proof of 
concept for the technology. Yet even with all the preparations, he said, he didn’t know 
whether it was going to work on election night. After Bohrman described the process and 
showed behind-the-scenes images, Blitzer asked him whether they had “a future in this 
hologram business?”38   Bohrman said it had been “a little ornament on the tree” in 
covering the events of election night. But as television might evolve in the future – 
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maybe “five or 10 or 20 years down the road” – Bohrman suggested that this technology 
might serve television news by allowing for more “intimate” possibilities in interviews at 
a distance.39 
Meanwhile, the technology companies behind the CNN episode were touting their 
role in their own online promotional material – and later at a major broadcasting trade 
show in Las Vegas.40  And that future mentioned by Bohrman might not be so far away: 
Less than a year later, in August 2009, ESPN, the sports cable network, revealed at a live 
demonstration for the news media that its staff had been working “feverishly” on 
hologram technology to enhance its reportage of sporting events – to “bring the people 
from the field in and bring the people from the studio out to the event.”41 
                                                 
39 “Challenges Facing Obama...,” transcript, CNN; and “CNN ‘Hologram’ Interview Explained,” CNN 
video on YouTube. 
40  See: “Vizrt and CNN’s ‘Hologram’ – Behind the Scene,” press release, Vizrt.com, Nov. 6, 2008, 
http://www.vizrt.com/news/press_releases/article3918.ece; and “VirtualVu – The CNN Hologram,” 
STATS, http://www.stats.com/VirtualVU-Case-Study.pdf.  There have also been discussions of the 
technology in the technical media. See, for example: “Vizrt and CNN’s ‘Hologram,’” AV Technology, 
Nov. 21, 2008, http://www.avtechnologyonline.com/article/27222.aspx; and Debra Kaufman, “Pushing for 
Computer Graphics’ Far Edge,” TVNewsCheck, March 12, 2009, 
http://www.tvnewscheck.com/articles/2009/03/12/daily.4/?print. For an account of the technologists touting 
of their election-night work for CNN at the 2009 trade show of the National Association of Broadcasters, 
see Carolyn Braff, “Vizrt, STATS Bring the CNN Hologram to NAB Floor,” Sports Video Group, April 
22, 2009, http://sportsvideo.org/main/blog/2009/04/22/vizrt-stats-bring-the-cnn-hologram-to-nab-floor/. 
41 For an account of the demonstrations and ESPN’s plans for using the new technology, see Glen Dickson, 
“ESPN Shows Hologram Technology,” Broadcasting & Cable, Aug. 27, 2009, 
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/329132-ESPN_Shows_Hologram_Technology.php. A clip of the 
hologram in action is online at: http://www.broadcastingcable.com/video/WEB_VIDEO/2925-
ESPN_Gets_Holographic.php.  The August 2009 ESPN announcement included a promise to employ the 
technology on air in 2010. Veteran anchor Chris Berman and Chuck Pagano, the executive vice president 
for technology, sat together in a room chatting, each dressed in khaki slacks, dark blazers, and open-necked 
shirts. Then like something out of Star Trek, a blur appeared between then and turned into a life-like 
apparition – Bob Ley, another veteran anchor, similarly attired. He joined in the conversation, gesturing 
and addressing the men to his right and his left as if he were there. And they reciprocated.  “It’s scary 
realistic, isn’t it?” said the beamed-in commentator.  Berman, briefly sounding the Luddite, confessed to 
being less than a complete fan of some of the high-tech wizardry employed in the network’s pre-game 
shows during football season. But this new development, he said, shaking his head and casting around for 
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Logistical Challenges and the Locus of Innovation 
I do not mean to suggest here that nothing has changed since 1952, or 1852.  
Certainly, computers became integral components not only of election night’s 
showmanship but of its journalism.  And computer analysis did come to have a place in 
the newsroom, slowly, for other stories. In some cases, this came through continued 
mining of voting data after an election was over. In 1962, for example, the New York 
Times used a combination of computer-generated election-night data and demographic 
data for stories written over several days on the meaning of the vote.42 Several pioneering 
projects in the late 1960s and early 1970s dealt with hot-button issues of race and crime: 
a survey to help understand the 1967 riots in Detroit; a study of courts and crime in 
Miami; an exploration of criminal activity and police effectiveness in various parts of 
New York City; revelations of discrimination in Philadelphia’s criminal justice system; 
and an expose of heroin trafficking in Delaware.43 There were efforts to spread the word 
and to provide means for journalists to support each other in making a place for computer 
analysis in the newsroom. During and after the 1970s, Philip Meyer, the reporter who led 
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the initiative for 1967 computer-aided survey analysis in Detroit and later worked on 
other projects, became an advocate for “precision journalism” – the application of 
empirical social science methods to journalism, including computer analysis.44  During 
and after the 1980s, Elliot Jaspin became a leading advocate for what he named 
“computer-assisted reporting,” which he had practiced at the Providence Journal and 
then went on teach at a center he was instrumental in creating at the University of 
Missouri.45 In turn, that center, now known as the National Institute for Computer-
Assisted Reporting, has served over the past two decades as hub for the mutual support of 
journalists interested in these practices.  
The increase of computer analysis in newsrooms beyond election night 
applications certainly coincided with the diffusion of different sorts of computers than 
those available in 1952, including computers and expertise acquired by news 
organizations for other day-to-day business and production tasks, and, eventually the 
installation of personal computers at reporters’ and editors’ desks.46 The spread of 
computer analysis also certainly coincided with governments’ increasing computerization 
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of public records – the bread and butter of computer-assisted reporting. And all of this 
came at a time when the circulation of print media was facing increasing competition 
from broadcast and then cable television, providing fertile ground for experiments of all 
sorts.47 
The wider use of easier-to-operate computer technology, the greater availability 
of digital data, and other contingencies of the latter years of the 20th century raise a 
question to which I alluded at the start of this dissertation. Could the limited number of 
instances of journalistic computer-use beyond election night for so many years 
immediately after 1952 have been otherwise? Was it merely the logistical and 
technological challenges associated with computing that explain in large part this very 
limited use for so long? Before undertaking this study, I assumed this was the case.  Now 
I am suspicious of that assumption.  For one thing, the use of computers for analysis of 
election results in 1952 and thereafter involved marshalling an extraordinary array of 
resources to gather and process the vote in real time under extremely tight deadlines. The 
technical and logistical challenges could be overcome – as could the challenges of 
bringing a new technology into a field not universally inclined to see it as appropriate. 
Another way of thinking about the question is to look at what was going on in other areas 
of endeavor.  To do that in a rigorous way is beyond the scope of this dissertation. But it 
is worth pausing here to consider some intriguing juxtapositions and unlikely 
applications. 
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In 1964, Prentice-Hall published Depth Reporting: An Approach to Journalism. 
The author, Neale Copple, a former journalist and Pulitzer-Prize nominee, was an 
associate professor of journalism and would soon go on to head the journalism program 
at the University of Nebraska.  Arguing that beneath-the-surface reporting got more lip 
service than application, Copple urged reporters to dig into the events and institutions 
they were covering. He also urged them to learn something about computers, but not 
because of any perceived usefulness for computers in depth reporting. He deemed that a 
remote possibility. Rather, he argued that journalists should know about computers 
because computers were changing the world around them. A dozen years after the 1952 
election, here was the author of a textbook about empirical journalism still not seeing 
much use for computers in journalism beyond election night. He even reveled in standing 
apart from this tool as one applicable to his field. On the one hand, he noted that 
television had done a better job than newspapers at dispelling the “modern myth” that the 
computer “is an awesome, almost mystical modern monster,” and he cited the computer’s 
use on television for “such special occasions as national elections.” 48  But he also noted 
that “the infernal machine has misinterpreted a time or two, which delighted those of us 
not ready for the wheel…”49 
While Copple was not pushing computers for the kind of in-depth reporting he 
was advocating, computers by then had already found a home across a wide swath of 
American life. Three years earlier, in 1961, the periodical Computers and Automation 
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had published a list of more than 500 areas of application for computers.50 Election return 
analysis was one of them, as were applications in fields populated by professionals who 
might have been as protective of their analytical turf as journalists – those engaged in 
medical diagnosis, legal analysis, and information retrieval, an activity in which the 
perceived competition between humans and computers had been highlighted by a 1957 
movie, the comedy Desk Set.51 
Analysis of documents was another such area of knowledge work not so far afield 
from some journalistic activities. Perhaps one of the more surprising juxtapositions of the 
1950s was that of computing and Bible studies. In 1956, Popular Science reported on the 
use of a UNIVAC to produce a concordance of the Bible – a list of each key word, its 
location (by book, chapter, and verse), and the phrase or phrases in which it appeared. 
The article ran under this attention-getting teaser: “Teaching their giant electronic moron 
a special numbers game, engineers beat the time of scholars by more than 20 years.” 52 
Popular Science noted that the idea had come from a divinity student at Harvard, who, 
after watching scholars try to sort and compare Biblical words by hand, wrote a letter to 
Remington Rand, setting in motion a project that took months of work to complete. 
Published the next year by Thomas Nelson and Sons, the concordance drew this praise 
from a reviewer in the Journal of Bible and Religion:  Despite a few minor omissions, 
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“Biblical scholarship has reason to be grateful to Mr. Ellison, the technicians at 
Remington Rand, Inc., and the publishers for this handsome volume.”53 
Football offered another example of computers turning up outside the more likely 
domains of business, science, and engineering.  In 1959, The New York Times reported on 
innovative uses of technology being put to work to analyze and direct the game, starting 
in the professional teams and filtering down to colleges and even high schools.54  These 
technologies included “picture-in-a-minute” Polaroid cameras, closed-circuit television, 
helmets with radio receivers – and computers: 
At Princeton and Rutgers, the clatter of electronic computers is as 
much a sound of football as the thud of cleat against pigskin.  At each 
game, statisticians in the grandstand make play-by-play notations which 
the coaches later correlate with movies of the game.  The results are fed 
into a computer, and out comes a thirty-seven-page statistical abstract of 
the game which the coaches peruse before planning next Saturday’s 
campaign.55 
Beyond the hardware and programs, the integration of computers and football extended 
even into the sport’s rich metaphorical terrain. With strategy grown more complex and 
the playbook more voluminous, Weeb Ewbank, in the midst of his second championship 
season in a row coaching the Baltimore Colts, referred to his equally legendary 
quarterback, Johnny Unitas, as “my crewcut little I.B.M. machine,” meant to be a 
compliment.56 
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Venturing even farther into the most unlikely of places – certainly not included in 
Eckert and Mauchly’s 1946 list of potential applications – computers appeared at the 
intersection of romance and show business as early as 1956. That fall, Art Linkletter, the 
stunt-loving host of a popular television show, People are Funny, reportedly read that 
millions of people belonged to “lonely-hearts clubs.”57 He ran newspaper ads seeking 
adults looking for mates, got thousands of replies, called upon an expert in family 
relations to draw up a questionnaire, and enlisted Remington Rand and one of its 
UNIVAC computers to work through the answers.  The end result played out on 
Linkletter’s show as a 28-year-old man who worked in advertising and a 23-year-old 
receptionist were introduced, hit it off, and announced their engagement within weeks, 
during which they appeared on the show several more times. The staff at Time magazine 
couldn’t resist a dig in an article that ran shortly after the fall elections, declaring 
UNIVAC “a better matchmaker than oddsmaker,” with the stunt “a clear-cut victory for 
Univac, hormones and Trendex,” a reference to the show’s ratings.58 Linkletter promised 
the couple a honeymoon in Paris, but this was not to be. They broke off their 
engagement, were later reported to be attempting a reunion – heralded in an Associated 
Press item that ran on the front page of at least one newspaper – and finally split for 
good. One response appeared in a light-hearted editorial in an Indiana newspaper. It 
poked fun at the computer’s lack of “complete infallibility,” adding that among the 
morals of the story, “Univac has learned to stick to easy simple things like predicting 
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elections.”59  Still, computers did not disappear from the realm of romance, though they 
were not universally applauded in that role.  By the mid 1960s, there were reports of 
dozens of “computer courtship services,” according to one newspaper account, despite 
the warnings of “social commentators who fear the transmutation of the human race by 
the machine – specifically the computer.”60  
These examples of early computer use overcame the logistical obstacles of the era 
with sufficient organizational interest, leading here to an observation about an important 
aspect of election night 1952 that might be easily overlooked – and might provide us with 
a tool for thinking about subsequent applications of computers in the newsroom. When 
computers arrived on the scene in the early 1950s, they did not have an automatic 
trajectory into the newsroom.  They did, however, offer a choice.  But to act on that 
choice required what might be called “buy-in” from a whole host of actors, ranging from 
key figures in the chain of command to those at lower levels who would be involved in 
carrying out the work.  Such buy-in, in the case of elections, was facilitated by the 
opportunity to address a matter of great public interest, which, in turn, promised 
“eyeballs,” to use the current phrase. And it might not be a coincidence that beyond 
elections, the hot-button issues of race and crime provided subjects for a number of 
important early stories built on computer analysis. When desktop computers arrived in 
the newsroom, their availability also did not automatically ensure that journalists would 
use them in analytical ways for reporting.  But what this modification, simplification, and 
spread of computing technology over time did make possible was opportunity, a chance 
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for reporters who were so inclined to experiment, to go out and learn what they needed to 
know in order to do this work themselves. Like-minded journalists also organized 
themselves beyond company lines to form national trade organizations for mutual 
support, the most enduring of these being Investigative Reporters and Editors and its 
affiliate, the National Institute for Computer-Assisted Reporting.  It was not merely that 
changes in computers had made new iterations of this technology cheaper and more 
accessible and easier to use, but that those things had allowed for levels of 
experimentation which did not require buy-in from the top levels of a news organization 
and from across boundaries to the inventors and purveyors of computing technology.  
 
To bring this dissertation back to a point raised at the outset – the tendency of the 
arrival of computing in journalism to be portrayed as revolutionary by some and yet to be 
greeted by others with skepticism about its utility for news reporting and analysis – I 
have emphasized the importance of what I have called cultural continuity in both of these 
responses. I have suggested that this innovation could be entertained as a change in the 
election-night mix precisely because that change could be built on a solid base of cultural 
continuity.  Here was new technology extending existing practices and values in election-
night journalism.  
This concept runs counter to one common way of talking about new technology 
that was discussed in Chapter 1 – that new technology arrives as a juggernaut which rolls 
through our lives and changes everything in its path, demanding that we conform.  Extant 
practices and values are also powerful and must not be forgotten in understanding the 




with findings from studies of other arenas for new technology, including the telephone, 
machine-like musical instruments, and newspapers’ early experiments with online 
editions. In his study of the diffusion of the telephone up to 1940, Claude Fischer found 
that this modern technology did not lead to alienation and the breakdown of 
relationships.61 Rather, groups that the technology’s promoters had originally overlooked 
or dismissed – including women and farm families – sought out telephone service to 
reinforce social relationships.  “We might consider a technology, such as the telephone, 
not as a force impelling ‘modernity,’ ” he concluded, “but as a tool modern people have 
used to various ends, including perhaps the maintenance, even enhancement, of past 
practices.”62  In a study of the reception of new technology in music, from player pianos 
to synthesizers, Trevor Pinch and Karin Bijsterveld concluded by remarking on “the 
presence of stability in the midst of change.” 63 This includes the continuing importance 
of personal achievement and virtuosity in composition and live performance even with 
the arrival of machine-like instruments. “New instruments are important, because they 
allow people to do new things in new ways,” wrote Pinch and Bijsterveld.64 “But 
acceptance seems to depend on an alignment between old values and new practices.  Old 
norms and values, it seems, die hard.”65 These findings resonate, too, with Pablo 
Boczkowski’s study of innovation in online newspapers. Rather than focus, as is 
commonly done, on revolutionary effects of new technology in journalism, he suggested 
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that what are often overlooked are “the more evolutionary ways in which people often 
incorporate new artifacts in their lives.” 66  The appearance of the new media he studied 
was characterized, he wrote, by the “merging of existing social and material 
infrastructures with novel technical capabilities.”67   
In the end, election night, too, is a place of intersections. There are intersecting 
interests in the outcome – the voting public is interested, of course, but there are others, 
from bookies interested in profits to scholars interested in the adequacy of their statistical 
modeling. And there are intersecting interests in getting the job done and getting 
attention, as we have seen in the alliances of journalists and technologists. This is 
evidence of what can happen – resistance that can be overcome and experiments in 
change that can be made consistent with existing values – when conditions prompt 
collaborations in unexpected ways and by unexpected allies.  Today, purveyors of news 
are trying to maintain their standing with the news-consuming public even as new players 
scramble for a foothold in a media landscape full of novel gadgets and applications. The 
lessons of 1952 are worth bearing in mind.  Here was neither necessity as the mother of 
invention nor invention as the mother of necessity.  Rather, the computer, a new 
technology developed with one set of uses in mind, was tried out by journalists not to 
make radical changes in election night, but to help achieve the varied goals of election-
night journalism, from gathering the news to attracting an audience.  
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This case study has chronicled the circumstances under which a new technology 
was employed by a relatively new form of the news media. On election night 1952, the 
computer was deployed not so much to revolutionize news reporting as to capture public 
attention. It functioned in line with existing values and practices of election-night news 
reporting. In this important instance, therefore, the new technology’s technical features 
were less a driving force for adoption than its usefulness as a wonder and as a symbol to 
enhance the prestige of its adopters. This suggests that a new technology’s capacity to 
provide both technical and symbolic social utility can be key to its chances for adoption 
by the news media. 
On one level, the appearance and operations of election night would change over 
time, even as the computer itself would go from being a curiosity to a necessity.   But on 
another level, the election-night engagement with computers has been consistent with old 
aspirations – the desire to be seen as the first to tell an important story, the desire to be 
seen as the first with something new. We should not be too surprised at this application of 
new technology to old aspirations. Long before the personal home page, Americans kept 
scrapbooks that they circulated among family and friends.68 The telephone became a new 
means to an ancient end, socializing.69 Before ubiquitous, Internet-enabled, news-
disseminating devices, there was portable radio. And before the online free-for-all in 
which it is said that anyone can now be a journalist, there were successive waves of other 
radio technologies and systems – wireless, shortwave, and Citizen’s Band among them – 
that allowed the spread of information and opinion by “amateurs” without the mediation 
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of news organizations. If we are inclined to think that everything changes when an 
innovation comes along at the intersection of news, technology, and culture, we run the 
risk of misunderstanding what is changing – and what is not.  
Epilogue 
Forty eight years after election night 1952, and just two years before the subject 
of this dissertation first grabbed my attention, William Burkhart, the inventor who played 
a pivotal role in the development of the Monrobot, passed away after a long illness.  
Before he passed away, he had been drafting a series of autobiographical sketches.  He 
talked about his childhood, his war years, his business endeavors, and his personal 
philosophy.  I had a chance to see these writings when I flew across country to meet his 
wife, Dorothy, and examine her husband’s papers. I was eager to know what he might 
have said in them about that election night in 1952. But nowhere was it mentioned.  The 
only related artifact among his files was a Newsweek magazine from November 1952. It 
included an article citing him and noting his role in connection with the Monrobot used 
on NBC.70  I wondered whether he had realized back in 1952 that he was doing 
something of historic significance. I talked this over with Dorothy, and she suggested that 
before I return home, I pay a visit to Monroe and Frederica Postman.71  They had been 
friends of the Burkharts since the 1950s, and the two men had worked together. Perhaps 
the Postmans could help me learn more about how Burkhart saw his involvement with 
election-night forecasting for NBC in 1952.  They lived nearby, and I stopped in to see 
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them: a lively, sharp, and active couple. Monroe Postman had come to work with Bill 
Burkhart at the Monroe Calculating Machine Company in New Jersey in 1954. I was 
hopeful for what the couple might remember of what Burkhart might have told them 
about election night 1952.  I asked, but my question was met by puzzled silence. I 
showed them photographs.  They were astonished.  Their reaction spoke volumes.  They 
had no recollection of Burkhart ever talking about the events of that night. 72 Burkhart 
had taken part in a sentinel and seminal episode at the dawn of the computer age, but its 
significance, perhaps, was not something he could see in real time. 
I was saddened that I had missed by just a few years the chance to talk with him. 
But one of the real pleasures of this project was getting to meet and hear about 
individuals who are not common names in the history books of journalism or technology 
but played important roles in the events I have described. One of these was Max 
Woodbury, the mathematician who worked out the election-night formulas for the 
UNIVAC in 1952.  I got to spend a pleasant day with him in Birmingham, Alabama.73 
Another was Stephen Wright, the engineer overseeing a team that converted Woodbury’s 
ideas into a program that would process the data as it came in on election night and 
generate forecasts. He graciously allowed me to spend a day with him at his home outside 
Philadelphia. 74  Several months later, he sent me an announcement by e-mail.75  There 
was to be a ceremony dedicating a historical marker in front of 3747 Ridge Avenue in 
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Philadelphia, the site of the former Eckert-Mauchly plant and a landmark of the early 
computer age.  
When I arrived on the appointed day in the early fall of 2006, a large canvass tent 
had been set up in a lot adjacent to the building. About 150 people had gathered, 
including Woodbury, who traveled from Alabama for the event.  The “pioneers,” men 
and women who had worked with Eckert and Mauchly, wore name tags noting their 
roles.  After the ceremony began, one of the speakers asked these pioneers to stand.  
Dozens rose to their feet, some more slowly than others, and they received a hearty 
ovation. Letters were read – among them messages from Sen. Arlen Specter and Gov. Ed 
Rendell. And there were speeches, including one by Wright.  He began by quoting two 
lines from William Wordsworth’s poem about the French Revolution:  
Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive, 
But to be young was very heaven! 76 
“To those of us who were here at the dawn of the computer revolution,” Wright 
explained, those words recall “the enthusiasm with which we took part in it. We came to 
work each day with a sense of joy in exploring the challenges of this undiscovered 
world.”77 He talked about the preparations for that election night in 1952. His engaging 
account was met with laughs and knowing nods – and, as I scanned the faces of the 
audience, admiration.  Wright said that after that first contest between Eisenhower and 
Stevenson, he continued to work on election-night computing projects through 1964. 
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“But,” he added, “I don’t think anything will ever match the thrill of that night in 
1952.”78 
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